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THE MÀR2HALL MISSION: ITS IMPACT UPON AMERICAN
FOREIGN POUCI TOWARD CHINA, 1943-1949
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
T rad itio n a l Po licy  o f  the  United S ta te s  
The t r a d i t io n a l  po licy  o f th e  United S ta te s  toward China was
based on two p r in c ip le s—the  eq u a lity  o f commercial opportunity  in  China 
and th e  p reserv a tio n  o f  the  t e r r i t o r i a l  and ad m in istra tiv e  in te g r i ty  o f 
China. These b asic  e s se n tia ls  o f  th e  American course o f  ac tion  were d e v ^ -  
oped between th e  years 1844-1900. As e v a its  o f  th e  tw o itie th  c a itu iy  f re ­
quently  required  a c la r i f ic a t io n  o f  th ese  two p r in c ip le s , the  po licy  o f 
th e  United S ta te s  toward China must f i r s t  be considered in  th e  l i ^ t  o f 
circum stances confron ting  these  two na tions a t  th e  time o f the  p o l ic y 's  
o r ig in . This in tro d u c to ry  sec tio n , tlie re fo re , w il l  be p a r t ia l ly  devoted
to  b r ie f  examinations o f :  (1) two problems confronting China during the
n ineteen th  century , and (2) th e  c rea tio n  o f American p o lic y  toward China
during th e  same century  in  the  l ig h t  o f  ac tio n s  o f  American c it iz e n s  in  
China and the  r e la t io n s  o f fo reign  powers with China. The remaining p re f­
a to ry  pages w il l  tr a c e  th e  development o f United S ta te s  po licy  toward 
China from 1900 to  1941.
One o f  C hina 's o ld  and deep-rooted problems was i t s  in te rn a l  p o l i t ­
i c a l  weakness. The Chinese Etapire was n e ith e r  strong nor u n ified  nationally .
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C hina's n a tiô n a l p o l i t i c a l  weakness was in d ica ted  by the  c i t iz e n s '
re je c tio n  o f lo y a lty  to  the  s ta te  while accep ting  in d iv id u a l lo y a lty  to 
th e  Manchu Bnperor. The growth o f n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  u n ity  was fu r th e r  
re ta rd ed  by th e  Ehiperor's p u rsu it o f h is  functions on a u n iv ersa l ra th e r  
than on a n a tio n a l le v e l.  In  ad d itio n , strong and am bitious warlords pro­
moted reg ional u n ity . The development o f  nationalism  was a lso  impeded by 
th e  low standards o f l iv in g , lin g u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and the emphasis on 
f i l i a l  obedience.
Another problem confronting  China during th e  n ineteen th  century 
was th e  in te rn a tio n a l r iv a l r ie s  fo r  in fluence  in  China. Chinese d isu n ity  
made i t  im possible to  prevent the  g ran ting  o f concessions demanded by the  
fo re ig n  powers. These demands took th e  form o f  spheres o f in flu en ce , le a se ­
h o ld s, fo reign  se ttlem en ts , eq u a lity  o f  commercial opportun ity , and ex tra ­
t e r r i t o r i a l  r ig h ts .  N evertheless, th e  Chinese r e s is te d  by try in g  to  absorb 
th e  invaders, accep ting  some o f  th e  ag g resso rs ' methods and re je c tin g  th e i r  
va lu es, xenophobia, occasional re b e llio n s , and war.
The i n i t i a l  in te r e s ts  o f  Americans in  China were confined to  the
a c t iv i t i e s  o f American merchants and m issio n aries . American commercial 
in te r e s t s  sought th e  e q u a lity  o f  trad in g  r ig h ts  in  China with t h e i r  non- 
Chinese com petitors. Toward th e  end o f  th e  n ineteen th  century , however, 
American tra d e rs  re a liz e d  th a t  t h e i r  claim s fo r  eq u a lity  o f trad in g  r ig h ts  
were jeopardized by fo re ign  demands o f  China fo r  spheres o f in fluence , 
demands th a t  m l ^ t  lead  to  war. The consequaices o f  war among th e  Great
Powers and between the  Great Powers and China mig^t be a lo s s  o f trad in g  
r i ^ t s .  T herefore, th e  Americans s tro n g ly  opposed th e  d iv is io n  o f  China
in to  spheres o f  in te r e s t .  The m issionary element supported th e  American 
a itrep ren eu rs  on th e  b a s is  th a t  peacefu l conditions were b est su ited  to
3
th e i r  C h ris tian  and hum anitarian o b jec tiv e s .
The form ation o f  t r a d i t io n a l  American po licy  toward China was 
influenced by th e  in te r e s ts  o f American m erchants and m issio n aries . Policy­
making o f f i c i a l s  a lso  took cognizance o f C hina's in te rn a l p o l i t i c a l  weak­
ness and o f th e  demands made o f China by fo re ig n  powers. C reation o f 
United S ta te s  po licy  was influenced  to  a g rea t ex ten t by ac tio n s  o f  the  
B ritish  and th e  F raich . The United S ta tes  had a weak navy and had no naval 
bases in  A s ia tic  w aters u n t i l  1898. I t  was, th e re fo re , to  th e  advantage 
o f the  American Republic to  l e t  Great B rita in  and France p ressu re  China to  
open Chinese p o rts  to  B ritish  and French n a tio n a ls . A lth o u ^  th e  American 
Government d id  not use aimed fo rce  ag a in st China, the  United S ta te s  d id
take advantage o f  coercive measures ag a in st China by Great B rita in  in  th e  
Opium War and by Great B rita in  and France in  1858 to  form th e  foundations
of i t s  (American) p o licy  toward th e  Oiinese Bnpire.
One o f  th e  h is to r ic  p r in c ip le s  o f th a t  po licy—th e  eq u a lity  o f
commercial opportunity--w as provided fo r  by th e  m ost-favored-nation c lauses 
in  th e  T reaty o f  W an^ia on Ju ly  3, 1844, and th e  Treaty o f T ia its in  on 
June 18, 1858.^  The United S ta te s  la id  down a second e s se n tia l  o f  i t s  
po licy  in  1899 to  f o r e s ta l l  th e  d iv is io n  o f China in to  spheres o f  in te r e s t
by the  Great Powers. Secretary  o f  S ta te  John Hay sen t a no te  to  th e  B ritish  
Government, and o th e r  s ta te s ,  \diich s tip u la te d  th a t  h is  government would 
"in  no way commit i t s e l f  to  a recogn ition  o f  exclusive r ig h ts  o f any power 
w ithin o r  co n tro l over any po rtion  o f  th e  Chinese Hnpire. • He fu r th e r  urged
^Taken from e x tra c ts  o f  th ese  t r e a t i e s  found in  U. S ., D^iartment 
o f S ta te , United S ta te s  R elations with China: w ith Special Reference to
the  Period 1944-1949. Dqaartment o f  S ta te  P ub lica tion  3573. Far Eastern 
Series 30 (W à sh in ^ n : Ü. S. Government P rin tin g  O ffice , 1949), Annexes 1
and 2, p . 413. C ited h e re a f te r  as S ta te  Departm ait, U. S. R elations with 
China.
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th e  B ritish  not to  in te r f e re  "with any t r e a ty  p o rt o r any vested  in te r e s t  
w ith in  any so -c a lled  'sphere  o f  i n t e r e s t '  o r  leased  t e r r i to r y ,"  and to  per­
m it th e  Chinese Goverment to  c o lle c t  t a r i f f  d u tie s  in  B r i ta in 's  sphere.
The Secretary  p ressed  B rita in  to  seek no p re fe re n t ia l  t a r i f f s ,  harbor dues, 
o r ra i lro a d  f r e i ^ t  ra te s  fo r  i t s  c it iz e n s  in  th e  B ritish  sphere o f  i n t e r ­
e s t .  ̂
The opportun ity  to  add to  th e  Open Door p o licy  was provided by 
th e  Boxer R ebellion in  19OO. This a n ti- fo re ig n , a n ti-C h r is tia n  u p ris in g  in  
China had re su lte d  in  a jo in t  expeditionary  fo rce  o f twelve n a tio n s  to  
re lie v e  the  le g a tio n s  in  Peking. The United S ta te s  Oove’Tanent, a p a r t ic ip a n t 
in  th e  expedition , feared  th a t  th e  o th e r na tio n s might make a d d itio n a l 
demands upon China, and S ecre tary  nay sen t id e n t ic a l  notes to  th e  in te r ­
vening powers on Ju ly  3. 1900. Though p ro tec tio n  fo r  American economic 
r ig h ts  was again supported, th e  p reserv a tio n  o f "Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l  and 
ad m in istra tiv e  e n t i ty ” was advanced fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e as a p a r t  o f  United 
S ta te s  p o licy .^
Subsequent ac tio n s  o f  th e  United S ta te s  have re s ted  on th ese  two 
p r in c ip le s  o f th e  e q u a lity  o f commercial opportun ity  in  China and th e  p res­
e rva tion  o f Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l  and ad m in istra tiv e  e n ti ty .  L ater c la r i ­
f ic a tio n s  came in  th e  form o f diplom atic no tes , m in is te r ia l  agreements, and 
t r e a t i e s .  For example, Russia sought "exclusive mining o r railw ay p r iv i­
leges and commercial monopolies" in  Manchuria. The S ta te  Department 
reminded the  Russian Govemnent and th e  o th e r Powers on February 1, 1902,
^ Ib id . . Annex 4, pp. 414-16. S im ilar notes were sen t to  th e  
governsents o f  Pm nce, Germany, I t a ly ,  Russia and Japan.
3l b i d . . Annex 5. pp. 416-17; Notes were sen t to  Germany, fYance, 
Great B rita in , I t a ly ,  Russia, A u stria , Belgium, Spain, Japan, The Nether­
lands and P ortugal.
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th a t  the  g ran ting  of such p r iv ile g e s  and monopolies would v io la te  th e  C^en 
Door d o c tr in e .^  An in te rp re ta t io n  o f 1914 was th a t  Vforld War I  should no t 
be used as a p re te x t fo r  spreading the  h o s t i l i t i e s  to  Chinese te r r i to ry *
I t  was* however, in  r e la t io n  to  Jap an 's  hegemony in  th e  Far East 
th a t  th e  need fo r  continuous c la i i f i c a t io n  o f  American po licy  became ev iden t. 
Events in d ica ted  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  would have to  make ad ju stm aits  in  
i t s  po licy  o r  openly r e s i s t  aggressive Japanese measures in  Korea, Man­
c h u ria , and China proper. The Korean is su e  was reso lved  by th e  T aft-  
K atsura Memorandum o f July; 1905.5 £y th e  terms o f  t h i s  agreement Japan 
s ta te d  th a t  i t  had no aggressive in te n tio n s  toward th e  P h ilip p in e  Is la n d s , 
and th e  United S ta te s  assen ted  to  Jap an 's  claim f o r  "suzerain ty" over 
Korea.
The Japanese demand fo r , and attainm ent o f , dominion over Korea
was a  v io la tio n  o f  th e  Open Door concept as extended to  a reas o th e r  than 
China. However, Japan a c c ^ te d  th e  Opw Door p o lic y , as app lied  to  China, 
a s  l a t e  as November 30, 1908, idien th e  United S ta te s  and Japan n ego tia ted  
th e  Root-Takahira Agreement. In  th i s  in s tan ce , th e  Japanese Oovemment 
agreed to  support th e  p r in c ip le s  "of equal opportun ity  f o r  commerce and 
in d u s try  in  China" and "the  independence and in te g r i ty  o f  China. This
concord was jeopard ized  in  1915 Jiqoan made demands o f  China Wiich, i f  
accepted, would have endangered th e  sovereignty  o f  China. S ecre tary  o f
S ta te  VfiLUiam Jennings Bryan reminded th e  Japanese Government on March 13, 
*̂Ibid . .  p . 3»
^The te x t  o f  th e  T aft-K atsura Memorandum i s  published in  ^ l e r  
D om ett, H oosev^t and th e  Russo-Japanese War: A C r i t ic a l  Study o f  Ameri­
can Policy  in  E àstem  Asia in  1902-05. Based P rim arily  upon th e  P riv a te  
Papers o f Theodore Roosevelt (Hew York; Doubledav. Page and Co.. 1925;. 
pp. 112-14.
% ext o f  Agreement. Ib id . . Annex 9, pp. 427-28.
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1915» th a t  the  Twenty-One Demands by Japan would im peril the  independence, 
in te g r i ty ,  and commercial freedom o f China* S ecre tary  Bryan s ta te d  in  
another no te  on May 11, 1915» th a t  th e  United S ta te s  could not recognize 
any agreement between Japan and China idiich was no t in  accord with h is  
e a r l ie r  correspondence* Bryan m odified th e  p o licy  o f  th e  United S ta te s , 
however, when he adm itted th a t  " t e r r i t o r i a l  con tigu ity*  created  "sp e c ia l 
re la tio n s"  between Japan and Siantung, South Manchuria, and East Mongolia.^ 
Secretary  o f  S ta te  Itobert Tnnaing acknowledged h i s  predecessor* s view in  
th e  L an sin g -Ish ii Agreement with Japan on November 2, 1917* This docu­
ment provided th a t  " t e r r i t o r i a l  prop inquity  c re a te s  sp e c ia l re la tio n s  b ^  
tween co u n tries , and, • • • th e  Goverment o f th e  United S ta te s  recognizes 
th a t  Japan has sp e c ia l in te r e s ts  i n  China, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  the  p a r t  to
O
idiich h e r possessions a re  contiguous. " Although i t  may be held  th a t  th e  
United S ta te s  had made i t s  p o s itio n  c le a r , i t  should be remembered th a t  
n e ith e r  Secre tary  Bryan nor S ecre tary  Lansing expressly  defined th e  " sp ec ia l 
re la tio n s"  ih ic h  " t e r r i t o r i a l  con tig u ity "  and " t e r r i t o r i a l  propinquity" 
c rea ted  between c o u n trie s . The u n c e rta in ty  c rea ted  by these  phrases was 
d isp e lle d  in  1922. For in  th is  y ea r, fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e, th e  two p r in ­
c ip le s  o f  th e  p o licy  o f  th e  United S ta te s  were incorpora ted  in  t r e a ty  form 
[The Nine-Power Treaty) and signed by th e  rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f  e ig h t n a tio n a l 
s ta te s ,  includ ing  Japan.^
^Secretary  B ryan 's communications a re  found in  Ib id . .  Annexes 11 
and 12, pp. 430-37*
®Text o f  Agreement. Ib id . .  Annex 13, pp. 437-58.
^Text o f  T reaty  i s  found in  I b id . . Annex 14, pp. 438-42. The 
s ig n a to rie s  o f  th e  Nin»-Power T reaty , i n  ad d itio n  to  the  United S ta te s  
and Japan, ware Belgium, the  B r itish  Bnpire, China, France, I t a ly ,  The 
N etherlands, and P ortugal.
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Beginning in  1931 and continuing a t  an increased  pace a f t e r  1937,
th e  po licy  o f  th e  United S ta tes  toward China became p rim arily  a reac tio n
to  Japanese measures. The S ta te  Department a sse rte d  th a t  the  Japanese
invasion  o f Mancliuria on September 19, 1933. was a v io la tio n  o f Jap an 's
t r e a ty  o b lig a tio n s  under the  Nine-Power Treaty and th e  Kellogg-Briand
Pact.^^  When i t  became evident th a t  Japan d id  no t in tend  to  withdraw her
troops from Manchuria, Secretary  o f S ta te  Stimson proclaimed th e  d o c trin e
o f  non-recognition  in  no tes to  Japan and China on January 7, 1932» The
S ecre tary  held  th a t  th e  American Government :
. . .  cannot admit th e  le g a l i ty  o f any s i tu a tio n  de facto  nor does 
i t  in tend  to  recognize any t r e a ty  o r  agreements en tered  in to  between 
those Govemmmts, . . .  which may im pair th e  t r e a ty  r ig h ts  o f  the
l^S ec re ta ry  o f  S ta te  Stimson in d ica ted  to  th e  S e c re ta r ia t  o f  the  
League o f  Nations as e a rly  as Sept. 21 th a t  th e  United S ta te s  was studying 
th e  m ili ta ry  a c tio n  in  Manchuria to  determine whether Japan had v io la te d  
p rov isions o f  th e  Nine-Power T reaty  and th e  Kellogg-Briand Pact. On Nov.
19 he to ld  th e  Japanese Ambassador to  th e  United S ta te s  th a t  th e  Japanese 
army was v io la tin g  th e  terms o f  th ese  two t r e a t i e s .  The view o f  th e  S ta te  
Department was th a t  th e  Japanese m ili ta ry  had ac ted  w ithout the  siq^port o f 
c iv i l  government a u th o r i t ie s ,  and th a t  th e  United S ta te s  should encourage 
th e  Japanese government "to solve th e  problem o f  co n tro llin g  th e  Japanese 
army*" Henry L. Stimson, The Par Eastern C r is is ;  R ecollections and 
Observations (3rd ed. ; New York: Harper and Bros. Publishers, 193^1, pp. 
31-84. The Uriited S ta te s  d id  n o t re ly  a lto g e th e r  upon u n i la te r a l  a c tio n , 
but th e re  has been su b s ta n tia l controversy over lA ether th e  United S ta te s  
supported th e  League o f  Nations to  the  ex ten t th a t  i t  should have. For 
example, G. Bernard Noble [Chief o f  th e  D ivision o f  H is to ric a l Po licy  
Research, O ffice  o f  Public A ffa irs , Department o f  S ta te )  contended th a t  
th e  advance o f  Japanese fo rces could have been stopped only by th e  "d ra s tic  
and rap id  ac tion" o f  th e  League "in  cooperation with th e  United S ta te s ."
The United S ta te s , he noted, was unw illing to  use th e  " th rea t o f  fo rce  . . . 
to  defend a system o f  r ig h ts  in  China which we had come to  regard as a 
v i t a l  aspect o f  American p o lic y ."  F urther, th e  American Government o r i ­
g in a lly  ob jected  to  th e  sending o f  an "on-the-spo t fa c t-fin d in g  commis­
sion" to  Manchuria by th e  League. The American Republic, although no t a 
member o f  th e  League o f  Nations, d id  appoint a rep re se n ta tiv e  to  th e  
League's ly tto n  Commission, but Noble dism issed th e  m ission as an in v e s t i ­
ga tion  o f  a s i tu a t io n  "some months a f t e r  th e  conquest had become a f a i t  
accom pli." U. S . ,  Department o f  S ta te , "American Policy  in  the  Far 
E as t,"  IV, No. 367 (Washington: U. S. Government P rin tin g  O ffice ,
Dec. 1 , 1946), 979-80.
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United S ta te s  o r  i t s  c i t i z m s  in  China, includ ing  those which 
r e la te  to  th e  sovereignty , th e  ind^endence , o r  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
and ad m in is tra tiv e  in te g r i ty  o f  th e  Republic o f  China, • • • o r  • • • 
th e  open door po licy  . . . .11
The p a tte rn , however, remained re la t iv e ly  unchanged: Japanese
ag ress ion , covert and open, and American p ro te s ts . The Secretary  o f S ta te , 
Cordell H ull, urged th a t  "governments and peoples must keep f a i th  in  p r in ­
c ip le s  and pledges . . .  [ th a t]  th e re  must be agreements and resp ec t fo r  
agreements in  o rd er th a t  th e re  may be th e  confidence and s t a b i l i ty  and 
sense o f se c u rity  which a re  e s s e n t ia l  to  o rderly  l i f e  and p r o g r e s s .  "12 This 
p lea  fo r  the  support o f  world public  opinion o f th e  American course and 
fo r  re je c tio n  o f  th a t  o f J ^ a n  d id  no t d e te r  th e  Japanese. Moral d is ­
approval, even though based on in te rn a tio n a l  law, was no more respected  
by Japan when voiced ty  th e  Ikiited S ta te s  than i t  had been when supported 
by th e  League o f  Nations in  1931. S ecre tary  Hull on Ju ly  l6 ,  1937, re ­
emphasized th e  seriousness o f  Japanese ac tio n s  in  China a f te r  th e  clash 
a t  Marco Polo Bridge on Ju ly  7, 1937, s ig n a lled  th e  beginning o f  an imde- 
c la re d  war between th e  two O rien ta l countides. P residen t Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt spoke out fo rc e fu lly  on October 5» 193% in  h is  famous "quarantine" 
speech. Noting th e  " th re a ta iin g  breakdown o f in te rn a tio n a l o rd er and law ," 
th e  P residen t l e f t  no doubt th a t  "the epidanic o f  world law lessness" would 
spread ju s t  as an "^ id em ic  o f  physica l d isease^" un less those "who want to  
l iv e  in  peace under law • • • f in d  a way to  make th e i r  w il l  p re v a il.
^ S t a t e  Department, U. S. R ela tions with China. Annex 17, pp. 440-41.
^^statem ent to  th e  Press on Dec. 5» 1933» The Memoirs o f  Cordell 
Ĥ GJ. (New lu rk : The Macmillan Co., 1948), I ,  446.
^3 ib id . . p . 545. On th e  day follow ing th e  P re s id e n t's  speech. 
Secre tary  Hull re leased  a  s ta tm e n t  to  th e  p ress  riftglartng th a t  J ^ a n e se  
a c tio n s  in  China v io la te d  th e  Nine-Power Treaty o f  1922 and th e  Kellogg- 
Briand Pact o f  Aug. 27, 1928.  A copy o f  th i s  p ress  re le a se  i s  found G  
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 20, p. 452.
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I t  vas a t  t h i s  in stanco , however, when the  United S ta te s  Government 
encountered opposition  on ano ther f ro n t .  The i s o la t io n is t  element a t  heme 
voiced strong opposition  to  th e  idea  o f  in te rn a tio n a l cooperation as the  
method to  be used in  quaran tin ing  aggresso rs. This reac tio n , Secretary  
Hull re c a lle d , "had th e  e ffe c t  o f  s e t t in g  back fo r  a t  l e a s t  s ix  months our 
constant educational campaign in tended to  c re a te  and strengthen public  
opinion toward in te rn a tio n a l  cooperation ."  This appearance o f a d ivided 
nation  a lso  had i t s  impact on th e  world sc a ie . Japanese ac tio n s became 
bo lder, and th e  European democracies wondered " i f  we could ever be with 
them in  more than words*
N evertheless, th e  United S ta te s  continued to  p ro te s t  Japanese 
tran sg ress io n s o f  th e  Open Door p o lic y  and o f  C hina's ad m in is tra tiv e  and 
t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty .  Japan p u b lic ly  re fu ted  th e  prem ise on idiich th e  
record was w ritte n , however, whai i t s  Foreign M in ister informed th e  Ameri­
can Ambassador, Jos^A  C. Grew, th a t  e a r l ie r  concepts and p r in c ip le s  were 
not app licab le  to  th e  c u r r a i t  conditions in  East Asia. The only b as is  
fo r  a la s t in g  peace in  th a t  a re a , th e  Foreign M in ister contended, was th e
"establishm ent o f  a  new order" by J a p a n .A m b a s s a d o r  Grew s te rn ly  denied 
Japanese o b jec tiv es  in  a note to  th a t  government's Foreign M in ister on
December 30, 1933. Japanese a u th o r i t ie s ,  th e  memorandum s ta te d , could 
not u n i la te r a l ly  abrogate t r e a ty  r ig h ts  o f  th e  United S ta te s  and i t s  c i t i ­
zens in  Qiina. Nor, i t  continued, was th e re  any "need o r  warrant fo r  any 
one Power to  tak e  upon i t s e l f  to  p re sc r ib e  what sh a ll  be th e  terms and
l^*HuU, pp. 545-46.
l^F or th e  te x t  o f  th i s  Japanese no te  o f  November 18, 1933, see 
S ta te  Departmait, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 22, pp. 456-59»
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conditions o f  a 'new o rd e r '"  in  C h i n a . L e s s  than two years l a t e r  th e  
Japanese e stab lish ed  a puppet government in  Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, 
and th e  United S ta te s  refused  to  recognize i t . ^7 Japan had thus ac ted  on 
i t s  concept o f th e  "new o rd e r ,"  and th e  United S ta te s  honored i t s  p o licy  
o f  long standing tqr re je c tin g  th e  leg itim acy  o f  th e  Japanese a c tio n .
I t  i s  wise to  remember a t  t h i s  p o in t, however, th a t  United S ta te s  
p o licy  d id  not a lto g e th e r  c o n s is t o f diplom atic p ro te s ts  to  Japan. Nor 
was th e  approach to  Japanese p o lic y  toward China as in d ire c t  as th e  fore* 
going might imply. F inancial and m ili ta ry  support were extended to  China, 
beginning in  193^.
F in an cia lly , th e  United S ta te s  en tered  in to  severa l agreements 
with China in  o rder to  improve th e  monetary and f in a n c ia l  cooperation o f
th e  two governments and to  s ta b i l i z e  th e  r a te  o f  exchange. In arrangements 
o f  Ju ly  14, 1937, and i ^ r i l  1, 1941, th e  United S ta te s  "agreed to  purchase
Chinese yuan up to  an amount equ ivalen t to  f i f t y  m illio n  d o lla rs , " a l ­
though the  1941 agreement d id  no t requ ire  such purchases to  be com pletely 
c o lla te ra l iz e d  by gold . The P residen t a lso  p laced  th e  a sse ts  o f China and 
Japan in  th e  United S ta te s  under th e  superv ision  o f  th e  Treasury Depart­
ment.^® In  ad d itio n , c re d i ts  to ta l in g  $18,900,000 were au thorized  by the  
Ejqport-Inport Bank in  1936 and 1 9 3 7 , and fo u r a d d itio n a l c re d its
^®Text o f Crew's n o te . lM d ._ Annex 23, pp. 460-62.
^?The Ihiited S ta te s  had recognized th e  Chinese Republic on May 2, 
1913, follow ing th e  re v o lt  a g a in st th e  Manchu dynasty, and was now sup­
po rting  th e  N ational Government o f  th e  Republic o f China under G eneralis­
simo Chiang Kai-shek which i t  (United S ta te s )  had recognized on Ju ly  25,
1928. IM d .. pp. 11- 12.
^® Ibid .. p . 31» The ac tio n  o f th e  P residen t w ith reference  to  
China was taken upon th e  request o f  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on th e  
assunqption th a t  th e  fo re ign  tra d e  and exchange p o s itio n  o f  th e  Chinese 
Government would be stren g th œ ed .
^ 9 l ^ . ,  p. 32.
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aggregating $120,000,000 were granted by the  Bank in  1938 and 1940 to  purchase
in d u s t r ia l  and a g r ic u ltu ra l  products and se rv ice s  o f  th e  United S t a l e s . ^0
M il i ta r i ly ,  pexnlssion was granted to  American p i lo ts  to  f i ^ t
fo r  China, and in  October, 1941, Chinese began a rr iv in g  in  the  United S ta te s
to  be tra in ed  as p i lo t s  and mechanics on th e  b a s is  o f  a recommendation by
th e  American Air Mission sen t to  China in  May, 1 9 4 1 .^  The "moral embargo"
on th e  shipment o f  a irp lan es  and a irp lan e  p a r ts  th a t  had been in  e f fe c t
since  the  middle o f  1938 was extended to  such item s as  o i l ,  scrap iro n ,
22machinery and machinery to o ls  a f t e r  January 26, 1940. M ateria l support 
was au thorized  lAen China was made e l ig ib le  fo r  len tU lease  a id  on May 6 ,
1941. The f i r s t  y e a r 's  shipments and se rv ices were a llo ca ted  p rim arily  
to  improving th e  Burma Boad ^  an a r te ry  fo r  g e ttin g  goods in to  China and 
to  provide th e  means o f  conveyance.
But n e ith e r  f in a n c ia l and m ili ta ry  a id  nor diplom atic support o r 
p ro te s ts  stopped th e  Japanese a t  t h i s  tim e. Under th e  cloak o f  feigned 
cooperation th e  Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, l a t e r  jo ined  by
^̂ ^Ibid. .  Annex IB5, p . 1044. The C red its  were advanced on Dec.
13. 1938 (#37000,000), Mar. 7 . 1940 ($20,000,000), Oct. 17, 1940 
($25,000,000), and Nov. 30, 1940 ($50, 000, 000) .  Of th e  grand t o t a l ,  
approxim ately $3. 000,000 went unspent.
^ I b i d . . pp. 28-29. The American p i lo t s  in  China were known as 
th e  American Volunteer Groiq), o r  "Flying T ig e rs ,"  and were commanded by 
Major General Claire L. Chunnault. The Group became a u n i t  o f  China* s 
aimed fo rces on Aug. 1, 1941, and was disbanded in  Ju ly , 1942, upon incoru 
p o ra tio n  in to  th e  United S ta te s  Tenth A ir Force.
^ Ib d d . .  p . 24. This a c tio n  followed U. S. n o t if ic a t io n  o f  Japan 
on Ju ly  26, 1939. th a t  i t  wished to  term inate  th e  T reaty o f Commerce and 
Navigation lAlch r ^ r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  th e  two co u n tries  had signed on Feb.
21, 1911.
^^ ib id . .  pp. 26.27.  C hina's e l i g i b i l i t y  was based on U. S. Con­
g re ss , An Act to  Promote th e  Defense o f  th e  United S ta te s . Public Law 11,
77th  Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1941. C ited h e re a f te r  a s  U. S .,  Cong., LencULease 
Act. 1941.
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Ambassador Saburo Kurusu, and S ecre tary  o f S ta te  Cordell H ull held  numerous 
conferences to  seek a modus vi vendi . The United S ta te s  continued to  
p ress  Japan fo r  observance o f the  p o licy  as re fe rre d  to  above, and specif­
i c a l ly  c a lle d  upon Japan to  withdraw i t s  fo rces  from China and to  support 
m i l i ta r i ly ,  p o l i t i c a l ly ,  and economically the  N ational Government o f th e  
Republic o f  China. The Japanese refused  and made th e i r  l a s t  proposals on 
November 20, 1941. The United S ta te s  rec ip roca ted  on November 26 and he ld  
f a s t  to  i t s  e a r l ie r  p ro p o sitio n s .^^  Although, as Secretary  Hull has s ta te d , 
th e  United S ta te s  had "threatened no one, invaded no one, and surrounded 
no one," and i t s  "peaceful and fr ie n d ly  processes" in d ic a te d  no "d es ire  
to  extend f ro n tie r s  o r  assume hegemony," these  n eg o tia tio n s  were te m in a te d  
by the  Japanese a tta c k  on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.26 United S ta te s  
po licy  now had to  be made in  re la tio n  to  a world-wide war.
R elations between Chines^ N a tio n a lis ts  
and ffhlnnnn 19SL-1944
The events o f  th e  years 1911-1949 rev ea l very c le a r ly  th e  r^ 'te r-  
n a l weakness o f China. From the  revo lu tion  in  1911 to  overthrow th e  Manchu 
dynasty u n t i l  th e  f a l l  o f  th e  Republic o f ChL^: in  1949, h e r  peoples saw 
attem pts by fou r d if f e re n t  groups to  become t h e i r  m aster. ̂  These fo u r—
24huU  noted th a t  "some fo r ty  to  f i f ty "  conversations were he ld  
between Mar. 8 and Dec. 7» 1941. H ull, I I ,  988.
25rhe te x t  o f th e  U. S. proposal fo r  an agreement i s  published in  
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 25, pp. 464-66.
26hu11. I I ,  983-84.
27F. F. Liu, an o f f ic e r  in  th e  Chinese N a tio n a lis t fo rces during 
World War H ,  s ta te d  th a t  "From 1911 to  1928 she (China) was in  th e  hands 
o f  th e  m i l i t a r i s t s .  From 1929 to  1938 she went through a period  o f  m il i ­
ta n t  na tio n a lism ."  A Military H isto ry  o f  Modem China. 1924-1949 (P rince­
ton : Princeton U n iversity  P ress, 1956), p . 273»
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numerous w arlords, the  Kxiomlntang, th e  Chinese Communists, and the  Japanese 
Bnpire—had a t  l e a s t  one th ing  in  common—fo rc e fu l methods, supported h7
am ed might vdienever necessary .
One o f C hina 's n a tiv e  sons saw these  y ears  as th e  culm ination o f 
a period  o f  t r a n s i t io n  which la s te d  over a  century . But he was no t happy 
over what he saw. He f e l t  th a t  in  th e  l a t t e r  h a lf  o f th e  n ineteen th  cen­
tu ry  China accepted Western methods, th a t  i s ,  weapons, "from fee lin g s  o f 
in f e r io r i ty  and weakness," and "developed a reac tio n  both a n t i - t r a d i t io n a l  
and m i l i t a r i s t i c . "  In  seeking woapons China th u s invested  in  war ra th e r  
than "in  peace o r  c u ltu re ."  China to  him began to  change, and t r a d i t io n a l  
China had f a l l a i ,  "not to  W esterners, but to  Chinese warlords."^®
Revolt, however, had been long recognized in  China as "a c o rre c t 
response to  bad ru le ,"  an accepted way to  acqu ire  and m aintain lA at th e  
Chinese c a l l  th e  Mandate o f Heaven.^^ Relying on t r a d i t io n ,  and a f t e r  
th e  m i l i t a r i s t s  under Yuan Shih-kai had lo s t  o u t. Sun Yat-sen acquired the  
mantle o f  lead e rsh ip . I t  was a f i t t i n g  t r ib u te  because Sun had founded the  
movement which le d  to  th e  overthrow o f  th e  Manchu dynasty. This o rgan i­
za tio n , th e  'Piing Keng Hui revo lu tionary  so c ie ty , was formed in  1905, and 
l a t e r  under th e  t i t l e  o f  Kuomintang (N ational P eop le 's  P arty ] served a s  
th e  governing fo rce  in  th e  Republic o f  Chinae Sun a lso  form ulated th e  
id eo lo g ica l b a s is  fo r  the  revo lu tion  lAich th e  Tung Meng Hui was to  work 
fo r . Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek m aintains th a t  Sun always held  th a t  
the  Kucmiintang was organized to  save th e  n a tio n , and th a t  the  in te r e s ts
2854^ ,  pp. 271- 73.
^W. W. Rostow and O thers, The Prospects f o r  Communist China 
(Cambridge and New York: The Technology Press o f  M assachusetts I n s t i tu t e
o f  Technology and John Wiley Sons, In c . ,  195^), P» 20.
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o f th e  nation  must be served before  those o f th e  Party .
Sun Y at-sen to ld  h is  fo llow ers th a t th e  nation  could not be saved 
simply by overthrowing th e  Manchus and by re ly in g  completely on Chinese 
t r a d i t io n .  The revo lu tionary  process would have to  make a new China, mix­
in g  the  best o f  Chinese t r a d i t io n  w ith th e  b est Western th o x i^ t and me­
chanics. The t r a n s i t io n ,  he noted, would co n s is t o f  th ree  stages: (1) m il­
i t a r y  ru le  lead in g  to  u n if ic a tio n . (2) p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  by th e  Kuomintang 
to  educate th e  people in  th e  use o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts ,^ ^  and (3) con­
s t i tu t io n a l  government.
The program fo r  th e  r e a l iz a t io n  o f Sun 's p o l i t i c a l  ideology was 
s e t  fo rth  in  a  s e r  es o f  le c tu re s  vdiich he d e liv e red  in  1924, c o lle c tiv e ly  
e n t i t le d  San Min Chu-I  (The Three P rin c ip les  o f  th e  P e o p l e  1.32 The Three 
P rin c ip les  included: ( l )  Min-chhian. o r  "peop le 's  democracy," in  which th e
people would be tra in e d  in  th e  ex erc ise  o f th e  r i ^ t s  o f  e le c tio n , r e c a l l , 
i n i t i a t i v e ,  and referendum to  co n tro l th e  government *«dion th e  th i r d  stage 
o f  th e  revo lu tion  was en tered , (2) Min-sheng. o r  "peop le 's  liv e lih o o d ,"  
Sun 's approach to  th e  economic revo lu tion  tdiich provided fo r  economic 
development and economic ju s t ic e  through a system o f  ta x  and land  re fo m s
30Chinese M inistry  o f Inform ation (comp.). The C ollected Wartime 
Messages o f  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. 1937-1946 (New York; The John 
Day Co.. 1946), I I .  805.
3^Rostov noted th a t  th i s p r in c ip le  o f  e li t is m  was a lso  recognized 
in  Confucian t r a d i t io n .  Rostov and O thers, p . 10. Q i'ien  Tuan-sheng, in  
commenting upon Sun Y a t-sen 's  in tu i t io n s  s ta te d  th a t  Sun "planned to  use 
e n o u ^  m ili ta ry  fo rce  to  p u t . . .  th e  Kuomintang in  power," but th a t  h is  
main re lia n c e  was upon a p a rty  d ic ta to rsh ip  ra th e r  than a m ili ta ry  one 
u n t i l  th e  th i r d  stage  o f  th e  revo lu tion  was reached. The Government and 
P o l i t ic s  o f  China (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity  P ress, 1950), p . x iv .
32smBBAXd.es o f th e se  le c tu re s  a re  found in  Chinese M in istry  o f 
Inform ation (com p.), China Handbook. 1937-1943 (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1943) ,  pp. 67- 83.
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and adequate d is tr ib u t io n  o f food, and (3) M in-tsu . o r  "peop le 's  n a tio n a l­
ism, " a dual concept advocating r a c ia l  na tionalism  and th e  e lim ina tion  o f 
fo reign  concessions.
Complete p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l by th e  Kuomintang was delayed, however, 
by conditions in  Qiina follow ing th e  revo lu tion  begun in  I 9I I .  Sun Yat-sen 
had been unable to  un ify  China because o f th e  re s is ta n c e  o f  re b e llio u s  war­
lo rd s  and had received unfavorable re p lie s  to  req u ests  fo r  a id  frcm a l l  
coun tries except th e  Soviet Union. A fte r n eg o tia tio n s  between Sun and 
Adolph Jo ffe , rep resen ting  th e  Soviet Union and th e  Communist In te rn a tio n a l, 
a statem ent was re leased  in  January, 192% in  vd^ich Jo ffe  committed Russia 
to  th e  support o f Sun 's e f fo r ts  to  develop a u n if ie d  and independent Qiina. 
Both p r in c ip a ls  a lso  agreed th a t  cond itions s u ita b le  fo r  th e  establishm ent 
o f  communism d id  not e x i s t .33 Following th ese  m eetings, th e  Soviet Ibiion 
sen t Michael Borodin to  China in  September, 1923, and Chiang Kai-shek was 
sen t to  Moscow in  October to  continue th e  n e g o tia tio n s . Further exchanges 
brought a  qnaii group o f  Russian m il i ta ry  a d v ise rs  to  China under th e  
leadersh ip  o f General Galens (V asily  K. B luecherl with th e  declared  pu r­
pose o f  unify ing  th e  countiy  by e lim ina ting  competing w a r l o r d s . 3 ^  Borodin 
became ad v ise r to  th e  IQiomintang and reorganized i t  to  provide co n tro l by 
th e  c œ t r a l  headquarters. An agreement was a lso  reached to  perm it Chinese 
C o m m u n i s t s 3 5  to  jo in  th e  Kuomintang i f  they  would submit to  i t s
33chinese M in istiy  o f Inform ation (comp. ) ,  Chjna Handbook. 1937- 
1945 (rev . and a i l .  w ith  1946 Supplemait; New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1947) , p . 66.
3%du, pp. 4-5»
35Aithough Communist groups began to  form in  China as e a rly  as 
1919, i t  was no t u n t i l  May, 1921, th a t  Q iai Tu-hsiu organized th e  p a r ty  as 
a branch o f  th e  Third Ih te m a tio n a l .  Car sun Qiang, prominent in  Chinese 
p o l i t i c a l  c i r c le s ,  says th a t  Mao Tse-tung was p resen t a t  th e  o rgan ization
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d isc ip lin e*  However, the  fa c t  th a t  th e  Communists jo ined  as Ind i­
v id u a ls  and not on a p a rty  b a s is , made I t  p o ssib le  to  perpe tuate  th e  
Communist o rgan ization  In  China.
This arrangement o f  January, 1924, o r a s  C hester Bowles c a lle d  
I t ,  a "marriage o f  convenience, made I t  p o ss ib le  fo r  th e  Kuomintang and 
Communists to  organize and operate  a t  th a t  time w ith a minimum o f c o n flic ts*  
From a h is to r ic a l  vantage p o in t, however. Car sun Chang observed th a t  Sun 
Y at-sen made a m istake In  perm itting  th e  Chinese Communist P arty  to  r e ta in  
I t s  Id e n ti ty  and I t s  freedom o f action* I t s  l a t e r  ro le  In  Chinese p o l i t i c s  
was, to  Chang, d ir e c t ly  traceab le  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s ta tu s  granted to  I t  by 
Sun In  1924.39
With the  death o f Sun Y at-sen In  March, 1925» th e  task  o f comple­
t in g  th e  unfin ished  revo lu tion  devolved upon Chiang K ai-shek*^  At Sun 's
m eeting and th a t  Chou fiv -la l and Id L l-san  were among th e  Chinese studen ts 
studying In  P a ris  who fom ed Communist groups ttiere* The Third Force In  
China (New York: Bookman A ssociates, 1952), p* 71.
3^See statem ent o f Id Ta-chao In  Chinese M inistry  o f  Inform ation 
(comp*), China Handbook. 1937-1945* p . 66.
37A)stow and o th e rs , p* 21* The authors contended th a t  th e  w ill­
ingness o f  the  Communists to  accept a subordinate p o s it io n  was probably 
due to  th e  fee lin g  th a t  the  young and as y e t weak Communist movement could 
b e s t serve I t s  purposes by p r ^ a r in g  I t s e l f  to  se ize  power a t  a more appro­
p r ia te  moment* Car sun Chang noted th a t  th e  Communists b ided th e i r  tim e h7 
working "as commissars in  th e  Army and as lead ers  In  th e  c e n tra l  and lo c a l 
p a rty  headquarte rs ,"  w hile working "under th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  the  Kuomintang." 
Carsun Chang, p . 72*
36The New Dimensions o f Peace (New York: Harpers and B ros., 1955).
p* 94*
39carsun Chang, pp. 64-69* The author absolved Sun, however, o f 
subservience to  Marxism, s ta tin g  th a t  he advised Kuomintang members a g a in s t 
follow ing M arxist d o c trin e ; c r i t ic iz e d  th e  m a te r ia l is t  c o n c ^ tlo n  o f  h is ­
to ry ; and opposed th e  c la ss  s tru g g le  concept and th e  su rp lus value theory  
o f  p r o f i t .
^ Q ila n g  was th e  d ire c to r  o f  Whampoa M illtazy  Academy ih ich  had 
been e stab lish ed  In  cooperation w ith Russian support. He had been
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death the  p o l i t i c a l  re la tio n sh ip  between th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communists 
remained In ta c t .  Sun a lso  l e f t  a b l u ^ r l n t ,  th e  San Min Chu^I .  to  guide 
h is  successor. But Sun a lso  l e f t  behind a China th a t  had not been t e r r i ­
t o r i a l l y  u n ited .
Seeking to  un ify  the  country. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek under­
took th e  Northern Expedition In  1926 destroy  th e  s t i l l  re b e llio u s  
northern  w arlords. Opposition by th e  Soviet ad v ise rs  to  the  campaign, 
though unsuccessfu l, developed on th e  ground th a t  I t  was f i r s t  necessary  
to  "conso lida te  th e  Kuomintang adm in istra tion  In  Kwangtung" fP rovlncel.^^  
Ihe  m ili ta ry  caoqpalgn produced many eai'ly  v ic to r ie s  dc ,p l te  open and sub­
v e rs iv e  undermining o f  Kuomintang revo lu tionary  purposes by the  Soviet 
ad v ise rs  and t h e i r  Chinese co llab o ra to rs . O bstructions encountered by 
Chiang were o f  a p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta ry  n a t u r e . T o m  by d iv is io n  w ith in  
I t s  ranks, th e  Kuomintang lo s t  co n tro l o f  I t s  n a tio n a l c a p i ta l  o f  Hankow 
to  th e  l e f t  wing o f  th e  p a rty  lAlch was supported by th e  Communists. The 
Communists' success was tra n s ito ry , however, as Chiang Kai-shek, supported 
by l i  Tsung-Jen and Feng ïu -h slang , es tab lish ed  a r iv a l  govenxnent a t
designated commanding general o f th e  Kuomintang P a r ty 's  Army by th e  C entra l 
Executive Committee o f  th e  Kuomintang on May 13, 1925* M u, pp. 7, 16.
^^ Ib id . . pp. 22, 29. According to  Liu, th e  r e a l  reason fo r  th e  
opposition  o f th e  Soviet adv isers to  th e  Expedition was th e i r  need "to  
r e p a ir  r i f t s  in  t h e i r  own ranks caused by th e  Mar. 20, 1926, coup" in  
lA ich Chiang a rre s te d  sev era l Communist commissars. Including some Russian 
ad v ise rs  a t  \àxaspoA M ilita ry  Academy.
^Some sp e c if ic  examples, according to  F. F. Liu, were a ttem pts o f 
th e  Communists: . ( l )  to  g e t th e  Kuomintang m ili ta ry  lead ers  to  d e se r t to  
t h e i r  s ide , (2) to  weaken Chiang's co n tro l by g e ttin g  more a u th o rity  p laced 
in  committees "idiich would be weaker than  Chiang and from lAioh they  could 
more eaaU y w rest power than  they  could from Chiang," (3) to  m aintain  supeiv 
v is io n  o f th e  m il i ta ry  by p o l i t i c a l  commissars; and (4) to  c re a te  u n re s t 
th r o u ^  s t r ik e s  and In su rre c tio n s . Ib id . .  pp. 35*^*
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Nanking in  A nril, 1927, and purged th e  Communists in  Shanghai, Canton, and 
Hankow. Borodin, the  Soviet ad v ise r, was forced to  leave China in  1927, 
and th e  co llab o ra tio n  o f  th e  Kuomintang, the  S ov ie ts , and th e  Chinese 
Communists was ended.
The fu tu re  o f th e  Chinese Communist P arty  a t  th is  tim e d id  not 
look prom ising. Chen Tu-hsiu, the  founder o f th e  Party , had f a i le d  in  h is  
attem pt to  co llab o ra te  w ith the  Kuomintang w hile build ing  an independent 
Communist movement, and he was rep laced  by Chu Chiu-pai in  1927. The Com­
m unists re so rte d  to  s t r ik e s  and in su rre c tio n a l movements in  1927 and to  the  
development o f a so lid  urban core under th e  leadersh ip  o f Li L i-san  in  1928 
in  opposing th e  N ational Government. N either Chu Chiu-pai nor l i  L i-san  
had much success, h o w ev er.^  Meanwhile, Mao Tse-tung deviated  from th e  
orthodox Communist re lia n c e  on th e  p r o le ta r ia t  ^nd urban o rgan iza tion  and 
concentrated on th e  peasan t and ru r a l  o rgan iza tion . His p lan  o f 1928 to  
secure Communist domination o f China was: ( l )  to  e s tab lish  a strong base
among th e  peasant masses through a program o f land  reform, (2) to  organize 
a strong p a rty  along th e  l in e s  p rescrib ed  by Lenin, (3) to  develop a strong 
army, and (4) to  get co n tro l o f  a " s t r a te g ic a l ly  located  t e r r i t o r i a l  base"
4 3 s ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 43-44. Paul 
M. A. lin eb a rg e r, in  w ritin g  o f  th e  co llab o ra tio n  attem pt, contended th a t  
th e  Communist lead ers  "unw ittingly  made a tremendous m istake between 1922 
and 1927. "  Qy agreeing to  perm it t h e i r  m ili ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  s t a f f s  to  
cooperate with th e  Kuomintang, by teaching  Chiang t h ^ r  methods o f  w arfare 
id iile  he was in  Moscow in  1923, includ ing  "Communist psychological w arfare 
techn iques,"  and because o f  th e i r  own "Communist sense o f c e r ta in ty ,"  
lin eb arg e r argued th a t  th e  Kuomintang outsm arted the  Communists a t  t h e i r  
own game. Psychological Warfare (2d ed. ; Washington: Combat Forces P ress ,
1954), p . 75.
44uostow and O thers, pp. 24-2^. O ff ic ia l  leaders o f  th e  Chinese 
Communist P arty  follow ing Chu Chiu-pai and befo re  Mao Tse-tung assumed 
co n tro l in  Jan., 1935, a  period  o f  le s s  than seven years du ra tion , were LI 
L i-san , Wang Ming, Po Ku, and Chang Wen-ten.
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vrtiich was s e l f - s t i f f ! c i As h is to ry  has proved, Mao's a l te rn a t iv e  
proved more successfu l than those  o f e ith e r  Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai, 
o r  Id. L i-san.
This program o u tlin ed  hy Mao Tse-Ttmg was, o f  course, in  d ire c t  
opposition  to  th a t  o f  Chiang Kai-shek and th e  Kuomintang, and th e i r  d iv er­
gent views were never completely reconciled . The fu tu re  reac tio n s  o f  the  
fo rces under Chiang and Mao v a rie d  from p ro tra c te d  c iv i l  wars to  pledged 
mutual stqiport o f  a common e f f o r t  ag a in st a common e n a n y .^
Mao increased  h is  e f fo r ts  in  1928 to  accomplish th e  p lan  s e t  fo rth  
above by combining h is  fo rces in  South Kiangsi with those  o f th e  Chinese 
Communist m i l i t a r i s t ,  Chu Teh, in  H u n a n . T h e  combined Communist fo rce , 
however, was no match fo r  th e  N a tio n a lis t Azmy o f  Chiang Kai-shek which
^^Benjamin I .  Schwartz, Chines* Commiirri .«an and th e  M ae o f  Man 
(Cambridge: Harvard U niversity  P ress , 1951), n . 10, pp. 189-90. As one 
wox4c has suggested, ” . . .  th e  problem o f  th e  Comintern and th e  CCP 
[Chinese Communist P arty ) in  th e  e a r ly  1920s was n o t. How can we s t a r t  a 
rev o lu tio n  in  China? bu t ra th e r . How can we cap tu re  and co n tro l th e  le a d e r­
sh ip  o f  th e  g re a t rev o lu tio n  which i s  a lready  so p la in ly  under way?” I t  
appears th a t  Mao had c o rre c tly  assessed  th i s  problem. Conrad Brandt, 
B ^ a m in  I .  Schwartz, and John K. Faizbank, A Documentary H istory  o f  Chinese 
Commnni an (Cambridge: Harvard U niversity  P ress , 1952), p . 4?1.
^*^The study o f  re la tio n s  between th e  Chinese Communists and th e  
Kuomintang and N ational Government have been d iv ided  in to  th e  follow ing 
phases by one source: ( l )  th e  f i r s t  un ited  f ro n t ,  1923-27, (2) th e  f i r s t
c iv i l  war, 1927-37. (3) th e  second un ited  f ro n t ,  1937-46, and (4) th e  
second c iv i l  war, 1946--. U. S . , Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 5 o f  
Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , The S tra tegy  and T ac tics o f  World Commnni^ ,  
Supplement I I I ,  Country S tud ies: C, Communism in  China, 81st Cong., 1 s t
S e ss ., 1948, House Doc. 154, p . i i i .  C ited h e re a f te r  as House Subcommittee 
on Foreign A ffa irs , The S tra tegy  and T actics o f  World Communism. House Doc. 
154. The S ta te  D q^rtm ent d iv ided  th e  periods in to  th e  y ea rs , 1924-27, 
1927- 36, 1937-44, and 1945-49. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith 
China, passim.
47%e combined fo rces numbered approxim ately 10,000-11,000.
Rostow and O thers, p . 27. House Subcommittee on Foreign A ffa irs , The 
S tra tegy  and T ac tics  o f  World Communism. House Doc. 154, p . 12.
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i n i t i a t e d  a campaign in  December, 1930, to  destroy  a l l  Communist in fluence .
In  1934-33 th e  Communists were forced to  m igrate s ix  thousand m iles to
Shensi Province in  North China. Chester Bowles, in  describ ing  th e  "long
M arch," s ta te d  th a t  only twenty thousand o f th e  i n i t i a l  fo rce  o f 100,000
survived the  "famine and epidemics, ambushes and b a t t le s  w ithout number."
More s ig n if ic a n t fo r  our purposes h e re , however, Bowles h in ted  o f  th in g s
to  cone in  th ese  words:
Between b a t t le s ,  th e  Communists had c a lle d  mass meetings in  
every occupied town ( th ^ r  tem porarily  occupied sixty-tw o c i t i e s  on 
th e i r  r e t r e a t ]  to  exp la in  th e i r  r u ra l  rev o lu tio n  and th e i r  a n t i -  
Japanese p o lic y . They had staged th e a tr ic a l  performances, freed  
many p riso n e rs , con fisca ted  th e  p roperty  o f  * t r a i to r ^ '—Kuomintang 
o f f i c i a l s ,  b ig  land lo rd s and ta x  c o lle c to rs—and d is tr ib u te d  th e i r  
goods among th e  poor . . . .48
Although the  Communists were severely  weakened, Chiang had not destroyed 
them. This f a c t ,  p lus t h e i r  sense o f  c e r ta in ty  and Chiang K ai-shek 's 
d iv ers io n  by th e  Japanese aggression since  1931, s t i l l  made th e  Communists 
a worthy adversary .
For th e  moment, though, sev era l fa c to rs  po in ted  toward a tru c e  
between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists. In  a weakened cond ition  and 
fe a r fu l  o f  fu tu re  clashes w ith both th e  Kuomintang fo rces  and th e  Japanese, 
th e  Communists o ffe red  in  January, 1936, and again  in  August o f  th e  same 
year "to fo ra  a strong revo lu tionary  u n ited  fro n t"  with th e  N ational 
Government a g a in s t th e  Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek, in  r e s is t in g  such sug­
g estio n s , made a move which aided th e  Communist cause idien he went to  
Sian in  Shensi Province to  organize a new campaign a g a in st h is  adversary. 
While th e re  he was a rre s te d  ty  come d is s id e n t N a tio n a lis t m i l i t a r i s t s  idio
^B ow les, pp. 104-05. Car sun Chang d id  no t consider th e  "Long 
March" to  be a ro u t o f th e  Bed Aray. In  fa c t ,  he sa id , th e  march "ac tu a lly  
gave i t  possession  o f  more t e r r i to r y  in  Northern China than  i t  had had in  
K iangsi.” Carsun Chang, p . 82.
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favored a un ited  f ro n t  ag a in st th e  Japanese* Although some mystery s t i l l  
surrounds th i s  in c id e n t, n eg o tia tio n s  were begun w ith th e  Communists to  
arrange a c o a lit io n  sh o rtly  a f t e r  Chiang was re leased  on December 25, 
1936.49
Ihe b a s is  fo r  th e  en ten te  was provided by a telegram  which the  
C entral Committee o f  th e  Chinese Communist P arty  sen t on February 10, 1937, 
to  th e  Third Plenary Session o f  th e  F ifth  C en tra l Executive Committee o f  
th e  Kuomintang and the  Kuomintang* s rqply  on February 21, 1937# The Com­
munist celegram recommended a program c a llin g  fo r :  (1) suspension o f  th e
c iv i l  war in  fav o r o f an a l l -o u t  concen tra tion  o f  e f fo r t  ag a in st ex te rn a l 
aggression , (2) th e  guarantee o f  c iv i l  r ig h ts , (3) a conference composed 
o f  the "capable le a d e rs  o f th e  country" from a l l  th e  p a r t ie s  and organi­
za tions to  work fo r  th e  " jo in t sa lv a tio n  o f th e  country ," and (4) iaqprove- 
ment o f  l iv in g  cond itions. I f  th e  Kuomintang would agree to  th ese  p o in ts , 
th e  Communists in d ic a te d  they would be w illin g :
1 ) To stop  ou r program o f conducting armed u p ris in g s throughout 
th e  country fo r  th e  overthrow o f  th e  N ational Government in  Nanking.
2) To change th e  Soviet Govenment in to  th e  Government o f  the  
f e c i a l  Region o f  th e  Republic o f  China and th e  Red Army in to  th e  
N ational Revolutionary Army under th e  d ire c t  leadersh ip  o f  th e  
C entral Government and th e  M ilita ry  A ffa irs  Commission in  Nanking.
3 ) To enforce th e  thorough democratic systems o f  u n iv ersa l 
su ffrage  w ith in  th e  sp ec ia l reg ions under th e  regime o f  th e  Govern­
ment o f  th e  Specia l Region; and
4) To p u t an end to  th e  p o lic y  o f  expropria ting  th e  land o f  
land lo rds and to  execute p e rs is te n t ly  th e  common program o f  the  
an ti-Japanese  un ited  f r o n t .30
The re so lu tio n  o f th e  Kuomintang Executive Committee noted th e  
e a r l ie r  " treasonab le  and re b e llio u s  a c t iv i t ie s "  o f  th e  Chinese Communists, 
bu t s ta te d  th a t  th e  Communists would be given a chance "to reform" i f  they  
would accept th e  follow ing fou r cond itions:
E s t a t e  Department, Ü. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 45-46.
30 lb id . , Annex 35. P# 522.
1) A bolition  o f  the  separa te  army and i t s  inco rpora tion  in to  
th e  un ited  command o f  the  n a tio n 's  armed fo rce s .
2) D isso lu tion  o f  th e  so -c a lled  'Chinese Soviet Republic' and 
s im ila r  o rgan iza tions and u n if ic a tio n  o f  th e  govextment power in  
th e  hands o f  th e  N ational Govemmait.
3) Absolute cessa tio n  o f  Communist propaganda and acceptance 
o f  th e  Three P eo p le 's  P rin c ip le s .
4) Stoppage o f  th e  c la s s  s t r u g g le .^
The d iffe re n c e s  vdiich had made a u n if ie d  Chinese e f fo r t  d i f f i c u l t  
had been narrowed to  some ex ten t by th ese  exchanges. This p rog ress, p lus 
renewed aggression by Japan in  Manchuria in  Ju ly , 1937, spurred th e  two 
Chinese p a r t ie s  to  continue t h e i r  n eg o tia tio n s  fo r  a peacefu l se ttlem en t 
o f  th e se  co n tro v ersies . Their e f fo r ts  were rewarded w ith an agreement to  
end th e  c iv i l  war. In  u n i la te r a l  promises th e  Communists agreed to  suspend 
t h e i r  land  co n fisca tio n  p o lic ie s ,  while th e  Kuomintang promised to  re le a se  
some p o l i t i c a l  p r iso n e rs  and to  c a l l  a P eo p le 's  N ational Congress in  Novem­
b e r, 1937, to  provide fo r  a new c o n s t i tu t io n .52
Public announcements o f  th e  two p a r t ie s  made th e  co llab o ra tio n
agreement o f f i c i a l .  In  th e  f i r s t  o f  th e se , th e  Communist P arty  made th e
follow ing pledge on Sqptanber 22, 1937:
1) The San Min Chu- I  (Three P eo p le 's  P rin c ip le s )  enunciated by
Dr. Sun T at-sen  i s  th e  paramount need o f  China today. This P arty
i s  ready to  s t r iv e  fo r  i t s  enforcement.
2) This P arty  abandons i t s  p o licy  o f  overthrowing th e  Kuomin­
tang o f  China by fo rce  and th e  movement o f  so v ie tiz a tio n  and d is ­
continues i t s  p o lic y  o f  fo rc ib le  co n fisca tio n  o f land  from land­
owners.
3) This P arty  abo lishes th e  p resen t Soviet Government and w il l  
enforce democracy based on th e  p e o p le 's  r ig h ts  in  o rder to  u n ify  th e  
n a tio n a l p o l i t i c a l  machinexy.
4) This P arty  abo lishes th e  Red Army, reorganizes i t  in to  th e  
N ational R evolutionary Army, p laces i t  under th e  d ir e c t  co n tro l 
o f  th e  M ilita ry  A ffa irs  Commission o f  th e  N ational Government, and 
aw aits o rders f o r  m ob iliza tion  -o share th e  re sp o n s ib ili ty  o f  r e ­
s is t in g  fo re ig n  invasion  a t  th e  f r o n t . 53
5Ilb id . .  p . 49.
5^ b i d . . n . 16, p . 49.  "Because o f  th e  war and repeated postpone­
ments t h i s Congress d id  no t meet u n t i l  November, 1946."
53lb id . .  Annex 36, p . 524.
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% e Generalissimo made a pub lic  statem ent on th e  follow ing day and accep­
te d  th e  Communist d ec la ra tio n  as being in  accord w ith previous exchanges 
and neg o tia tio n s between th e  two P a r t ie s . Ths agreements were, he sa id , 
"ample proof th a t  China today has only one o b jec tiv e  in  i t s  war e f f o r t s . "5^ 
In  th is  s p i r i t  th e  follow ing step s were taken in  1937-38 to  imple­
ment th e  compact: ( l )  reo rgan iza tion  o f  th e  Chinese Communist Anny under
the  command o f General Chu Teh, (2) designation  o f  t h i s  azmy to  ga rriso n  
th e  former Communist co n tro lled  provinces o f Shensi, Kansu, and VQLnghsia, 
and (3) monetary su b sid iza tio n  o f  th e  Communist arm ies by th e  N ational 
Government. Ihe  Extraordinary  N ational Congress o f  th e  Kuomintang made a 
s ig n if ic a n t  c o n trib u tio n  in  March, 1938, idien i t  c rea ted  th e  People’s P o li t ­
i c a l  Council and provided i t  "with powers to  d iscu ss and question  a l l  
im portant Government measures and to  make proposals to  th e  Government.
I t  was an advisory  body, but i t  d id  serve to  s tim u la te  increased  democrati­
z a tio n  and freedom o f d iscussion . In  carry ing  ou t th ese  and o th e r  commit­
ments, th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communists agreed to  be bound by th e  "Program 
o f  Aimed R esistance and N ational Reconstruction, and the  San Min Chu-I .
But, as  was to  be th e  case u n t i l  th e  N ational Government f e l l  in  
1949, th e  w illingness o f  th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communists to  make agree­
ments was not matched by t h e i r  w illingness and a b i l i ty  to  execute them.
I h is  en ten te , l ik e  o th ers  preceding and follow ing i t ,  was more apparent
54 ib id . .  Annex 37, pp. 524-25. Chinese M in istry  o f Inform ation 
(comp.). The C ollected  Wartime Massages .  .  . . I ,  41-42.
55sta te  Dqpartmwt, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 51-52*
^ I h e  teoct o f  th e  "Program o f  Armed R esistance and N ational Recon­
s tru c tio n "  i s  p r in te d  in  Chinese M inistry  o f  Inform ation (coiq}. ) ,  China 
Handbook. 1937-1945. pp. 79-81. I t  c a lle d  fo r  an increased  m il i ta ry  
e f f o r t ,  e s tab lish ed  th e  People’ s P o l i t ic a l  Council a s  th e  h ig h es t rep re­
se n ta tiv e  body o f  th e  people in  wartime, declared  San Min Chu-I to  be th e  
h i p e s t  a u th o rity  governing war a c t iv i t i e s ,  and c a lle d  fo r  g re a te r  economic 
growth.
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than real* The crux o f  th e  d i f f ic u l ty  seemed to  be th e  unw illingness o f  
th e  Communists to  accede to  the  Government's demand fo r  f u l l  co n tro l o f 
th e i r  arm ies. Mutual charges th a t  th e  o th e r had v io la te d  th e  agreement o f 
1937 and frequent c lashes between th e i r  fo rces o fte n  re su lte d  in  th e  neg­
l e c t  o f  e ith e r  to  c a n y  out common re s is ta n c e  ag a in s t th e  Japanese.
When unable to  reso lve  th e  d iffe ren ce  on th e  b a t t l e f i e l a ,  Chiang
Kai-shek went before  th e  P eop le 's  P o l i t ic a l  Council on March 6, 1941 and
d e livered  a m ajor address in  \riiich he urged se ttlem en t by p o l i t i c a l  means.
He spoke in  re fe ren ce  to  p roposals before th a t  body in  which he sa id  th e
Communists claimed th a t
. . .  th e  Government should not suppress d isobed ien t and reb e l­
l io u s  troops . . . .  th a t  th e  Government should e s ta b lish  sp ec ia l 
a reas o u ts id e  th e  sphere o f  i t s  a u th o rity , recognize th e  ex istence  
o f anomalous p o l i t i c a l  o rgan iza tions and r e s t r i c t  i t s  powqf to  
check ü l e g a l  a c t iv i t i e s  on th e  p a r t  o f  o rgan iza tions o r  in d iv i­
dua ls . 5°
Chiang added th a t  th e se  demands in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  Communist P arty  was 
asking f o r  a p riv ile g e d  s ta tu s  and "spec ia l r i ^ t s "  th a t  i t  would no t be 
w illin g  to  extend to  o th e rs . He concluded by urging th e  Communists to
57See S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, p . 53» and 
Rostow and O thers, p . 31* F. F. l i u  contended th a t  th e  Commun! s t s  were 
"d e lib e ra te ly  conserving th e i r  s tre n g th , holding back a good p a r t  o f  th e  
fo rce  they m i ^ t  have d ire c te d  a g a in s t th e  Japanese in  p repara tion  fo r  th e  
eventual c lash  w ith C hiang's govem nent." In  supporting t h i s  view, he 
re fe rre d  to  a  Communist document s t ip u la tin g  th a t  t h e i r  p o lic y  was to  be 
"70 p e r cent eoqiansion, 20 p e r cen t dealing  w ith th e  Kuomintang, and 10 
p e r cen t r e s is t in g  Jsq)an." Such a c tio n  o f  th e  Communist, he contended, 
requ ired  th a t  Chiang Kai-shdc d iv e r t  "considerable s tren g th "  to  oppose th e  
Communists ra th e r  than  th e  Japanese. L iu, pp. 205-06, 222-23. Representa­
t iv e  W alter H. Judd o f  Minnesota supported t h i s  view in  a  statem ent he made 
before th e  House Committee on fb re ig n  A ffa irs  on Nov. 14, 194?. U. S. Con­
g re ss , House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , H earings. Baergency Foreign Aid. 
80th Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1947, pp. 241-43.
58For t e x t  o f  speech, see Chinese M in istry  o f  Inform ation (comp.). 
The C ollected Wartime Messages . . .  , pp. 5 6 ^7 2 .
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honor th e  agreement thqy v o lu n ta r ily  entered  in to  in  1937 so th a t  th e  
m atters ra ised  by them could be s e t t le d  befo re  th e  P eop le 's  P o l i t ic a l  
Council.
While m il i ta ry  c lashes continued between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  
Communists, th e  s p o t l i ^ t  focused on th e  m eetings o f  th e  P eop le 's  P o l i t ic a l  
Council, and s p e c if ic a lly  on th e  attem pts o f  minor p a r t ie s  in  th a t  body 
to  g e t th e  an tag o n is ts  to  d ire c t th e i r  e f fo r ts  toward a u n ified  C hina.^9 
These p a r t ie s ,  however, were no more successfu l in  th e i r  e f fo r ts  to  reso lve  
th e  d iffe ren ces  between th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communists than  they  had 
been in  fu rth e rin g  t h e i r  own fo rtu n es . arsun Chang, a p a r t ic ip a n t in  
th ese  n eg o tia tio n s  and lead er o f  th e  D em ocratic-Socialist P arty , wrote th a t  
th e  ta sk  o f  th e  th i r d  p a r t ie s  was to  stop th e  m il i ta ry  b a t t le s  between th e  
N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists and to  work f o r  a democratic fo m  o f  govern­
ment. They sought to  do th i s ,  according to  Chang, by seeking
59ihe j o in t  a sso c ia tio n  o f  these  minor p a r t ie s ,  which was known as 
th e  Democratic League in  S e p t., 1944, was p r io r  to  t h i s  tim e v a rio u s ly  
known a s  th e  Grand League o f  Democratic P o l i t ic a l  Grot^s o f  China, th e  
Federation o f  Chinese Democratic P a r t ie s , and th e  United N ational Con­
s tru c tio n  League. T heir membership va ried  from tim e to  time and included 
in d iv id u a l members a s  w ell as p a r t ie s  and groups, but a t  th e  apex o f  I t s  
s tren g th  I t  included th re e  p a r t ie s  and th re e  groups: th e  Youth P a rty , th e
N ational S o c ia l is t  P arty  [D em ocratic-S ocialist), th e  Third P arty , th e  
N ational Salvation  Groiq>, th e  V ocational Education Groiqp, and th e  Rural 
Reconstruction Group. See C h 'ien  Tuan-sheng, The Govenment and P o l i t ic s  
o f  China, p. 359-60; Paul M. A. lin e b a rg e r, "The Post-War P o l i t ic s  o f  
C hina,” Journal o f  P o l i t ic s . IX (Nov., 1947), 533-34; and S ta te  Department, 
U. S. R elations w ith  China, p . 54.
^ l in e b a r g e r .  In  w ritin g  o f  th e  cond itions faced  ty  th e  minor 
p a r t ie s ,  noted th a t  "according to  th e  Organic Law o f 1933 . . .  th e  Kuomin­
tang was th e  so le  le g a l  p a rty  in  th e  Chinese S ta te ,"  but "in  th e  atmoqdiere 
o f  wartime to le ran c e  a number o f  minor p a r t ie s "  d id  appear. He added, 
however, th a t  none o f  them ever co n tro lled  a s in g le  county. T heir im]^- 
ten ce , he continued, stemmed from a lack  o f  guns, w ealth , and p ra c t ic a l  
p o l i t i c a l  power. Jou rna l o f  P o l i t i c s . I I ,  pp. 532-33» C3i*len Tuan-sheng 
siqiported th is  view w ith th e  statem ent th a t  " the  Kuomintang's a t t i tu d e  
toward p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  has always been c o n s is te n t. I t  has never chosen 
to  to le r a te  o th e r p a r t ie s .  " The Govenment and P o l i t ic s  o f  China, p . 381. 
Chang blamed th e  p l ig h t  o f  th e  minor p a r t ie s  on th e  Kuomintang's siqjport 
o f  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  tu te la g e . Carsun Chang, pp. 100-01.
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n a tio n a lisa tio n  o f  th e  axuy and th e  a b o lit io n  o f  Kuomintang tutelage*
Hit i t  was p re c ise ly  a t  t h i s  po in t th a t  n e ith e r  o f  th e  p r in c ip a ls  would 
y ield*  The Communists were unw illing  to  p lace a l l  r i l i t a z y  fo rces  under a 
u n if ie d  N a tio n a lis t command u n t i l  th e  l a t t e r  would renounce tu te la g e , and 
th e  N a tio n a lis ts  refused  to  forego p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l u n less  the  Communists 
re linqu ished  th e i r  azmy*
N egotiations to  secure a se ttlo n e n t by p o l i t i c a l  means, vdiich both 
p r in c ip a ls  had freq u en tly  endorsed since 1937* continued with l i t t l e  in te r ­
ru p tio n . However, th e  s p i r i t  a lledged ly  p reva len t when th e  co llab o ra tio n  
e f f o r t  was undertaken in  1937 e ith e r  disappeared o r  never ex is ted  idien i t  
came time to  execute an agreement* Conferences in  and rep o rts  to  the  
re sp ec tiv e  p a r t ie s  and th e  P eop le 's  P o l i t ic a l  Council continued unabated 
from 1941 to  1945, but two speeches re f le c te d  th e  d e te r io ra tio n  in  re la tio n s  
between th e  p r in c ip a l adversaries* Chiang K ai-didc, i a  an address before 
th e  P eop le 's  P o l i t ic a l  Council on September 16, 1944, accused th e  Commun­
i s t s  o f  refu sing  to  siq)port n a tio n a l u n ity  and "n a tio n a l laws and decrees*" 
S p e c if ic a lly , he was angered because the  Communist f i f t e e n t h  Group Axmy 
would not obey o rders o f  th e  N ational Govenment* Mao Tse-tung was equally
^^The au thor pu t th e  blame fo r  th e i r  f a i lu r e  on th e  Kuomintang 
because i t  was "unsynqxathetic and unfriend ly" to  th e  Democratic League and 
c o n tro lled  enou^  vo tes in  th e  P eo p le 's  P o l i t ic a l  Council to  vo te  down 
League proposals* Car sun Chang, pp. 112-14*
^ Ĵkmong th e  most im portant o f th ese  was a speech o f Chiang Kai- 
shek before th e  Eleventh Plenazy Session o f th e  F if th  C entral Executive 
Committee o f  th e  Kuomintang on Sept. 13, 1943, which i s  found in  Chinese 
M in istry  o f  Infozm ation (comp*). The ColJ.ected Wartime Messages * * * ,
U ,  576-77; "Report o f  th e  R epresentative o f  th e  N ational Government" to  
th e  P eop le 's  P o l i t ic a l  Council on Sept* 15, 1944, in  S ta te  D^mrtment,
U. S. R elations with  China. Annex 40, pp. 531-44; and "R eport,of th e  Repre­
se n ta tiv e  o f th e  C en tra l Committee o f th e  Chinese Communist Party" to  the  
P eo p le 's  P o l i t ic a l  Council on Sept* 15, 1944, in  S ta te  Department, Ü* S* 
R elations with China. Azmex 41, pp. 5 ^ 4 8 *
^3por t e x t  o f speech see Chinese M in istry  o f  Infozm ation (comp*).
The C ollected Wartime Messages * * * , pp. 798-99*
27
d e fia n t in  h is  re p o rt, "On C oalition  Government," to  th e  Seventh N ational 
Congress o f  th e  Chinese Communist P arty  on A pril 24, 1945. Peace and co­
opera tion  depended, he a sse rte d , upon: (1) a b o li t io n  o f the  d ic ta to rsh ip
o f  th e  Kuomintang and th e  establishm ent o f a "democratic c o a lit io n  govern­
m ent," (2) d isso lu tio n  o f  th e  se c re t p o lic e , (3) g iv ing  le g a l recogn ition  
to  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s ,  and (4) recogn ition  o f  th e  a reas  l ib e ra te d  from th e  
Japanese l?y th e  Communists o r the  withdrawal o f N a tio n a lis t troops th a t  
were ha rrass ing  th e  people and th e  Communist fo rce s  th e re .  ̂
This period  o f  th e  re la tio n s  between th e  Kuomintang and th e  Chinese 
Communists, then , was re p le te  with fe a rs  and d i s t r u s t ,  broken agreem ents, 
a  maze o f  p roposals and counter-proposals, and d iv ided  e f fo r t  ag a in s t th e  
Japanese m il i ta ry  machine. I t  was a period  in  which th e  two r iv a ls  fo r  th e  
Mandate o f Heaven could not s e t t l e  t h e i r  d iffe ren ces  by e i th e r  p o l i t i c a l  
o r  m ili ta ry  measures and would no t cooperate w ith th e  minor p a r t ie s  toward 
th a t  end.
United S ta te s  R elations with Chirm. 1941-1945 
United S ta te s  re la tio n s  w ith China p r io r  to  World War I I ,  as 
re fe rre d  to  above, had been p rim arily  d irec ted  toward checking th e  aggres­
s iv e  ac tio n s o f Japan. American a c tio n  had been in  th e  form o f p ro te s ts  
and the  n eg o tia tio n s  o f  t r e a t i e s ,  and th e re  had been no concerted e f fo r t  
to  b u ild  up o r  re ly  on a  power p o s itio n . Also, th e  United S ta te s  had no t 
beccme openly involved in  C hina's in te rn a l  p o l i t i c a l  problems.
Japan 's  a ttac k  on Pearl Harbor in  D ecaber, 1941, a l te re d  the  
s i tu a tio n  considerably . The n e ce ss ity  fo r  destroy ing  Japanese hegemony in  
th e  Far E ast, w hile k e y in g  China in  th e  war as an e ffe c tiv e  p a r t ic ip a n t,
^^*Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, pp. 300-01.
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was o f immediate ij^)ortance to  th e  United S ta te s . Through our e f fo r ts  
we became in c re as in g ly  involved in  rhe c o n f l ic ts  between the  Kuomintang and 
th e  Chinese Communists.
China as a Major Power 
One o f th e  most c o n tro v e rs ia l American fo re ign  p o lic ie s  was th e  
designation  o f China a s  a g rea t p o w e r . Secretary  o f S ta te  Cordell H ull 
wrote th a t  i t  was th e  a d m in is tra tio n 's  goal to  accord to  China th e  s ta tu s  
o f  equal rank w ltn th e  United S ta te s , Great B rita in , and Russia, "during 
and a f t e r  th e  war, both fo r  th e  p repara tion  o f a postwar o rgan ization  and 
fo r  th e  establishm ent o f  s t a b i l i ty  and p ro sp e rity  in  th e  O rient.
In  1943, th e  United S ta te s  v e r if ie d  i t s  recogn ition  o f China a s  a 
prim ary power by th re e  major a c tio n s . One o f these  was the  re lin q u ish ­
ment o f  e x t r a te r r i t o r i a l  r i ^ t s  o f  th e  United S ta te s  in  China th r o u ^  th e  
t r e a ty  signed on January 11, 1943. A second occurred on October 30, 1943, 
wh«i China, a t  th e  in s is te n c e  o f th e  United S ta te s , became one o f  th e  signa­
to r ie s  o f  th e  D eclara tion  o f Four Rations on General S ecurity , and th e re fo r#
^5prime M in is te r Winston C hurchill o f  Great B rita in  d isagreed  w ith 
t h i s  "unreal standard  o f  values" th a t  he found in  Washington, both as to  
th e  co n trib u tio n s  China could make in  World War H  and in  th e  fu tu re . The 
Second World War: The Hinge o f Fate (Boston: Houghton M ifflin  Co., 1950),
p . 133; The Second World War; Closing th e  Ring (Boston: Houghton M J,fflin 
Co., 1951) .  PP* 328- 29.  Bumner Welles s ta te d  chat "China would never have 
b e w  so accepted as a Great Power had not Roosevelt overridden th e  J o in t  
B r itish  and Russian ob jec tions'."  "Two Roosevelt Decisions: One D ebit,
One C red it,"  Foreign A ffa irs , XXIX (Ja n ., 1951). 201.
66hu1^, I I ,  1583* Sumner W elles, Under Secretary  o f  S ta te  from 
1937 to  1943, s t a t  xi th a t  i t  was P residen t R oosevelt's  p o s itio n  "from th e  
o u tse t"  th a t  " recogn ition  o f  C hina 's s ta tu s  as one o f th e  fo u r m ajor Powers 
would prevent any charge th a t  th e  w hite races were undertaking to  dominate 
th e  world . . .  and would be a b a r r ie r  to  Soviet ambitions in  th e  Far East 
.  . . •"  Foraitm A ffa irs . XXIX, 199.
67huU, I I , 1583.
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vas recognized as a jo in t  p a rtn e r  In  prosecuting th e  war and developing 
post-w ar machinery to  keep th e  peace* China subsequently became one o f 
th e  peraanent members o f  th e  Security  Council o f th e  United Nations* A 
th ir d  dem onstration by th e  United S ta te s  in  19^3* o f  i t s  recogn ition  o f 
China as a g rea t power, and one th a t  Secretary  H ull considered e sp ec ia lly  
d e s ira b le , was th e  a c t passed by Congress on December 1 7 * ^  This s ta tu te  
repealed  th e  Chinese exclusion laws and placed th e  Chinese on a quota basis* 
Another step  by th e  United S ta te s  to  in d ic a te  i t s  recogn ition  o f  China* s 
ex a lted  s ta tu s  was taken a t  th e  Potsdam Conference i n  1945* A d iffe ren ce  
o f  opinion had developed over th e  ro le  China was to  assvme in  working out 
th e  peace settlem ents* Ihe is su e  was resolved  when C hurch ill and S ta lin  
accepted P residen t Truman's proposal to  include China as a member o f  th e  
proposed Council o f  Foreign M in isters  idien th a t  body was studying problems
f
involv ing  th e  East o r  th e  w orld-at-large*  ̂ 9
Economic S ta tu s o f  China 
Die d is r tp t io n  o f  o rder in  Chinese so c ie ty  brought on by Japanese 
aggression  and in te rn a l  p o l i t i c a l  d iffe ren ces  a lso  extended to  th e  economic 
realm* Die sources o f  government revenue were a l te re d  in  number and in  kind 
by th e  Japanese advance which deprived China o f revenue from commercial, 
in d u s t r ia l ,  and f in a n c ia l  c en te rs . Custom re c e ip ts , which had been the  
Government's main source o f  revenue in  th e  e a rly  and middle Wbrld War H
^U* S. Congress, An Act to  Repeal the  Chinese Erelngion Acts* to  
E stab lish  Quotas, and fo r  Other Purposes* Public law 199, 78th Cong*, 1 s t  
Sess*, 1943, pp* ëoO -01* H ull sa id  i t  "seemed anomalous to  s t r iv e  fo r  com­
p le te  cooperation w ith our Chinese a l ly  w hile b a rrin g  her c it iz e n s  from our 
shores*"
^^Herbert F e is , The China Tanglat The American E ffa r t in  China 
from P ea rl Harbor to  th e  M ardiall M ission (P rinceton; Princeton Univer­
s i t y  P ress , 1953) ,  p . 331.
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p eriod , dropped 85-90 p e r cent in  r e la t io n  to  th e  period  of 1928-1937 
and in te rn a l  ta x  re tu rn s  were cu t to  le s s  than h a lf  t h e i r  prewar le v e ls .
There was, concom itantly, an in c reas in g  tendency on th e  p a r t  o f th e  Govern­
ment to  re ly  on d ire c t  t^axation m e a s u r e s . I n  ad d itio n , Chiang Kai-shek 
had been forced  in to  th e  i n te r io r  and had to  r e ly  on th e  more conservative  
e lem œ t, th e  "arach a ir conservatives (land lo rd s) o f  a dead p a s t ."  These 
in f lu e n t ia l  land lo rds were "out o f  touch w ith th e  revo lu tionary  march o f  
even ts ,"  and th e  N ational Goveraaent was confronted w ith increasing  an i­
m osity idiich grew out o f  resentm ent toward increased  ta x a tio n , recru itm ent 
o f  m ili ta ry  personnel, o jm q p tio n , and in f la t io n .72
As war co s ts  soared, o th e r  p r ic e s  rose  because o f  th e  dwindling 
o f  supp lies . The s c a rc ity  o f  supp lies  was th e  r e s u l t  o f  severa l fa c to rs— 
d e s tru c tio n , reduction  o f  acreage under c u lt iv a tio n , lo s s  and d e te r io ra tio n  
o f  th e  tra n sp o rta tio n  and in d u s t r ia l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and th e  needs o f th e  
N a tio n a lis t, Japanese, and Communist arm ies. As World War I I  wore on,
7ÛGeorge Wbodbridge, ÜNHRA; The ^ s t o r v  o f  th e  United Nations 
R e lie f  and R eh ab ilita tio n  A dm inistration iNew Xoric: Columbia Ita iv e rs ity
P ress , 1950) ,  n ,  393» Chang KLa-Ngau s ta te d  th a t  th e  customs duty p e r ­
centage cooqx)sition o f  govenment ta x  revenue dropped from 4?. 8 in  1936- 
37 to  4 .1  in  1945. The In f la tln n a rv  "pi : The Rrperience  1" China.
1939-1950 (Cambridge and New Y ort: The Technology P ress o f  M assachusetts
I n s t i tu t e  o f  Technology and John Wiley Sons, I n c . ,  1958), p . 160.
T^Chang Kia-Ngau observed th a t  whereas th e  commodity ta x  co n sti­
tu te d  only 23.0  p e r cen t o f  th e  Govenment ta x  revenue in  1945 in  c o n tra s t  
to  25.8  p e r cent in  1936- 37# th e  s a l t  ta x  Juiq>ed from 25.8  p e r  cent in  1936-  
37 to  52.7  in  1945.  He a lso  noted th a t  >hereas d i r e c t  ta x a tio n  c o n s titu te d  
only  0 .6  p e r  cent o f  th e  1936-37 t o t a l  o f  ta x  revenue, i t  ro se  t o .20.2  p e r  cent 
in  1945.  However, he cautioned, i t  must be remembered th a t  t o t a l  ta x  
revenues provided fo r  only  8 .2  p e r cen t o f  Govenment expenditures in  1945, 
w ith non-tax revenue and sa le s  o f  bonds accounting fo r  th e  remainder.
Chang Kia-Ngau, p . 158.
7^Bowles, pp. 106- 07.
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in f la t io n  became in creas in g ly  acute* A m acter o f s ig n if ic a n t impoiv 
tance to  th e  United S ta te s , in  r e la t io n  to  i t s  a id  program, was th e  currency 
exchange ra te s  o f  th e  two countries*  Whereas a United S ta tes d o l la r  would 
purchase approxim ately 3*30 Chinese N ational Currency (CNC) d o l la r s ,  o r 
yuan, p r io r  to  Wbrld War I I ,  th e  o f f i c i a l  exchange r a te  .iunqped to  twenty 
CNC fo r  one United S ta te s  d o l la r  in  Januaxy, 19^5 and to  312 on th e  a c tu a l 
market* Vliile th e  o f f i c i a l  exchange ra te  remained a t  twenty CNC f o r  one 
United S ta te s  d o l la r  fo r  th e  p e rio d  under immediate study, th e  b lack  market 
r a te  increased  to  2 ,97^ in  Ju ly , 1945, be fo re  tap e rin g  o f f  to  1,330 and 
670 fo r  August and September o f  th a t  year* The decrease during th e  l a s t  
c ite d  months o f  1945 were probab]y a t t r ib u ta b le  to  th e  optim isa ^Aich came 
with th e  v ic to ry  over Japan*
73sased on in d ices  o f  w holesale p r ic e s  o f  b asic  commodities in  
Chungking, as revealed  by C en tra l Bank o f  China s t a t i s t i c s ,  and using  th e  
Jan*-June, 1937, average as a  base o f 1 , Wbodbridge s ta te d  th a t  th e  general 
index number o f  w holesale p r ic e s  in  wartime Chungking rose  to  2 in  Dec*, 
1939; 11 in  Dec*, 1940 ; 28 in  Dec*, 1941; 57 in  Dec*, 1942; 200 in  Dec*, 
1943; 549 in  Dec*, 1944; and 1,795 in  Aug*, 1945* Wbodbridge, p* 394.
Harry B* P ric e , A ss is tan t D irec to r o f  th e  UNRRA China O ffice , had in d i­
cated  th i s  in f la t io n a ry  tren d  in  Apr*, 1946* However, th e  f ig u re s  o f  
P rice  th a t  a re  c i te d  below, u n lik e  those quoted by Woodbridge, showed a 
cumulative in c re ase  in  p ric e s  over severa l periods o f  two years i n  duration  
ra th e r  than a y e a r ly  p rog ressive  r a te  increase* Based on in d ices  o f  whole­
s a le  p r ic e s  o f b a s ic  commodities in  Chungking, 1937-1945, as in d ic a te d  by 
C entral Bank o f China s t a t i s t i c s ,  and beginning w ith a base o f 1 , P rice  * 
s ta te d  th a t  p r ic e s  ro se  1*3 tim es from Sept*, 1937, to  Aug*, 1939; 16*3 
tim es from Sept*, 1939 to  Aug*, 1941; 6*7 tim es from Sept*, 1941, to  Aug*, 
1943; and 11*2 tim es from Sept*, 1943 to  Aug*, 1945* "UNRRA in  China, 
P r^ a re d  by Harry B* P rice" (U nited Nations R e lie f and R A a b ili ta tio n  
A dm inistration, Washington, D. C*, Apr*, 1948), O perational A nalysis Papers, 
No. 53, P* 78 [Mimeographed), in  th e  f i l e s  o f  RepresM itative Helen Gahagan 
Douglas, D ivision o f  M anuscripts, C k iversity  o f  Oklahoma l ib ra ry , Norman, 
Oklahoma* C ited h e re a f te r  as P r ic e , "UNRRA in  China," UNRRA, O perational 
A nalysis Pa e rs . No. 53, A p r,, 1948. Converting th e  fig u re s  used by P rice  
fo r  purposes o f  comparison w ith those  quoted by Woodbridge rev ea ls  th a t  
according to  P ric e  th e  general index nmnber o f  w holesale p rice s  ro se  to  21 
in  Aug., 1941, 141 in  Aug., 1943, and 1,590 in  Aug., 1945* These f ig u re s  
compare favorably  with th e  s l ig h t ly  h i ^ e r  ones c i te d  by Woodbridge, i*e*,
28 in  Dec*, 1941, 200 in  Dec*, 1943. and 1,795 in  Aug*, 1945*
74see Appendix I ,  p* 272.
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United S ta te s  O bjectives and Policy
According to  Secretary  o f S ta te  James F. Elyrnes, the  p o lic y  o f th e  
United S ta te s  toward China during and a f t e r  Vfor3d War I I  had two o b jec tiv e s . 
T estify ing  in  December, 19^5. before th e  Senate Committee on Foreign Rela­
t io n s  th a t  was in v e s tig a tin g  Far Eastern p o licy , he sa id :
During th e  war the  immediate goal o f th e  United S ta tes  in  China 
was to  promote a m il i ta ry  union o f th e  sev era l p o l i t i c a l  fa c tio n s  
in  o rder to  bring  t h e i r  combined power to  bear vqpon our common 
enemy, Japan. Our longer^range g oa l, then as now, and a goal o f 
a t  l e a s t  equal irqportance, i s  the  development o f  a strong , u n ited  
and democratic China.75
The emphasis, i t  w il l  be noted, was p laced  upon ending the  war w ith  Japan, 
th u s assigning a pre-em inent p o s itio n  to  th e  m il i ta ry  fa c to r  in  th e  re la ­
t io n s  between th e  United S ta te s  and China. The sheer n ecess ity  o f  win­
ning th e  war, o f course, d ic ta te d  the  p r io r i ty .  I t  was, however, in  try in g  
to  promote a "m ilita ry "  union o f  th e  " p o l i t ic a l"  fa c tio n s  in  China in  
o rd er to  speed up th e  Chinese m ili ta ry  co n trib u tio n  th a t  th e  m il i ta ry  and 
p o l i t i c a l  problems became p ra c t ic a l ly  in e x tr ic a b ly  interwoven and even tually  
unsolveable.
In  seeking to  carry  ou t i t s  p o lic y , th e  United S ta tes continued 
to  sijpport the  N ational Government o f  th e  Republic o f  China and G eneralis­
simo Chiang Eai-shek. American a ss is ta n c e  took th e  form o f  m a te r ia l, 
te c h n ic a l and p o l i t i c a l  measures.
M ateria l. Technical and Reonomic A ssistance. 7^ Total g ran ts  and
75published in  U. S ., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee o f  th e  Com­
m ittee  on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. S ta te  Department amoloyee Loyalty 
In v e s tig a tio n . 8 l s t  Cong., 2d S ess ., 1950, F t. 2, p . 1912. C ited  h e re a f te r  
as Senate Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee on Foreign R elations, S ta te  Depart­
ment Bnplovee H earings. 1950.
7°The United Nations R e lie f and R e h ab ilita tio n  A dm inistration, 
though created  on Nov. 9, 1943, functioned in  a minor capacity  in  th e  p e r i­
od preceding th e  end o f  World War H .  For th i s  reason, a ss is ta n c e  through 
th i s  agency i s  t r e a te d  ftiU y in  Chapter V.
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c re d its  au thorized  by th e  United S ta te s  to  China from 1937 to  March 21,
1949, amounted to  approximately $3,523,000,000. Of th i s  to ta l  $2,422,000,000 
was in  g ran ts  and $1,101,000,000 in  c re d its .  Forty p e r cent o f th e  t o t a l ,  
o r  approxim ately $1,515,700,000, was au thorized  p r io r  to  the  end o f  World 
War n. In  ad d itio n , m ili ta ry  and c iv il ia n - ty p e  su rp lus property  with a 
procurement value o f  $1,078,100,000 was so ld  to  th e  National Government 
fo r  a United S ta te s  re tu rn  of $368,500,000.7?
Lend-lease, one o f th e  p r in c ip a l means through which th e  United 
S ta te s  aided China, amounted to  $845,748,220.88 from i t s  incep tion  on 
May 6, 1941, u n t i l  V-J Day. As Table 1 in d ic a te s , len d -lease  was p rim arily  
o f  a m il i ta ry  n a t u r e . A l l  but approxim ately $20,000,000 o f th i s  t o t a l  
was made in  the  fo m  o f  g ran ts . The q u an tity  o f  American a id  to  China 
was r e s t r ic te d  because o f  the  p r io r i ty  given to  th e  war in  Europe, %Aich, 
according to  P residen t Truman, was determined in  December, 1941.?^ The 
a ss is ta n c e  provided through len d -lea se  was fu r th e r  hampered because no land  
rou te  in to  China was a v a ilab le  a f t e r  A pril, 1942, u n t i l  th e  opening o f  th e  
Ledo (S tilw e lll  Road from India through Burma in  January, 1945. IXiring 
th i s  period  th e  only  means o f supply was d e liv e ry  by a i r  cargo plane from
77see Appendix I I ,  p. 255*
78Secretary  o f  War Henry L. Stimson s ta te d  on Feb. 14, 1945, th a t  
th e  United S ta te s  fu rn ished  "su b s ta n tia l ly  a l l  o f  th e  equipment o f  th e  
Chinese d iv is io n s  tdiich f o u ^ t  in  Burma." U. S ., Congress, House Commit­
te e  on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings, on H. R. 2013. A f f i l l  to  Extend f o r  one 
Year th e  P rovisions o f  an Act (Lend-Lease) to  Promote thA Dafanse o f  th e  
U. S .. Approved Mar. 11. 1941. a s  M ended. 79th Cong.. 1 s t  S e ss .. 1945. 
p . 77.  C ited  h e re a f te r  as House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Lend-Lease 
Hearings. 1^5*
79u. s . .  P res id en t, 1945-53 (Truman), Tw enty-First Report to  Con-
fre ss  on Lend-Lease O perations, f o r  th e  Period~~râiH^ng Reptember 30. 1945 WaAington: U. S. Government P rin tin g  O ffice , 1945), House Doc. 432, 
p . 29.  C ited  h e re a f te r  as U. S ., P resid en t, 1945-53 (Truman), Twenty- 
F i r s t  TAnH_TAa«A Report. 1945, House Doc. 432.
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Ind ia  over the  Himalaya Moxmtains.®®
TABLE 1
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF PRE-V-J DAY LEND-LEASE AID*
C ategories T otal
Ordnance and Ordnance Stores  $153,333,189.94
A irc ra f t and ae ro n au tica l M a te r ia l ..........................................  187,339,849.94
Tanks and Other V ehicles   94,177,927.72
V essels and o th e r  W atercraft .  . .  . . . .  35,581,264.12
M iscellaneous M ilita ry  Equipment ..........................................  h7 ,058,115.94
F a c i l i t ie s  and Equipment   9,928,803.33
A g ricu ltu ra l, In d u s tr ia l  and Other
Commodities . . . . . . . . . . .  46,505,983.26
Testing and Reconditioning o f
Defense A rtic le s    204,393*63
Services and Ebqpenses   271.611.693.00
T otal  $845,748,220.88
^S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations with China. Annex 185, p . 1046. 
Aid o f a m il i ta ry  n a tu re  was extended by th e  Unit«3d S ta te s  in  th e  
form o f tec h n ic a l advice through th e  t ra in in g  o f  a i r  fo rce  personnel in  
opera tion  and maintenance procedures. Ihe United S ta te s  a lso  cooperated 
in  th e  development o f  more e f fe c tiv e  techniques fo r  supplying Chinese 
fo rces . In  the  tr a in in g  o f Chinese ground fo rc e s . United S ta te s  o f f ic e r s
8 0 s ta te  D ^artm en t, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 1045-46. Leo 
T. Crowley, Foreign Economic A dm inistrator, re fe rre d  to  an a l te rn a t iv e  
method o f  supply in  h i s  testim ony o f  Feb. 7, 1945 befo re  th e  House Commit­
te e  on Foreign A ffa irs . At t h i s  tim e, he sa id , a 2,000 m ile  p ip e lin e  '..'as 
being constructed  under len d -lea se , p a ra lle l in g  Ledo Road, to  b ring  gaso­
l in e  and o i l  fo r  th e  tra n sp o rta tio n  system and fo r  th e  a i r  fo rce . House 
Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Lend-Lease H earings. 1945, pp. 7-8 . P re s i­
dent Truman, in  re fe r r in g  to  th e  stepped-up program o f  len d -lea se  a id  to  
China, reported  on May 22, 1945 th a t  15,000 tru ck s and some railw ay equip­
ment were being sen t th e re  to  remedy th e  tra n sp o rta tio n  system, and th a t  
Chinese would be tra in e d  in  th e  United S ta te s  and in  th e  Far East to  th a t  
end. U. S ., P re s id en t, 1945-53 (Truman), Nineteenth Report to  Congress on 
Lend-Lease O perations, fo r  th e  Period Biding March 31. 1945 (Washington;
Ü. S. Government P rin tin g  O ffice , 19^5), House Doc. 189, pp. 22-23.
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were assigned to  th e  various u n i ts  "to give o p e ra tio n a l advice on a l l  le v e ls  
and under a l l  cond itions, includ ing  a c tiv e  c o m b a t * I n  ad d itio n , l i e u ­
ten an t General Joseph W. S ti lw e ll , Commanding General o f  United S ta te s  
Forces in  th e  China-Bunia*India Theater, became Chief o f  S ta ff  to  Chiang 
Kai-shek a t  th e  la t te r*  s request, and assumed command o f  a l l  Chinese troops 
assigned to  him th e  Generalissimo,®^ Major General A lbert C. W edan^er 
re ta in e d  the  p o s itio n  a s  Chief o f S ta ff  i6en  he was appointed to  succeed 
General S tilw e ll  in  October, 1944.^^ I t  i s ,  o f course, im possible to  
estim ate  in  monetary terms th e  value o f  a ss is ta n c e  o f t h i s  type*
Aid to  b o ls te r  C hina's in te rn a l  economy, thus streng then ing  the  
N ational Government in  i t s  war ag a in st Japan was provided by a $500,000,000 
Treasury C redit on February 7* 1942*®^ P residen t F ranklin  D* Roosevelt 
had asked Congress in  a l e t t e r  o f January 31, 1942, to  make such a id  a v a il­
a b le , noting  th a t  governmental o f f i c i a l s  o f  both th e  United S ta te s  and
G ls ta te  Department, U* S* R elations with China, pp* 342-46* When 
General A lbert C* Wedemeyer to ld  Senator Vfl.Uiam Knowland o f  C a lifo rn ia  
on June 11, 1951* th a t  th e re  was a m il i ta ry  advisory group in  China a f t e r  
Wbrld Wiar I I  bu t none w hile th e  war was going on, he was undoubtedly r e f e r ­
r in g  to  th e  M ilita ry  Advisory Group crea ted  by a p re s id e n tia l  d ire c tiv e  
on Feb* 25, 1946* U* S ., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services 
and Committee on Foreign R ela tions, H earings. Inqu iry  in to  M ilita ry  S itua­
t io n  in  th e  Far Ba s t  and Facts Surrounding R e lie f o f  Douglas MacArthur 
from h is  A ssigm ents in  th a t  Area. 82d Cong*, 1 s t  S e ss .,  1951, Pt* 3, PP* 
2358-59* C ited h e re a f te r  as Senate Committees on Armed Services and on 
Fbreign R elations, H earings. M jllltaTy S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far East. 1951*
®^State Department, U* S* R elations with China, pp* 29-30, and 
Annex 2? (a) and (b ), pp* 468-69*
83General Wedemeyer's testim ony o f  June 12, 1951* found in  Senate 
Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings* M ilita ry  
S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951* P t. 3, p . 2420.
®^* S*, Congress, Jo in t  Resolution to  Authorize th e  P residen t o f  
th e  United S ta te s  to  Render  Wnanci a l  Aid t a  q ilM . and fo r  Other Purposes. 
Public  Law 442, 77th Cong., 2d Sess*, 1 ^ ,  pp* 82-83*
36
China had d irec te d  h is  a tte n tio n  to  "the ex istence  o f urgent need fo r  th e  
immediate extension to  China o f  economic and f in a n c ia l  a ss is ta n c e , • • • 
d if f e re n t  in  fo m  from such a id  as Congress has a lready  au thorized . As 
in d ica ted  by Table 2, th ese  funds were used p rim a rily  by th e  Chinese Govern­
ment to  f ig h t  in f la t io n  and to  e s ta b lish  a re se rv e  ($200,000,000) fo r  th e  
redemption o f  s e c u r i t ie s  denominated in  United S ta te s  d o lla r s . The theory  
was th a t  in f la t io n  could be co n tro lled  by s e l l in g  $220,000,000 o f  gold in  
China, thereby reducing th e  currency in  c irc u la t io n , and by keeping th e  
p r ic e  o f gold low. £|y V-J Day China had drawn on th i s  c re d i t  to  th e  ex ten t 
o f $485,000,000.
P o l i t ic a l  R ela tions. Although the  c re a tio n  o f a m i l i ta r i ly  
u n ifie d  China was the  immediate o b jec tiv e  o f American p o licy , th e  Depart­
ment o f  S ta te  d id  not neg lec t the  long-range o b jec tiv e  o f  e s ta b lid iin g  
a strong and un ited  China fr ie n d ly  to  th e  United S ta te s . "Die re a l iz a t io n  
o f  both o b jec tiv e s  was p e r io d ic a lly  hindered by th e  strugg le  fo r  power 
between th e  Kuomintang and the  Communists and th e  re su ltin g  weakened condi­
t io n  o f  China. S ecre tary  o f S ta te  Dean Acheson siqaported th e  th e s is  th a t  
th e  en try  o f  th e  United S ta tes  in to  World War I I  may even have stim ula ted
®Estate Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. 32. The Ü. S.
Ambassador to  China, Clarence Gauss, in  a rep o rt to  Secretary  H ull on 
Dec. 30, 1941, s ta te d  th a t  Chiang Kai-shek had requested  th e  a id  on th a t  
d a te . Ib id . . Annex 28 (a ) , pp. 471-72. S ecre tary  H ull, though never 
" fa l te r in g  in  my b e l ie f  th a t  we should do everything in  our power to  a s s i s t  
China to  become strong and s ta b le , " was i r r i t a t e d  by th e  i r r e g u la r  deal­
in g s followed by Chiang, H. H. Kung (M in ister o f  Finance), and T. V. Soong
(M in ister o f  Foreign A ffa irs ) , in  contacting  th e  Treasury, Navy, and War
Departments and circumventing th e  D ^artm ent o f  S ta te . H ull, I I ,  I 586- 87. 
The S e c re ta ry 's  view about i r r e g u la r  con tacts o f  American o f f i c i a l s  by 
Chinese o f f i c i a l s  would seem to  be su b s tan tia ted  by th e  m u ltip le  number 
o f  communications included in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with 
China. Annex 28 (P ts . a - i i ) ,  pp. 471-509.
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TABLE 2
TRANSFERS TO CHINESE ACCOUNTS FROM THE 
FINANCIAL AID AUTHORIZED IN 1942&
Date o f  T ransfer Purpose
Amount
(m illio n s)
1. A pril 15, 1942 Establishm ent o f fund 
fo r  redemption o f  U. S. 
d o l la r  se c u rity  is su e s $200
2. February 1, 1943 Purchase o f  gold 20
3. March 2, 1943 Purchase o f  bank notes 
and supplies 20
4. October 13, 1944 Purchase o f  gold 20
5. May 22, 1945 Purchase o f  gold 60
6. June 12, 1945 
Ju ly  18, 1945
Purchase o f gold 60
7. Purchase o f  t e x t i l e s 10
8. Ju ly  27, 1945 Purchase o f  gold 60
9. August 3, 1945 Purchase o f  bank notes 35
10. February 7, 1946 Purchase o f  t e x t i le s 1 .5
11. March 13, 1946 Purchase o f  raw cotton
T otal . . .
13-5
^Source: S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 28,
p. 470.
86period ic  renewals o f  th e  Chinese c o n f lic t .  °  In  s p i te  o f th e  o b s ta c le s , 
however, th e  immediate o b jec tiv e  was achieved, and progress was made toward 
a so lu tion  o f  th e  long-range g o a l . ^7
®^In h is  "L e tte r  o f T ran sm itta l,” he s ta te d  th a t  "Once th e  United 
S ta tes  became a p a r t ic ip a n t in  th e  war, th e  Kuomintang was apparen tly  con­
vinced o f  th e  u ltim a te  defea t o f  Japan and saw an opportunity  to  improve 
i t s  p o s itio n  fo r  a show-down s tru g g le  with th e  Communists. The Communists, 
. . .  seemed to  see in  the  chaos o f  China an opportun ity  to  a t ta in  th a t  
which had been denied them befo re  th e  Japanese war, namely, f u l l  power in  
China." S ta te  D ^artm ent, U. S. R elations with China, p . v i .
®7As Secretary  Acheson sa id , however, th e  United S ta te s  had to  
adapt i t s  h is to r ic  concepts o f  p o licy  to  a new s i tu a t io n  (th e  worlds wide 
w ar), because during th i s  period  "two o f th e  fundamental p r in c ip le s  o f 
United S ta te s  p o liq r  in  regard to  China—nonin terference  in  i t s  in te rn a l  
a f f a i r s  and support o f  i t s  u n ity  and t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty —came in to  
c o n flic t  . . .  . "  Ib id .
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As the  prim ary emphasis was placed on winning the war, much of 
th e  e a rly  American e f fo r t  involved Genera]. S tilw e ll and some o f  h is  a ides. 
Because o f the  G enera l's  numerous m ili ta ry  d u tie s , fo u r caree r men o f the  
S ta te  Department—John P. Davies, John Stewart Serv ice , John finerson, and 
Raymond Ludien—were assigned to  h is  s t a f f  as p o l i t i c a l  a d v i s e r s . T h e i r  
d u tie s , as Service has s ta te d , were to  observe tho e ffe c tiv en e ss  o f  th e  
e f fo r ts  o f the  United S ta tes in  implementing i t s  p o lic y  and "to make rec­
ommendations from tim e to  tim e, in  th e  l ig h t  o f  changing circum stances, 
as to  th e  b est means o f  achieving th a t  po licy .
The e ffe c tiv en e ss  o f  th e  e f f o r ts  o f th e  United S ta te s  in  imple­
menting i t s  p o licy  depended to  a very  g re a t ex ten t upon vAat China was and 
was not doing. And th e  rep o rts  from th e  f ie ld  were no t encouraging. 9® The 
essence o f  th e  d ispa tches was th a t  th e re  was a steady d e te r io ra tio n  in  the  
re la tio n s  between S tilw e ll and Chiang, between th e  Kuomintang and th e  Com­
m unists, and in  th e  war e f fo r t  a g a in st Japan by both o f  th e  Chinese fac tio n s
SSQeneral Wedemeyer s ta te d  th a t  th i s  arrangement was made by Sec­
re ta ry  o f  War Henry L. Stimson through Secretary  o f  S ta te  C ordell Hull 
when Hull re lu c ta n tly  acceded to  th e  request. A lbert C. Wedemeyer, Wede­
meyer ReportsI (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1958), p. 303» Service 
s ta te d  in  h is  testim ony o f June 22, 1950* th a t  th e  fo u r were not "formal 
rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f  th e  S ta te  Department operating  an o f f ic e  o f  th e  S ta te  
Department abroad .  . . .  We were j u s t  tu rned  over to  th e  Army. We did  
no t rep o rt d i r e c t ly  to  th e  S ta te  Department, we d id  no t m aintain any S ta te  
Department o f f ic e ."  Senate Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee on Foreign Rela­
t io n s ,  S ta te  Department aiployee Loyalty Hearings. 1950, F t. 1 , I 3OO.
added th a t  i t  was irqxrrtan t to  remember, however, th a t  he 
"was p rim arily  a re p o rte r  and never a policy-form ing o f f ic e r  . . . . "
Senate Subcommittee o f  the  Committee on Foreign R ela tions, S ta te  Depart­
ment Bnployee Loyalty Ĥ arings. 1950, P t. 1, 1264-65.
90service , in  h is  remarks o f  June 22, 1950, s ta te d  th a t  th e  fou r 
Foreign Service O ffice rs  re fe rre d  to  above made re p o rts  to  the  Commanding 
General o f Army Headquarters and to  th e  Babassy i f  th e  inform ation was o f 
" p o l i t ic a l  im portance." S w ate  Subcommittee o f th e  Committee on Foreign 
R ela tions, S ta te  Department Banloyee Loyalty H earings. 1950, P t. 1 , 1300.
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and arm ies.91 Much o f  the  blame fo r  th ese  conditions was a tt r ib u te d  to  
th e  Kuomintang which, i t  was contended, had lo s t  th e  support o f  the  masses 
because o f  co rrup tion  in  the  governmental and m ili ta ry  s tru c tu re , suppres­
sion o f p o l i t i c a l  r ig h ts ,  and heavy tax a tio n  and in f la t io n .  In  a strong 
condonnation o f th e  un rep resen ta tive  ch arac te r o f  th e  Kuomintang, Service 
reported  th a t  i t  was a "congerie o f  conservative . . .  c liques in te re s te d  
p rim arily  in  the  p reserva tion  o f  t h e i r  own power . . .  and in  jockeying 
f o r  p o s itio n  among them selves." This "congerie," he noted, consisted  o f  
" the  ru ra l-g en tiy -la n d lo rd s  and m i l i t a r i s t s ,  th e  h igher ranks o f th e  govern­
ment bureaucracy, and merchant bankers . . .
The m atter which worried United S ta tes o f f i c i a l s  the  most, in  
view o f  th e  inform ation av a ilab le  to  them, was whether c iv i l  war could be 
avoided in  C h i n a . T h e  prevention o f  such a c o n f l ic t  would a id  th e  war 
e f f o r t  ag a in st Japan and the  accomplishment o f th e  primary o b jec tiv e  o f 
Am erica's fo reign  p o licy . VBLth th i s  in  mind, V ice-President Henry A.
Wallace was sent to  China in  June, 1944, "to get th e  maximum o f m ili ta ry  
co -ord ination" in  f ig h tin g  the  Japanese. 9^ Wallace to ld  th e  Generalissimo 
on June 21 th a t  P residen t Roosevelt was p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned about th e
9lThis a n a ly s is  i s  based on a s e r ie s  o f e x tra c ts  from th e  re p o rts  
o f  th e  Foreign Service O fficers a ttached  to  General S tilw e ll fo r  th e  y ears  
1943-44. S ta te  D ^artm ent, Ü. S. R elations with China. Armex 47, pp. 564- 
76.
92Ejctract o f  a repo rt dated June 20, 1944. Ib id . . p. 569*
93as e a rly  as Jan. 23, 1943, Service had in d ica ted  strong doubts 
along th i s  l in e  idien he reported th a t  " I t  i s  now no longer wondered whether 
c iv i l  war can be avoided, but ra th e r  A e th e r  i t  can be delayed a t  le a s t  
u n t i l  a f t e r  a v ic to ry  over Japan. " Ib id . , p. 570.
94L etter o f  Henry A. Wallace, "Wallace T e lls  His S to ry ,"  US Mews 
and World Report. XXXIV (Ja n ., 1953). 16. A s im ila r  view i s  expressed 
in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. 55*
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need fo r  a strong democratic China and th a t  he f e l t  th a t  in f la t io n  and th e  
continuing in te rn a l  c o n f l ic t  were re ta rd in g  progress in  th a t  d ire c tio n ,
The emissary a lso  to ld  Chiang th a t  the  P residen t had to ld  him th a t  i f  the  
Kuomintang and th e  Communists could not s e t t l e  th e i r  d iffe ren ces  they might 
" c a ll  in  a fr ie n d . " Further, Roosevelt m ight consider serving in  th a t  
capac ity . The Generalissimo on th e  follow ing day dwelled a t  length  on the  
reasons fo r  C hina's p l ig h t ,  but remarked to  Wallace on th e  l a s t  day o f 
t h e i r  meetings th a t :
The Chinese Communist question  i s  an in te rn a l  p o l i t i c a l  prob­
lem but he would nev erth e less  welcome th e  P re s id e n t 's  a ss is ta n ce .
He . . « would no t consider th e  P re s id e n t 's  p a r t ic ip a tio n  as med­
d lin g  in  C hina's in te rn a l  a f f a i r s ,  . • .96
Although Secretary  o f S ta te  Hull be lieved  th a t  "W allace's t r i p  was 
w ithout b e n e f ic ia l e f f e c t , "97 th e  record o f  th ese  m eetings su b s tan tia ted  
previous and continuing rqx>rts from th e  f i e ld  and from th e  Bnbassy in  
Chungking. Reacting to  th e  d iv ided  Chinese e f fo r t  a g a in st the  Japanese ,98
95lhe a n a ly s is  o f  th ese  m eetings o f  June 21-24 i s  based on notes 
taken by John C arte r V incent, Chief o f  th e  D ivision o f  Chinese A ffa irs , 
Department o f S ta te , vdio was designated  by th e  Department to  accompany 
Mr. W allace. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 43, pp. 
549-59* The O ffice  o f  War Inform ation sen t Owen L a ttia o re  to  handle pub­
l i c i t y  m atters  in  China. L e tte r  o f  Wallace to  P residen t Harry S. Truman, 
Sept. 19, 1951, p r in te d  in  New York Times. Sept. 24, 1951• P* 20.
98gtate  Department, U. S».R elations with China. Annex 43, p. 559*
97h u 11, I I ,  1585-86. The t r i p  had been suggested to  P residen t 
Roosevelt w ithout H u ll 's  foreknowledge, and th e  S ecre tary  opposed th e  t r i p  
from th e  beginning. Hull t r ie d  to  d issuade Wallace from th e  undertaking 
on th e  b a s is  th a t  "raw m ate ria ls"  frmn o u ts id e  th e  S ta te  Department were 
no t equipped to  handle such "im portant phases o f  our fo re ign  a f f a i r s ."
98Several a u th o r i t ie s  have he ld  th a t  th e  Communists con tribu ted  
l i t t l e  o r  nothing to  th e  e f fo r t  a f t e r  1941. For example, see testim ony 
o f  General C la ire  Chennault on May 29, 1952, in  U. S . , Congress, Senate, 
Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee o f  th e  Ju d ic ia ry , Hearings to  In v e s tig a te  
thA A dm inistration o f  th e  Intamal S ecurity  ^ t  and o th e r  In te rn a l Security  
Laws. 82d Cong». 1 s t  Sess», 1952, P t. 13. 4767* C ited h e re a f te r  as  Senate 
Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee o f  th e  Ju d ic ia ry , I n s t i tu t e  o f  P a c ific  Rela­
t io n s  Hearings. Also see statem ent o f  General Wedameyer in  S ep t., 1951,
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and cognizant o f mutual charges th a t  th e  o ther was responsib le  fo r  the  
s i tu a tio n . United S ta te s  Ambassador Clarence Gauss observed th a t  Chiang 
Kai-shek was "overlooking a very  im portant po in t"  in  try in g  to  solve th e  
in te rn a l  problem. The Ambassador was re fe rr in g  to  rep o rts  th a t  th e  Com­
m unists were improving th e  conditions o f  th e  masses w hile th e  Kuomintang 
was neg lec ting  th e  needs o f th e  people. Gauss suggested th a t  some o f th e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  might be resolved by perm itting  in f lu e n t ia l  p o l i t i c a l  elements 
to  assume some c f  the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  the  Government through th e  crea­
t io n  o f  a c o a lit io n  co u n c il.99
The id eas expressed above—m ilita ry  co -o rd in a tio n , c a llin g  in  a 
f r ie n d , and c rea tio n  o f  a c o a lit io n  council—began to  take on s ig n if ic a n t 
im portance. P residen t Roosevelt in  a s e r ie s  o f  messages to  Chiang Kai- 
shek in  July-A ugust, 1944, urged an increased  war e f f o r t  on th e  p a r t  of 
th e  Chinese and recommended th a t  General S tilw e ll be re c a lle d  from Buma 
and placed d ir e c t ly  under th e  Generalissimo in  command o f a l l  American and 
Chinese m il i ta ry  fo rce s . Chiang repeated ly  countered with th e  suggestion 
th a t  the  P residen t f i r s t  send a prominent American to  Chungking who was 
w ell prepared on both p o l i t i c a l  and m ili ta ry  m atte rs  so th a t  th e  problem
in  ib id . , 1951, FL. 3, 790. The opinion th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  cooperated 
in  th e  war e f f o r t  was voiced hy G aieral Wedemeyer in  h is  testim ony c f  
June 11, 1951, a s  found in  Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on 
Foreign R e la tions , H earings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, p t-  
3, 2298- 2304.  John Service contended th a t  n e ith e r  Chinese army f o u ^ t  th e  
Japanese u n less  i t  was to  th e  advantage o f  one Chinese aimy ag a in s t th e  
o th e r  Chinese army. See testim ony o f  June 22, 1950, in  Senate Subcommittee 
o f  th e  Committee on Foreign R ela tions, S ta te  Department Bimlovae Loyalty 
Hearings. 1950, P t. 1 , I 262- 63.
99RQX)rt o f th e  Ambassador to  S ecre tary  H u ll, Aug. 31, 1944, 
found in  S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations with China. Annex 45, pp. 5^1- 
63. H u ll 's  rep ly , S ^ t .  9, 1944, s ta te d  th a t  he  and th e  P residen t con­
sidered  th e  proposal "worthy o f  c a re fu l considera tion" i f  c a rr ie d  out 
"under th e  leadersh ip  o f  Chiang K ai-shek." Ib id . . Annex 46, pp. 563-64.
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could be studied  further*  As a r e s u l t  o f  th is  exchange o f messages Major 
General P a trick  J .  Hurley a rrived  in  China on September 6, 1944, as the  
Personal R epresentative o f  the  P residen t to  C h i n a . H u r l e y  was soon con­
vinced th a t  th e  Chinese war e f fo r t  was being o b struc ted  not only by th e  
c o n f l ic t  o f  th e  Kuomintang v is -a -v is  th e  Communists but a lso  because o f 
th e  s tra in ed  re la tio n s  between General S tilw e ll  and the  Generalissimo. 
Chiang in  ea rly  October s t i l l  had not agreed to  th e  P re s id e n t 's  recommen­
da tion  th a t  S tilw e ll be given command o f American and Chinese m ili ta ry  
fo rce s , and Hurloy concluded th a t  he never would appoint S tilw e ll .
Bringing the  impasse to  an end, th e  P re s id e n t 's  Personal R epresentative 
sen t him a telegram  on October 13 recommending th a t  S tilw e ll be re liev e d  
o f  h is  command and an American general a c c ^ ta b le  to  the  Generalissimo be 
a p p o i n t e d . s t i lw e l l  was re c a lle d  on October 24, 1944, and General 
A lbert C. Wedemeyer was appointed to  rep lace  him. Wedemeyer's d ire c tiv e ,
lO^The communications between Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek and 
H urley 's appointment a re  f u l ly  t re a te d  in  ib id . , pp. 66-68.
lOlHurley in  testim ony o f June 21, 1951. sa id  th a t  Chiang to ld  him 
in  Sept. and in  Oct., 1944, th a t  he had no confidence in  S t i lw e l l 's  m ili­
ta ry  judgment and th a t  he refused to  "unreservedly obey my o rd ers . "
H urley 's personal opinion was th a t  " the  two men a re  fundamentally incom­
p a tib le  and . . .  m utually  susp icious o f  each o th e r ."  Senate Committees 
on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings- M in ta rv  S itu a tio n  
in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. F t. 4 , 2870- 8O. S tilw e ll  apparen tly  had l i t t l e  
respec t fo r  th e  Generalissimo, as ^ e  follow ing d e sc rip tiv e  terms o f  him 
would imply: "Peanut"; "Most H i^  One"; " L i t t le  S qu irt" ; "Wonder Man";
"P i^eaded"; " i l lo g ic a l"  ; and o th e rs . Theodore H. White (ed. ) ,  The S t i l ­
w ell Papers (New York: William Sloane A ssocia tes, In c . ,  1946), passim.
102copy o f  the  telegram  i s  in se r te d  w ith th e  testim ony o f Hurley 
on June 21, 1951» befo re  th e  Senate Committees on Armed Services and on 
Foreign R ela tions, HearingSr M ilita r y S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951.
P t. 4, 2879- 81. Hurley s ta te d  h e re  th a t  th e  breaking p o in t came when 
S tilw e ll d e liv e red , in  a "pereegitofy manner," a  cab le  from Roosevelt c a l­
l in g  fo r  S ti lw e ll '3  appointment to  th e  p o s itio n  under question  and which 
cable S tilw e ll and Chiang considered to  be an ultimatum.
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which remained in  e f fe c t  u n t i l  World War I I  ended, s tip u la te d  :
1) That in  regard  to  th e  United S ta te s  combat fo rces under 
h is  command h is  primary m ission was to  c a r iy  out a i r  opera tions 
from China.
2) He was a lso  to  continue to  a s s i s t  th e  Chinese a i r  and ground 
fo rces in  o p e ra tio n s , t r a in in g , and lo g is t i c a l  siq)port.
3) He was to  co n tro l th e  a llo c a tio n  o f  Lend-Lease supplies 
de livered  in to  China, w ith in  p r io r i t i e s  se t  hy th e  J o in t  Chiefs 
o f S ta ff .
4} In  regard to  the  Chinese fo rces he was au thorized  to  
advise and to  a s s i s t  the  Generalissimo in  th e  conduct o f  m ili ta ry  
opera tions ag a in s t Japan.
5) He was no t to  use United S ta te s  resources to  suppress 
c iv i l  s t r i f e  except in so fa r  as necessary to  p ro te c t United S ta te s  
l iv e s  and p ro p e rty .103
Whatever th e  reasons fo r  the  c o n tr o v e r t  between S tilw e ll and 
Chiang Kai-shek, a tte n tio n  was now d irec te d  toward securing rapprochement 
between th e  N ational Government and th e  Chinese C o m m u n i s t s . H u r l e y ,  th e  
h ig h es t ranking American diplom atic o f f i c i a l  in  C h i n a , 5  urged a renewal 
o f  n eg o tia tio n s and made h is  se rv ices  av a ila b le  to  both s id e s . A fter 
co n su lta tio n  with Chiang Kai-shek, and agreement on a p lan  to  reso lve  th e
1030uoted in  F e is , p. 202.
104j^e United S ta te s  e f fo r ts  to  a s s i s t  th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  securing 
an agreement were aided  by th e  temporary easing o f  Japanese aggressive 
ac tio n s  and Wedemeyer's decision  to  leave p o l i t i c a l  m atters  to  Hurley w hile 
he a ttended to  m il i ta ry  a f f a i r s .  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith 
China, p. 69: Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, 
H earings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, P t. 3 , 2420.
105Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned on Nov. 1, 1944, Hurley 
became Ambassade redesigna te  on Nov. 30, and presen ted  h is  c re d e n tia ls  on 
Jan. 8 , 1945. S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations w ith China, p. 59» K u r i l 's  
d u tie s  as Ambassador were: "(1) to  prevent th e  co llap se  o f  th e  N ational
Government, (2) to  su s ta in  Chiang Kai-shek as P residen t o f  th e  Republic 
and Generalissimo o f th e  A m ies, (3) to  ham onize r e la t io n s  between th e  
Generalissimo and th e  American Commander, (4) to  promote production o f  war 
sup p lies  in  China and prevent economic co llap se , and (5) to  un ify  a l l  th e  
m il i ta ry  fo rces in  China fo r  th e  purpose o f  defea ting  Japan. * Quoted in  
H urley 's  testim ony o f  June 21, 1951, Senate Conmittees on Amed Services 
and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast.
1951. P t. 4 , 2907.
Chinese s i tu a t io n , th e  American Ambassador took th e  proposal to  a confeiv 
ence with Mao Tse-tung in  Yenan.^^^ Mao, Chainnan o f  th e  C entral Executive 
Committee o f th e  Chinese Communist P arty , rev ised  th e  proposal and issued  
h i s  own on November 10, 1944. The d r a f t ,  e n ti t le d  "Agreement between th e  
N ational Government o f  China, th e  Kuomintang o f  China and th e  Communist 
P a rty  o f China," demanded th a t  " a l l  an ti-Japanese  p a r tie s "  be le g a liz e d  
and th a t  the  p a r t ie s  be represen ted  in  a c o a lit io n  goverm ent possessed 
o f  re a l  power. Mao's proposal fu r th e r  demanded th a t  th e  N ational M ilita ry  
Council be reorganized in to  th e  United National M ilita ry  Council th r o u ^  
th e  in c lu sio n  o f  rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f " a l l  an ti-Japanese  arm ies." A ll 
a n d e s  would then  be sub jec t to  th e  o rders o f  th e  c o a lit io n  government and 
th e  new m ilitax y  o rgan iza tion  and would receive  an equ itab le  d is tr ib u t io n  
o f  a l l  supplies secured from fo re ign  s o u r c e s .
Hurley believed  th a t  th e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  fo r  a settlem ent were im­
proved by th e  p lan  embodied in  the  f iv e  Point D raft Agreement and presen ted  
i t  to  th e  N ational Government. The Chinese Govenment re je c ted  Mao Tse- 
tu n g 's  o f fe r ,  however, and submitted i t s  own Three-Point Plan. The N ational 
Government's s in e  qua non fo r  an adjustmmit o f d iffe ren ces  was th e  in co r­
po ra tio n  o f th e  Communist kxtoy in to  th e  N ational Amy before government 
reo rgan iza tion . Once th i s  had been acconq)lished, th e  Ccmmunist fo rces
lOÔHurley sa id  in  a telegram  o f Jan. 31. 1945, to  Secretaxy o f 
S ta te  Edward R. S te t t in iu s  th a t  he "evolved” th e  proposal a f t e r  consul­
t in g  with T. V. Soong [M in ister f o r  Foreign A ffa irs ) , Wang Shih-chieh 
[M in ister o f  In fo m a tio n ) , and Genexal Chang Tz»-chung (D irector o f  P o l i t ­
i c a l  Training o f  th e  N ational M ilitaxy C ouncil). Copy o f telegram  in  
Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings, 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 5 , Appendix W , 3670- ^ .
107Copy o f  te x t  o f  proposal i s  published in  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R ela tions w ith China, pp. 74-75. The d ra f t  i s  c i te d  h e re a f ts r  as Flvo- 
P o in t D raft Agreement.
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would be tre a te d  l ik e  o th e r components o f  the  N ational Amy and the  Com­
munist P arty  would be le g a lly  recognized. The N ational Government fu r th e r  
demanded th a t the  Communist P arty  fu l ly  support th e  Government in  th e  war 
ag a in st Japan and in  th e  post-w ar reco n stru c tio n  period .
At th is  p a r t ic u la r  stage o f th e  n eg o tia tio n s , the  crux o f  the  
d iffe ren ces  seemed to  be th a t  th e  Communists demanded a strengthened p o l i t ­
i c a l  p o s itio n  before they  would in te g ra te  th e i r  am y on a n a tio n a l b a s is , 
and th e  Government demanded th a t  th e  (kmmunist troops become p a r t  o f  th e  
National Amy before p o l i t i c a l  reo rgan iza tion  would be c a rr ied  o u t. Each 
considered acceptance o f  th e  o th e rs  proposal to  be a weakening o f  i t s  own 
p o s itio n .
A temporary impasse ensued from the  d a te  o f th e  Three-Point Plan 
u n t i l  January 23, 1945*^^9 Chou B i- la i ,  th e  Communist rep re se n ta tiv e  in  
Chungking, considered th e  N a tio n a lis ts ' rep ly  to  be a re je c tio n  o f  th e  Com­
m unists ' e a r l ie r  proposal and re tu rned  to  th e  Communist c a p ita l  a t  Tenan. 
Amid th re a ts  to  end th e  n e g o tia tio n s . Hurley w rote numerous l e t t e r s  to  
Chou and Mao Tse-tung urging a reopening o f th e  conferences. R eplies were 
e i th e r  negative in  ch arac te r o r  suggested amendments to  th e  proposals. 
Hurley to ld  Chou th a t  th e  suggested amendments were a departure from "our 
o rig in a l agreed procedure" to  concur on "general p r in c ip le s  before  d is ­
cussing sp e c if ic  d e ta i l s .  N evertheless, th e  l e t t e r  w ritin g  continued,
lOBcopy o f te x t  o f  th e  Three-Point Plan i s  published in  ib id . , p . 75*
l^^Hurley believed  th a t  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  were being obstruc ted  
fo rces  o th e r  than th e  two Chinese groiq)s. In  a telegram  to  th e  S ecre tary  
o f  S ta te  on Jan. 31, 1945, he s ta te d  th a t ,  in  a d d itio n  to  th e  "stand p a t 
element” i n  th e  Kuomintang and th e  Communist P a rty , opposition  was a lso  
coming from r ^ r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  " a l l  th e  j jq p e r ia l is t  governments," and some 
American diplom ats and m il i ta iy  personnel. Senate Committees on Aimed Ser­
v ic e s  and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings- M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast. 1951, P t. 5 , i ^ e n d ix  W , 3672.
H^Telegram from Hurley to  Secretaxy o f S ta te  S te tt in iu s ,  Feb. 7» 
1945, published in  ib id . , pp. 3673-74.
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and on January 23# 1945» Mao Tse-tung informed Hurley th a t  Chou E h-la i 
was re tu rn in g  to  Chungking to  reopen n eg o tia tio n s .
Apparently im patien t with th e  stalem ate th a t  had continued a f t e r  
Chou's a rr iv a l#  Hurley informed Qiiang Kai-shek on February 3 th a t  "he 
could a ffo rd  to  make p o l i t i c a l  concessions and shorten th e  period o f  tra n ­
s i t io n  in  o rder to  ob ta in  co n tro l o f th e  Communist f o r c e s ." lH  On th a t  same 
day a new agreement was worked out between th e  Government and the  Com­
munist r ^ r e s e n ta t iv e  and presen ted  to  th e  American Ambassador. I t  
provided fo r  th e  c re a tio n  o f a P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative  Conference composed 
o f  th e  various p o l i t i c a l  and non-partisan  elem ents. The number o f d e le ­
gates# by group and in  to ta l#  and th e i r  method o f  se le c tio n  were not s t i p ­
u la te d . .  Their fu n c tio n  was to  consider measures fo r :  (1) ending th e
period  o f  p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  th r o u ^  th e  establishm ent o f  " c o n s titu tio n a l 
government#" (2) in te g ra tin g  th e  m ili ta ry  forces# and (3) detenoining th e  
ro le  o f  members o f  p a r t ie s  o th e r than th e  Kuomintang in  th e  National Govern­
ment.
I t  would appear# in  view o f previous re su lts#  th a t  accomplishments 
o f  th e  Conference would be n e g lig ib le . For# as th e  d r a f t  stated# th e  
N ational Government would no t be o b liga ted  to  ca rry  out th e  recommendations 
o f  th e  conferees u n less  they  had received  unanimous approval. F urther, no
•^ H u rle y , Telegram to  th e  Secretaxy o f  State# Feb. 18# 1945.
I b id . . pp. 3676- 77.  Hurley added in  th e  same telegram  th a t  in  l a t e  Jan . 
he to ld  Wang S h ih -ch i^ #  M in ister o f Inform ation o f  th e  National Govern­
ment and one o f  i t s  r ^ r e s e n ta t iv e s  in  th e  nego tiations#  th a t  "the funda­
mental is su e s  involved had been debated ty  every one so many tim es th a t  we 
were now merely rep ea tin g  what had been sa id  befo re . I  reminded them th a t  
they  had been n eg o tia tin g  w ith th e  Communists f o r  over f iv e  years# . . .  
th a t  th e re  had been too much n eg o tia tio n  and no a c tio n ."
^ ^ A  copy o f  th e  proposal i s  found in  S ta te  Department# Ü. S. 
R elations with China, p . 81.
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d e f in i te  commitments were made by e i th e r  an tag o n is t. Ihe Chinese only 
agreed to  seek agreement, and even then they had no t es tab lish ed  a d a te  fo r  
th e  p a r tic ip a n ts  to  convene. However, I t  must be remembered th a t  th e  Con­
ference , as I t s  f u l l  t i t l e  Ind ica ted , was p rim arily  an advisory one. One 
must a lso  keep In  mind th a t  th e  National Government was re lu c ta n t to  make 
any major rev is io n s  during the  war ag a in st J ^ a n  fo r  f e a r  th a t  weaknesses 
would re s u l t  and bring  about I t s  c o l l a p s e .  ^ 3
The immediate reac tio n  to  th e  new proposal was a mixed o n e .^ ^  
According to  H u r l^ .  Chou B i- la l  was o p tim is tic  over th e  p rospects o f fu tu re  
cooperation id ille  Chiang Kai-shek f e l t  th a t  too many concessions had been 
made to  secure th a t  cooperation. Hurley d id  not b e liev e  th a t  th e  Ckm- 
m unlst p o s itio n  had changed since  he s ta r te d  n eg o tia tin g  with them In  
November. 1944. He could see no p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  Communist cooperation u n t i l  
th e  tu te la g e  stage  o f  th e  Kuomintang was ended In  favo r o f  a c o a lit io n  
government based on rep resen ta tio n  o f  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s .  The Commu­
n ists*  thus, were making a d is t in c t io n  between th e  N ational Government and 
th e  Kuomintang P a rty , and Hurley d id  not b e liev e  they  would re le a se  t h e i r  
troops to  th a t  government u n t i l  p a r t ie s  o th e r than  th e  Kuomintang were a lso  
perm itted  to  a c tiv e ly  p a r t ic ip a te  In  th e  form ulation o f  I t s  p o licy . Neveiv 
th e le s s . some p rogress seemed to  have been made, and Chou £ h -la l l e f t
Chungking fo r  co n su lta tio n s w ith Mao Tse-tung In  Tenan on February 16. 1945*
^ 3 T h ls  l a t t e r  view was esqpressed to  Hurley by T. V. Soong. Senate 
Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  
S itu a tio n  In  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t. 5, -^Jpendlx W  I Telegram from H u r l^
to  th e  Secretary  o f  S ta te , dated  Feb. 18, 1945), 3677*
1^4'Ihls account o f th e  views o f Ambassador Hurley. Chiang Kai-shek 
and Chou E n-la l I s  based on a telegram  from Hurley to  Secretary  S te t t in iu s  
on Feb. 18. 1945, sum lng up th e  n eg o tia tio n s ju s t  p r io r  to  h is  departu re  
f o r  th e  United S ta te s . Ib id . . pp. 3676-79*
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The Aabassador, apparen tly  welcoming t h i s  b r ie f  l u l l  in  th e  nego­
t ia t io n s .  departed fo r  Washington on February 19# Accompanied by General 
Wedemeyer, he intended to  seek th e  answer to  a question  which had been 
tro u b lin g  him and to  which he had re fe rre d  in  h i s  telegram  o f  th e  preceding 
day to  Secretaxy S te tt in iu s .  According to  t h i s  cab le , he in te rp re te d  a 
recen t message o f th e  S ecre tary  a s  g iving him a u th o r ity  to  make suggestions 
to  th e  n eg o tia to rs  but no t to  ixqplement them. In d ica tin g  a d e f in i te  d i f ­
ference  o f  opinion with th e  S ta te  Department, Hurlqy s ta te d  in  h is  telegram  
th a t  th a t  procedure had been follow ed by Ambassador Gauss and had f a i le d  
com pletely "because i t  lacked vigorous im p lem en ta tion ."^^
While Hurley was i n  Washington United S ta te s  o f f i c i a l s  were con­
fro n ted  w ith severa l problems re la te d  to  th e  p o lic y  toward China. One o f  
th e se  was A e th e r  a id  should be extended to  th e  Chinese Communists a s  w e ll 
a s  to  th e  R ^ u b lic  o f  China. The is su e  was germane because United S ta te s  
p o lic y  had c o n s is te n tly  supported u n if ic a tio n  o f  a l l  Chinese m ili ta ry  
fo rces  to  d e fea t th e  Japanese, and Ambassador H urley 's  dixrective included  
such a p r o v i s i o n . B u t  th a t  p o lic y  had a lso  c o n s is te n tly  supported th e  
N ational Government and Chiang Kai-shek. The question  o f d e s i r a b i l i ty  o f  
a id  to  th e  Chinese Communists had b e œ  ra ise d  on e a r l ie r  o c c a s i o n s , b u t
l^^Telegram from Hurlqy to  th e  S ecre tary  o f  S ta te , Feb. 18, 194̂ 5# 
I b i d . . p . 3679.
H 6supra. n. 105. Hurlqy had c o n s is te n tly  opposed a id ing  th e  Chinese 
Communist P arty  in  any way on th e  b a s is  th a t  i t  would o b s tru c t r a th e r  than  
he lp  u n if ic a tio n  e f fo r ts  and was in c o n s is te n t w ith h is  d ire c tiv e . H is 
dec ision  to  deny a  request fo r  such a id  by th e  Communist g en era l, Chu T A , 
i s  re la te d  in  a telegram  to  th e  Secretary  o f  S ta te  on Jan. 31, 19^5, inco iv  
porated  in  Smuite Committees on Armed Services and on Fbreign R ela tions, 
Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t. 5, Appendix W ,
U 7 fb r  exaaqxle, th e  rep o rts  to  th e  Department o f  S ta te  o f  Fbreign 
Service O ffice rs  John Davies on Dec. 12, 1944, and Raymond Ludden and John
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th e  ten sion  o f th e  moment was c rea ted  by a rep o rt to  th e  Department o f 
S ta te  by th e  American Charge d*A ffaires a t  Chungking, George Atcheson.
This d ispa tch , dated  February 26, 1945* a rriv ed  in  Washington idxile Hurley 
was th e re  fo r  co n su lta tio n . In d ica tin g  th a t  i t s  conten ts re f le c te d  the  
Im pression o f  the  observers in  Chungking, th e  rep o rt s ta te d  th a t  events 
appeared to  be lead ing  to  c iv i l  war. The rep o rt fu r th e r  suggested th a t  
considera tion  be given to  supplying and cooperating with "the Communists 
and o th e r su ita b le  g ro ins who can a id  in  t h i s  war aga in st th e  Japanese." 
Atcheson* s d ispatch  a lso  sp ec ified  th a t  t h i s  d id  not mean a decrease in  
a ss is ta n ce  to  the  N ational Government, and th a t  th e  suggestion should be 
discussed in  th e  presence o f Generals Hurley and Wedemeyer. The Ambas­
sador strong ly  opposed taking such a c tio n , and th e  m atter was dropped.
Hurley* 6 presence in  Washington a lso  came during a  period  in  
which th e  form ulation and in^lem entation o f  United S ta te s  p o licy  became 
more deeply entangled in  an in t r i c a t e  network o f  fa c to rs  involving th e  
prosecu tion  o f th e  war against Japan. One phase o f  th i s  complex involved 
th e  maintenance o f  amicable re la tio n s  between China and Russia and th e  
ex ten t to  lAich th e  United S ta te s  im plica ted  i t s e l f  in  th is  m atte r. The 
problem had ram ifica tio n s which antedated H urley 's t r i p  to  Washington.
In  one o f  th ese , Chiang Kai-shek had to ld  V ice-President Wallace during 
h is  1944 m ission to  China th a t  a Sino-Russian conference was needed to  
improve th e  re la tio n s  o f  th e  two. He asked th e  V ice-President to  convey
Stewart Service on Feb. 12, 1945, e i th e r  s ta te d  o r  ia p lie d  th a t  accomplish­
ment o f  United S ta te s  po licy  m i ^ t  be aided by such a move. The re p o rts  
d ir e c t ly  s ta te d , however, th a t  th e  United S ta te s  should continue to  recog­
n ize  th e  N ational Goverment w ith Chiang Kai-shek as i t s  P res id en t, and 
provide i t  with m a te r ia l and support. S ta te  D ^artm ent, U. S. R elations 
with China. Annex 47, pp. 574-76.
l^A tcheson* s rep o rt and th e  d isp o s itio n  o f  i t s  suggestion a re  f u l ly  
tre a te d  in  ib id . , pp. 87-92.
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h is  request to  P residen t Roosevelt th a t  th e  American P resident use h is  good 
o f f ic e s  to  bring  about such an assaably* Roosevelt, in  a c o rd ia l rep ly  o f 
Ju ly  14, 1944, in fo raed  the  Generalissimo th a t th e  proposed meeting would 
have a b e t te r  chance o f  success i f  th e  Chinese ai d th e  Chinese Communists 
f i r s t  arranged a working agreement fo r  e ffe c tiv e  p rosecu tion  o f  th e  war 
a g a in st Japan.
On another occasion p r io r  to  H urley 's departu re  fo r  Washington in  
February, 1945. th e  N ational Government had sought th e  a ss is ta n c e  o f  the  
United S ta te s  in  i t s  r e la t io n s  with th e  Union o f Soviet S o c ia l is t  Republics. 
Ambassador Hurlqy reported  to  th e  Department o f S ta te  on February 4, 1945. 
th a t  Chiang Kai-shek was contemplating sending T. V. Soong to  Moscow to  
promote Jiam onious re la tio n s  with Russia. In th i s  connection, he continued, 
th e  Generalissimo would welcome any "changes o r suggestions” th e  United 
S ta te s  Government would care  to  make in  th e  te n ta t iv e  agenda which he fo r ­
warded. The rep ly  o f  th e  United S ta te s  Government, as  in  th e  one o f  P re s i­
dent Roosevelt re fe rre d  to  above, in d ic a te d  a d e s ire  to  help th e  Chinese 
Government. But, Hurley was informed, "We should no t perm it th e  Chinese 
Government to  gain  th e  im pression th a t  we a re  prepared to  assume responsi­
b i l i t y  as 'a d v is e r ' to  i t  in  i t s  r e la t io n s  with th e  USSR.
However, w hile th ese  in s tru c tio n s  were being d ra fted  fo r  Ambassador 
Hurley, a conference was being he ld  a t  Y alta in  which th e  United S ta te s  d id  
agree to  advise China in  i t s  re la tio n s  w ith the  Soviet Union. In  th i s
^ ^ C h ia n g 's  request o f  P residen t Roosevelt i s  re fe rred  to  in  John 
C arte r V incen t's  tra n s c r ip tio n  o f  th e  no tes taken during th e  ta lk s  between 
Wallace and th e  G oieralissim o. D)id. . Annex 43. p . 550. R oosevelt's  
rep ly  i s  found in  Annex 44, p . 5^0, o f th e  same source.
120ib id . . pp. 92-93.
-̂21a copy o f  th e  te x t  o f  th e  Y alta  Agreement, Feb. 11, 1945, i s  
found in  ib id . , pp. 113-14. China was no t represen ted  a t  t h i s  conference
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meeting th e  Soviet Union committed i t s e l f  to  e n te r  the  war ag a in st Japan 
w ith in  two o r  th re e  months a f t e r  th e  war with Germany was tenn inated . The 
pledge was made to  th e  United S ta te s  and Great B rita in  on February 11, 19^5* 
and th e  United S ta te s  agreed th a t  th e  P residen t would "take measures" to  
secure th e  compliance o f  Chiang Kai-shek to  some o f  th e  conditions govern­
ing  R ussia 's  en try  in to  th e  c o n f l ic t .  Among th e se  provisos were: (1) p re s ­
e rva tion  o f th e  s ta tu s  quo in  Outer-Mongolia, (2) in te rn a tio n a liz a tio n  
o f  the  "commercial p o rt o f Dairen" and th e  p ro te c tio n  o f R u ss ia 's  "pre- 
e n in œ t in te re s ts "  th e re , (3) re s to ra tio n  to  Russia o f th e  " lea se  o f Port 
Arthur as a naval base ,"  and (4) jo in t  Sino-Soviet operation  o f  th e  Chinese- 
Eastezn and South Manchurian R ailroads. Russia, in  accepting these  con­
d itio n s  and some o th e rs  un re la ted  d i r e c t ly  to  China, agreed to  C hina's 
re te n tio n  o f  sovereign ty  in  Manchuria, and to  make a "pact o f  frien d sh ip  
and a llian ce*  w ith China.
The decision  to  agree to  th e se  conditions fo r  R u ssia 's  p a r t i c i ­
p a tion  in  th e  Far E astern  war has been ju s t i f i e d  by th e  Department o f 
S ta te  on th e  ground o f  "m ilita ry  n e c e ss ity . The piim aiy o b jec tiv e  was
and was n o t, th e re fo re , a  signato ry  o f  th e  p ac t. China was to ld  o f  i t s  
p rov isions on June 15. 1945* Harriman sa id  th a t  th e  Chinese were not in ­
formed e a r l ie r  o f  th e  Y alta compact because R u ss ia 's  en try  in to  th e  war 
was a  m ili ta ry  s e c re t ,  and i t  was necessary  to  ta k e  a l l  p recau tions ag a in s t 
th e  d isc lo su re  o f  Russian troop movements to  th e  Far East. Harriman s ta te -  
m w t, Ju ly  13, 1951» Senate Committees on Armed Services and oq Foreign 
R ela tions, H earings- M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, 5, Appen­
d ix  NN. 333^1
I n s t a t e  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 114-15, 126. 
Probably few agreem w ts between heads o f  s ta te  have re su lte d  in  controver­
s ie s  o f  such in te n s i ty ,  scope, and du ra tion  as th e  Y alta Agreement. These 
c o n tœ tio n s , pro and con, w il l  be t r e a te d  throughout th i s  wort in  so f a r  
as they  a re  ap p licab le , ra th e r  than  in  a sec tion  devoted exclusively  to  
th e  many ram ifica tio n s o f  th e  s to ry . For an e x c e l la i t  d iscussion  o f th e  
Y alta Papers, see John L. Snell and O thers, The Meaning o f Y alta : Big
Three Dinlmmanv and th e  New Balance o f  Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
S ta te  U niversity  P ress , 1956).
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to  end th e  war a g a in st Japan as early  as p o ss ib le . Hence, g e ttin g  Russia 
in to  th e  c o n flic t  a t  a time vdien her co n trib u tio n  would be most e ffe c tiv e  
would co n trib u te  to  an ea rly  cessa tion  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  and th e  saving o f 
m illio n s  o f l iv e s .  I t  was believed th a t  detezm ination o f th e  Soviet Union's 
demands p r io r  to  i t s  d e c la ra tio n  o f war might prevent post-w ar disagreem ents 
in  th e  Far E ast, and, i f  i t  d id  no t, th e  Soviet Union would be v io la tin g  
i t s  own commitment. Ambassador Hurley, who was s t i l l  in  Washington, de­
pa rted  on A pril 3. 1945, fo r  Chungking by way o f  London and Moscow. He 
l a t e r  to ld  a congressional hearing th a t  P residen t Roosevelt had confided 
in  him th a t  some o f h is  "fea rs"  about th e  Y alta compact were ju s t i f i e d ,  
and th a t  th e  P residen t asked him to  go to  London and Moscow to  "am eliorate" 
th e  agrément. Hurley a lso  to ld  the  Senators th a t  he was "making headway" 
u n t i l  a cable was de livered  to  him informing him o f the  death o f P residen t 
Roosevelt and s ta tin g  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  was "irrevocab ly  committed" 
to  th e  Y alta Agreement.
Whether t h i s  account o f  the  Ambassador's in s tru c tio n s  was c o rre c t 
o r  n o t, i t  was no t s p e c if ic a lly  corroborated by a repo rt he made to  th e  
Department o f  S ta te  on A pril 17, 1945.^^^ According to  th i s  cab le , he d id
^^^Testimony o f  June 21, 195^-, before  Senate Committees on Armed 
Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. Mil i t a r y  S itu a tio n  in  th e  
Far E ast. 1951. P t. 4, 288ii-88 , 2942.
^24sta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 94-96. W. 
A verell Harriman, Ambassador to  th e  Soviet Union a t  th e  tim e o f H urley 's 
v i s i t ,  s a t  in  on th e  conferences o f th e  l a t t e r  w ith S ta lin  and Molotov, the  
Russian Foreign M in iste r. In  a statem ent o f Ju ly  13, 1951, he challenged 
H urley 's testim ony above in  th e  follow ing words: "He stayed with me during
h is  v i s i t .  At no tim e d id  he in d ic a te  to  me th a t  P residen t Roosevelt was 
d is tu rbed  about th e  understanding reached a t  Y alta o r  th a t  he desired  th a t  
t h i s  understanding be am eliorated. On th e  con tra ry , the  purpose o f  . . . 
H urley 's v i s i t  to  Moscow, as he s ta te d  i t  to  me and to  S ta lin , was to  f in d  
ou t from Stalin lA ether Chiang could be to ld  about the  Y alta understanding 
and to  help  f a r th e r  cement th e  re la tio n s  between th e  Soviet Union and th e  
Chinese N ational Government." Senate Committees on Armed Services and on
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secure, however, rea ffirm a tio n  o f S ta l in ’ s support fo r  the  u n if ic a tio n  of
th e  Chinese m il i ta ry  fo rces and the  government o f  th e  Republic o f  China
with Chiang Kai-shek as i t s  p res id en t.
United S ta te s  o f f i c i a l s  accepted th is  re p o rt by Hurley as fa c tu a lly
c o rre c t, but sev era l o f  than were d is tu rb ed  by h is  seemingly unquestioned
acceptance o f S ta l in 's  prom ises. This view was e^qpressed in  a telegram
of George Kennan, th e  Charge d 'A ffa ire s  in  Moscow, to  Ambassador W. A verell
Harriman vdio was in  Washington fo r  co n su lta tio n . Recommending th a t  "the
re a l  ch arac te r and im p lica tions of Russian Far E astern aims" be examined
with " c l in ic a l  o b je c t iv i ty ,"  Kennan reminded Harriman th a t:
. . .  to  th e  Russians words mean d if fe re n t  th in g s  than they  do 
to  us. S ta lin  i s  prepared to  accept th e  p r in c ip le  o f u n if ic a tio n  
o f Chinese Armed fo rce s  and th e  p A n c ip le  o f  a un ited  China since  
he knows th a t  th ese  conditions a re  fe a s ib le  only  on terms accep t­
ab le  to  th e  Chinese Communists. S ta lin  i s  a lso  prepared to  accept 
th e  idea o f  a f re e  and democratic China since  a f re e  China means 
to  him a China in  idiich th e re  i s  a minimum o f  fo re ign  in fluence
o th e r than R u s s i a n . ^25
Harriman voiced th e  opinion th a t  H urley 's "too o p tim is tic  impres­
sion o f  • . . S t a l in 's  re a c tio n s” m ight "arouse unfounded eoqpectations" in  
Chiang Kai-shek i f  th e  Ambassador were not c a re fu l in  h is  d iscussions with 
C h i a n g .  ^26 O n  H arrim an's recommendation, Secre tary  S te t t in iu s  in s tru c te d  
Hurley to  im press Chiang with th e  "general thought" th a t  S ta l in 's  comments 
o f svqpport were made on th e  b a s is  o f conditions e x is tin g  a t  th e  given time
Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t.
5, Appendix NN, 3335*
125summary o f Kennan* s telegram  o f  . ^ r .  23, prepared by Secretary  
o f S ta te  S te t t in iu s  fo r  th e  P resid en t. Hsrry S. Truman, Manoirs by Harry 
S. Truman: Tear o f  Decision (Garden C ity : Doubleday and Company, I n c . ,
1955). I .  84-83.
1 2 6 ^ ese  comments o f  Harriman and th e  follow ing reference to  th e  
in s tru c tio n s  o f  S te t t in iu s  to  Hurley a re  given in  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China, pp. 97-98*
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and th a t th ese  "c ircu n sta rces  . • • may not long con tinue."  Placing renewed 
emphasis upon America's wartime p o licy  toward China, the  Secretary  d irec te d  
Hurley to  impress iqx>n th e  Generalissimo the  compelling need fo r  a u n ifie d  
China. Such an accomplishment, he s ta te d , could expedite th e  d efea t o f 
Japan and a id  China in  i t s  postwar re la tio n s  w ith th e  Soviet Union.
Upon h is  re tu rn  to  Chungking, Ambassador Hurley found th e  Nation­
a l i s t  Government and th e  Chinese Communists s t i l l  agreeable to  a se ttlem ent 
o f  th e i r  d iffe ren ces  ly  p o l i t i c a l  means. Although th e  Communists had l e f t  
no doubt th a t  t h e i r  u ltim ate  goal was communism, they were w illin g  to  
seek i t  through n eg o tia tio n . Hurley reported  to  th e  Department o f S ta te  
in  l a te  June, 1945» th a t  th e  N ational Government made a renewed e f fo r t  to  
g e t an agreement with th e  Communists, but th a t  p rogress had been impeded 
ty  new Communist p roposals. Hurley, who d id  no t a c tiv e ly  engage in  
th ese  m eetings, believed  th ese  were spurious p ro p o sitio n s , pending th e  out­
come o f n eg o tia tio n s in  Moscow between th e  N ational Government and th e  
Soviet Union fo r  a con tact based on th e  Y alta Agreement. In  h is  d ispatch
^^TMao Tse-tung in  a speech, "On C o a litio n  Government," before the  
Seventh N ational Congress o f th e  Chinese Communist Party  on Apr. 24, 1945, 
had in d ica ted  th a t  a c o a lit io n  goverm ent was j u s t  a t r a n s ito ry  stage .
"Our fu tu re , o r  u ltim a te , programme, " he sa id , " is  to  push China forwanl 
to  socialism  and Communism; th i s  i s  d e f in i te  and beyond q u estio n ."  From 
e x tra c t o f te x t  o f  Mao's speech, found in  Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 
p . 304. Also th e  C onstitu tion  o f th e  Chinese Communist P arty , dated June 
11, 1945, s ta te s  th a t  " I t s  (Chinese Communist P a rty  3 u ltim ate  aim i s  th e  
re a liz a tio n  o f  Communism in  China." Taken from a copy o f  t h i s  C onstitu tion  
idiich i s  p rin te d  in  i b i d . . p . 422.
^ ^T he  Cmmunist proposals had been made to  a committee o f  seven, 
composed o f  th re e  p o l i t i c a l  independents appointed by th e  P eop le 's  P o li t ­
i c a l  Council and two vo lun teer rep re se n ta tiv e s  each from th e  Kuomintang 
and th e  Democratic League. The suggestions by th e  Comnunists were th a t :
(1) th e  meeting o f  the  N ational Assembly, scheduled fo r  November 12 to  
adopt a c o n s titu tio n , be cal l ed o f f ,  and (2) a p o l i t i c a l  conference be 
convened w ith th re e  rep re sen ta tiv es  each from th e  Kuomintang, th e  Chinese 
Communist P arty , th e  Democratic League, and th e  independent p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t ie s .  S ta te  Department, U. S. RAla tlo n s  w ith China, p. 105»
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to  th e  Secretary  o f S ta te  he remarked th a t  th e  Chinese Communists:
• • • s t i l l  b e liev e  th a t  they  have the  support o f  th e  Soviet.
Nothing w ill  change th e i r  mind on th i s  sub jec t u n t i l  a t r e a ty  
has been signed between th e  Soviet and China in  Wiich the  
Soviet agrees to  support th e  N ational G o v e r n m e n t .129
The United S ta te s , in  an attem pt to  ca rry  out i t s  commitment made 
a t  Y alta , encountered d i f f ic u l ty  in  th e  Moscow conference in  securing th e  
National Government’ s compliance with i t s  advice. Harriman, the  United 
S ta te s  Ambassador to  Russia, and th e  Chinese Foreign M in ister, T. V.
Soong, 130 agreed th a t  th e  Russian demands exceeded the  Y alta p ro v is io n s , 
and Lhe American Ambassador recommended th a t  they  be re s is te d . However, 
as th e  meetings continued through Ju ly  and in to  August, Harriman noted a 
sense o f  urgency among th e  Chinese. "In s p i te  o f th e  p o sitio n "  th e  United 
S ta te s  took, he has sa id , Soong "made i t  c le a r  to  me th a t  h is  Government 
was anxious to  reach an agreement w ith th e  Soviet Union," and t h ^  made 
"concessions lA ich we considered went beyond th e  Y alta understanding.
Ambassador Hurley* s sta tem ents, above—th a t  th e  Chinese Communists 
would use delaying t a c t i c s  u n t i l  th e  Soviet Government pledged i t s  support 
to  th e  N ational Government by signing a t re a ty —would seem to  have some 
v a l id i ty .  For, sh o rtly  a f t e r  th e  signing o f th e  Sino-Soviet T reaty o f
1 2 9 jb id .. p . 99.
130lhese n eg o tia tio n s  were suspended during th e  Potsdam Conference, 
and VEang Shih-chieh, th e  new Chinese Foreign M in ister, replaced Soong when 
they  were resumed in  August.
131-Harriman Statem ent, Ju ly  13» 1951* Senate Committees on Aimed 
Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast. 1951» F t. 5 , Appendix NN, 3339» % e c if lo  o b jec tio n s o f  th e  Ih i te d  
S ta te s  to  th e  term s o f  th e  Sino-Soviet T reaty  o f  Friendship and A llian ce , 
signed on Aug. 14, 1945» were th a t  one-half o f  th e  p o rt f a c i l i t i e s  o f 
Dairen were lea sed , w ithout charge, to  th e  Soviet Union, and th a t  th e  
Port A rthur area  designated  as a naval base was g re a te r  than had been ex­
pected . S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 117-18.
56
Friendship and A lliance  on August 14, 1945,^32 ir» which th e  Soviet Govern­
ment had made such a pledge, Mao Tse-tung agreed to  leave from Yenan fo r  
Chungking to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  between th e  N ational Government 
and th e  Chinese Communists.^33 The d e lib e ra tio n s  proceeded smoothly, and 
Hurley l e f t  fo r  co n su lta tio n  in  th e  United S ta te s  on September 22, 1945* 
Shortly  before he l e f t  Chungking, he sen t a progress rep o rt to  th e  Depart­
ment o f  S t a t e . ^3^ The n e g o tia to rs , he s ta te d , had agreed to  cooperate in  
e s tab lish in g  a democratic government and to  m aintain  Chiang Kai-shek as 
P residen t o f th e  Republic o f China. Thqy promised to  support th e  p r in c ip le s  
o f  Sun Yat-sen and to  guarantee c iv i l  r ig h ts .  The Communists promised 
recogn ition  o f th e  dominant p o s itio n  o f th e  Kuomintang and to  support i t  
in  th e  period preceding th e  establishm ent o f a democratic government.
Hurley cautioned, however, th a t  agreement had not y e t been reached 
on two s a lie n t  is su e s : (1) th e  method o f  se lec tin g  p ro v in c ia l governors
and mayors, and (2) th e  composition o f  th e  u n if ie d  peace-tim e axmy. On 
th e  f i r s t  p o in t, th e  Communists claimed "the r ig h t  to  appoin t, s e le c t ,  o r  
e le c t  any Communist governors o r  mayors in  c e r ta in  p r o v i n c e s ,  "^35 vdaile th e
132Texts o f  the  Treaty and re la te d  agreements a re  in  S ta te  Depart­
ment, U. S. R elations with China. Annexes 51-59, pp. 585-96.
^33However, according to  a noted source. Colonel Ivan Yeaton, head 
o f  th e  United S ta te s  Axmy Observers M ission to  Yenan, to ld  Ambassador 
Hurley who was then  in  Yenan th a t  th e  Communists considered th e  request 
f o r  Mao Tse-tung to  go to  Chungking "to  mean th a t  both th e  Chinese and 
American governments needed them." F e is , p. 361.
^3^*The follow ing an a ly s is  o f  th e  agreements reached and th e  d iv e r­
gencies remaining a re  based on th e  tœ ct o f  Hurley* s rep o rt in  S ta te  Depart­
ment, U. S. R ela tions with China, pp. 105-07*
^35%bid. . p . 106. This con ten tion  would seem to  imply th a t  a t  t h i s  
stage  o f n eg o tia tio n s  th e  Communists believed  th a t  they  would have a domi­
nan t in f lu œ c e  in  c e r ta in  provinces a f t e r  China had become u n if ie d . In  
any event, l a t e r  co llab o ra tio n  betweœ th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists 
depended, in  p a i t ,  upon reaching an amicable so lu tio n  to  th i s  problem. I t  
i s ,  th e re fo re , tr e a te d  a t  g re a te r  leng th  in  Chapters H  and I I I .
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Government contended th a t  the  p reroga tive  o f appointing o f f ic ia l s  was 
vested  in  th e  P residen t o f  the  Republic pending adoption o f a new c o n s ti­
tu tio n  and in au g u ra tio a  o f  a government under i t .  On the  second p o in t, 
th e  National Government refused th e  demand fo r in c lu s io n  o f fo r ty -e ig h t 
Communist d iv is io n s  in  th e  peace-tim e army on th e  b asis  th a t  th i s  would 
c o n s titu te  one-ha lf o f i t s  to ta l  s tre n g th . C alling  a tte n tio n  to  th e i r  
m inority  s ta tu s , th e  Government s ta te d  th a t  i t  would agree to  an o f fe r  o f 
twenty Communist d iv is io n s , which would be approxim ately o n e -f if th  o f  th e  
t o t a l  fo rce .
Ambassador Hurley, who played a prominent ro le  in  these  d e lib e ra ­
t io n s ,  believed th a t  p rogress had been made Wien he l e f t  fo r  th e  United 
S ta te s . Noting th a t  Mao Tse-tung would remain in  Chungking fo r  th e  nego­
t ia t io n s  which would continue during h is  absence. Hurley sa id  in  h is  rep o rt 
to  th e  Department o f S ta te  th a t
The s p i r i t  between the  n e g o tia to rs  i s  good. The rapprochement 
between th e  two lead ing  p a r t ie s  o f  China seems to  be p rogressing , and 
th e  d iscussion  and rumors o f c iv i l  war recede as th e  conference 
continues. ^36
There were j u s t i f i a b le  reasons fo r  Hurley’ s b e l ie f  th a t  h is  mis­
sion  had produced sa tis fa c to ry  r e s u l ts .  I f  accomplishment o f th e  p rovi­
sions o f h is  am bassadorial d ire c tiv e  a re  taken a s  in d ic a tiv e  o f success, 
c e r ta in ly  h is  fe e lin g  o f  confidence in  a job w ell done i s  su b s tan tia ted  to  
th e  ex ten t th a t  a person in  h is  p o s it io n  could have influenced th e  outcome. 
For during h is  tenu re  a s  Ambassador: (1) the  N ational Government had not
co llapsed , (2) Chiang Kai-shek had been su sta inç^  as the  p o l i t i c a l  and 
m ilitax y  lead e r o f  th e  Government, (3) congruous re la tio n s  had been re s to re d  
between Qiiang Kai-shek and the  Commanding Genexral o f  th e  Ameiican fo rce s ,
^36gtate  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. 10?.
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and (4) China had not co llapsed  economically. In  ad d itio n , the  United 
S ta te s  had co n trib u ted , in  an advisory capacity , to  th e  establishm ent of 
amicable re la tio n s  between the  N a tio n a lis ts  and the  Communists. For exam­
p le , Hurley had been instrum ental in  c rea tin g  basic  conditions fo r  a working 
re la tio n sh ip  between th e  National Goverment and the  Chinese Communists 
before he l e f t  fo r  Washington in  February, 1945* Also, Ambassador Harriman 
had advised th e  Chinese Government in  i t s  n ego tia tions with th e  Soviet 
Union vdien the  Russians promised to  support th e  National Government. The 
Soviet pledge was made in  th e  Sino-Soviet Treaty and in  re la te d  agreements 
o f  August 14, 1945.
These achievements, however, were s u p e rf ic ia l  in  so f a r  as th e i r  
permanent e ffe c t was concerned. They can be compared with an in v erted  
iceberg  i f  th e  hidden p o rtio n  o f th e  iceberg  corresponds to  th e  two s a lie n t  
disagreem ents tdiich H u r l^  re fe rre d  to  in  h is  re p o rt. These d iffe ren c e s , 
and re la te d  ones idiich took on added s ig n ifican ce  l a t e r ,  were never re ­
solved, p a r t ly  because o f th e  i l lu s o ry  natu re  o f  th e  Chinese co n trib u tio n  
to  t h e i r  so lu tio n . Chinese t a c t i c s  to  prevent a fu tu re  p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e ­
ment o f  th e  d iffe ren ces  between th e  N ational Goverment and the  Communists 
were a lready  apparent— confron ta tion  o f  proposals with counter-proposals; 
mutual unw illingness to  accept each o th ers  amendments to  proposals; and 
p e rio d ic  m ili ta ry  c lashes o f th e  contending fo rce s . I t  i s  to  th i s  phase 
o f  th e  o v e ra ll problem and th e  post-w ar attem pt o f th e  United S ta te s  to 
help  solve i t  th a t  we now tu rn  our a tte n tio n .
CHAPTER I I  
THE MARSHALL MISSION IN PERSPECTIVE
S ta tu s o f China. August-November. 1949 
The surrender o f Japan on August 14, 19^5t ended e ig ^ t years o f 
war fo r  China. However, as Japanese aggressive a c tio n s  had begun in  1931» 
China had a c tu a lly  su ffered  through fou rteen  years o f  invasion , d e s tru c tio n , 
and d isru p tio n  o f  i t s  communications and productive systems. And even with 
th e  cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  China was s t i l l  faced w ith tremendous prob­
lems and p rospects o f o th ers .
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in  a speech to  th e  na tion  on Sep­
tember 18, 1945, re fe rre d  to  th e  su ffe rin g s  o f th e  p a s t and, p a r t ic u la r ly ,  
to  th e  need fo r  reco n stru c tio n  in  th e  N orth-eastern  Provinces, p e a k in g  
on th e  fourteen th  anniversary  o f th e  Mukden in c id e n t, "our n a tio n a l humil­
i a t io n  day," he to ld  h is  countiymen o f th e  recoveiy o f th e  N orth-eastern  
Provinces and reminded them o f th e  ta sk  o f  reco n stru c tio n  to  be undertaken 
in  th a t  a rea . In d ica tin g  a w illingness to  work with th e  Soviet Union, he 
s ta te d  th a t  "We must . . .  w holeheartedly cooperate with our fr ie n d ly  
neighbor fo r  th e  improvement o f  th e  a lready  amicable re la tio n s  between th e  
two g rea t na tions . . . ."^
Die u n c e r ta in tie s  idiich confronted China and to  which th e  United
^Chinese M inistry  o f  In fo m atio n  (comp. ) ,  The C ollected Wartime 
Messages . . . , I I ,  872. Chiang made no reference  in  th e  speech to  th e  
probable in g ress  o f  Chinese Communists in to  th e  N ortheastern Provinces.
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S ta te s  a ttached  s ig n ifican ce  were many: the  appalling  prospects o f c iv i l
war; th e  fe a r  th a t ,  i f  c iv i l  war d id  come, th e  Japanese fb rce  and in fluence  
could, in  d e fe a t, a c tu a lly  gain co n tro l o f China by throwing i t s  w e i^ t  to  
e i th e r  side; th e  conceim over what th e  Chinese Communists and th e  Soviet 
Union would even tually  do, in d iv id u a lly  o r  jo in t ly ;  the  postwar f in a n c ia l  
s t r a in  upon th e  N ational Government; and the  question  o f the  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a b i l i ty  o f  th e  Government.^
These u n c e r ta in tie s  become o f  g re a te r  import ^ e n  one analyzes 
th e  fa c to r  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  con tro l a t  th e  end o f  World War I I .  P resid«nt 
Truman, in  re fe r r in g  to  China as a "geographical expression" ra th e r  than  a 
na tion  in  th e  Western sense, s ta te d  th a t  th e  a u th o rity  o f th e  National 
Government a t  th a t  time was lim ited  to  th e  southwest a rea . The Japanese,
he added, occupied East China and th e  r e s t  o f  South China, and th e  Russians
were in  Manchuria. The Chinese Communists were loca ted  in  th e  ru ra l  a reas
o f  southeast China, but thqy were in  complete co n tro l o f  North China. ̂  In
ad d itio n , th e  N ational Government claimed th a t  approximately 4,000,000 
troops not under i t s  co n tro l were s ta tio n ed  in  China and Manchuria. These 
fo rces  were l i s t e d  ly  th e  Government as 310,000 Chinese Communist reg u la rs  
p lu s  a la rg e r , bu t unspecified , number of m i l i t i a ;  approximately 2,000,000 
Japanese troops; 930,000 puppet government so ld ie rs ; and 600,000 to  700,000
^Reference to  th ese  a n x ie tie s  were eoqpressed in  Secretary  o f  S ta te  
Dean Acheson's testim ony o f  June 4 , 1951» before  th e  Senate Committees on 
Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  
th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 1 , 1842, and in  Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry 
S. Truman: Years o f T r ia l  and Hope. 1946-1952 (Garden C ity: Doubleday
and Co., I n c . ,  195^), I I ,  6 ].
^Truman, H ,  61. Secretary  Acheson in  testim ony o f  June 4, 1951. 
s ta te d  th a t  th e  Communists co n tro lled  15 p e r cen t o f the  country, excluding 
Manchuria, and th a t  25 p e r  cent [116,000,000] o f  th e  people liv e d  in  th a t  
a re a . Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hear­
in g s . M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 3. 1839*
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Soviet tro o p s .^
Of these  fo rces th e  Chinese Communists were to  be the  most p e rse ­
vering  and the  most d is ru p tiv e  o f  N a tio n a lis t c o n tro l .5 Secretary  o f  S ta te  
Acheson spoke o f th e  fa c to rs  which con tribu ted  to  the  s treng th  o f th e  Com­
munist movanent when he to ld  a congressional committee th a t  the  Chinese 
Communists were
. . .  not sc a tte re d  through th e  population as an element o f the  
population . . . .  They had a government o f  th e i r  own; they had 
an army of t h e i r  own; and, in  e f fe c t ,  t h ^  had a country w ithin  
China . . .
Another fa c to r  th a t  con tribu ted  to  th e  cause o f  th e  Chinese Communists was
^*These f ig u re s  a re  based on a "Memorandum from th e  Chinese Govern­
ment to  L t. Gen. A lbert C. Wedem^er, " \diich was given to  th e  General 
during h is  194? m ission to  China and was published in  S ta te  Department,
0. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 138, p. 617. There a re  c o n riic tin g  s ta te ­
ments r e la t iv e  to  th e  number o f  both Japanese and Communist troops.
P residen t Truman s ta te d  th a t  th e re  were over 1,000,000 Japanese, and Wede- 
mqyer has w ritte n  th a t  he re p a tr ia te d  1,400,000 Nipponese. Truman, I I ,
63; Wedemqyer^ p . 351* F* F* l l u ,  an o f f ic e r  in  th e  N ational Army during 
Vforld War I I ,  noted th a t  th e  Chinese Communists claimed a t  Jap an 's  sur­
render to  have 930,000 men and an organized m i l i t i a  o f  2,200,000. Liu, 
p. 253* The only variance  between th e  fig u res  o f  Liu and those given by 
Mao Tse-tung in  h is  speech, "On C oalition  Government," in  A pr., 1945 was 
th a t  th e  regu la r fo rces  numbered 910,000. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 
pp. 297-93.
^The darkened po rtions o f  a l l  maps in d ic a te  th e  t e r r i to r y  co n tro l­
led  by th e  Chinese Communists on th e  da tes sp e c if ied . Map, p. 277 i s  
i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  th e  area  co n tro lled  hy th e  Chinese Communists on Aug. 15,
1945. This map and those on pp. 278-83 were photographically  reproduced 
from a s e t  o f maps found a t  th e  end o f i^pendix  I I I  in  U. S. House o f 
R ^ re se n ta tiv e s . Committee on Foreign A ffa irs . Foreign A ssistance Act o f 
1 ^ ^ .  Report No. 1585 to  Accompany S. 2202, 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., Mar.
20, 1948. The o th e r  map on p. 284 o f  th i s  d is s e r ta t io n  was photographi­
c a lly  reproduced from a map a ttached  to  U. S. Senate. Committee on Foireign 
R ela tions. A B il l  to  Promote th e  General W elfare. N ational I n te re s t ,  and 
Foreign Policy  o f  th e  United S ta te s  bv Providing A^d to  China. Report No. 
1026, Amended Report o f  th e  Committee on Foreign R elations on S. 2393,
80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., Mar. 25, 1948.
^Testimony o f  June 4, 1951* Senate Committees on Armed Services 
and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast.
1951, P t. 3. 1842.
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th a t  they could lo g ic a lly  deny any n a tio n a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  fo r  th e  prob­
lems which confronted th e  National Government. U tiliz in g  th is  advantage, 
th e  Communists issued  such d en ia ls  w hile advocating a b o litio n  o f th e  one- 
p a r ty  government o f th e  Kuomintang and th e  c rea tio n  o f a m u lti-p a rty  
c o a lit io n  government.
Another task  confronting th e  Government, and one th a t  became 
p rog ressively  d i f f i c u l t  to  cope w ith, was th e  re s to ra tio n  o f a sound 
economic system. One fa c to r  th a t  probably made i t s  accomplishment more 
d i f f i c u l t  was th e  ex ten t to  idiich public  o f f i c i a l s  tended to  re ly  on v ic to ry  
in  th e  war as a s ta b il iz in g  in fluence . A Department o f S ta te  p u b lica tio n  
described  Lhe c rip p lin g  blows su ffered  by in land  and co as ta l shipping and 
ra i lro a d  f a c i l i t i e s ,  e le c t r ic  power equipment, and a g ric u ltu re  and indus­
t r y ,  and added th a t :
th e  economic s i tu a tio n , . . .  was su rp ris in g ly  good and contained 
many elements o f hope . . . .  th e  productive p o te n tia l  o f a g r i­
c u ltu re , m ining, and in d u stry  in  most o f th e  a reas  taken from th e  
Japanese was not su b s ta n tia lly  d if fe re n t  from th a t  o f  1937»^
Noting th a t  th e  production o f  coal and p ig  iro n  capacity  had been increased  
under Japanese management by 25 per cent and 50 per cen t, resp ec tiv e ly , 
over prewar le v e ls ,  t h i s  source s ta te d  th a t  a very favorable production 
in c re ase  in  in d u s try  and food production was expected to  r e s u l t  from the 
recoveiy  of Manchuria and Foraosa. Thus, the  view taken by the  United 
S ta te s  Government a t  th e  end o f h o s t i l i t i e s  was th a t ,  with a peaceful 
China, the  economic problems o f the  country " . . .  re la te d  le s s  to  th e  re ­
construction  o f  productive equipment than  to  th e  o rgan ization  o f production 
and d is tr ib u tio n  through f a c i l i t i e s  a lready  a v a ila b le .
7S ta te  Department, U« S. R elations with China, p. 12?.
Qjbid. . pp. 127-28. Chang Kia-Ngau, in  a thorough an a ly s is  of 
th e  conditions in  China, was d istu rbed  fay the  "unprecedented magnitude"
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C hina's f in a n c ia l  s ta tu s , though alarm ing in  some re sp ec ts , was 
considered by th e  Department o f S ta te  to  be "reasonably b r ig h t."  Obser­
ving th a t  the  magnitude o f  the  ta sk  o f reco n stru c tio n  was g rea t, i t  was 
noted th a t  C hina's fo re ig n  exchange holdings were g re a te r  a t  th e  end o f 
th e  war than a t  any tim e in  i t s  h is to r y .9 I t  was believed  th a t  the  s ta ­
b i l i t y  o f th e  Chinese in te rn a tio n a l  f in a n c ia l  p o s it io n  depended on a speedy 
recovery o f the  export in d u s tr ie s  and a re tu rn  to  th e  prewar le v e l o f pay­
ments from th e  Chinese in  o th er c o u n trie s . D om estically, wartime in f la ­
t io n  would have to  be stopped, revenue expanded, and m ili ta ry  expenditures 
r e d u c e d . % e s t a b i l i ty  o f  th e  Chinese economy would, o f  course, presup­
pose a u n if ie d  China a t  peace with an in te g ra te d  economy in  c o n tra s t to  
th e  previous fragmented economy under th e  Japanese, th e  Chinese Communists, 
th e  war lo rd s , and th e  N ational Government.
Chang Kia-Ngau contended th a t  th e  N ational Government p laced undue
o f th e  " task  o f  re h a b il i ta t io n  and reco n stru c tio n  confronting China . . . ."  
He believed  th a t  i t  would take "an astronom ical amount o f  c a p i ta l  resou rces” 
to  re tu rn  50. 000,000 d isp laced  persons to  t h e i r  homes, to  re s to re  m illio n s  
o f  acres  o f faim land to  production, and to  pu t tra n sp o rta tio n , communica­
t io n s  and in d u s tr ia l  f a c i l i t i e s  in  opera tion  again . Chang Kia-Ngau, p . 6?.
9 j t  was estim ated  th a t  "fo reign  exchange a sse ts  he ld  by p r iv a te  
Chinese" on V-J Day to ta l le d  over "severa l hundred m illio n  United S ta te s  
d o l la r s ,"  and th e  Chinese reserves o f  gold and U. S. d o l la r  exchange were 
estim ated to  be over 900,000,000 U. S. d o lla rs  on Dec. 31, 1945. S ta te  
D ^artm ent, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 129-30.
^®Chang Kia-Ngau s ta te d  th a t  th e  expenditures ICNC $2,348,000,000] 
o f  th e  N ational Government during 1945 were n ea rly  nine tim es th e  budget 
estim ate  o f CNC $263,800,000. S ix ty  per cent o f  t h i s  t o t a l  was spent be­
tween V-J Day and th e  end o f  Dec. He added th a t  CNC $500,000,000, o r 
s ix ty - f iv e  p e r cent o f  th e  t o t a l  expended during th e  l a s t  q u a rte r  o f th e  
y ear, were spent to  re e s ta b lish  ad m in is tra tiv e  se rv ices  in  th e  form erly 
occupied a re a s , to  r e p a tr ia te  th e  Japanese tro o p s , and to  take  and opera te  
Japanese " e n te rp r iz e s ." Chang Kia-Ngau, pp. 154, 156. The f ig u re s  used 
a re  more meaningful when one re a l iz e s  th a t  a U. S. d o lla r  was o f f i c i a l ly  
worth twenty CNC d o lla rs  throughout 1945 and was valued from 512 to  2,974 
CNC d o lla rs  on ü ie  a c tu a l market during th e  same period . During th e  l a s t  
q u a rte r  o f  th e  year re fe rre d  to  by Chang Kia-Ngau, th e  average black mar­
k e t exchange ra te  fo r  U. S. d o lla rs  was 1,408 CNC d o lla rs . See Apnendix 
I ,  p . 272.
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re lian c e  on too many cond itional fa c to rs—u n if ic a tio n , peace, recovery o f 
l o s t  t e r r i to r i e s  w ith subsequent in creases  in  revenue, and re s to ra tio n  o f 
normal tra d e  re la tio n s  in te rn a l ly  and e x te rn a lly . "U nfortunately ," he 
w rote, lead ers  o f th e  Government "welcomed the  v ic to ry  as an autom atic 
so lu tio n  to  th e  problem o f in f la t io n ,"  and believed th a t  th e  re tu rn  o f 
Manchuria, the  a reas  occupied by Japan, and Formosa with a l l  t h e i r  f a c i l i ­
t i e s  and resources, p lu s  p o l i t i c a l  u n if ic a tio n  under th e  National Govern­
ment, would " c o n s titu te  an adequate in v is ib le  reserve against"  a d d itio n a l 
i s s u e s . ^  Such reasoning, he contended, le d  to  d e le te rio u s  a c tio n s  by th e  
Government, such as th e  abandonment o f p r ic e  co n tro ls . Ih is  a c tio n  was o f 
p a r t ic u la r  concern to  th e  average consumer whose savings had been dep leted  
during th e  stru g g le  w ith Japan.
In f la t io n  had most se rio u sly  h u rt the  sa la r ie d  worker. The liv in g  
standards o f  c iv i l  o f f i c i a l s ,  members o f the  teaching p ro fessio n , th e  peas­
a n t, and, to  a le s s e r  ex ten t, lab o re rs  and in d u s tr ia l  workers su ffe red  
g re a tly . Chang Kia-Ngau claimed th a t  th ese  people were "antagonized by 
th e  growth o f  a w ealthy c la ss  which had achieved i t s  p o s itio n  by engaging 
in  a c t iv i t i e s  in im ica l to  th e  general w e l f a r e . T h i s  c la ss  o f nouveaux 
rich e s  consisted  o f tra d e rs  who had smuggled scarce goods in to  Free China; 
specu la to rs idio had bought gold and commodities with borrowed monqy; m ili­
ta ry  o f f ic e rs  and h ig h er ranking c iv i l  o f f i c i a l s  who had used th e i r  o f f i ­
c ia l  p o s itio n s  to  promote business en te rp rizes ; and banking personnel \dio 
had v io la ted  the  law by financing  specu la tive  undertakings.
With th e  cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  aga in st Japan th e  N ational 
Government had to  tu rn  i t s  a tte n tio n  to  p o l i t i c a l  as w ell as economic
l^Chang Kia-Ngau, p. 151. 
^^Ibid. . pp. 65-66.
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reconstrxictiDa Early in  October, 1945, Ambassador Hurley was n o tif ie d  by 
th e  American Qnbassy in  Chungking o f th e  progress o f n eg o tia tio n s  between 
th e  rep re se n ta tiv e s  of th e  Government and th e  Chinese Communists. This 
rep o rt s ta te d  th a t  an agreement had been reached between th e  two p a r t ie s  
to  c re a te  a P o l i t ic a l  C onsultation Conference composed o f th ir ty -se v e n  
members. The functions o f th e  Conference were to  make recommendations 
r e la t iv e  to  a d r a f t  c o n s titu tio n , to  determ ine th e  d a te  fo r  convening a 
people’ s c o n f e r e n c e ^ 6 to  approve th e  c o n s titu tio n , and to  serve as a body 
fo r  th e  se ttlem ent o f o th e r d isputed  questions. Decisions o f th e  Confer­
ence were to  be f in a l ,  and th e  National Government agreed to  enforce th e  
re so lu tio n s  i t  adopted. I t  was fu r th e r  agreed th a t  a jo in t  committee o f 
th e  two d isp u tan ts  would be formed to  consider th e  reo rgan iza tion  and 
reduction  o f t h e i r  armed fo rces . One o f  th e  most encouraging signs o f 
adjustm ent was th e  decision  o f  th e  Communists to  accept the  N ational 
Government’ s proposal o f twenty d iv is io n s  in  th e  N ational Army.
Chou E h -la i was o p tim is tic  over th e  r e s u l ts .  He rep o rted ly  to ld  
a member o f th e  American Hnbassy th a t  th e  only prim ary issu e  u n se ttle d  was
p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l o f Communist-dominated a reas . Chou made p a r t ic u la r
* - _  - — -  _ -------------------
^^Hurley had no t retu rned  to  China from h is  t r i p  to  Washington on 
S q jt. 22, 1945, and th i s  inform ation was relayed  to  him a t  th e  request o f 
K. C. Wu, th e  Chinese M in ister o f  Inform ation. A copy o f  Hurley’ s mes­
sage i s  p rin ted  in  S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations with China, pp. 107- 
08.
^^trhis number was to  include e ig h t Government, seven Communist, 
th ir te e n  Third P arty , and n ine  non-partisan  members.
15chiang Kai-shek had proposed on Mar. 1 , 1945, in  a speech before 
th e  Conmission f o r  the  Inauguration o f th e  C o n stitu tio n a l Government tn a t  
th e  People’s Congress be convened on Nov. 12. As th e re  had been some d is ­
sen t on the  da te  s e t ,  th e  agreement here  provided th a t  th e  P o l i t ic a l  Con­
s u lta t io n  Conference would determ ine whether th e  meeting o f th e  Congress 
would convene as scheduled o r  be postponed. The te x t  o f C hiang's speech 
i s  p rin te d  in  Chinese M in istry  o f Inform ation (comp. ) , The C ollected  War­
tim e Messages • • • , I I ,  826-30.
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reference  to  th e  no rtheaste rn  provinces o f  Hopei, Shantung and Chahar.
The American o f f i c i a l s  in  Chungking were convinced, however, th a t  the  
two sides had made l i t t l e  headway on th i s  question .
This agreement o f  October 11 c o n s titu te d , n ev erth e less , a very 
im portant basic  adjustm ent and was r e l ie d  on l a t e r  in  an attem pt to  end 
th e  p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  o f  th e  Kuonlntang.^^ There were some immediate 
o b stru c tio n s to  implementing i t ,  includ ing  delay by the  Communists in  
naming delegates to  th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultation Conference and postponement 
o f  th e  meeting o f th a t  body scheduled fo r  November 20th. However, the  
Government re leased  a "p rov isional l i s t  of the  de legates"  to  th e  Conference 
on November 2? and s e t  th e  convening da te  fo r  January 10, 1946. I t  was to  
meet a t  Chungking.
United S ta te s  Po licy  toward China.
August-November.' 19^5
The United S ta te s  was f i r a ly  e stab lish ed  as a g rea t power a t  th e
l^According to  Chou the  d iffe ren ce  between the  proposals o f th e  two 
was th a t  th e  Communists wanted a council e lec ted  from th e  d i s t r i c t s  and 
v i lla g e s  to  appoint th e  governors o f th e  " lib e ra te d  a re a s ,"  and th e  Govern­
ment demanded th a t  p ro v in c ia l governors be appointed d i r e c t ly  by i t .  S ta te  
Department, U. S. R elations with China- p. 108. However, according to  a 
re le a se  o f  th e  te x t  o f  th e  agreement by th e  Government on Oct. 11, 1945, 
th e  N a tio n a lis ts  claimed th a t  th e  phrase " lib e ra te d  a reas" had become 
"obsolete" idien the  war with Japan had ended, and c a lle d  upon th e  Commu­
n is ts  to  resp ec t th e  " in te g r i ty  o f  th e  ad m in istra tiv e  a u th o rity  o f th e  
country. " A fter fou r p roposals by th e  Communists to  s e t t l e  t h i s  is su e  
and four re je c tio n s  by th e  Government, i t  was agreed th a t  t h i s  m atter 
should be re fe rre d  to  th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultation Conference " fo r d iscu s­
sion  and se ttlem en t."  A copy o f th e  te x t  of th e  Government's re le a se  i s  
found in  ib id . , Annex 49, pp. 577-81.
IfO unther S te in , a correspondent in  Hong Kong, Chungki ng and Yenan 
from 1938 to  1944 fo r  th e  C h rirtian  Science Monitor and th e  London News 
Chronicle, claimed in  O c t., 1945, th a t  the  Chinese Cmmunists were so 
strong th a t  they  would remiain as a strong p o l i t i c a l  fo rce  whether they 
en tered  a c o a lit io n  government o r  continued t h e i r  opposition . Using even 
stronger language, he contended th a t  the  movement "could not be destroyed 
even in  a c iv i l  war." "The Other China," Foreign A ffa irs . XXIV (O ct., 1945), 
62.
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end o f  World War I I  and was expected to  have a dominant in fluence  in  the  
shaping o f  th e  peace. America emerged from th e  c o n f l ic t  with known capa­
b i l i t i e s  and was th e  lone possessor o f awesome nuclear p o te n t ia l i t i e s .
I t s  primary o b jec tiv e  in  th e  Far East o f defeating  Japan had been achieved, 
and th e  Republic o f  China had been susta ined . Expectations fo r  a peaceful 
world were f o r t i f i e d  by professed  commitments o f th e  v ic to rs  to  in te r ­
n a tio n a l cooperation a i^  harmony among them selves.
This period  was one fo r  planning reco n stru c tio n  and r e h a b i l i ta ­
t io n  and fo r  th e  development o f  methods to  solve th e  problems o f a world 
no longer a t  war. In  th e  Far East the  United S ta te s  had to  consider what 
i t s  approach would be to  th e  vacuum l e f t  by th e  co llap se  o f the  Japanese 
Dnpire, the  ac tio n s  o f the  Soviet Union in  Manchuria, and the  d is tu rb in g  
cond itions in  China. Toward th i s  end i t  had to  give thoughtfu l considera­
t io n  not only to  i t s  c a p a b il i t ie s ,  but a lso  to  th e  read iness o f th e  Ameri­
can people to  support th e  chosen course o f ac tio n .
Impact o f Dem obilization Program 
United S ta te s  wartime o b jec tiv e s , i t  w il l  be re c a lle d , were two 
in  number. Although th e  goal o f  winning th e  war had a h igher p r io r i ty  
than  th e  one o f  c re a tin g  a strong , un ited  and democratic China, th e  primary 
goal had not been pursued exclusively  nor with any g re a te r  devotion to  
p r in c ip le  than th e  secondary one. The basic  d iffe ren ces  were in  th e  methods 
used to  accomplish th e  two o b jec tiv e s  and in  th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  fa c to rs  
governing th e  success o f the  secondary o b jec tiv e  were le s s  sub ject to  con­
t r o l  by the  United S ta te s .
There was, with th e  cessa tio n  of h o s t i l i t i e s ,  a realignm ent o f 
p r i o r i t i e s ,  but th e  a lte rn a t iv e s  av a ila b le  to  government o f f i c ia l s  were
68
severely  lim ited  by p ressu re  from th e  American public  to  augment the  demo­
b i l iz a t io n  p rocess. P residen t Truman s ta te d  th a t  th e  demands fo r  the  
re le a se  o f aimed fo rce s  personnel which began with th e  surrender o f Germany 
became " in s is te n t"  upon the  defea t o f  Japan. He described the  cond itions 
e x is tin g  a t  th a t  time and what was being done to  assuage the  populace in  
th e  follow ing words:
. . . , th e  demand fo r  speedier dem obilization continued to  
inc rease . On September 16 H9^5l I  issued  a statem ent assuring  
th e  American people th a t  the  re tu rn  o f  servicemen from the  
f ig h tin g  f ro n ts  o f  th e  world to  t h e i r  homes was proceeding a s  
f a s t  as th e  circum stances perm itted . In  le s s  than  one month 
a f te r  th e  day o f  Jap an 's  surrender th e  number o f men discharged 
each day from th e  Army had r is e n  from 4,200 to  more than 15.200.
Our so ld ie rs  were being retu rned  to  c iv i l ia n  l i f e  a t  a r a te  in  
excess o f  650 per hour. This r a te ,  I  announced, would be 
s te a d ily  increased  to  more than 25,000 discharges per day by 
January, 1946.
These popular p leas were a lso  supplemented by those o f members of 
Congress. Senator Raymond E. W illis  o f  Indiana asked a very b lu n t ques­
t io n  on November 30, 1945, but in  essence i t  was not much d if fe re n t  from 
those  being posed by o th er congressional members. "What p o ss ib le  s ta k e ,"  
he wanted to  know, "has the  average American in  th e  outcome o f C hina's 
c iv i l  w a r ?  "^9 Contending th a t  many l e t t e r s  were being received lA ich blamed
^®Truman, I ,  507-08. P residen t Truman added on p. 509 th a t  th e  
m ili ta ry  branches had re leased  th e  follow ing numbers o f personnel by Jan.
8 , 1946: (1) Army, 4 -3 /4  m illio n , (2) Navy, 1 -1 /4  m illio n  o f a "peak
streng th"  o f  3 -1 /2  m illio n , (3) M arines, 183,000 o f  a to ta l  o f 486,000, 
and (4) Coast Guard, 74,000 out o f a fo rce  o f 180,000. The d im a n tlin g  
o f  Ü. S. m ili ta ry  organs was fu r th e r  in d ica ted  by th e  re lease  o f f ig u re s  
by th e  War Department on Nov. 23, 1945, vdiich were published in  th e  Con­
g ress io n a l Record. This source recorded th a t  252,000 personnel were re ­
leased  during th e  week ending Nov. 23, 1945, and th a t  2,774,000 were d is ­
charged between Sept. 2, 1945, and Nov. 23, 1945. U. S.. Congressional 
Record. 79th Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1945, IC I, P art 9, 11159*
s . , Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1945, IC I,
P a r t 9, 11236. The Senator was s t i l l  im patien t d e sp ite  the  pub lic  s t a te ­
ments o f th e  P residen t and th e  one o f  L t. Gen. Brdion Somervell on Aug.
17 , 1945. The General, Commander o f th e  A ny Service Forces, was quoted
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Congress fo r  the  delay in  the  re tu rn  o f overseas tro o p s, Representative 
John C. Kunkel o f Pennsylvania observed th a t  the  Congress had given the  
executive branch everything th a t  was requ ired  to  complete the  task . How­
ever, he added, i f  anything had been overlooked, " a l l  th a t  i s  needed i s  
fo r  Congress to  be asked and i t  w ill  be g ran te d ."^0 Senator Alexander Wilqy 
o f  Wisconsin used th e  f lo o r  o f th e  Senate on December 7, 19^5» to  voice 
sentim ents s im ila r  to  those  o f Kunkel, and sa id  th a t  h is  o f f ic e  was deluged 
w ith messages in q u irin g  about th e  delay  in  the  d ischarge o f th e i r  loved 
ones from o v e r s e a s . H e  c a lle d  fo r  an explanation and wanted to  know why 
th e  Congress, and not th e  P residen t, was being blamed.
Regardless where the  blame should be p l a c e d , ^3 prominent executive 
o f f i c i a l s  d isp layed increas ing  concern over the  impact th a t  th e  ra te  of
as saying th a t  1,500,000 o f th e  1,800,000 troops then  in  the  P ac ific  and 
th e  Far East would be re leased  by June 30, 1946. He s ta te d , however, th a t  
th i s  d id  not mean th a t  th e  U. 3. would have only 300,000 men in  those a reas  
on th a t  da te  because replacem ents would be sen t. New York Times. Aug. 17,
1945, pp. 1, 9.
20u, S ., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1 s t S ess ., 194-5, XCI,
P a rt 9, 11180.
^ R e p re se n ta tiv e  Francis W alter o f Pennsylvania had a p a r t ia l  
answer to  th ese  q u estio n s . On th e  same day th a t  Senator Wiley spoke,
W alter re fe rre d  to  a p re s s  re le a se  o f  Dec. 6 , 19^5, which was ca rried  in  
th e  Washington P ost. This news item s ta te d  th a t  th e  A ir Corps had to  aban­
don i t s  p lans to  f ly  100,000 ve te rans from the  P a c if ic  p o rts  o f debarkation 
to  th e i r  homes. The reason given was th a t  th e  A ir Corps had discharged i t s  
personnel so ra p id ly  because o f  p ressu re  from th e i r  fam ilies  th a t  not 
enou^  crewmen were a v a ila b le  to  c a rry  out th e  ta s k . Pzdnted in  U. S . , 
Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1 s t S ess ., 1945, XCI, P art 9 , 11633*
^^Ib id . , p . 11627. S i m i l a r  comments were expressed in  Nov. and 
Dec. by Congressmen about th e  p ressu re  o f  th e i r  c o n s titu en ts  to  eoqpedite 
th e  discharge process and a re  found in  th e  same source, pp. 11634 and 11814,
23According to  no tes taken by Major Mathias F. Correa a t  the  meet­
ing  o f th e  Departments o f  S ta te , War, and Navy on Nov. 20, 1945, Secre­
ta ry  o f  War P a tte rson  wrote a note to  Secretary  o f S ta te  Byrnes on Nov. 1 
in  tdiich he contended th a t  Congress was more in te re s te d  in  accomplishing 
dem obilization e f fo r ts  w ith th e  funds a lready  appropria ted  than in  m aintaining
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dem obilization would have on the  po licy  th e  United S ta te s  could pursue.
P residen t Truman has voiced th e  opinion th a t  th e  Government was no longer
follow ing a program o f  dem obilization. " I t  was," he sa id , "d is in te g ra tio n
pito f our armed fo rc e s ."  He claimed th a t  th e  United S ta te s  needed to  "tem­
per and ad ju st"  th e  discharge r a te  in  o rder to  meet i t s  world o b lig a tio n s  
and agreed "en tire ly "  with s im ila r views expressed in  a Cabinet meeting 
on October 26 by S ecre tary  o f th e  Navy James F o rre s ta l  and Secretary  o f  
War Robert P. P a tte rso n . Dean Acheson, Under S ecre tary  o f  S ta te , a t te s te d  
to  th e  need fo r  follow ing th e  P re s id e n t 's  advice tdien he spoke fo r  th e  De­
partm ent o f S ta te  a t  a Cabinet m eeting. The impact o f dem obilization was 
so g re a t, he sa id , th a t  the  Department was g re a tly  embarrassed in  i t s  con­
duct o f fo re ign  a f f a i r s . ^5 But General George C. M arshall, Chief o f S ta f f ,  
probably perceived th e  basic  reason fo r  th e  rap id  decrease in  th e  s iz e  o f 
th e  m il i ta ry  establishm ent, and im plied  th a t  those  who form ulated United 
S ta te s  po licy  in  th e  immediate fu tu re  would have to  a d ju s t to  th e  "d is ­
in te g ra tio n . " The General in  a speech on October 29, 19^5, remarked th a t  
"dem obilization has become, in  e f f e c t ,  d is in te g ra tio n , not only o f th e  
aimed fo rces but apparen tly  o f a l l  conception o f  world re s p o n s ib i l i ty  and 
what i t  demands o f  us,
'   ■ ■ -  . . .     ............................
adequate m ilitaixy s tren g th . See e d i to r 's  comments i n  W alter H i l l i s  ( e d .),
The F o rre s ta l  D iaries (New York; The Viking P ress , 1951), P» HO. General 
Wedemeyer charged th e  American people w ith having f o u ^ t  th e  war " l ik e  a 
footbaOl game," but exonerated than o f any re q x > n s ih ility  because they  "did  
no t r e a l iz e  . . . .  th e  long range consequences" o f  th e i r  a c tio n . His 
stro n g est c r i t ic i s n  was reserved  fo r  "our lead ers"  %ho were " e ith e r  too  naive 
o r  too impotent to  speak out fra n k ly ,"  and fo r  Congressmen who y ie ld ed  to  
th e  pub lic  p ressu re . Wedemeyer, pp. 356-57»
^^*Truman, I ,  509.
^^Diary en try  o f  Jan. 11, 1 9 ^ ,  i n  H i l l i s  (ed. ) ,  p . 129»
26gjftract from M arsh a ll 's  speech, quoted in  F e is , n. 19, p» 422. 
M arshall s ta te d  sev era l years l a t e r  th a t  i t  would have no t been a " p ra c tic a l
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Continued Support o f the  N ational Government 
One o f  th e  major ta sk s  of the  N ational Government o f  the  Republic 
o f  China was th a t  o f reconstruc tion  and re h a b i l i ta t io n . As in d ica ted  ear­
l i e r ,  e ig h t years o f w arfare had caused se rious d is lo c a tio n s  in  C hina's 
economic and so c ie ta l  re la tio n sh ip s . However, a tte n tio n  to  th ese  problems 
had to  be delayed u n t i l  Japanese-held t e r r i to r y  had been retaken  and th e  
occupying troops re p a tr ia te d . I t  was immediately evident th a t  th e  Govern­
ment would not be perm itted  to  undertake th i s  job  alone. The Chinese Com­
m unists were in  a favorable p o s itio n  geographically , and they began to  d is ­
arm th e  Japanese and to  accept lo c a l su rrenders in  C entral and North China 
under o rders o f th e  Communist commander-in-chief. General Chu Teh.^? At 
th i s  tim e, however, th e  Government had th e  more favorab le  advantage of 
su p e rio r m ili ta ry  s t r e n g t h .  ^8 I t s  e f fo r ts  a lso  had th e  sanction  o f  le g a l­
i t y  as i t  had been designated by the  Supreme Commander o f the  A llied  
Forces as "the so le  agent to  receive th e  surrender o f Japanese fo rces  in
p o l i t i c a l  question" in  19^5. to  consider m aintaining a la rg e  m ili ta ry  
machine, but th a t  a m istake was made in  no t e s tab lish in g  "a very  d e f in i te  
procedure fo r  m aintaining our defensive p o s tu re ."  Testimony o f  May 12, 
1951* in  Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, 
H earings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 1, 626.
^ S t a t e  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. 312. General 
Chu.Teb by such ac tio n  had refused  to  obey an o rder issued  by Chiang Kai- 
shek on Aug. 12, 1945, idiich d irec ted  Chu to  keep h is  fo rces a t  th e i r  post 
and to  aw ait in s tru c tio n s  from Chungking. New York Times. Aug. I 6 , 1945, 
p. 5.
^A ccording to  a p u b lica tio n  o f th e  Department o f S ta te , th e  
N ational Government in  S e p t., 1945, "possessed an estim ated f iv e  to  one 
siq>eriority  in  combat troops and in  r i f l e s ,  a p ra c t ic a l  monopoly o f  heavy 
equipment and tra n s p o rt , and an unopposed a i r  aim. " Ü. S. R elations with 
p . 311* However, f ig u re s  re leased  by th e  N ational Government and 
c ite d  by Chang Kia-Ngau in d ica ted  th a t  th e  Chinese Government's 8 iq )erio rity  
in  maiqwwer, r i f l e s  and a r t i l l e r y  was even g re a te r . Chang Kia-Ngau, n. 15, 
p . 254.
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China p r o p e r . *29
One o f  th e  g re a te s t  o b stac les  confronting  th e  N ational Government, 
however, was th a t  o f g e ttin g  i t s  troops to  the  Japanese-held a reas before 
th e  Chinese Communists a rriv e d . P residen t Truman claimed th a t  an o rder to  
th e  Japanese to  leave th e i r  weapons and march to  th e  seacoast would prob­
ably  have re su lte d  in  th e  Communists tak ing  over the  vacated a reas . The 
United S ta te s , th e re fo re , a ss is te d  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  by using th e  Japanese 
"as a garrison" u n t i l  Chinese troops could be moved in to  those a reas . 
F urther, in  immediate moves to  a id  in  th e  reoccupation o f v i t a l  p o in ts  and 
to  open l in e s  o f communications, th e  United S ta te s  tran sp o rted  th ree  
N a tio n a lis t armies by a i r  to  northern  and easte rn  China, includ ing  the  
c i t i e s  o f Shanghai, Nanking and P e i p i n g . T h e s e  e f fo r ts  were continued 
by w ater u n t i l  approxim ately 500,000 Chinese troops had been rr io c a te d .
An ad d itio n a l 50,000 American marines were sen t to  North China to  occupy 
Peiping and T ien ts in  and to  take  over some o f th e  coal mines and ra i lro a d s .
United S ta te s  support o f th e  National Government was a lso  demon­
s tra te d  hy th e  con tinuation  o f programs to  strengthen  th e  N a tio n a lis t army,
Z^According to  th e  testim ony o f  General Wedemeyer on June 13, 1951» 
General Order No. 1 o f General Douglas MacArthur made th i s  sp e c if ic a tio n . 
Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, H earings. 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t. 3 , 2492.
^^Ti-uman, I I ,  62. This decision  was made hy th e  Departments ox' 
S ta te  and Defense and approved 67 P residen t Truman.
31lhe a i r  l i f t s  were c a rried  out 67 th e  U. S. Army A ir Force under 
len d -lea se  p rov isions and cost almost $300,000,000. U. S ., P residen t, 
19^5-53 (Truman), Twenty-Second Report to  Congress on Lend-Lease O perations. 
f o r  the  Period Aiding Dec. 31. 1945 (W ellingtont Ü. S. Government P r in t-  
ing  O ffice , 19^5), House Doc. 663, P« 16. C ited h e re a f te r  as U. S . , P re s i­
d en t, 19^5-53 (Truman), Twenty-Second Lend-Lease Report to  Congress. 1945, 
House Doc. 663.
3 2 sta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 3H -12.
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a i r  fo rce , and quarterm aster corps. Plans o rig in a te d  by General S tilw e ll  
to  equip and t r a in  a th ir ty -n in e  d iv is io n  ground fo rce  had been c a rr ie d  
forward by General Wedanqyer. gy December, 1945, th e  supply phase o f th e  
p ro je c t was completed, and p rogress was being made toward c rea tin g  an 
8 -1 /3  group Chinese a i r  f o r c e .  33 in  ad d itio n , vqx>n th e  request o f th e  
N ational Government, P residen t Truman began p relim inary  s tu d ies  re la te d  to  
th e  establishm ent o f  American m ili ta ry  advisory groups in  China. The 
P residen t in fo raed  T. V. Soong in  a conversation on September 14, 1945, 
th a t  th e  permanence o f such bodies would depend upon ac tio n  by th e  Congress 
o f  the  United S ta te s .
A United S ta te s  advisory m ission composed o f o f f ic e rs  on a c tiv e  
duty can only  be e s tab lish ed  under th e  emergency powers o f th e  P re s i­
den t. Consequently le g is la t io n  would be requ ired  to  continue the  
m ission a f t e r  th e  ex p ira tio n  o f  th ese  p o w e r s . 34
However, n e ith e r  t h i s  support o f  th e  N ational Government by th e  
United S ta te s , no r th e  agreement entered in to  by th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  
Chinese Communists in  September, 1945, before Ambassador Hurley l e f t  o r  
th e  one o f  October 11 prevented frequent m ili ta ry  c lashes between th e  two 
fo rce s . General Wedemeyer, Commanding General o f  th e  China T heater, claim­
ed th a t  both p a r t ie s  were responsib le  fo r  th e  b a t t le s .  He s ta te d  th a t  th e  
Communists v io la te d  th e  o rders o f  th e  N ational Government p ro h ib itin g  th e i r  
acceptance o f th e  surrender o f  Japanese troops, and th a t  Chiang Kai-shek
33 ib id . , p . 312. I t  was general p o licy  to  d iscontinue len d -lea se  
a f t e r  Japan had surrendered. An exception was made, however, to  provide 
fo r  th e  t r a n s fe r  o f  m illtax y  equipment, ammunition, and c lo th ing  to  th e  
N a tio n a lis t fo rces  to  f a c i l i t a t e  th e i r  reocc tpa tion  o f  Japanese-held t e r r i ­
to r ie s .  U. S ., P res id en t, 1945-53 (Truman), Twenty-Second Lend-Lease 
Report to  Congress. 1945, House Doc. 663, 9«
3 4 sta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex I 70, p . 939.
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had ra th e r  f ig h t  th e  Conmunists than  r e p a t r ia te  J a p a n e s e . 35
General Wedemeyer became in c re as in g ly  alarmed over th ese  and o th e r 
events in  China and Manchuria and over th e  "con trad ic to ry  o r in c o n s is te n t 
nature" o f h is  d ire c tiv e . His o rders  were to  help  disarm and re p a tr ia te  
th e  Japanese u n t i l  th e  troops o f th e  N ational Government could ca rry  out 
th e  task  a l o n e . T h e s e  in s tru c t io n s , Wedemeyer be lieved , were o f a "con­
tra d ic to ry  o r  in c o n s is te n t nature" because while th e  Jo in t Chiefs o f  S ta ff  
approved them and advocated m il i ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  to  China, thqy a lso :
. . .  emphasized th a t  United S ta te s  Forrces must not be invo l­
ved in  f r a t r i c i d a l  w arfare . . . .  th a t  . . .  a ss is ta n c e  in  the  
development o f  Chinese Armed Forces would be d iscontinued  i f  i t  
i s  e s tab lish ed  to  th e  s a t is fa c tio n  o f  the  United S ta te s  Government 
th a t  such Chinese Armed Forces a re  being used in  support o f an 
adm in istra tion  not accep tab le  to  th e  United S ta te s , to  engage in  
f r a t r i c id a l  w arfare o r  to  a ffo rd  a  th re a t  o f  aggression . The 
ex ten t to  which p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i ty  i s  being achieved in  China 
under a u n if ie d , f u l ly  re p re se n ta tiv e  government i s  regarded . . . 
as a b asic  con sid era tio n  which w il l  a t  a l l  tim es govern th e  
fu rn ish ing  o f  economic, m il i ta ry  o r  o th er a ss is ta n c e  . . .37
The General in te rp re te d  h is  in s tru c tio n s  to  mean th a t  he and
h is  fo rces were to  p revent, not c o n trib u te  to , th e  f r a t r i c id a l  c o n f l ic ts ,
and th is  could be done only i f  he tran sp o rted  N a tio n a lis t  troops in to  a reas
where n e ith e r  they  nor Americans would come in to  c o n f l ic t  with Chinese
Communists seeking to  occupy th e  same te r r i to r y .  He believed th a t  the
Marines would became involved in  in c id e n ts , and h is  d e sc rip tio n  o f th e
execution o f  h is  o rders  su b s ta n tia ted  h is  judgment.
•
35Based on a paraphrase o f General Wedemeyer’ s message to  th e  War 
Department, Nov. 20, 1945» Wedemqrer, Appendix IV, p . 452.
36The re tu rn  o f th e  Japanese to  th e i r  homeland proceeded very 
slowly. P residen t Truman sa id  on Dec. 16, 1946, th a t  only "some 200,000" 
ou t .o f  a t o t a l  o f  over 3,000,000 Japanese c iv i l ia n  and m ili ta ry  personnel 
had been re p a tr ia te d  tdien General M arshall a rriv ed  in  China in  Dec., 1945. 
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 114, p . 690.
37wedemeyer, pp. 359-60.
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. . . I  was not pen n ltted , • • • to  pick up a Chinese army 
a t  po in t A and move i t  to  B to  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  recovery o f  an 
area from th e  Communists hy th e  Chinese N ational fo rces . . .
But in  th e  process o f moving them; I  d id  do ex ac tly  th a t .
I t  was inheren t in  my in s tru c tio n s  th a t  I  should recover the  
areas form erly occupied hy th e  Japanese, so I  had to  move them 
in to  a reas th a t  were vacant, and th a t  did cause some f r ic t io n  
with th e  Chinese Communists.38
Wedemeyer fu r th e r  believed th a t  America's in s is te n c e  upon p o li­
t i c a l  s t a b i l i ty  in  China as a condition  fo r  a id  meant, in  e f fe c t ,  th a t  
such a ss is ta n ce  depended \qx>n acceptance hy th e  N ational Government o f  th e  
term s demanded hy th e  Chinese Communists. Since th e  General was convinced 
th a t  th e  Chinese Communists were under o rders from Moscow, he th e re fo re  
contended th a t  th e  United S ta te s  was demanding th a t  the  N ational Govern­
ment submit to  th e  Soviet Union in  o rd er to  secure American a id .39
General Wedemeyer a lso  believed  th a t  th e  m ili ta ry  s i tu a tio n  in  
China would d e te r io ra te  vdien Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced p lans 
to  move in to  Manchuria in  November, 1945. Wedemeyer had been d irec ted  
to  determine th e  da te  on idiich th e  N ational Government could assume so le  
re sp o n s ib ili ty  f o r  disarming and re p a tr ia tin g  th e  Jé^anese. He feared  
th a t  Chiang's proposed m ili ta ry  opera tion  would delay  in d e f in ite ly  h is  
recommendation to  th a t  e f fe c t .  The American G enera l's  an a ly sis  of th e  
s i tu a tio n  l e f t  him d istu rb ed  on sev era l p o in ts . F i r s t ,  a l th o u ^  he had 
confidence in  th e  in te n tio n s  o f th e  Generalissimo to  woxic fo r  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a b i l i ty  and fo r  democratic and so c ia l  reform s, he d id  not be lieve  th a t
38Testimony o f  June 12, 1951. Senate Conmittees on Aimed Services 
and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 
195L, P t. 3» pp. 2461-62. I t  appeared th a t  the  United S ta te s  Government 
d id  not esqpect to  be com pletely successfu l in  i t s  a ttem pts to  prevent th ese  
Chinese c lashes, b u t, th a t ,  in  any event, i t s  s iç p o r t  would not extend 
to  th e  use o f  American troops fo r  b a t t l e s  on th e  Chinese mainland. In  
t h i s  connection P residen t Truman sa id  he to ld  Hurley and Wedemeyer in  Sept. 
1945, th a t  " i t  would be our p o licy  to  support Chiang Kai-shek but th a t  we 




Chiang could succeed alone. In  th i s  re sp ec t, he seemed to  be lieve  th a t  
th e  Generalissimo was alone because h is  one m ajor weakness— "extreme 
lo y a lty "  to  anyone who had p rev iously  supported him—had le d  him to  appoint 
such men to  responsib le  p o s itio n s  w ithout regard  f o r  competency o r  honesty. 
This condition  was compounded by the  g^pointment o f "w orthless subordi­
nates" by these  o f f i c i a l s  to  le s s e r  p o s itio n s . Thus, poor o rgan ization  
p lu s  incompetent and unscrupulous a s s is ta n ts  and adv iso rs, c o n s titu te d  s e i i -  
ous governmental d e fic ie n c ie s . F urther, Wedemeyer f e l t  th a t  Chiang Kai- 
shek a lso  made a se rio u s m istake in  appointing southern Chinese to  key 
p o s itio n s  in  th e  Northern Provinces. Such a c tio n , Wedemeyer contended, 
re f le c te d  a lack  o f  confidence in  th e  northern  Chinese, em bittered th e  
people o f th e  n o rth , and re ta rded  th e  movement toward p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i ty  
o f North C h in a .^
Second, Wedemeyer believed  th a t  th e  G eneralissim o's Manchurian 
p lan  im plied a lac k  o f  f u l l  ap p rec ia tio n  o f  th e  problems o f  lo g is t i c a l  
support and se c u r ity . Inform ation a v a ila b le  to  th e  American General in d i­
cated  th a t  harrassm ent by the  Chinese Communists would make i t  an eoqien- 
sive  and long campaign. The Generalissimo was, th e re fo re , advised by 
Wedemeyer to  concen tra te  h is  e f fo r ts  on conso lida ting  co n tro l in  North 
China before a ttem pting to  occupy Manchuria. The p rospects were not very  
prom ising, however, because he doubted th a t  Chiang could s ta b i l iz e  condi­
t io n s  in  North China " fo r  many months, po ss ib ly  years" w ithout coming to  
agreement with th e  Chinese Communists. Wedemeyer fu r th e r  concluded th a t  
s t a b i l i ty  in  South China depended iqpon carry ing  out p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and 
so c ia l  reforms.
^ I b i d . . ^ p e n d ix  IV, pp. 446-49
^^Ib id . . pp. 450-53» Wedemeyer in d ic a te d  sp e c if ic a lly  th a t  corrup­
t iv e  p ra c tic e s  by o f f i c i a l s  and "p ro h ib itiv e  taxes"  should be removed.
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A th ir d  reason fo r  General Wedemeyer's anx ie ty  a f te r  h is  an a ly sis  
o f  th e  Chinese s i tu a t io n  was th e  ac tio n s o f the  Russians in  Manchuris. He 
d id  not be lieve  th a t  th e  Soviet Government intended to  honor th e  Sino-Soviet 
T reaty  and agreements o f  August, 19^5t and c ite d  as proof R u ssia 's  d en ia l 
o f access to  Manchuria by th e  N a tio n a lis t fo rces and the  re le a se  o f  Japanese 
m il i ta ry  item s to  th e  Chinese Communists. Seriously  doubting th e  a b i l i ty  
o f  th e  N ational Government to  con tro l th e  s i tu a tio n , Wedemeyer requested 
th a t  seven American d iv is io n s  be used in  North China and Manchuria as a 
b a r r ie r  ag a in st th e  Soviet Union. When h i s  request was denied by th e  War 
D e p a r t m e n t , 42 he recommended th a t  Manchuria be made a tru s te e sh ip  under 
th e  guidance o f  th e  United S ta te s , Great B rita in , and Russia u n t i l  th e  
N ational Government was ab le  to  assume re s p o n s ib i li ty  in  th e  a re a . This 
request was a lso  d e n i e d . 43
The United S ta te s  Government was more in te re s te d  in  th e  evacuation 
o f Soviet troops from Manchuria and re s to ra tio n  o f  con tro l th e re  to  th e  
N ational Government, includ ing  th e  p o rts  covered in  th e  Sino-Soviet agree­
ments o f  1945,44 than  i t  was in  Wedemeyer's tru s te e sh ip  p r o p o s a l . 45 Robert
4^Ib id>. p . 348. Wedem^er s ta te d  th a t  he was informed th a t  seven 
d iv is io n s  were u n av a ilab le , but th a t  two Marine Corps d iv is io n s  were pro­
vided and sen t to  T ien ts in .
4 3 s ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p . 132.
44secre tary  o f  S ta te  Byrnes claimed th a t  th e  agreement on Dairen 
was s t i l l  no t being c a rr ie d  out two years a f t e r  th e  agreements had been 
made because Moscow would no t c le a r  e i th e r  ships o r  personnel fo r  p o rt 
en try . James F. Bymos, Snaakinr  Frankly (New York: Harper and B ros.,
1947) ,  p . 205. Another source s ta te d  th a t  th e  idiole agreement on Dairen 
was never put in to  e f fe c t  because Soviet-Chinese Communist co llab o ra tio n  
made i t  im possible fo r  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  to  function  in  th e  Kwantung 
Peninsula. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 117-18.
4 5 jt i s  wise to  keep in  mind th e  comments o f  Secretary  o f  S ta te  
Acheson on th i s  p o in t o f  " re s to ra tio n "  o f  Manchuria to  th e  N ational
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P. P a tte rson , Secretary  o f War, in d ica ted  the  p o s itio n  o f the  United S ta tes 
in  a meeting o f  th e  Departments o f S ta te , War, and Navy in  November, 19^51 
vdien he sa id  th a t  th e  Russians would take  permanent con tro l o f Manchuria 
i f  the  United S ta te s  evacuated i t s  troops from C hina»^  Soviet withdrawal 
from Manchuria was o r ig in a lly  scheduled to  be completed by December 3»
1943, and Secretary  o f S ta te  % m es proposed th a t  th e  question  o f the  tra n s ­
f e r  o f con tro l o f Manchuria to  th e  N ational Government be considered a t  
th e  Moscow Conference o f  th e  Foreign M in isters meeting in  December o f th a t  
year. Molotov, th e  Soviet Foreign M in ister, refused  to  add th e  question  
to  the  agenda, claim ing th a t  i t  was not necessary as th e re  was a sp ec ia l 
agreement between th e  Soviet Union and China r e la t iv e  to  Manchuria, and 
th a t  th e  two coun tries d id  not d i f f e r  on th e  su b jec t. The issu e  was de­
bated, however, when Secretary  Elymes accepted M olotov's counter-proposal 
to  d iscuss th e  presence o f American m ili ta ry  fo rces in  North China, and 
th e  two men expiai ned why troops o f th e i r  co u n tries  were in  North China 
and Manchuria, re sp ec tiv e ly . Ey th e  terms o f th e  agreement reached, th e  
Soviet Union consented to  th e  withdrawal o f i t s  fo rces  on February 1, 19^»  
and the  United S ta te s  agreed to  evacuate i t s  troops from North China as 
soon as i t  had discharged i t s  re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  disarming and deporting 
th e  Japanese o r  sooner i f  th e  N ational Government could carry  out th a t
Government. Making sp e c if ic  refe rence  to  th e  N ational Government o f  Chiang 
Kai-shek, he s ta te d  th a t  i t  "had no ro o ts  o f any s o r t  in  Manchuria, . . . 
Manchuria, except in  a very  nominal way, and then  only fo r  a period  o f two 
o r  th ree  y e a rs , . . .  had never been in  any way under th e  co n tro l o f th e  
p resen t N a tio n a lis t Government . . . . ” Testimony o f  June 4, 1951, in  
Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t. 3, 1840.
^ D ia ry  en try  o f  Nov. 20, 1945, o f  meeting between Byrnes, P a tte r ­
son and F o rre s ta l. M illis  (e d .) ,  p . 108.
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respon s i b i l i t y .  ̂ 7
Another Soviet ac tion  in  Manchuria th a t  se rio u s ly  d is tu rb ed  th e  
re la tio n s  between th e  United S ta te s  and the  Soviet Union was the  dismant­
lin g  and d e s tru c tio n  o f  in d u s tr ia l  p la n ts  and f a c i l i t i e s .  Accounts o f 
th ese  d e e d s^  were confirmed by th e  Pauley Mission to  Manchuria in  Ju ly ,
1946. According to  th e  repo rt made by Edwin W. Pauley, th e  Personal Repre­
se n ta tiv e  o f the  P residen t on R eparations, th e  Russians were se le c tiv e  in  
vdiat they  took, destroy ing  much o f  th e  r e s t  o r encouraging Chinese mobs 
to  p i l l a g e . ^  Power generators and transfo rm ers, e le c t r ic  motors, and 
machine to o ls  were high p r io r i ty  item s if. they  were o p e ra tiv e . Although 
th e  Soviet Union had agreed in  th e  a l l i e d  rep a ra tio n s d iscussions a t  Moscow, 
Potsdam, and P a ris  in  1945 th a t  “th e  g re a te s t  economic u t i l i t y  would re s u l t  
i f  th e  in d u s tr ia l  equipment in  Manchuria were l e f t  in ta c t  th e re ,"  Russia 
j u s t i f i e d  the  tak in g  o f  th is  p roperty  as “war booty ." The United S ta te s  
continued to  p ro te s t  th e  Russian c la s s if ic a t io n  o f in d u s tr ia l  equipment 
as war booty and th e  Soviet removal o f equipment. American p ro te s ts  met
^7s ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 125-26.
^ î b r  exasqple, W alter Robertson s ta te d  th a t  he “personally  inspected  
th e  lo o ted  p lan ts  in  th e  Mukden area" id iile  he was in  charge o f th e  Ameri­
can Bnbassy in  Chungking, and th a t  th e  Russians had removed a l l  th e  modem 
in d u s t r ia l  equipment and destroyed th e  r e s t .  Testimony o f  Mar, 4 , 1948, 
in  U. S ,, Congress, House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings, f o r  a 
Post-War Recovery Program, th e  F i r s t  Step RAinp- C onsideration o f Pronosais 
fo r  a  European Recovery Program, includ ing  H. R, 4840. H, R, 4579. and 
«similar Measures. 80th Cong., 2d S e ss ., 1948, P t. 2, p . 2078. C ited here ­
a f t e r  as House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a Post-War Re­
covery Program. 1948.
49This b r i e f  an a ly sis  i s  based on Paulqy*s "Report on Japanese 
A ssets in  Manchuria to  the  P residen t o f  th e  United S ta te s , Ju ly , 1946," 
p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 60 (c ) ,  
598-604.
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with l i t t l e  success, how ever.^
H urley 's  A ttack on United S ta te s  Policy  
The f i r s t  serious a tta c k  on American fo re ig n  po licy  toward China 
occurred idien Ambassador Hurlay resigned  in  November, 19^5* The Ambassa­
d o r 's  re tu rn  to  th e  United S ta te s  on September 22, 19^5. had been followed 
by severa l d iscussions with P residen t Truman and S ecre tary  Hymes about 
th e  Chinese s i tu a tio n . Although Hurley f i r s t  informed th e  S ecre tary  th a t  
he wished to  re s ig n  because o f i l l  h e a lth , he to ld  th e  P residen t on October 
9 th a t  he w u ld  re tu rn  to  China a f t e r  a r e s t .  However, when Hurley re tu rn ­
ed to  Washington on November 25, he p resen ted  h is  l e t t e r  o f re s ig n a tio n  to  
Secre tary  Ejymes and asked th a t  i t  be given to  P residen t Truman. Elymes 
impressed upon th e  Ambassador th e  c r i t i c a l  na tu re  o f  th e  problems confront­
ing  th e  Republic o f  China and urged him to  re tu rn  to  Chungking immediately. 
Hurley informed th e  Secretary  on th e  afternoon  o f November 26 th a t  he would 
re tu rn  to  h is  p o s t a f t e r  he d e livered  a speech befo re  th e  N ational P ress 
Club th e  follow ing day, and Pymes n o t if ie d  th e  P residen t to  th a t  e f f e c t . 51
5Qlbid. . p . 123* The United S ta te s  p ro te s te d  a Russian proposal 
o f e a r ly  1 9 ^  th a t  Russia '■nd China d iv id e  th e  co n tro l o f  Manchurian indus­
t r i a l  e n te rp r ise s  between them on th e  ground th a t  such ac tio n  would v io la te  
th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  Open Door. Ib id . . Annex 60 (a ) , pp. 596-97»
51 Statement o f Secretary  % m es on Dec. 7, 1945, before th e  Senate 
Committee on Foreign R elations in  answer to  charges made fay Hurley when 
he resigned . U. S ., Congress, House, Adverse Report to  Accompany H. Res. 
443 Requesting th e  Secretary  o f  S ta te  to  Mvm In form ation Rwardinp thm 
R esignation o f  General P a tric k  J .  Hurletv and th e  Sabotage o f our Foreign 
P o licy  in  China. Report No. 1376. 79th Cong.. 1 s t  S e ss .. 1945. p .  5.
C ited h e re a f te r  a s  House, Adverse Report Requesting Informa tio n  Regarding 
th e  Resignation o f  General Hurley. 1945. In  testim )nv  o f June 21, 1951* 
Hurley sa id  he to ld  th e  P residen t i f  he were gran ted  t h i r t y  days "to 
reciq)erate , " he would consu lt with him then  about re tu rn in g  to  China.
Senate Committees on Armed Forces and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings. 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. P t. 4 , 2396.
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Presiden t Truman thought th a t  th e  m atte r had been disposed of 
and sa id  th a t  Hurley assured him in  a conversation on November 2? " th a t 
he would only wind tqp a few personal m atters and then  re tu rn  to  C hina." 
There was an unforeseen development, however, which th e  Chief Executive 
has described as follow s:
This conversation (with Hurley) took p lace  about 11:30 A. M., 
bu t le s s  than two hours l a t e r ,  ^ i l e  the  members o f  th e  Cabinet 
were with me fo r  th e  weekly Cabinet luncheon, I  was c a lle d  to  the  
telephone. One o f th e  White House correspondents c a lle d  from th e  
N ational P ress Club and, to  my astonishm ent, to ld  me th a t  Ambas­
sador Hurley, in  a t a lk  with newspaperaen, had a ttacked  th e  admin­
i s t r a t io n ,  th e  S ta te  Department, our fo re ign  p o lic y , and me per­
sonally .
To me, t h i s  was an u t te r ly  ine^q^licable abou t-face , and idiat 
had caused i t  I  cannot imagine even y e t. I  re a liz e d , however, th a t  
Hurley would have to  go, and th e  Cabinet concurred. The same day 
I  learned  to  my su rp rise  th a t  a ' l e t t e r  o f  re s ig n a tio n ' from Hurley 
was given by him to  th e  p ress; bu t he would have been ou t, with o r  
w ithout th a t  l e t t e r . 52
Ihe Ambassador's l e t t e r  o f re s ig n a tio n  o f  November 26 was accepted 
by P residen t Truman on th e  day o f K u r i l ' s  P ress Club s p e e c h . 53 H urley 's 
l e t t e r  d isc losed  th a t  he agreed with th e  fo re ign  p o licy  o f th e  United 
S ta te s  as o u tlin ed  by th e  P residen t, th a t  he had had th e  stgpport o f P re s i­
den ts Roosevelt and Truman and S e c re ta rie s  o f S ta te  H ull, S te t t in iu s ,  and 
Ejyrnes in- a l l  h is  m issions, and th a t  th e  o b jec tiv e s  o f  American po licy  
"were nearly  always c le a r ly  defined" in  th e  upper le v e l o f policy-making 
o f f i c i a l s .  The g re a te r  p o rtio n  o f  h is  l e t t e r ,  however, was devoted to  th e  
"wide discrepancy between our announced p o lic ie s  and our conduct o f in te r ­
n a tio n a l r e la t io n s ."  His basic  charge, then , was th a t  th e  po licy  announced 
by the  P residen t was not being executed by various diplom atic o f f i c ia l s ;  
and th a t  he (H u r l^ l  was being undermined in  h is  e f fo r ts  to  perform h is
d u tie s . He was extremely c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  opposition  o f Foreign Service
j _______________________________
52Tnman, H ,  65-66.
53lhe te x t  o f  H urley 's l e t t e r  i s  p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex 50, pp . .581^84. .
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o f f ic e rs  in  the  Embassy a t  Chungking and the  ca ree r o f f i c i a l s  in  th e  Chi­
nese and Far Eastern D iv is io n s 'o f th e  Department o f S ta te . His a lle g a tio n s  
in  t h i s  l a s t  in stan ce  were th a t  th ese  men: ( l )  a ligned  themselves with
th e  Chinese Communists and co lo n ia l powers to  keep China d iv ided , (2) in ­
formed th e  Communists th a t  h is  e f f o r ts  to  prevent th e  co llap se  o f  th e  Chi­
nese Government were no t rep re se n ta tiv e  o f United S ta te s  p o licy , and 
(3) recommended to  th e  Chinese Communists th a t  they not accept in te g ra tio n  
o f th e  two Chinese arm ies un less t h ^  were given th e  dominant p o s itio n .
The Ambassador's charges received wide p ress coverage and were 
s tro n g ly  supported by some congressmen. ̂  Secretary fym es appeared before 
th e  Senate Committee on Foreign R elations in  December, 19^5» to  answer the  
accusations made hy Hurley before  th a t  body and in  h is  l e t t e r  o f resign  
n a tio n , but he made no attem pt to  d iscuss a l l  o f them .-55 The S ecre tary  of 
S ta te  p laced  g rea t enqphasis on H urley 's complaint th a t  th e  A dm inistration 
refused  to  make th e  p o licy  toward China a m atte r o f pub lic  record , and
^^R epresentative W alter Judd o f Minnesota sa id  on th e  f lo o r  o f  the  
House on Dec. 7, 19^5» th a t  .  .  .  perhaps th e  s in g le  g re a te s t  and most 
p a t r io t ic  se rv ice  General P a tric k  Hurley has rendered to  h is  country . . .  
i s  h is  re s ig n a tio n  a s  Ambassador to  China to  b ring  in to  th e  open th e  con­
fused and confusing s i tu a t io n  in  our S ta te  Department.” U. S. Congres­
sional Record. 79th Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 19^5. %CI, P a rt 9. U 634. Repre­
se n ta tiv e  Edith Nourse Rogers o f  M assachusetts in troduced H. Res. 443 
th e  79th Congress requesting  th a t  th e  S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  give in form ation  
regarding th e  re s ig n a tio n  o f Gen. Hurley and th e  "sabotage o f  our fo re ig n  
p o licy  in  C hina.” The House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  recommended 
th a t  th e  re so lu tio n  no t p ass , and Secre tary  Elymes on Dec. 8 informed 
R epresentative Sol HLoom o f New York th a t  he had no inform ation in d ic a tin g  
th a t  fo re ig n  p o licy  had been sabotaged in  China. House, Adverse Report 
Requesting Inform ation Rera rd in r  th e  Resignation o f  General Hurley. 1945.
p. 1.
^^These hearings occurred on Dec. 5-10» 1945. and were never pub­
lish e d . The follow ing a n a ly s is  o f  th e  S e c r e ta ^ 's  comments i s  based on 
h is  statem ent befo re  th e  Senate Committee on Foreign R elations on Dec. 7 
and p r in te d  in  House, Adverse Report Requesting Inform ation Regarding th e  
Resignation o f General Hurley. 1945, PP* 2-4.
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p a r t ic u la r ly  th e  one th a t  th e  h igher o f f ic ia l s  had not p u b lic ly  proclaimed 
support fo r  th e  N ational Government o f China and fo r  Chiang Kai-shek. Con­
tending  th a t  th i s  charge was completely unfounded, Byrnes l i s te d  severa l 
a c tio n s  o f the  Government as "public evidences" o f i t s  support fo r  th e  
N a tio n a lis ts :
1) We fo im ally  recognize only th e  N ational Government.
2) Our Ambassador i s  an Ambassador to  th e  N ational Govern­
ment.
3) Our war supplies and f in a n c ia l  a ss is ta n ce  have been d e livered  
only to  th e  N ational Government.
4) At th e  Cairo Conference i t  was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek who represen ted  China.
5) At San Francisco i t  was th e  Foreign M in ister o f the  
National Government ^ o  signed th e  C harter o f  th e  United Nations.
6) I t  was th e  N ational Government which r a t i f i e d  th e  C harter.
7) I t  i s  th e  Foreign M in ister o f  the  N ational Government who 
s i t s  in  th e  Council o f Foreign M in isters .
8) Our troops a re  in  China fo r  th e  so le  purpose o f f a c i l i t a ­
t in g  th e  surrender o f la rg e  numbers o f  Japanese troops to  th e  
armies o f  th e  National Government . . .  .56
The Secretary  o f S ta te , in  r ^ I y  to  th e  charge th a t  he and the  P residen t
had refused h is  [ Hurley] request fo r  a public  statem ent o f sxçport fo r
th e  N a tio n a lis ts , s ta te d  th a t  n e ith e r  he nor th e  P residen t could r e c a l l
such an appeal, e i th e r  o ra l o r  in  w ritin g .
D irecting  h is  a tte n tio n  to  idiat appeared to  him to  be a d i s ta s te ­
f u l ,  but necessary , duty, th e  Secretary  came to  th e  defense o f th e  Foreign 
Service o f f ic ia l s  ag a in st whom accusations had been made. He believed  
th a t  Hurley’s complaint th a t  FordLgn Service o f f ic e rs  were undermining him 
in  h i s  attem pt to  ca rry  out American p o licy  in  China was based p rim arily  
on George Atcheson’ s telegram  o f Februaiy 28, 1945, and John S. S e rv ice 's
^ I b id . . p . 2.
^T he  Secre tary  believed th a t  he was "compelled" to  d iscuss these  
charges, "in  fa irn e s s  to  th e  lo y a l, in te l l ig e n t ,  and hard-working men o f 
our fo re ign  se rv ice ."  Ib id .
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memorandum o f October 10, 1 9 4 4 .^  Admitting th a t  A tcheson's communication 
d id  suggest a m odifica tion  o f  p resen t s tra te g y , £(/mes remarked th a t  the  
a n a ly s is  was a comprehensive and considera te  re p o rt o f a f lu id  s i tu a tio n , 
and th a t  in  th i s  connection i t  conformed to  th e  ru le s  and tr a d i t io n s  o f 
th e  Department o f  S ta te . Further, th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  telegram  e x p lic i t ly  
proposed th a t  H urley 's views should be s o u ^ t  re fu ted  the  l e t t e r ' s  claim 
th a t  Atcheson had been d is lo y a l to  h is  superio r.
S im ila rly , th e  Secretary  contended. Service was not g u ilty  of 
insubord ination  to  Hurley when he wrote h is  re p o rt o f October 10, 1944.
This po in t was based on th e  nature  o f  th e  assignm ents o f th e  two o f f i c i a l s .  
Hurley was th e  Personal R epresentative o f th e  P residen t to  China and had 
th e  rank o f ambassador, but he was not th e  Ambassador to  China and, th e re ­
fo re , had no superv isory  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  in  connection w ith th e  United 
S ta te s  Bnbassy in  Chungking. Service was a ttached  to  th e  s t a f f  o f 
General S tilw e ll as a p o l i t i c a l  ad v ise r and fo r  ad m in is tra tiv e  purposes 
was responsib le  to  th e  General. As f a r  as th e  re p o rt i t s e l f  was concerned. 
Secretary  Elymes s ta te d  th a t  i t  was w ritte n  fo r  General S tilw e ll  and was 
l a t e r  sent to  th e  Bnbassy, which, in  tu rn , forwarded i t  to  th e  Department 
o f  S ta te . I t  was "w ritten  in  fo rc e fu l language," he sa id , and th e  D ivision 
o f  Chinese A ffa irs  in  th e  Department o f  S ta te  c irc u la te d  i t  with an a tta c h ­
ed note c a llin g  a t te n t io n  to  some conclusions th a t  were inaccu ra te . The
^ Ib id . H urley 's  a t t i tu d e  toward the  Atcheson telegram  and i t s  
con ten ts i s  d iscussed  on pp. 48-49 o f th i s  work. A copy o f S e rv ice 's  
manorandum i s  included in  Senate Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee on Foreign 
R ela tions, S ta te  Department Bnplovee Loyalty H earings. 1950. F t. 2, pp. 
1988-90. Among i t s  p rov isions which l a t e r  caused considerable controversy 
in  congressional hearings were those th a t  th e  Kuomintang was dependent on 
th e  U. S. but th e  U. S. was not dependent on th e  Kuomintang, and th a t  
Chiang Kai-shek would never make th e  needed governmental reforms as long 
a s  th e  U. S. siq)ported th e  Kuomintang exclusively .
59House, Adverse Report Requesting Inform ation Rep^ardlng th e  Resig­
n a tio n  o f  General Hurley. 1946. p p .  3-4.
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Secretary agreed th a t  o f f i c i a l s  must execute th e  po licy  o f th e i r  government, 
but declared th a t  th e  changing conditions in  China requ ired  th a t  re p o rts  
from the  f ie ld  r e f le c t  th e  "free  and honest judgment" o f th e  au thors.
This was done by Atcheson and Service and w ith in  th e  proper c h a n n e ls .^
The Secretary  ended h is  statem ent before  the  Senate Committee on 
Foreign R elations by re fe rr in g  to  a th ird  charge by Hurley—th a t  some o f  
th e  Foreign Service o f f ic e rs  in  China had in fom ed  th e  Communists th a t  
H urley 's e f fo r ts  to  preven t the  co llapse  o f th e  Chinese Government were not 
rep re sen ta tiv e  o f United S ta te s  p o licy . Byrnes s ta te d  th a t  th e re  could be 
no defense fo r  such a c tio n , and th a t  he would dism iss any person vdio was 
g u ilty  o f  such conduct. But in  th i s  p a r t ic u la r  in s tan ce , he concluded, 
th e  Ambassador had not provided him with any corroborating  evidence.
Genesis o f th e  Marshall M ission 
M arsh a ll 's  i^pointm ent and D irec tive  
The P residen t and th e  Secretary  o f S ta te  had become absorbed in  
another m atter o f g rea t importance more than  a week before these  hearings 
had begun—th a t  o f  choosing a successor to  Ambassador Hurlqy. Hurlqy had 
not been in  China fo r  over two months, and th e  agreements entered in to  by 
the  National Government and th e  Chinese Communists on October 11, 19^5, 
were on th e  verge o f co llap s in g . The Communists s t i l l  refused to  perm it 
th e  National Government to  a c t a s  th e  so le  agent fo r  accepting th e  su rren­
der o f Japanese tro o p s , and th e  armies o f th e  d is s id e n ts  engaged in  sporad- 
ic  c lashes. American o f f i c i a l s  feared  th a t  c iv i l  war would break ou t and 
make i t  in c reas in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  re p a tr ia te  th e  Japanese. ̂  The e f fe c t
^ I b i d . .  p. h.
Jo in t  C hiefs o f S ta f f  wired th e  Far Eastern m ili ta ry  com­
manders (Generals Wedemeyer and MacArthur and Admiral Raymond T. ^ ru a n c e .
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th a t  f r a t r i c id a l  c o n f l ic t  would have upon China and upon the  re la tio n s  be­
tween th e  governments o f th a t  country and the  United S ta te s  has been de­
scribed by Dean Acheson as follow s :
The p o s s ib i l i ty  o f occupying North China became much dimmer; 
th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of moving in to  Manchuria became non -ex is ten t; 
and th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f r e a l ly  g e ttin g  any re fe ra s  South China 
o r  any o th e r p a r t  o f  China would be g re a tly  dim inished. So. th e  
peace became a major o b jec tiv e  o f  both the  Chinese Government and 
th e  United S ta te s  Government in  i t s  e f fo r ts  to  he lp  the  Chinese
Government. 62
One o b jec tiv e  o f th e  American course o f  a c tio n  during and since 
World War I I  had been to  help  c re a te  a strong , u n ite d  and democratic China. 
P o licy  had been fo rau la ted  on th e  assumption th a t  American goals could be 
a tta in e d  only in  a peacefu l China with a government dedicated to  p o l i t i ­
c a l ,  economic and so c ia l reform s. Top ranking American o f f i c i a l s  were a lso  
convinced th a t  th e  s tip u la te d  ends could not be reached by re so r tin g  so le ly  
to  m il i ta ry  measures. I t  was in  connection with t h i s  an a ly sis  o f  th e  con­
d i t io n s  in  China and th e  commitment o f th e  United S ta te s  to  a l le v ia te  them 
th a t  H urley 's successor was chosen.
Cabinet o f f i c ia l s  a ttend ing  th e  luncheon w ith P residen t Truman 
on th e  day o f  H urley 's Press Club speech considered a t  th a t  tim e sending 
General George C. M arshall and were favorably  in c lin e d . The General had
Commander-in-Chief o f  th e  P a c if ic  Naval Forces) on Nov. 30 th a t  p lans were 
being considered to  tra n sp o rt ad d itio n a l N a tio n a lis t troops to  North China 
and Manchuria, bu t cautioned them th a t  th e  o rders had not y e t received  
approval. Ihe Commanders were a lso  asked to  comment on the  p roposal.
Senate Committees on Araed Forces and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings. M ili­
ta r y  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951t P t. 3, PP« 235^^55» The rq i ly  o f 
Wedemayer, Spruance and MacArthur i s  p rin te d  on pp. 2247-&48 o f  t h i s  source. 
I t  o u tlin e d  a p lan  and program to  ship s ix  more Chinese a ra ie s  and s u f f i ­
c ie n t  supplies to  th e  designated a reas and to  r e p a tr ia te  500,000 Japanese 
monthly.
^^Acheson was Under Secretary  o f  S ta te  during th is  pe riod  but was 
S ecre tary  o f S ta te  when he made th i s  statem ent on June 4, 1951, before th e  
in v e s tig a tin g  committees. Ib id . , pp. 1847-48.
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only recen tly  resigned as Army Chief o f S ta ff , and although th e  P residen t 
believed th a t  General M arshall fu l ly  m erited re tirem en t, he was convinced 
th a t  fla rsha ll was th e  man best q u a lif ie d  fo r  th e  " d i f f ic u l t  m ission to  
China."
I  went to  the  telephone in  th e  Red Room o f th e  White House
and c a lle d  th e  general a t  h is  home in  Leesburg. Without any p re p ­
a ra tio n  I  to ld  him: 'G eneral, I  want you to  go to  China fo r  me. '
M arshall sa id  only , 'Yes, Mr. P re s id e n t, ' and hung up a b ru p tly .«3
Ihe P residen t revealed to  a g rea t degree th e  po licy  th e  govern­
ment would pursue toward China idien he s ta te d  ^ y  he thought General 
M arshall was so w ell q u a lif ie d  fo r  th e  proposed m ission. M arshall s in cere ­
ly  believed , Truman sa id , th a t th e  people should detennine t h e i r  own f a te ,  
and th a t  c iv i l ia n  supremacy over th e  m ili ta ry  was e s se n tia l  to  th e  w elfare 
o f  a l l  n a tio n s . There were American m ili ta ry  and diplom atic experts  who 
th o u ^ t  th a t  th e  United S ta tes  "could fo rce  u n ity  on China," but they 
"would have been th e  wrong men fo r  th e  job.
The most d e ta ile d  an a ly sis  o f th e  i n i t i a l  stages in  d ra f tin g  th e
d ire c tiv e  fo r  the  M arshall Mission i s  found in  th e  testim ony o f  John
C arte r V incent, D irec to r o f the  Far Eastern O ffice  o f th e  Department o f 
S ta te , before a  Senate subcommittee on January 24, 1952.^5 He sa id  th a t
^^Truman, I I ,  66-6?. The P residen t re la te d  th a t  he inqu ired  two 
days l a t e r  idiy th e  telephone c a l l  had been ended so ab rup tly , and M arshall 
re p lie d  th a t  he d id  no t want Mrs. M arshall "to  know how sh o rt- liv e d  th e i r  
re tirem ent would be ."  The General added th a t  he was not successfu l very  
long because he turned on th e  radio  and "the v e iy  f i r s t  th in g  she heard 
was th e  news f la sh  announcing th e  . . .  m ission ."
^ A  warn re la tio n sh ip  had ex is ted  between th e  P residen t and General 
M arshall since  1941 when the  P resid en t, then Senator, served as chaim an o f 
th e  Senate Committee to  In v es tig a te  th e  N ational Defense Program. Ib id . . 
p . 90. Mr. Truman has sa id  th a t  he had g re a te r  a ffe c tio n  fo r  M arshall than  
f o r  any o th e r person ou tsid e  h is  own fam ily. In terv iew  with Mr. Truman, 
Aug. 20, 1959.
^^Senate Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee o f  th e  Ju d ic ia ry , I n s t i tu t e  
o f  P ac ific  Relations Hearings. 1952, P t. 6, 1710-21. There were v a r ia tio n s
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he was asked on November 28 to  prepare a mmmorandim \dilch could be used to  
in fo ra  M arshall o f th e  O ^ artm en t's  opinion o f the  ta sk  confronting him.
Ib is  statem ent, he was advised, should be based on h is  "poin t (c)" o f an 
e a r l ie r  no te.^^  Vincent suggested to  Secretary  Qymes in  h is  memorandum 
o f November 28 th a t  th e  United S ta te s  should take  measures dAsigned to  
f a c i l i t a t e  the  recovery o f Manchuria by Chiang Kai-shek, end th e  f r a t r i c id a l  
h o s t i l i t i e s ,  u n ite  and organize a l l  Chinese a ra ie s  under th e  National 
Government, and s e t t l e  th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f ic u l t i e s  in  a general p o l i t i c a l  
conference.
P residen t Truman and Secretary  Elyrnes, using  V incen t's  memorandum, 
d iscussed  the  Chinese problem with General M arshall in  a lengthy session  
on November 29, and th e  P residen t to ld  th e  General to  use f a c i l i t i e s  o f 
th e  Department o f  S ta te  in  fo ra u la tin g  a " se t o f in s tru c tio n s"  th a t  would 
c o n s titu te  the  p re s id e n tia l  d ire c tiv e  fo r  th e  m ission .^7 According to  Dean
in  th e  testim ony o f  V incent, Acheson and M arshall before th i s  and o th e r 
congressional bodies, and they  w il l  be tre a te d  below. Vincent confused 
th e  questioners considerably  w ith h is  d is t in c tio n  between d ra f tin g  th e  
idea  on idiich th e  m ission was based and d ra ftin g  th e  d ire c tiv e  i t s e l f .
^ V in cen t sa id  he was asked " in  l a t e  October o r  e a rly  November"
(19^5 ) to  d ra f t  a memorandum "regarding" th e  China s i tu a tio n , includ ing  
suggestions fo r  re lie v in g  conditions th e re . His note in d ica ted  th a t  fo u r 
a l te rn a t iv e  procedures were a v a ila b le  to  th e  U. S. One o f  th ese , "po in t 
( c ) , ” provided th a t  th e  U. S. would a s s i s t  th e  N ational Government in  
reaching a se ttlem en t w ith non-Kuomintang groups in  o rder to  p re v œ t c iv i l  
war. Ihe  o th er a l te rn a t iv e s  were f u l l  support o f  th e  N ational Government, 
n o raa l diplom atic r e la t io n s  with th e  Chinese Government w ithout involvement 
in  in te rn a l  m a tte rs , and c rea tio n  o f an in te rn a tio n a l conference of 
n a tio n s in te re s te d  in  re s to rin g  peace and s t a b i l i ty  in  China. Vincent 
added th a t  th ese  were a lte rn a t iv e s ,  th a t  he d id  no t recommend th e  se lec ­
t io n  o f  "point ( c ) ' ,  and was never consulted about i t s  choice as th e  a l ­
te rn a tiv e  to  be follow ed. I b id . . pp. 1711-12.
67Truman, H ,  67. V incen t's  suggested a lte rn a t iv e  o f an in te iv
n a tio n a l conference o f  in te re s te d  na tions was apparen tly  never given seri-^ 
ous considera tion  as Truman d id  not mention i t ,  and i t  i s  not among th e  
a l te rn a t iv e s  l i s t e d  in  S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations with China, p . x , 
o r  in  those  given by Acheson in  h is  testim oqy o f June 4, 1951» before th e
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Acheson, then Under Secretary  o f S ta te , M arshall d id  not approve o f  the 
in s tru c tio n s  in  th e  Vincent statem ent, and, with th e  a ss is ta n ce  o f  some o f 
h is  a s s o c ia te s ,^  form ulated a new p r o p o s a l . ^9 This d r a f t ^ O  was rev ised  
ly . Byrnes, with M arsh a ll's  consent, on December 8 and was accepted by Efymes, 
M arshall, Acheson, Vincent and General John E. Hull in  a meeting on the  
follow ing day. The conference o f December 9 a lso  approved; ( l )  the  
e s s e n tia ls  o f a l e t t e r  from th e  P residen t to  M arshall, (2) a statem ent 
from Byrnes to  S ecre tary  o f  War P a tte rson  which requested a ss is ta n c e  in
Senate Committees on Araed Services and on Foreign R elations, H earings. 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951» P t. 3» 1842.
^Testim ony o f June 4, 1951» Senate Committees on Armed Services 
and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings- M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast.
1951. P t. 3» 1 8 1859# Acheson id e n t i f ie d  th e  a sso c ia te s  as Generals 
John E. H ull, Thomas T. Handy and Louis A. Craig. M arshall s ta te d  in  
testim ony o f May 10, 1951» th a t  James Shepley o f Timn Magazine, who had 
been in  China during World War H ,  a lso  served as an adv iser to  him.
Ib id . .  P t. 1, 459- 60.
69Marshall to ld  a congressional in v e s tig a tin g  committee on May 
10, 1951» th a t  he d id  not d ra f t  th e  in s tru c tio n s  which he was to  follow  
because a t  the  tim e he was appearing " in  th i s  room f o r  f iv e  o r  s ix  days,
. . .  morning and afternoon , being in v es tig a te d  in  regard to  P ea rl Har­
b o r,"  and was p reparing  h im self a t  n i ^ t  fo r  th e  next days questioning .
He added th a t  he ta lk ed  b r ie f ly  with Secretary  Eÿmes during th e  lunch 
period  on one o r  two o f  th ese  days, and on one morning he ta lk ed  with 
Etymes, Acheson, Vincent and h is  own ad v ise rs . Ib id . , P t. 1, 468.
Acheson s ta te d  on June 6, 1951» answer to  a question  o f Senator Levs- 
r e t t  S a lto n s ta ll  o f  M assachusetts, th a t  he did not be lieve  th e re  was any 
discrepancy between th e  testim oiw  o f M arshall and him because th e  General 
spoke in  general terms while he Acheson] was more sp e c if ic . Ib id . , P t. 3»
2032.
7®Vincent sa id  th a t  th e  d r a f t ,  e n t i t le d  "Statement of P o licy  To­
ward China," came from th e  War Department and " in  composition and charac­
t e r  was a much b igger paper" than  th e  memorandum he had w ritten  on Nov.
28. There were some o th e r d iffe ren ces  between th e  two d ra f ts ,  he added,
"but th e re  were no t . . .  o f  any g rea t m e rit."  F urther, Vincent doubted 
th a t  M arshall p repared the  memorandum which came from the  War Department, 
bu t he was c e r ta in  th a t  the  General "had a g rea t d ea l to  do" w ith i t s  
general id eas. Testimony o f  Jan . 24, 1952, in  Senate Subcommittee o f 
th e  (kmmittee o f  th e  Ju d ic ia ry , I n s t i tu te  o f P a c if ic  R elations H earings.
1952, P t. 6, 1715- 16.
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re p a tr ia tin g  the  Japanese, tran sp o rtin g  Chinese a m ie s  to  th e  no rth , and 
imposing c e r ta in  r e s t r ic t io n s  on the  N a tio n a lis t m ilita ry  movements, and 
(3) on " th a t day o r a few days l a t e r  . . . the  fo ra  of a p ress  re le a se ."  
These item s were subsequently endorsed by P residen t Truman and Byrnes and 
were unanimously approved by th e  P re s id e n t, General M arshall and Dean 
Acheson on December 14.?^ With a few exceptions, th e  p ress re le a se  o f 
December 15 contained everything th a t  M arshall’ s in s tru c tio n s  d id .?^
M arsha ll's  In s tru c tio n s  
United S ta tes p o licy  toward China, as demonstrated by th e  M arshall 
M ission, was a recogn ition  o f th e  hope and b e l ie f  th a t  the  se ttlem ent o f  
C hina 's in te rn a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  would make her a s ta b il iz in g  ra th e r  than a 
d is tu rb in g  in fluence  in  th a t  se c to r  o f  th e  world. In  f a c t ,  th e  United 
S ta te s  had supported China as a m ajor power since 1943 on th e  b a s is  th a t  
th e  power vacuum created  by th e  eventual de fea t o f  Japan would be f i l l e d  
by China. P residen t Truman, in  a p re ss  re le a se  o f  December 15, 1945, 
recognized th e  need fo r  a strong China as a bulwark o f world peace in  th e
7^Acheson's testim ony o f June 4 , 1951* Senate Committees on Araed 
Services and on Foreign R elations, H earings- M m ta jnr S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast. 1951, F t. 3, 1848-49. Acheson p a r t ic ip a te d  in  th is  meeting because 
Byrnes and Vincent had a lready  l e f t  f o r  th e  Moscow Conference o f  Foreign 
M in isters  which convened on Dec. 16.
7^Acheson' s comments o f June 4, 1951, revealed  th a t  th e  p ress re ­
le a se  om itted a t  l e a s t  th re e  p rov isions o f M arsh a ll 's  in s tru c tio n s . One 
om ission was th e  reference  to  th e  a u th o r ity  o f th e  General, and th e  d is ­
c re tio n  to  use i t ,  to  tra n sp o rt  Chinese N a tio n a lis t troops in to  areas 
ïrtiere f ig h tin g  was in  p rog ress. Two o th e r  om issions, u n id en tifie d  by 
Acheson, re la te d  to  ac tio n s  th e  U. S. would take  i f  the  N ational Govern­
ment asked. He ju s t i f i e d  th e  f i r s t  om ission on th e  b asis  th a t  i t s  suc­
cess depended on secrecy, and th a t  o f  th e  l a s t  two d e le tio n s  because 
"obviously" you do not p u b lic ize  th a t  you w ill  do something fo r  someone 
i f  he w il l  ask you. "You leave i t  to  th e  o ther person ," he sa id , "to 
ask  you . . .  i f  thqy wish. " Ib id . , p . 1849.
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follow ing words:
I t  i s  th e  f i m  b e l ie f  o f t h i s  Government th a t  a strong , u n ited  
and democratic China i s  o f th e  utmost importance to  th e  success o f 
t h i s  United N ations o rgan iza tion . A China d isorganized  and d iv ided , 
. . .  i s  an undeznining in flu en ce  to  world s t a b i l i ty  and peace, now 
and in  the  f u t u r e .
The o b jec tiv e  o f th e  United S ta te s  remained unchanged with th e  
appointment of General M arshall. Am erica's goal was s t i l l  th e  c re a tio n  of 
a strong , un ited  and democratic China which would include  Manchuria w ith in  
i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  l im i t s .7^
M arsh a ll 's  s ta tu s  as an instrum ent o f  American po licy  was th a t  o f 
Special R epresentative o f  the  P residen t to  China w ith th e  rank o f  Ambas­
sador. The Chief E xecu tive 's l e t t e r  o f  in s tru c tio n s  to  him s tip u la te d  
th a t  M arshall was to  a id  the  Chinese in  e ffe c tin g  a cessa tio n  of h o s t i l i ­
t i e s  and in  bring ing  rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f  th e  major p o l i t i c a l  elements to ­
gether to  work toward a u n if ie d  C hina.75 M arshall was d irec te d  to  use the  
in fluence  o f th e  United S ta te s  " in  an app rop ria te  and p ra c tic a b le  manner" 
to  accomplish the  u n if ic a tio n  o f China by peacefu l and democratic methods.
73statem ent on United S ta te s  Po licy  Toward China, S ta te  Depart­
ment, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 62, p. 60?.
7^Ebid. . p . 60S. Truman observed in  h is  p ress  re le a se  o f Dec.
15, 19^5t th a t  th e  United S ta te s  was committed to  support Manchuria as 
p a r t  o f China by th e  Cairo D eclaration  o f 19^3, and th e  Y alta and Pots­
dam Agreements o f  19^5*
75rhe P re s id e n t 's  l e t t e r  to  M arshall i s  incorpora ted  in  ib lz i . .
Annex 6 l ,  pp. 605-06. M arshall remarked before  a congressional committee 
on May 11-12, 1951» th a t  he considered h is  prim ary duty to  be one o f  secur­
ing  a m il i ta ry  tru c e . " I t  seemed to  me," he sa id , " h i^ ily  d e s irab le  th a t  
I  remain a loo f from th e  p o l i t i c a l  development.” L a te r, however, when c iv i l  
war broke o u t, " I  [M arshall] was involved both in  th e  m il i ta ry  side  in  
endeavoring to  keep th e  peace and on th e  p o l i t i c a l  s id e  in  try in g  to  f in d  
some b a s is  fo r  implementing t h e i r  agreements th a t  would be acceptab le  to  
n il p a r t ie s ."  Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign Rela­
tio n s , Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 1, 549-50* 
637.
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To th is  end he was empowered to  speak to  Chiang Kai-shek and th e  o th e r  
Chinese o f f ic ia l s  "with th e  utmost frankness" and to  inform them th a t  th e  
United S ta tes could not consider a d ivided and w ar-d isrup ted  China as an 
appropria te  p lace  fo r  th e  extension o f  economic, te c h n ic a l and m ili ta ry  
a ss is ta n c e .
Ihe Ambassador's d ire c tio n s  to  secure a cease f i r e  were supple­
mented ly  o rders to  General Wedemeyer to  a s s i s t  th e  N ational Government in  
tra n s fe r r in g  i t s  troops, equipment and supp lies to  Manchurian p o rts  and 
to  a cc e le ra te  th e  re p a tr ia tio n  o f Japanese tro o p s. For th e  p resen t he 
was forbidden to  move Chinese troops in to  North China except Wiere i t  be­
came necessary to  use th e  p o r ts  in  th a t  a rea  to  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e i r  movement 
in to  Manchuria. Wedemeyer was, however, d irec te d  to  complete American 
lo g is t i c a l  arrangements fo r  p o ss ib le  shipment o f  Chinese troops in to  North 
China. The N ational Government was no t to  be n o t if ie d  o f th ese  arrange­
ments because Wedemeyer's execution o f th e  p lan  depended upon th e  progress 
th a t  Ambassador M arshall made in  the  n eg o tia tio n s  in  Chungking. M arshall 
would n o tify  Wedemeyer to  pu t th e  arrangements in to  e ffe c t  when he had 
determined e i th e r :
1) th a t  th e  movement o f Chinese troops to  North China can be 
c a rr ied  out c o n s is te n tly  with h is  n eg o tia tio n s , o r
2) th a t  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  between the  Chinese groups have 
fa i le d  o r  show no p rospect o f success and th a t  th e  circum stances 
a re  such a s  to  make th e  movement necessary  to  e ffe c tu a te  th e  
surrender term s and to  secure th e  long-term  in te r e s ts  o f  ^ e  
United S ta te s  in  th e  maintenance o f  in te rn a t io n a l  peace.?"
One a d d itio n a l m il i ta ry  in ju n c tio n  was revealed  in  th e  statem ent to  th e
f^Tbis a n a ly s is  o f Wedemeyer*s o rders i s  based on a memorandum 
from Secretary  Etymes to  th e  War Department, d a t ^  Dec. 9, 19^5» which 
requested th e  War Department to  is su e  th e  d ire c tio n s  in d ica ted  above.
Ih is  memorandum c o n s titu te d  p a r t  o f M arsh a ll's  in s tru c t io n s . S ta te  
Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 6 l ,  pp. 606-O7.
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p ress by P residen t Truman onDecember 15* He sa id  th a t  United S ta te s  
troops were in  North China to  disarm and evacuate Japanese troops and th a t  
th i s  po licy  would be continued. However, the  P residen t s ta te d , American 
m ili ta ry  fo rces would not in tervene  in  any m ili ta ry  c o n f l ic t  between th e  
N a tio n a lis t and Chinese Communist a rm ies .??
P residen t Truman assured th e  National Government th a t  th e  United 
S ta te s  recognized i t  as  th e  appropria te  agent to  accomplish the  u n if ic a tio n  
o f China. He declared , however, th a t  th e  economic, tec h n ic a l and m ili ta ry  
a ss is ta n ce  o f th e  United S ta te s  depended upon th e  in te g ra tio n  o f a l l  m il i ­
ta ry  fo rces  in to  the  Chinese N ational Army. The extension o f American 
a ss is ta n ce  a lso  depended upon the  establishm ent o f a government th a t  would 
provide " f a i r  and e ffe c tiv e  rep resen ta tion"  to  a l l  major p o l i t i c a l  elem ents. 
The P residen t observed th a t  ac tio n  on th is  l a s t  p o in t would req u ire  th e  
N ational Government to  modify th e  p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  o f  th e  Kuomintang as 
advocated by Sun Yat-sen and as p rac tic ed  by Chiang Kai-shek. As China 
made progress toward accomplishing th ese  o b jec tiv e s , he continued, the  
United S ta te s  would be in c lin ed  to  favorably  consider requests fo r  c re d i ts  
and loans designed to  strengthen  th e  economy and develop th e  m ili ta ry  o r­
ganization  o f C h i n a .  78
77Ib id . . Annex 62, p. 6O8. Admiral F o rrest P. Sherman, Chief o f  
Naval Operations a t  th e  tim e o f h is  testim ony, sa id  b>efore a congressional 
in q u iry  on May 30, 1951# th a t  every m ili ta ry  d ire c tiv e  issued  from the  
da te  o f Wedemqyer's appointment in  1944 u n t i l  American fo rces were w ith­
drawn from China included th e  p rov ision  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  would not 
stqpport th e  N ational Government in  " f r a t r ic id a l  w arfare ."  Senate Commit­
te e s  on Armed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itua­
t io n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951» F t. 2, I 605.
7®statem ent on United S ta te s  Policy  Tbward China, December 15,
1945. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 62, pp. 6O8-
09.  The P residen t noted elsewhere th a t  what he hoped to  accomplish was 
th e  development o f  a China economically sound and dem ocratically  governed 
so th a t  Communism "would lo se  i t s  appeal to  th e  m asses." Truman, I I ,  91.
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Hie B nissaxy 's Departure 
Fkvorable Réaction» Ambassador M arshall l e f t  Washington on Decem­
ber 13 and a rriv ed  in  China on December 21* Public comments a t  th e  tim e, 
though not numerous, were favorab le  in  re la tio n  to  United S ta te s  p o licy  
toward China and M arsh a ll 's  assignm ent. R epresentative C la ire  Booth Luce 
o f Connecticut sa id  on December 5* 1943, she was c e r ta in  th a t  the  General 
would not undertake t h i s  ta sk  "unless he had a c le a r  p o licy  behind him ." 
F arther, she observed, he would not go to  China to  implement a po licy  
"which was in  any sense contrary  to  th e  in te r e s ts  and id e a ls  o f our coun­
t r y . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Mike M ansfield o f Montana ra is e d  some doubts th a t  
th e  Chinese problem could be solved, but he expressed no rese rv a tio n s  about 
th e  choice o f M a r^ a ll  fo r  the  assignm ent. On December 11, 1943, he sa id :
The appointment o f General George C. M arshall as  our new 
Ambassador to  China i s ,  . . .  th e  b e s t p o ss ib le  choice th i s  
country could make. He has been given not only  th e  most d i f f i ­
c u lt  but a lso  one o f  th e  most thank less jobs in  the  world . . .
Perhaps th e  problem i s  not capable o f so lu tio n ; but i f  we have 
any one man idio can unlock th e  key to  th e  Chinese puzzle , th a t  
man i s  General M a r^ a ll .° ^
R epresentative W alter Judd o f Minnesota, a  strong  c r i t i c  o f Ameri­
can fo re ig n  p o licy  toward China a few years l a t e r ,  supported the  a c tio n  
taken in  December, 1943. In  f a c t ,  he seemed to  be preoccupied with ju s t ify in g
79u, S ., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1 s t S e ss ., 1943, XCI,
P a rt 9. 11481.
^Qltd^d. . p . U 832.  Sumner Welles gave comparable p ra ise  to  th e  
choice o f M arshall f o r  th e  job  in  China, and a l th o u ^  th e  p u b lica tio n  da te  
o f h is  book follow s th e  chronological sequence tr e a te d  h e re , i t  i s  be lieved  
th a t  th e  time la g  between th e  composition and p u b lica tio n  da te  o f h i s  w oit 
j u s t i f i e s  a re fe rence  to  i t .  Welles recognized th a t  M arsh a ll 's  knowledge 
o f  China was undoubtedly " s u p e r f ic ia l ,"  but s ta te d  th a t  h i s  a sse ts  were 
many: "an im p a rtia l and o b jec tiv e  p o in t o f  view, " "grea t p re s tig e , *
"g rea t t a c t  and p a tien c e , an exceedingly lu c id  mind, th e  a b i l i ty  to  e s t i ­
mate r e la t iv e  values w ith unusual r a p id i ty ."  Where Are We Heading? (New 
York: Harper and B ros., 1946), p . 303.
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American po licy  ag a in s t probable charges th a t  i t  would c o n s titu te  
in te rv en tio n  in  th e  in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  o f China. In  a rad io  speech on Town 
Meeting o f the  A ir on December 2?, Judd expressed th e  opinion th a t  a nation  
as powerful as th e  United S ta te s  could not avoid in flu en c in g  m ajor world 
is s u e s . This was t ru e , Judd sa id , because i f  th e  United S ta te s  d id  not 
a s s i s t  one s id e , i t  was autom atically  a s s is t in g  th e  o th e r . Applying h is  
reasoning to  th e  s i tu a tio n  in  China, he a sse rte d :
I f  we refused  to  a s s i s t  our Chinese a l ly ,  we thereby a s s i s t  
th e  re b e llio n  which i s  try in g  to  overthrow th a t  a l ly .
I f  to  continue s i^ p o rt o f Chiang i s  to  in te rv en e  on h is  s id e , 
then  to  withdraw our support i s  to  in te rvene  on th e  Communist 
s id e .81
Influence and P rerogatives o f th e  P re s id e n tia l  Agent. M arshall’ s 
a b i l i ty ,  t a c t ,  p a tien ce  and p re s tig e  were c e r ta in ly  d e s ira b le  a t t r ib u te s  
f o r  th e  ta sk  as m ediator between the  N ational Government and th e  Chinese 
Communists.^^ The g rea t respec t and adm iration o f P residen t Truman and the
Slfiased on te x t  o f speech p rin te d  in  U. S . , Congressional Record. 
79th Cong., 2d S e ss ., 1946, %CU, P art 9, A108.
82The au tho r has been, and s t i l l  i s ,  d is tu rb ed  over the  desig­
n a tio n  o f  th e  American e f fo r t  in  China as one o f  m ediation. C erta in ly  
some c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f m ediation were p resen t. For example: Although
no a v a ila b le  p u b lic  records in d ic a te  th a t  th e  d isp u tan ts  asked fo r  th is  
sp e c if ic  m ission, thqy rea d ily  consented to  i t ;  M arshall advised th e  two 
an tag o n is ts  and t r i e d  to  get them to g e th er to  s e t t l e  d iffe ren ces  on which 
th e re  was a modicum o f agreement before he was appointed; he tran sm itted  
p roposals of th e  one to  th e  o ther; and he made suggestions o f  h is  own to  
narrow th e i r  d iffe ren c e s . However, th e re  a re  dev ia tions from m ediation, 
to o . The United S ta te s  was not always a n e u tra l o r  im p a rtia l p a r t ic ip a n t. 
One o f th e  d isp u tin g  groins was the  Chinese Communist P arty  with an aimy 
and t e r r i to r y  and population which i t  co n tro lled  de fa c to . The United 
S ta te s  never recognized th i s  Party  and had no o f f i c i a l s  acc red ited  to  i t .
The o th e r  d isp u tan t was a one-party  government %diich th e  United S ta te s  
recognized. The p o licy  o f  th e  U. S. Government was to  uphold and strengthen 
th e  government o f th e  one while engaged in  a id ing  them to  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s .  This basic  p o in t, and th e  l im ita t io n s  i t  p laced  iqpon th e  ef­
f o r t s  o f  the United S ta te s , a re  re fe rred  to  a t  sev era l p laces in  th e  re ­
maining pages o f  t h i s  work.
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o f f i c i a l  fam ily  fo r  him strengthened h is  p o s itio n  to  an evon g re a te r  
degree. There was an a d d itio n a l element needed, so f a r  as h is  n a tiv e  
country was concerned, to  enable him to  make a worthy e f f o r t ,  and i t  was 
provided through h is  p rero g a tiv es  as th e  Special R epresentative o f th e  
P residen t and a d d itio n a l d ire c tiv e s  issued  by th e  Chief Executive.
James Eÿmes, Secretary  o f S ta te  p r io r  to  M arsha ll's  appointment 
and u n t i l  th e  end o f h is  m ission, has a tte s te d  to  the  Ambassador's in f lu ­
ence on th e  p o licy  o f th e  United S ta te s  during th a t  period and to  th e  value 
placed by th e  P residen t on h is  views. In  re fe r r in g  to  the  statem ent o f 
p o licy  toward China which was approved by P residen t Truman and Ambassador 
M arshall on December 14, 19^5, Etymes sa id  th a t  "the  P residen t made no 
change in  th a t  po licy  except upon th e  recommendation o f General M arshall 
o r  with h is  approval.
This d e c la ra tio n  o f th e  S ecre tary  th a t  th e  po licy  o f th e  United 
S ta te s  toward China was not changed, w ithout th e  recmmendation o r approval 
o f  M arshall to  th a t  e f f e c t ,  was supported by John C arter V incent. Vincent 
a lso  s ta te d  th a t  th e  P re s id e n t 's  em issary did no t re ly  on th e  Department 
o f  S ta te  fo r  advice p r io r  to  tak ing  such ac tio n . "General M arshall, under 
th e  d ire c tiv e , had, . . .  a f re e  hand." Ihen he added, he "exercised i t . "  
Vincent sa id  th a t  a l th o u ^  th e  Ambassador kept th e  Department "very w ell 
informed" by sending telegram s "every te n  days o r  two w e e k s , "85 i t  was
83Marshall had th e  rank of Ambassador bu t was not th e  Ambassador 
to  China. This p o s itio n  remained u n f i l le d  u n t i l  th e  Senate confirmed 
P residen t Truman's appointment o f  J .  Leighton S tu a rt on Ju ly  11, 1946. 
W alter Robertson, Charge d 'A ffa ire s  a t  Chungking a f te r  H urley 's departu re  
in  S e p t., 1945, s ta te d  th a t  \*en  M arshall a rr iv e d , he "had complete author­
i t y  over a l l  Bnbassy m a tte r s ." House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hear­
in g s . fo r  a Post-War Recovery Program. 1 9 ^ ,  P t. 2 , 2089.
8^E|ymes, p . 226. Eymes was Secretary  o f  S ta te  from July, 1945, to  
J a n .,  1947.
85Acheson, Under Secretary  o f  S ta te , was d irec ted  by P residen t
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h is  impression th a t  M arshall d id  not ask fo r  any advice in  those cab les o r 
in  conferences w ith Qymes when he came home fo r  co n su lta tio n  in  March, 
1946.86 These comments become even more s ig n if ic a n t  in  r e la t io n  to  the  
ro le  o f M arshall v is - a -v is  th e  Department o f S ta te  with V incent’ s a sse r­
tio n  th a t  the  Department sent very few messages to  th e  Ambassador because 
"he was in  charge; i t  was h is  own show.
M arshall’ s concept o f l ia is o n  re la tio n sh ip s  apparen tly  was th a t  
he work c lo se ly  with and through P residen t Truman. Mr. Truman has w ritte n  
th a t  th e  Ambassador always sen t re p o rts  to  him once a week and occasion­
a l ly  two o r th ree  tim es a week, and th a t  they were so d e ta ile d  th a t  he 
could not have been b e t te r  in fo raed  w ithout having been a p a r t ic ip a n t.
were handed p ersonally  to  th e  Chief Executive by Colonel M arshall S. 
C arte r, th e  General’ s personal rep re se n ta tiv e  in  W a s h i n g t o n . 88 Temporary 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  d id  a r is e  idien th e  P residen t was not a v a ila b le , bu t th e re  was 
no dev ia tion  from th e  in s tru c tio n s  l e f t  by th e  Ambassador. A memorandum 
on The White House S ta tionery  f o r  Matthew Connelly, th e  P re sid en t’s appoint­
ments sec re ta ry , described  a re la te d  in stan ce  in  1946 as follow s:
Truman to  see th a t  a l l  messages from M arshall to  th e  Department were "acknowl­
edged o r  answered w ith in  tw enty-four hou rs."  Truman, I I ,  75»
88'ihese comments o f V incent a re  from h is  testim ony o f Jan. 24,
1952.  Senate Subcommittee o f th e  Committee o f th e  Ju d ic ia ry , I n s t i tu t e  
o f  P a c if ic  R elations H earings. 1952, P t. 6 , I 7I 8. Vincent was D irec to r 
o f  th e  Far Eastern O ffice  o f th e  Department o f S ta te  from S ep t., 1949, to  
Ju ly , 1947. Thus, he was in  t h i s  top p o s itio n  before M arshall was appoint­
ed, during the  e n t i r e  m ission, and fo r  seven months a f t e r  M arshall re tu rned ,
8 7 ib id .. p . 1709.
88Truman, I I ,  75. Vincent sa id  on Jan. 24, 1952, th a t  M arsh a ll 's  
rep o rts  to  the  P residen t were "seen only" by C arte r, Secretary  Etymes,
Under Secretary  Acheson and h im self. Senate Subcommittee o f th e  Commit­
te e  o f th e  Ju d ic ia iy , I n s t i tu te  o f P a c if ic  R elations H earings. 1952, P t. 6 ,
1721- 22.
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Colonel C arte r . . . wants to  give the  P residen t another mes­
sage he has received  from the  General. I  explained th a t  the  
P resident was out o f  town and would not re tu rn  u n t i l  th is  evening.
He wants to  b ring  i t  over sometime ton igh t o r  tomorrow morning 
and hand i t  to  th e  P residen t pe rso n ally . I  suggested th a t  he 
give i t  to  you and l e t  you give i t  to  the  P residen t before he 
leaves. He sa id  th a t  th e  General had in s tru c te d  him to  see 
th a t  the  P residen t received a l l  th e  communications and he would 
much ra th e r  d e liv e r  i t  h im self • • •
This c lose  working re la tio n sh ip  between th e  P residen t and the  emissary can 
be p a r t ia l ly  explained by th e  fa c t  th a t  M arshall was th e  Special Repre­
se n ta tiv e  o f th e  P resid en t, and, although he had th e  personal rank o f 
Ambassador, he was not accred ited  to  th e  N ational Government o f th e  Repub­
l i c  o f  China as th e  American Ambassador to  th a t  country.
As re la te d  p rev iously , th e  economic and f in a n c ia l  cond itions of 
China had been constan t reminders o f th e  need fo r  rem edial ac tio n  by th e  
N ational Government. The United S ta te s  Government had been g ran ting  a s s is ­
tance  o f  various kinds since 1937 a l th o u ^  a id  fo r  re h a b il i ta t io n  and recon­
s tru c tio n  had been subordinated during th e  war to  e f fo r ts  necessary  to  de­
fe a t  Japan. P residen t Truman recognized, however, in  h is  in s tru c tio n s  to  
M arshall the  continuing p ressing  need fo r  th e  type o f  a id  su ited  to  a 
peacefu l China. I t  was in  t h i s  area o f  M arsh a ll's  functions th a t  th e  Chief 
Executive made arrangements to  streng then  th e  G eneral's con tro l over Ameri­
can po licy  toward China. L e tte rs  to  th a t  e f fe c t  were w ritten  by th e  P re s i­
dent to  Heniy A. Wallace, S ecre ta iy  o f Commerce, and to  severa l o th e r  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c i a l s  th re e  days a f te r  M arshall l e f t  f o r  China. The o b jec tiv e  
o f  th e  P residen t was to  preven t ac tio n  by these  d ig n ita r ie s  and th e i r
®?Memo f o r  Mr. (Matthew) Connelly, from The Papers o f H any S. 
Truman, O ff ic ia l  FU.es 768, Folder 840 (1945-46), Harry S. Truman L ibrary , 
Independence, Mo., Nov. 16, 1946. The no te  fu r th e r  in d ica ted  th a t  th e  
Ambassador's re p o rt was being decoded (apparently  in  th e  War Department] 
and could not be de livered  fo r  two o r  th ree  hours.
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subordinates which would be p re ju d ic ia l  to  the  purposes o f th e  m ission to  
China and which would encourage Chinese o f f i c i a l s  to  expect th a t  the  
United S ta te s  was considering the  extension  of a id  to  the  N ational Govern­
ment. To th i s  end the  l e t t e r s  d ire c te d  th a t  a l l  d iscussions and negotia­
tio n s  o f th is  na tu re  between th e  United S ta tes and Chinese o f f ic e rs  in  
th i s  country be suspended, and th a t  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f new n eg o tia tio n s and 
th e  resumption o f d iscontinued  ta lk s  be made only with th e  approval of 
General M arshall. P e rtin e n t excerp ts in d ic a te  th e  l in g u is t ic  tone o f th e  
P residen t*s in s tru c tio n s  as follow s:
In  o rder th a t  General M arshall * s m ission may not be p r e j ­
udiced in  any way, I  d e s ire  th a t  a l l  conversations with Chinese 
o f f i c i a l s  regarding extension o f American economic o r  f in a n c ia l 
a id  to  China, in  which o f f ic e rs  o f  your o rgan iza tion  may be p a r t ic ­
ip a tin g , , be suspended, and th a t  f o r  th e  tim e being no member o f 
your s ta f f  engage in  conversations with Chinese o f f i c i a l s ,  which 
m i^ t  encourage th e  Chinese to  hope th a t  t h i s  Government i s  con­
tem plating th e  extension o f any type  o f a ss is ta n c e  to  China, except 
in  accordance with ihe recommendations o f General M arshall.
A ll d iscussions and n eg o tia tio n s  with Chinese in  t h i s  country 
should be i n i t i a t e d  o r  resumed and c a rr ie d  on only in  complete 
coordination with General M arshall and recommendations in  th e  prem­
i s e s , ,  both from and to  General M arshall, should be c leared  th r o u ^  
th e  Department o f  S ta te .90
Die Ambassador l e f t  fo r  China on December 15» Die l e a s t  he could 
eaqpect from the  o th e r  two p a r t ie s  was th a t  t h ^  be w illin g  to  cooperate,
90L e tte r  from P residen t Harry S. Truman, from Die Papers o f Harry 
S. Truman, O ff ic ia l  P ile s  I 50 (1945-46), H any S. Truman L ib ra iy , Indepen­
dence, Mo., Dec. 18, 1945.  Id e n tic a l  copies o f  t h i s  l e t t e r  to  Wallace 
were a lso  sen t to  Fred M. Vinson, S ecre tary  o f th e  Treasury; Harold L. 
Ickes, Secre ta iy  o f  th e  In te r io r ;  William M. M artin, Chairman, Board o f 
T rustees, Export-Import Bank o f Washington; L. Welch Pogue, Chairman,
C iv il Aeronautics Board; Bnory S. Land, Chairman, U. S. Maritime Commis­
sion; Paul P o rte r , Chairman, Federal Communications Commission; Charles 
B. Henderson, Chairman, Reconstruction Finance Corporation; and B. A.
Locke, J r . ,  f e c i a l  R epresentative o f  th e  P resid en t. I t  w i l l  be re c a lle d  
th a t  Secretary  H ull had p rev iously  c r i t ic iz e d  th e  p ra c tic e  o f  i r r e g u la r  
con tac ts  between United S ta te s  and Chinese o f f i c i a l s ,  and th a t  he believed  
th a t  some kind o f c e n tra liz e d  co n tro l in  s im ila r m atters  should be coordi­
nated th r o u ^  th e  Department o f S ta te . Supra. Chapter I ,  n . 85*
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to  compromise, to  s e t t l e  th e i r  d iffe ren ces  around the  conference ta b le ,  and, 
most o f  a l l ,  th a t  they a c t in  good f a i th .  The remainder o f th is  work i s  
devoted to  determ ining the  e x ta it  to  which these  expectations were met, 
th e  re s u ltin g  e f fe c t  upon the  Maf*shall M ission, and th e  subsequent impact 
upon American fo re ign  po licy  toward China.
CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL COURSE OF ACTION,
1945-1949
In troduction
General M arshall a rriv e d  in  China on December 21, 1945# and was 
th e re a f te r  d i r e c t ly  connected with th e  form ulation and implementation o f 
American po licy  toward China u n t i l  Januaiy 3# 1949» During these  years 
he served th e  United S ta te s  Government in  two c a p a c itie s . F i r s t ,  he was 
th e  P re s id e n t 's  Special R epresentative to  China with th e  rank o f Ambassador 
u n t i l  th e  Mission was o f f i c i a l ly  term inated on January 6, 194?. Second, 
he was appointed Secretary  o f  S ta te  on Januaiy 7» 194?. He f u l f i l l e d  th e  
d u tie s  o f  th i s  o f f ic e  u n t i l  he resigned on January 3. 1949. M arsha ll's  
co n trib u tio n  to  American p o licy  toward China can th e re fo re  be a t t r ib u te d  
in  p a r t  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  he held  th ese  two to p -le v e l p o s itio n s  in  th e  cru­
c ia l  period  o f 1945-1949»
The o b jec tiv e  o f American p o licy  toward China in  December, 1945, 
was th e  c rea tio n  o f  a strong , u n ited , and democratic China which would 
include  Manchuria w ith in  i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  l im its .  P residen t Truman had 
s ta te d  in  December, 1945 th a t  p rogress toward th e  achievement 
o f t h i s  o b jec tiv e  would be in d ica ted  by th e  a b o lit io n  o f  the  one-party  
government o f th e  Kuomintang and th e  in te g ra tio n  o f  a l l  autonomous aimed 
fo rces  in to  a Chinese N ational Amy. When th e  Chinese had s e t t le d  t h e i r  
c iv i l  war, th e  P residen t s ta te d , and reorganized th e i r  government and
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army as in d ica ted , then  th e  United S ta te s  would consider g ran ting  economic, 
m ili ta ry , and tech n ica l a ss is ta n ce  to  the  new government.^
As in d ica ted  above,^ M arshall o r ig in a lly  considered i t  h is  p r i ­
mary duty to  secure an a rm istice  between th e  m ili ta ry  fo rces o f th e  Govern­
ment and th e  Chinese Communists. Ibe Chinese had agreed on October 11,
1945, to  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d iffe ren c e s  through p o l i t i c a l  means and had provided 
fo r  th e  convening o f th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsu ltative  Conference on January 10,
1946, toward th a t  end. M arshall be lieved  th a t  i t  was necessary to  c re a te  
peaceful conditions fo r  th e  meetings o f  th e  Conference, th a t  h is  e f fo r ts  
in  th i s  respec t would be in  harmony with th e  agreement consummated between 
th e  two Chinese p a r t ie s  in  October, 19^5. and th a t  th i s  p o s itio n  was f u l ly  
supported by h is  d ire c tiv e  from P residen t Truman.^
The Ambassador soon found, however, th a t  he was confronted with 
more than ju s t  a m il i ta ry  problem. He became in c re as in g ly  involved in  
m atters  having p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and psychological ram ifica tio n s . His 
ta sk  was fu r th e r  complicated a few months a f t e r  h is  a r r iv a l  in  China ly  
th e  p ra c tic e  which th e  Chinese d isp u tan ts  had p e rfec ted  during th e  Hurley 
m ission—a rr iv a l  a t  agreements only a f t e r  i n t r i c a te  and prolonged nego tia ­
t io n s , followed by th e  re fu sa l to  implement them. The p a tte rn  followed in  
th e  n ego tia tions was co n sis ten t— confron ta tion  o f  proposals with counter­
proposals; mutual unw illingness o f th e  one to  accept fu l ly  th e  amendments 
o f th e  o ther to  p roposals and counter-proposals; and th e  in te rru p tio n  o f 
n eg o tia tio n s by m ili ta ry  clashes o f varying in te n s i ty .  In  f a c t ,  th e  most
^Supra, pp. 91^93-
^Supra. Chapter I I ,  n. 75»
3 lh is  chapter w il l  emphasize th e  p o l i t i c a l  phase o f th e  American 
course o f ac tio n . The m ili ta ry  and economic a sp ec ts  o f United S ta te s  po l­
ic y  toward China w ill  be tre a te d  in  Chapters IV and V, re sp ec tiv e ly .
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wearing, d is tu rb in g , f ru s tra t in g  fe a tu re  o f M arsh a ll's  s tay  in  China was 
the  p rog ressively  increas ing  d i f f ic u l ty  he encountered in  securing agree­
ments and th e  subsequent re luc tance  o f th e  Chinese to  implement than . To­
ward th e  end o f h is  m ission he found i t  im possible even to  promote har­
monious re la tio n s  between th e  d isp u tan ts .
And iidien th e  M arshall Mission was term inated , so were th e  American 
m ediation e f fo r ts .  Although th e  United S ta te s  continued to  recognize th e  
National Government, th e  years 1947-1949 were charac te rized  by American 
re luc tance  to  become deeply involved in  Chinese a f f a i r s ,  hy increasing  con­
g ressio n a l opposition  to  A dm inistration p o licy , and, even tually , by re lia n c e  
on congressional measures o f economic a ss is ta n c e . Bjy August o f 1948 th e  
United S ta te s  had taken th e  p o s itio n  th a t  i t  could not form a r ig id  pro­
gram to  help  th e  N ational Government in  i t s  s tru g g le  with th e  Chinese 
Communists. American p o licy , i t  was h e ld , would have to  be charted as con­
d itio n s  developed. H iis ^ p ro ach —plus strong sentim ental support fo r  
Chiang Kai-shek—b a s ic a lly  determined American p o licy  toward China u n t i l  
th e  N ational Government was overthrown in  l a t e  1949.
M arsh a ll's  C ontributions to  th e  Agreements between 
th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Communists.
Januarv-February. 1946
"Die T em ination  o f  H o s t i l i t ie s :  Procedures
fo r  Implementation
L ieutenant General A lbert C. Wedemeyer, th e  ranking American m il i­
ta ry  commander in  China, met General M arshall a t  the  a irp o r t  ^ e n  he 
a rriv ed  in  China and b rie fe d  him on th e  lo c a l cond itions. M arshall, ^diile 
enroute, had stud ied  o f f i c i a l  papers re la tin g  to  the  in te rn a l  Chinese s i tu a ­
t io n , and he immediately began an in v e s tig a tio n  o f th e  h o s t i l i t i e s  in
104
progress when he a rriv ed . Shortly  th e re a f te r  he began n eg o tia tio n s to  
arrange a c e a s e - f ire .^
M arsha ll's  e f fo r ts  to  secure a m ili ta ry  tru ce  between the  Nation­
a l i s t s  and the  Communists were made through h is  p o s itio n  as Chairman o f 
th e  Committee o f Three. Formation o f th is  Committee, with M arshall as i t s  
chairman, was proposed by the  National Government. The Communists accepted 
th e  Government proposal and designated Chou E h-lai as th e i r  rep re se n ta tiv e . 
General Chang Chun represented th e  National Government, and the  Committee 
held  i t s  f i r s t  formal meeting on January 7, 1946.
Success in  th e  nego tia tions was immediately jeopardized idien Chou 
E n -la i p ro tes ted  the  shipment o f  Government troops in to  Manchuria and 
p a r t ic u la r ly  th e i r  movement in to  th e  provinces o f  Jehol and Chahar. Chou 
withdrew h is  ob jec tions to  the  tra n s fe r  o f  the  N a tio n a lis t troops, however, 
when M arshall informed him th a t  the  United S ta te s , Great B rita in , and th e  
Soviet Union were committed to  th e  re tu rn  o f  a l l  China, includ ing  Manchuria, 
to  th e  con tro l o f  th e  National Goverrment. With th is  o b stac le  to  the  
n e g c ^ a tio n s  removed, ̂  th e  Chinese p rin c ip a ls  announced on January 10 th a t  
a tru c e  had been arranged. The agreement provided th a t  a l l  h o s t i l i t i e s  
between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and Communists would cease, e ffe c tiv e  m idnight, 
Januaiy 1 ] . The m il i ta ry  fo rces were a lso  ordered to  cease th e i r
^*Marshell's testim ony before th e  Senate Conmittees on Armed Serv­
ic e s  and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E art, May 8, 11, 1951# P t. 1, 395» 549* P residen t Truman sa id  th a t  th e  
Ambiassador spent severa l days in  China "merely l is te n in g  to  people." 
M arshall, th e  P residen t sa id , a lso  spoke with Chiang Kai-shek, Communist 
le a d e rs , various p a rty  o f f i c i a l s ,  numerous Government o f f i c i a l s ,  American 
embassy personnel, and correspondents. Truman, I I ,  73»
^Truman noted th a t  M arshall had been ab le  to  expedite th e  pro­
ceedings by persuading Chiang Kai-shek on Jan. 9 to  accept a c e a se -f ire  
o rd er which made no reference  to  th e  provinces o f  Jehol and Chahar.
Truman, I I ,  73»
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movements^ and to  r e f r a in  from destroying  or in te r fe r in g  with the  l in e s  
o f  communications.
A dditional s ig n if ic a n t  understandings were also  reached on January
10. The Government and Communist members of th e  Committee o f Three 
announced th a t  an Executive Headquarters would be estab lished  in  Peiping 
to  implement th e  agreement fo r  the  cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s .?  Three Com­
m issioners—one each rep resen ting  th e  National Government, th e  Communist 
P arty , and th e  United S ta te s—were to  be responsib le  fo r  d ire c tio n  o f th e  
Headquarters. The agreement s tip u la te d  th a t  the  American member would be 
chairman, and M arshall appointed W alter S. Robertson to  serve as th e  Ameri­
can Commissioner. Each Commissioner had one v o te , and unanimity was 
requ ired  before o rders could be issu ed . In  th e  event of a d ivided vo te , 
th e  d isputed  issu e  was to  be re fe rre d  to  th e  Committee of Three.
The agreement e s tab lish in g  th e  Executive Headquarters a lso  pro­
vided th a t  th e  O perations Section o f th e  Headquarters would execute the  
d ec is ions and d ire c tiv e s  o f the  th ree  Commissioners. I t  was s tip u la te d  
th a t  an American Amy o f f ic e r  would be d ire c to r  o f th e  Operations Section, 
and M arshall appointed B rigadier General Henry A. Qyroade to  serve in  
th a t  capacity . The key personnel o f th e  Operations Section were to  be th e
^The jo in t  statem ent sp e c if ic a lly  po in ted  ou t, however, th a t  th e  
p ro h ib itio n  a g a in st th e  t r a n s fe r  o f  m ili ta ry  fo rce s  did not apply to  th e  
movement o f N a tio n a lis t troops "south o f th e  Yangtze River fo r  th e  continu­
ed execution o f  th e  p lan  o f  m ili ta ry  reo rgan iza tion  o f the  N ational Govern­
m ent." The p ro h ib itio n  a lso  d id  not apply to  th e  tra n s fe r  o f th e  u n its  o f 
th e  N ational Amy " in to  o r  w ith in  Manchuria which a re  fo r  th e  purpose o f 
re s to r in g  Chinese sovereign ty ."  For copy o f th e  agreement, see S ta te  
Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 63, pp. 609-10.
?A copy o f t h i s  document i s  p rin te d  in  ib id . . Annex 71 (a) ,  pp. 
627-28. A dditional d e ta i l s  providing fo r  th e  opera tions o f th e  Executive 
H eadquarters and fo r  th e  designation  o f  American personnel were worked 
o u t ly  th e  Committee o f  Three and a re  p rin te d  in  ib id . . Annex 71 (b) (c) ,  
pp. 629-32.
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f ie ld  (tx*uce) teams.^ These crews were to  be composed of one rep re se n ta tiv e  
each o f th e  N ational Goverment, th e  Chinese Communists, and the  United 
S ta te s , and were to  be sent to  c r i t i c a l  a reas to  prevent o r  h a lt  h o s t i l i ­
t i e s  between the  Chinese.
The American o b jec tiv e  o f rep lacing  m il i ta iy  maneuvers with p o l i t ­
i c a l  bargaining had, with these  agreements, been p a r t i a l ly  f u l f i l l e d .  A 
tru ce  had been reached, and th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists had agreed 
on th e  measures necessary  to  implement i t .  M arshall had, th e re fo re , 
accomplished what he considered to  be h is  prim ary ta sk , and he had done 
i t  in  le s s  than one month a f t e r  h is  a r r iv a l  in  China.^ C iv il war had been 
h a lted  e a r ly  enough to  make i t  p o ss ib le  fo r  th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative 
Conference to  convene under peacefu l cond itions.
R esolutions o f  the  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative Conference
A tten tion  was now centered  on th e  m eetings o f th e  P o l i t ic a l  Con­
s u l ta t iv e  C o n f e r e n c e ( P C C ) T h e  PCC convened on January 10, 1946, and ty
®John C arte r Vincent sa id  on Jan. 24, 1952. th a t  M arshall o rig in a te d  
th e  idea  o f  using tru c e  teams to  im plm ent o rders  from Executive Head­
q u a rte rs . Vincent was D irector o f  th e  Far Eastern O ffice o f th e  Department 
o f S ta te  during th e  M arshall M ission. Senate Subcommittee o f  th e  Committee 
o f th e  Ju d ic ia ry , I n s t i tu te  o f P a c if ic  R elations Hearings. 1952, P t. 6 ,
1717.
^Associate Ju s tic e  Bennett Champ Clark o f th e  U. S. Coui*t o f 
Appeals, Washington, D. C ., was e la te d  over M arsh a ll 's  success. In  a t e l e ­
gram to  P residen t Truman on Jan. 12, 1946, he s ta te d  th a t  " I to ld  you 
appointment o f M arshall was a s tro k e  o f genius but I  d id  not expect to  see 
i t  work ou t as soon a s  i t  d id ."  Truman, equally  p leased , wired th e  Ju s tic e  
on Jan. 14 th a t  " I t  does look as i f  M arshall i s  going to  accomplish h is  
purpose." Both telegram s a re  included in  The Papers o f H any S. Truman, 
O ff ic ia l  P ile  768, îb lder 840 (1945-46), Harry S. Truman L ibrary , Indepen­
dence, Mo.
l^The Conference was composed of th i r ty - s ix  p a rty  and non-party 
d e leg a tes . Paul M. A. Linebarger l i s t e d  th e  p a r t ic ip a n ts  and th e i r  numbers 
a s : Kuomintang, 8 ; Communist P arty , 7 ; Young China P arty , 5; Democratic
League, 2; Special Democrats, 2; Vocational E ducation ists , 1; Rural Recon­
s t ru c t io n is ts ,  1; Third Party , 1; Non-Party, 9* L inebarger, Journal o f 
P o l i t ic s .  IX, 535- 36.
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January I 3 i t  had made severa l agreements to  f a c i l i t a t e  the  solving o f 
C hina 's primary p o l i t i c a l  problems. M arshall d id  no t p a r t ic ip a te  in  these  
m eetings in  Chungking because the  d iscussions focused on m atters o f a 
p o l i t i c a l  na tu re . He believed th a t  the  in te rn a l  p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l ic ts  o f 
China were wholly a "Chinese a f f a i r , "  and th a t  th e  United S ta tes  should not 
be a p a rty  to  th ese  neg o tia tio n s.^^
Five re so lu tio n s  were approved during th e  PCC d e lib e ra tio n s , and
most o f  them were re la te d  to  governmental reo rgan iza tion  and th e  adoption
I Po f a c o n s titu tio n . Among th e  agreements were those  providing fo r  the  
re v is io n  o f th e  1936 D raft C onstitu tion  l?y the  C o n stitu tio n a l D raft Review­
ing  Committee and the  convening o f th e  N ational Assembly on May 5. 19^6, 
to  adopt th e  rev ised  c o n s titu tio n . The re so lu tio n s  a lso  s tip u la te d  th a t  
a S ta te  Council would be created  to  func tion  as th e  supreme goverrmental
^ M a rsh a ll s ta te d , in  rep ly  to  a question  o f  Sen. William Knowland 
o f  C a lifo rn ia  on May 11, 1951» th a t  th e  United S ta te s  had in d ica ted  i t s  
in te r e s t  in  th e  development o f a tw o-party  government in  China. "Beyond 
th a t , "  Marshall sa id , " I d id  not touch th e  m atter a t  a l l ,  except to  fu rn ish  
th e  Generalissimo [on Jan. 23, 19^» and a t  th e  G eneralissim o's request] 
c o n fid e n tia lly  our B ill  o f Rights and a p o ss ib le  in te rim  set-up  while thqy 
were reaching form al co n s tiu tio n a l fs ic ]  s ta tu s ."  Senate Committees on 
Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  
th e  Far E ast. 1951» P t. 1, 349#
^ ^ e x ts  o f  th ese  re so lu tio n s  a re  p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U.
S. R elations w ith China. Annexes 64-68, pp. 610-21. C h'ien Tuan-Aeng 
claim ed th a t  th e  re so lu tio n s  were not always passed by a la rg e  m ajo rity  
because th e re  was d issension  among th e  Chinese fa c tio n s . He contended th a t  
th e  Kuomintang and th e  Youth P arty  were opposed by th e  Communist Party  
and th e  Democratic League, while th e  non-party  d e leg a tes  divided th e i r  
v o te s . The d iv is io n  e x is ted , he observed, because th e  Kuomintang secured 
a number o f Conference se a ts  fo r  th e  Youth Party  "out o f a l l  proportion  to  
i t s  r e la t iv e  s tre n g th ,"  providing th e  Youth Party  would "d isso c ia te  i t s e l f  
from th e  League l in e ."  Qy th i s  ac tio n , C h'ien noted, th e  Kuomintang 
offended the  remaining Chinese d e leg a tes . C h'ien Tuan-sheng, pp. 359»
378.
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organ p r io r  to  and a f t e r  adoption o f the  c o n s titu tio n .^ ^  A dditional term s 
guaranteed th e  le g a l i ty  o f a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  and provided fo r  the  
maintenance o f  th e  s ta tu s  quo in  l ib e ra te d  a reas c u rre n tly  under d isp u te  
u n t i l  th e  N ational Government, as reorganized, s e t t le d  th e  controversy.
M ilita ry  Reorganization and In te g ra tio n  
Although M arshall did not d ir e c t ly  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  meetings 
o f  the  PCC, he d id  work with a committee to  implement a Conference re so lu ­
t io n  r e la t iv e  to  the  m ili ta ry  problems th a t  China f a c e d . M a r s h a l l ,  upon 
req u est, served as adv iser to  th i s  body, the  M ilita ry  Sub-Committee. Gener­
a ls  Chang Chih-Chung and Chou E n-la i represen ted  th e  in te r e s ts  o f the  
Government and th e  Chinese Canmunist P arty , re sp e c tiv e ly . The Committee’ s 
ta sk  was to  dev ise  p lans fo r  th e  reo rgan iza tion  and re d isp o s itio n  o f th e  
Chinese armed fo rce s .
^3%he agreement providing fo r  th e  establishm ent o f th e  S ta te  Coun­
c i l  recognized th e  dominant p o s itio n  o f  th e  Kuomintang. The Council was 
to  be composed o f fo r ty  members, twenty from th e  Kuomintang and twenty 
from a l l  o th er Chinese. A lth o u ^  th e  p a r t ie s  concerned could suggest nomi­
nees fo r  th e  p o s itio n s , th e  Generalissimo was empowered to  choose th e  
in d iv id u a l members. The only l im ita t io n  on Chiang’ s power in  th i s  re sp ec t 
was th a t  appointment o f  a non-party Councillor could be defeated  by th e  
opposition  o f  o n e -th ird  o f th e  o th e r nominees. In  a d d itio n , Chiang could 
veto  any decision  o f th e  Council. Further, re v e rsa l  o f th e  G eneralissim o’ s 
a c tio n  was rendered d i f f i c u l t  by th e  proviso th a t  a t h r e ^ f i f t h ’ s vo te  o f  
th e  Council was requ ired  to  overturn  h is  veto . Statement o f Dean Acheson, 
June 4, 1951I before th e  Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign 
R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast, 1951» F t. 3. 1850.
l^*tîars\in Chang, a de legate  o f  th e  D em ocratic-S ocialist P arty  in  
th e  PCC, s ta te d  th a t  M arshall’ s prim ary co n trib u tio n s  to  th e  success o f 
th e  Conference were: (1) arranging th e  tru ce  between the  N a tio n a lis ts
and th e  Communists, (2) serving as ad v ise r to  th e  M ilita ry  Sub-Committee, 
and (3) h is  "p e rso n a lity . ” This prominent Chinese a lso  commented on 
M arshall’ s rigorous schedule as fo llow s: "On one day he [M arshall! he ld
th re e  conferences, from n ine to  eleven in  the  morning, from two to  four 
in  th e  afternoon , and frmn e ig h t to  nine in  the  evening." Car sun Chang,
p . 157.
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D iscussions by the  M ilita ry  Sub-Committee began on February 14, 
and on February 25 th e  Chinese concurred on a p lan  fo r  th e  dem obilization , 
redeployment, and in te g ra tio n  o f a l l  m il i ta ry  u n i t s . T h e  Government and 
th e  Communists promised to  reduce th e i r  m ili ta ry  components to  f i f t y  and 
te n  d iv is io n s , re sp ec tiv e ly , over th e  next e ighteen  months. ï h ^  fu r th e r  
agreed to  d iv ide China in to  f iv e  a reas  fo r  purposes of in te g ra tio n  and 
deployment o f  th e i r  f o r c e s , a n d  to  submit l i s t s  to  th e  Committee o f the  
u n its  th a t  would be demobilized.
M arshall believed  th a t  th e  in te r e s ts  o f  China would b est be 
served by ai armed fo rce  organized along th e  l in e s  o f w estern m ili ta ry  t r a d i ­
t io n , i . e . ,  a n a tio n a l anny not sub jec t to  the  p o l i t i c a l  co n tro l o f any 
p a rty . He c o n s is te n tly  advised th e  Committee members to  work toward th i s  
end. The Ambassador was s a t is f ie d  with th e  agreement reached by th e  Com­
m ittee , but he was not confident th a t  th e  cu rren t good w i l l  would be mani­
f e s t  in  th e  fu tu re . When th e  concord was signed, he made th e  follow ing 
statem ent:
This agreement, I  th in k , r p r e s e n t s  th e  g rea t hope o f  China.
I  can only t r u s t  th a t  i t s  pages w il l  not be so iled  by a small 
group o f ir re c o n c ila b le s  who fo r  a s e l f is h  purpose would defeat 
th e  Chinese people in  th e i r  overwhelming d e s ire  fo r  peace and
^^The d e ta i l s  o f  th is  agreement, as re la te d  below, a re  based on a 
p ress re le a se  announcing the  agreement. A copy o f the  document i s  p rin te d  
in  S ta te  D ^artm ent, U. S. R elations w ith Q iina. Annex 69. pp. 622-26.
This pact o f  Feb. 25 was supplemented by a d ire c tiv e  which th e  Committee 
agreed to  on Feb. 2? and signed on Mar. I 6. The d ire c tiv e  o f  Mar. I 6 
in s tru c te d  th e  Executive Headquarters to  implement the  agreement o f Feb.
25. For a copy o f  th e  d ire c tiv e , see ib id . . Annex 70, pp. 626-27.
^^These a reas  and the  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  th e  m ili ta ry  fo rces a t  the  
end o f th e  eighteen months period were as fo llow s: N ortheast China
(Manchuria! -  14 Government d iv is io n s , 1 Communist d iv is io n ; Northwest 
Qiina -  9 Government d iv is io n s ; North China -  11 Government d iv is io n s ,
7 Communist d iv is io n s ; C entral China -  10 Government d iv is io n s , 2 Commu­
nist d iv is io n s ; South China (includ ing  fbzvosa! -  6 Government d iv is io n s . 
I b id . .  Annex 69. p . 625.
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p ro sp er ity .^7
The American Attempt to  Implement  
th e  Agreements. March-June 1946
Acceptance o f  the  Agreements and Support 
fo r  th e  M arshall Mission
The Chinese populace reacted  favorably to  th e  accomplishments 
o f  th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative Conference. "The achievement o f th e  . . . 
Conference," according to  Carsun Chang, "was the  expression o f  th e  consen­
sus o f the  Chinese people as a \ r t i o l e . Unfortunately,  however, the  
masses had no opportun ity  to  form ally express th e i r  opinions. Only the  
p a r t ie s  p a r t ic ip a tin g  in  th e  PCC were authorized  to  r a t i f y  the  re so lu tio n s  
o f  th e  Conference. The p rescribed  procedure fo r  approval o f the  reso lu tio n s  
was through th e  c e n tra l  executive committees o f th e  p a r t ic ip a tin g  p a r t ie s .  
And th e  two most powerful com petitors in  China, the  Kuomintang and the  
Communists, never d id  s a t is fy  the  demands o f  the  o th e r in  r e la t io n  to  th e  
PCC reso lu tio n s .
l ^ Ib id . . p . 142. M arsha ll's  fe a rs  th a t  th e  agreements might not 
be implemented were supported by F. F. Liu, an o f f ic e r  in  th e  N a tio n a lis t 
fo rces  during World War I I .  In  a 1956 p u b lica tio n , Liu s ta te d  th a t  the  
m il i ta ry  lead ers  o f  the  Kuomintang a t  th e  time o f  th e  1946 agreement were 
" se c re tly  unw illing" to  support any reo rgan iza tion  o f  th e  m ili ta ry  fo rces 
which would r e s u l t  in  any army not co n tro lled  by th e  Kuomintang. Liu, 
p . 231.
Chang a lso  noted th a t  some "enlightened members" o f  th e  Kuomin­
tang were encouraged by th e  work o f th e  PCC because th e  re so lu tio n s  in d i­
cated  th a t  the  period  o f p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  would be ended and th e  l a s t  
stage  o f th e  rev o lu tio n ary  work o f  th e  Kuomintang, c o n s titu tio n a l govern­
ment, would be in i t i a t e d .  Among th ese  Kuomintang members, Chang l i s te d  
Chang Chung, Sun Fo, Wang Shih-chieh, and Shao L ih -tse . Carsun Chang, p.
156. The view th a t  popular reac tio n  to  th e  work o f  th e  PCC was favorab le  
was a lso  supported by S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p.
143, and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, p. 378.
^^The C entra l Executive Ccmmittee o f the  Kuomintang unanimously 
approved the  PCC re so lu tio n s  on Mar. I 6 , 1946, but th e  Communists cancelled
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M arshall was encouraged by the  progress which the  January- 
February p ac ts  rep resen ted  and recu  unended th a t  he be re c a lle d  to  Washing­
ton  fo r  a b r ie f  v i s i t .  He was p a r t ic u la r ly  p leased  with Chiang K ai-shek 's 
decision  to  perm it c e a se -f ire  teams to  en ter Manchuria, a p o s itio n  p re­
v iously  unacceptable to  the  G e n e r a l i s s im o .^0 M arshall believed on the  eve 
o f h is  departu re  fo r  Washington th a t  the  proposed in terim  government had 
a " f a i r  chance o f success."  Although he was convinced th a t  the  Communists 
would not give up th e i r  strugg le  fo r  con tro l o f China, the  Ambassador 
believed th a t  the  Communists were confident th a t  they could secure p o l i t ­
i c a l  co n tro l w ithout re so rtin g  to  m ili ta ry  means. M arshall cautioned, 
however, th a t  th e  only hope fo r  China was the  w illingness o f the  Kuomintang 
to  solve C hina's problems by p o l i t i c a l  measures through a working agreement
th e i r  Mar. 31 meeting which had been scheduled to  pass on th e  agreements.
In  eoqplanation o f th e i r  ac tio n  th e  Communists s ta te d  th a t  they wanted th e  
1936 D raft C onstitu tion  thoroughly rev ised  w hile the  Kuomintang was try in g  
to  in fluence  th e  C o n stitu tio n a l D raft Reviewing Committee to  p resen t th e  
C onstitu tion  to  th e  N ational Assembly without any major changes. The 
u ltim a te  e f fe c t  o f th e  impasse between the  Kuomintang and th e  Communists 
was f a r  reaching—the C o n stitu tio n a l D raft Reviewing Committee, charged 
w ith d ra f tin g  a rev ised  c o n s titu tio n , had to  suspend i t s  work; and th e  
N ational Assembly, scheduled to  adopt the  c o n s titu tio n  on May 5» 19^6, 
had to  postpone th e  meeting u n t i l  îtovember. S ta te  Department, U. 5. Rela­
t io n s  with China, p. 144.
Chiang Kai-shek had prev iously  held th a t  the  en try  of tru ce  
teams in to  Manchuria would c o n s titu te  a r e s t r a in t  on the  Government's 
freedom o f ac tio n  th e re . M arshall d id  not ag ree , however, and, sh o rtly  
before Chiang*s a c tio n , th e  Ambassador made a 3.000 m ile f l ig h t  through 
northern  China to  exolain  th e  function  of th e  tru c e  teams to  the  p r in c ip a l 
f i e ld  commanders and Mao T se-tung ., Truman, I I ,  78. M arshall appeared 
before  th e  Senate Foreign R elations Committee soon a f te r  h is  a r r iv a l  in  
Washington in  1946, and Sen. Tom Connally o f Texas sa id  th a t  M arshall spoke 
"e n th u s ia s tic a lly "  to  th e  Committee about the  need fo r  th e  tru ce  teams "to  
go to  tro u b le  spo ts and stop th e  f ig h tin g ."  As th e  Senator s ta te d  i t ,  
M arshall to ld  th e  Committee th a t  "much of the  country was co n tro lled  by 
war lo rd s  idio had th e i r  own armies and would f ig h t  anyone who came close  
to  th e i r  t e r r i to r y ."  Tom Connally (as to ld  to  A lfred S te inberg), My 
Name I s  Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1954), p. 314.
112
with th e  o ther p a r t ie s  and non-party groups.
Marshall l e f t  fo r  the Unifyd S ta tes on March 11, 19^6. He was 
held  in  high esteem by Chiang Kai-siiek, and the  support o f American po licy
pp
toward China was favo rab le . The Generalissimo wrote P residen t Truman a 
l e t t e r  on the  day o f th e  Ambassador's departure  and thanked the  P residen t 
fo r  sending "a man o f  h is  (M arshall) s ta tu re  and s in c e r ity "  to  help  China 
solve her problems. Noting th a t  s ig n if ic a n t p rogress had been made in  th e  
n e g o tia tio n s , th e  Generalissimo made i t  ev iden t, however, th a t  M arsh a ll 's  
se rv ices would be needed fo r severa l years.
I  hope th a t  he w ill  re tu rn  to  China immediately upon comple­
t io n  o f h is  m ission to  America, fo r  th e  seed th a t  he has sown needs 
h is  presence to  b ring  i t  to  germ ination. I  would l ik e  to  add
Based on M arshall’ s rep ly  of May 12, 1951, to  Sen. John C. S tennis 
o f M iss issipp i before  Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign 
R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  the  Far E ast. 1951, P t. 1, 638. 
W alter S. Robertson, Chairman o f  th e  Executive H eadquarters, supported 
M arsh a ll 's  view th a t  th e  m ili ta ry  s i tu a tio n  was r e la t iv e ly  favorab le  to  
th e  cause o f peace. Speaking o f th i s  period , Robertson observed th a t  "All 
e ffe c tiv e  f ig h tin g  in  China ceased. There were sporadic o u tb u rs ts , but 
no responsib le  commanders were involved . . . .  There was th e  most evident 
d e s ire  to  cooperate on th e  p a rt  o f both th e  Communists and th e  Government 
rep re se n ta tiv e s  up u n t i l  about th e  f i r s t  o f  A pril (1946)." Testimony o f 
Mar. 4, 1 9 ^ ,  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a Post- 
War Recovery Program. 1 9 ^ ,  P t. 2, 2090.
^^Congressmen d id  not begin to  c r i t i c i z e  American po licy  u n t i l  
l a t e  Ju ly , 1946, and even then th e re  was no organized opposition . The 
stro n g est a ttac k  was made by Sen. Wherry vdao questioned th e  wisdom o f 
supporting the  in c lu s io n  o f Communists in  a c o a lit io n  Chinese government 
while regarding "Communists in  o th e r lands as to ta l i t a r i a n ."  Comments o f 
Sen. Vftieriy on Ju ly  31. found in  U. S ., Congressional Record. 79th Cong.,
2nd S e ss ., 1946, XCU, P a rt 8, 10532-33» Other congressional a tta c k s  upon 
American po licy  were made on Ju ly  26 ty  Reps. H u^ DeLacy o f Washington, 
E l l i s  E. P a tte rso n , and Charles Savage o f Washington. DeLacy contended 
th a t  th e  U. S. should evacuate American m il i ta ry  personnel from China and 
"Let th e  Chinese p a r t ie s  find  th e i r  own le v e l o f  p o l i t i c a l  s tre n g th ,"  
w hile P a tte rson  argued th a t  M arshall should be re c a lle d  un less th e  Nation­
a l i s t s  complied w ith Truman's p o licy  statem ent o f Dec. 15, 1945. Savage 
c r i t ic iz e d  the  U. S. fo r  a id ing the  National Government a l th o u ^  Chiang 
had not made th e  reform s demanded by Truman in  Dec., 1945. Ib id . , pp. 
10223- 28.
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moreover th a t ,  . . not only i s  General M arshall:s  speedy re tu rn  
to  China o f urgent n ecess ity , but h is  continued presence here fo r  
the  next th re e  years w ill  play  an im portant p a r t  in  the  s t a b i l i ­
sa tio n  o f th e  Far E a s t . 2 3
Ihere  was, a t  th is  tim e, very  l i t t l e  public  d iscussion  in  the  
United S ta tes o f American fo re ign  po licy  toward China. But what th e re  was, 
was generally  favo rab le . R epresentative Clare Boothe Luce of Connecticut 
spoke in  h igh ly  complimentary terms of the American ven tu re . She s ta te d  
on March 28, 1946, while the  Ambassador was in  Washington, th a t  M arshall 
had done an "ex traord inary  diplom atic job" in  China and th a t  the  "Nation 
should be g ra te fu l indeed" fo r  h is  accomplishments.^^ M arshall made a 
rep o rt to  a jo in t  Senate committee in  March, 1946, and he did not note any 
opposition  to  th e  A dm inistration’s po licy  toward China. In  fa c t ,  he re ­
ported  severa l y ears  l a t e r  th a t  he "got th e  im pression" th a t  he was "being 
supported" in  h is  e f fo r ts  although th e re  was "no formal e^qpression o f 
opinion" to  th a t  e f f e c t . ^3 Senator John J .  Sparkman o f  Alabama strong ly  
defended M arsh a ll's  opinion th a t  he was "being supported ." Ihe Senator 
observed th a t  when M arshall appeared before the  Senate Foreign R elations 
Committee in  executive session  on A pril 3» 1946,
He d iscussed  not only idiat he was attem pting to  do and th e  
d e ta i ls  o f h is  n eg o tia tio n s , but a lso  h is  proposed fu tu re  course.
He answered many questions propounded by th e  members o f the
copy o f th e  G eneralissim o's l e t t e r  i s  found in  The Papers of 
Harry S. Truman, O ff ic ia l  F ile  768, Folder 840 (1945-46), Harry S. Truman 
L ib ra iy , Independence, Mo.
24u. S ., Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 2nd S ess ., 1946, XCII, 
P a rt 10, A1750» Rep. Luce's b r ie f  comments precede th e  in se r tio n  o f  a 
Washington Post e d i to r ia l  o f Mar. 27, idiich was a lso  h igh ly  laudatozy o f 
M arsha ll's  record  in  China.
^^Testimony o f May 11, 1951, before the  Senate Committees on Araed 
Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings- M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
East. 1951, F t. 1 , 570.  Ihe records o f th e  1946 hearings were never pub- 
lish e d .
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committee* No a lte rn a tiv e  p o licy  was advanced o r suggested by any 
member o f the  committee, of e ith e r  p a r ty .^6
Extension o f M arsha ll's  Range of P a r tic ip a tio n  
M arsha ll's  c h ie f  aim in  re tu rn in g  to  th e  United S ta te s  on March 
11, 19^6, was to  rep o rt to  the  P residen t on the  p rogress being made. The 
Ambassador believed  th e  Chinese needed American a id , and he sought au th o ri­
za tion  fo r  United S ta tes a ss is ta n ce  to  a l le v ia te  th e  economic and f in a n c ia l  
co n d itio n s .27 However, th e  tru ce  he had arranged began to  crum ble,2® and 
he returned to  China on A pril 18. M arshall worked unceasingly u n t i l  
January, 19^7, to  patch up the  Chinese agreements, but h is  e f fo r ts  were 
f r u i t l e s s .  For M arshall i t  was a period  o f a lte rn a tin g  hope and f ru s ­
t r a t io n ,  with f i r s t  one Chinese element and then th e  o ther making progress
26jbhn J .  Sparkman, Review o f B ipartisan  Foreign Policy  Consul­
ta t io n s  since World War I I . U. S ., Congress, Senate Doc. 87, 82nd Cong.,
1 s t  Sess. (Washington: Ü. S. Government PriJiting O ffice , 1952), p . 20.
H ereafter c ite d  as Sparkman, Review o f B ipartisan  Foreign Policy  Consul­
ta t io n s  since World War I I . 1952, Senate Doc. 87. Sen. Tom Connally o f 
Texas also  contended th a t  M arshall was firm ly  supported in  h is  m ission \dien 
he returned to  th e  U. S. in  Mar., 1946. Comments o f  Apr. 13, 1950, U. S . , 
Congressional Record. 81 st Cong., 2nd S ess ., 1950, XCVI, P art 4, 5IO9.
27 lh is phase o f th e  M arshall Mission i s  tre a te d  in  Chapter V.
2®Factors co n trib u tin g  to  th e  d e te r io ra tio n  o f th e  tru ce  before 
M arshall retu rned  have been held  to  include: ( l )  th e  tim e lo s t  between
th e  agreement o f Mar. 11, 1946, providing fo r  th e  e n tiy  o f tru c e  teams in to  
Manchuria and a r r iv a l  o f  th e  teams on Apr, 8 , (2) re fu sa l o f th e  Govern­
ment members o f th e  Manchurian tru ce  teams to  tak e  any ac tio n  on th e  b a s is  
th a t  they were no t so au thorized , (3) Chinese Communist p ro te s ts  ag a in st 
th e  ad d itio n a l tra n sp o rta tio n  o f Government troops by American f a c i l i t i e s .  
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w i^  China, pp. 146-49. General A. C. 
Gillem, J r . ,  reported  on Apr. 6, 1946^ th a t  th e  m ili ta ry  s i tu a tio n  was 
se rious. The Government, he wrote, had v io la ted  th e  tru ce  agreement by 
d e ta in ing  Communist members o f th e  c e a se -f ire  team a t  Mukden and by a r­
re s tin g  o th ers  in  Peiping. In  ad d itio n . N a tio n a lis t p lanes had "buzzed” 
th e  Communist c a p i ta l  o f  Yenan. The Chinese Communists, th e  rep o rt con­
tinued , had been equally  g u ilty  in  occupying p a r ts  o f Manchuria as th e  
Russians l e f t  and ^  a ttack in g  Government tro o p s. Truman, I I ,  79* General 
Gillem was M arsh a ll 's  deputy and represen ted  th e  U. S. Ambassador in  
meetings o f th e  Committee o f  Three in  th e  absence o f  th e  Ambassador.
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d i f f i c u l t  i f  not i m p o s s i b l e . O v e r t u r e s  and proposed coun terso lu tions, 
temporary truces and aimed c o n flic ts  were commonplace. In  fa c t , i t  i s  
frequen tly  d i f f ic u l t  to  determine which ta c t ic  was tak ing  p reced en ce- 
p o l i t i c a l  nego tia tion  o r m ilita ry  a t t a c k . 30 I t  i s  c le a r , however, th a t  
th e  Chinese adversaries used the  conference ta b le  and the  b a t t le f ie ld  to  
fu r th e r  th e i r  o b jec tiv e s . I t  a lso  became in creasin g ly  evident th a t  no 
so lu tio n  to  C hina's problems was fe a s ib le  so long as the  p a r tic ip a n ts  
accepted a compromise a s  a temporary se ttlem ent toward th e  attainm ent o f  
a p a r tis a n  goal ra th e r  than as a so lu tio n  o f a n a tio n a l problem.
There was, a f t e r  M arsha ll's  re tu rn  to  China, a marked change in  
the  American search fo r  so lu tions to  C hina's problems. M arshall had p re ­
v iously  been p rim arily  concerned with securing and implementing a tru ce  
between th e  Chinese arm ies, and in te rn a l  Chinese conditions required  th a t
29E fforts to  secure and m aintain th e  peace were a lso  obstructed  
by th e  delay  in  th e  withdrawal o f Russian m ili ta ry  fo rces from Manchuria 
and th e  Soviet re fu sa l to  permit th e  N a tio n a lis ts  to  use Dairen as a p o rt 
o f en try  in to  Manchuria fo r  N a tio n a lis t tro o p s. The Russians were o r ig i­
n a lly  scheduled to  withdraw th e i r  Manchurian fo rces by Dec. 3. 19^5» but 
had postponed th e  da te  u n t i l  Feb. 1, 19^»  a t  th e  request o f th e  N ational 
Government which was no t ready fo r  occupation d u tie s  on th e  e a r l ie r  d a te .
a subsequent agreement, in  e a rly  Mar., 1 9 ^ ,  th e  Soviet evacuation was 
to  be completed between Apr. 6-29, 19^» The Russians fu r th e r  aided the  
Chinese Communists-therety making peace more remote between the  Chinese 
p r in c ip a ls—idien, upon withdrawal from Manchuria, t h ^  l e f t  captured 
Japanese arms to  the  i n f i l t r a t in g  and invading Chinese Communists. S ta te  
Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. 14?.
3^Dean Acheson has s ta te d  th a t  armed a ttac k s  were used by both 
p a r t ie s  to  secure p o l i t i c a l  ends. He described the  s i tu a tio n  as follow s 
on June 4, 1951: "One side  or th e  o ther would believe  th a t  i t  could gain
an advantage by cap turing  th is  o r th a t  c i ty  o r a rea , and believed i t  could 
streng then  i t s e l f  in  th e  n ego tia tions; and then  would s t a r t  an a tta c k . 
E ither th e  Communists would a ttac k  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  o r th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
would a tta c k  the  Communists, and in  th a t  way th i s  s i tu a tio n  became worse 
and worse; and General M arsha ll's  e f fo r ts  were unable to  deal with i t .  " 
Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t. 3 , 1851.
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he a tten d  to  th is  m atter fo r  the remainder o f the  m ission. However, he 
became in creasin g ly  involved in  p o l : t i c a l  developments in  China during 
A p ril, 1946-January, 194?.^^ The Ambassador used a v a r ie ty  of techniques 
in  try in g  to  implement American fo reign  po licy . He held  frequent confer­
ences with the  p r in c ip a l Chinese o f f i c i a l s ,  analyzed th e  s itu a tio n , and 
suggested th a t app rop ria te  step s be taken to  remove ob stru c tio n s to  negoti­
a tio n s  and to  c o rre c t designated f a u l ts .  The Ambassador d rafted  statem ents 
and proposals fo r  th e  Generalissimo in  o rder to  c la r i f y  th e  N a tio n a lis t 
p o s itio n , and he strong ly  endorsed the  u t i l i z a t io n  o f th ird  p a r t ie s  and 
non-partisan  groups to  break th e  i m p a s s e . 32 As the  s i tu a tio n  d e te r io ra te d  
from month to  month, M arshall recognized th e  need fo r  another American in  
a top le v e l p o s itio n  to  help him carry  ou t United S ta te s  po licy . This 
need was met in  Ju ly , 1946, by the  P re s id e n t's  appointment o f J . Leighton 
S tu a rt as Ambassador to  China. And when Communist propaganda a tta c k s  on 
United S ta tes a id  to  the  N ational Government th rea tened  to  destroy  th e  
e ffec tiv en ess  o f th e  American p o sitio n  as m ediator, M arshall imposed an 
embargo on American shipment of m ili ta ry  supplies and equipment to  th e  
N a tio n a lis ts .
M arsh a ll's  i n i t i a l  e f fo r ts  upon re tu rn in g  to  China were d irec te d  
toward s e t t l in g  th e  m ili ta ry  c o n f l ic t ,  however, ra th e r  than the  p o l i t i c a l .
3^Supra, n. ?5i Chapter I I .  M arshall s ta te d  on May 11, 1951. th a t  
h is  involvement in  the  p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  o f China was "not as to  th e  gener­
a l  types o f government [the  Chinese should form), but as to  how to  get them 
to g e th er in  the  m atter o f d e leg a tes , p a r t ic u la r ly  (those to ) the  S ta te  
Council which remained th e  argum entative b asis  fo r  months th e re ."  Senate 
Committees on Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  
S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 1, 550»
32carsun Chang, lead er of the  D em ocratic-Socialist Party , sa id  th a t  
M arshall sought h i s  cooperation "to persuade Chou â i - I a i ,  . . . , to  
moderate many o f h is  demands." Carsun Chang, pp. 25-26.
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For on the  da te  of h is  re tu rn  the  Chinese Communists had captured Changchun 
in  Manchuria. E(y th is  ac tio n  of xn- Communists and the  reac tio n  o f the  
Government to  i t ,  the  tru ce  arrangement of January 10 had been rendered 
in e f fe c tiv e . M arshall was convinced th a t  i t  would be d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not 
im possible, to  convene th e  National Assembly a t  f u l l  streng th  to  approve 
a new c o n s titu tio n  and end the Kuomintang's p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  un less th e re  
were an e ffe c tiv e  tru c e . He a lso  believed th a t i t  was u n like ly  th a t  the  
reo rgan iza tion , re d isp o s itio n  and in te g ra tio n  o f th e  Chinese m ili ta ry  
fo rces would be secured unless th e  c e a se -f ire  arrangements were implemented.
Thus, the  American Ambassador's immediate a tte n tio n  was d irec te d  
toward the  s i tu a tio n  in  Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek contended th a t  the  
Communist capture o f Changchun th rea tened  the  Government's con tro l o f 
Manchuria, and he informed M arshall th a t  he would not sign any agreement 
th a t  did not ensure N a tio n a lis t sovereignty  in  Manchuria. The f i r s t  step  
in  th i s  d ire c tio n , th e  Generalissimo observed, would be fo r  th e  Communists 
to  evacuate Changchun and to  perm it the  en try  o f N a tio n a lis t fo rce s . Chou 
E n -la i, th e  Communist spokesman, opposed th e  Government demand fo r  evacu­
a tio n  o f Changchun on th e  basis th a t  withdrawal th e re  would lead  to  demands 
fo r  abandonment o f o th e r key p o in ts . Chou a lso  s ta te d  th a t  th e  M ilita ry  
Reorganization Agreement o f February should be rev ised  to  au tho rize  f iv e  
Communist d iv is io n s  fo r  Manchuria in s tead  o f th e  one d iv is io n  o r ig in a lly  
s tip u la te d . M arshall assessed  th e  fundamental d iffe ren c e  between th e  
p o s itio n s  o f the  two s id e s  as one involving the  question  o f sovereignty 
in  Manchuria, and he supported th e  N a tio n a lis t p roposal. There was, 
however, no immediate improvement in  th e  re la tio n s  between th e  Chinese on 
th e  Changchun issu e , and th e  N a tio n a lis ts  opposed Chou E tv la i 's  proposal 
fo r  an in c rease  in  th e  number o f Communist d iv is io n s  in  Manchuria.
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Further, th e  dim inishing e ffec tiv en ess  of the  Executive Head­
q u a rte rs  and the  tru ce  teams was ap a ren t.33  Though M arshall aided the  
Chinese in  reaching an agreement rc speed up the  in v e s tig a tio n  o f reported  
v io la tio n s  o f the  January 26 c e a s e - f ire  o r d e r , h e  became discouraged in  
May and d iscontinued h is  formal m ediation e f fo r ts  to  s e t t l e  the  Manchurian 
is su e . The break was not complete, however, because the  Ambassador con tin ­
ued to  hold separa te  conferences with the  N a tio n a lis ts  and the  Communists 
and to  serve as a channel o f communications between them.
The p rospects fo r  a peacefu l so lu tio n  su ffered  another setback 
when th e  Generalissimo went to  Mukden on May 23 to  check on h is  troops in
333inplanentation o f the  c e a s e - f ire  o rder was made d i f f i c u l t  by a 
frequent p ra c tic e  o f th e  Chinese members o f th e  Executive Headquarters : 
th e  veto o f any proposal which would not be advantageous to  the  p a rty  
castin g  th e  ve to . This rea c tio n , o f course, prevented ac tio n  hy th e  tru ce  
teams. Robertson qu ick ly  appraised th e  development, and tw ice suggested, 
once as l a t e  as May, 1 9 ^ ,  th a t  he as Chairman o f  the  Executive Headquarters 
be au thorized  to  o rder an in v e s tig a tio n  o f any reported  v io la tio n  o f th e  
c e a s e - f ire  agreement. The N ational Government rep re se n ta tiv e  o f the  
Executive Headquarters agreed to  R obertson 's p roposal, but th e  Communist 
Commissioner vetoed th e  suggestion as being "contrary  to  th e  p r in c ip le  o f 
unanimity under idiich th e  Headquarters opera ted ."  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex ?1 (c) ,  p. 63O.
3 ^ n e  reason fo r  th e  decreased e ff ic ie n cy  o f th e  Executive Head­
q u a rte rs  and th e  tru c e  teams, as in d ic a te d  in  th e  preceding note, had been 
th e  o b stru c tio n s  hy both N a tio n a lis ts  and Communists to  prompt in v e s tig a tio n  
o f repo rted  v io la t io n s  o f  th e  J a n . , 1946, c e a se -f ire  o rder. The r e s t r ic t io n  
was tem porarily  removed ly  an agreanent reached by th e  Committee o f Three, 
w ith M arshall p re s id in g , on May 14. This d ire c tiv e  to  th e  Executive Head­
q u a rte rs  provided th a t  th e  c iv i l  and m ili ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s  o f both Chinese 
groups would a s s i s t  th e  f ie ld  teams in  undertaking prompt in v e s tig a tio n s  
o f  repo rted  v io la tio n s  o f  th e  Jan. tru c e  o rder and would guarantee th e  per­
sonal freedom and se c u rity  of team members. I t  was fu r th e r  s t ip u la te d  
th a t  th e  American member o f th e  various teams would serve as th e i r  chairman, 
and th a t  th e  chairman would rep o rt to  th e  Executive Headquarters any d is ­
agreement in  regard  to  p r io r i ty  o f a reas and m atters  fo r  in v e s tig a tio n . 
I n a b i l i ty  -of th e  Headquarters to  reach a unanimous dec ision  w ithin  twenty- 
fo u r hours on th e  a c tio n  to  be taken should be repo rted  by th a t  body to  the  
Committee o f  Three. Text of th e  agreement i s  p rin te d  in  ib id . . Annex 75 , 
pp. 640-41.
33 ib id . . pp. 150- 52.
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Manchuria. Chiang*s absence from Nanking fo r th e  next eleven days consider­
ably  reduced the  e ffec tiv en ess  o f M arsha ll's  endeavors. Communications 
between the  Ambassador and Chiang were poor, and d e liv e ry  o f messages to  
Chiang was d i f f i c u l t .  Mi sunder standing s between them arose over in te r ­
p re ta tio n  of the  conten ts of messages. Further, Chiang did not always 
inform M arshall during th is  eleven aay period  o f h is  [Chiang] reac tio n  to  
th e  American Ambassador*s suggestion. For example, M arshall had repeated ly  
urged th e  Generalissimo to  order Government troops to  h a l t  th e i r  advance 
in  Manchuria and to  perm it th e  establishm ent of an advance sec tion  o f th e  
Executive Headquarters in  Changchun. Chiang did not rep ly  to  Marshall* s 
requests u n t i l  he (ChiangJ returned to  Nanking on June 3»^^
Although M arshall advised both p a r t ie s  in  separa te  conferences 
to  r e je c t  the  use o f armed m ight, the  m ili ta ry  c o n f l ic t  continued unabated. 
Government troops had recaptured Changchun on th e  day Chiang l e f t  fo r  Mukden 
and had continued th e i r  advance northward. M ilita ry  v ic to ry  fo r  one was, 
o f course, m ili ta ry  defea t fo r  the  o th e r, and, as frequen tly  noted h e re ­
a f t e r ,  m ilita ry  conquest by e ith e r  s ide  made co n stru c tiv e  neg o tia tio n s 
im possible on both m ilita ry  and p o l i t i c a l  problems.
In  the  immediate in stan ce , i t  w il l  be remembered, the  Government 
had previously  refused  to  n eg o tia te  un less the  Communists evacuated Chang­
chun and perm itted  N a tio n a lis t troops to  en te r th a t  c i ty .  Vdth t h e i r  recap­
tu re  o f Changchun, however, th e  N a tio n a lis ts  believed th a t  they could secure 
a settlem ent by armed m i^ t .  Thqy were, th e re fo re , re lu c ta n t to  compromise 
with th e  Communists. For th e i r  p a r t ,  th e  Communists began to  openly 
question  th e  s in c e r i ty  o f Government proposals and th e  ex ten t to  which 
M arshall was im p a rtia l. % e Communists contended th a t  Chiang* s presence
36jbid. . p. 157.
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in  Mukden a t  the  time Changchun was captured in d ica ted  th a t  th e  G eneralis­
sim o's t r i p  had been planned to  coincide with th e  N a tio n a lis t m ilita ry  
v ic to ry . R irth e r, i t  was s ta te d , M arshall had jeopardized  h is  p o s itio n  as 
m ediator by p lacing  h is  plane a t  the  G eneralissim o's d isposa l fo r  th e  
trlp.37
M arshall had been o p tim is tic  as la te  as th e  " l a t t e r  p a r t  o f May" 
th a t  a tru ce  could be arranged, but Chiang was le s s  w illin g  to  cooperate 
a f t e r  th e  N a tio n a lis t successes in  Manchuria and a f te r  he [Chiang] had 
consulted  with h is  genera]s in  Manchuria. When th e  Generalissimo asked 
M arshall to  guarantee th e  good f a i th  o f th e  Communists, M arshall became 
discouraged and cabled P residen t Truman as follow s:
I  am working ag a in s t time; o therw ise I  would be q u ite  hopeful.
As i t  i s ,  success depends on th e  developments in  th e  f ie ld  more 
than on the  problems o f  n e g o tia tio n s .^8
As M arshall be lieved  th a t  success depended on "developments in  
th e  f i e ld ,"  he repeated ly  proposed th a t  a c e a se -f ire  be ordered, th a t  an 
advance echelon o f th e  Executive Headquarters be moved in to  Changchun, 
th a t  N a tio n a lis t troop movements cease, and th a t  n ego tia tions be entered  
in to  fo r  a settlem ent o f  th e  Manchurian question . The Ambassador s t i l l  
had not fo m a lly  reen tered  th e  n eg o tia tio n s , however, and h is  conferences 
w ith Chou E h-lai in  Nanking and h is  messages to  Chiang Kai-shek in  Manchuria 
produced no p o s itiv e  r e s u l ts .
37 lb id . . pp. 155-57* The Communist charges aga in st M arshall con­
t r a s t  sharply with Carsun Chang's statem ent about th e  Communists' a t t i tu d e  
toward M arshall a t  th e  end o f the  PCC m eetings. The lead er o f th e  Demo­
c ra t ic -S o c ia l is t  Party  s ta te d  th a t  Qiou E h-la i to ld  him many tim es th a t  
"M arshall never once attem pted to  deceive him during h is  m ediation e f f o r t s ."  
Carsun Chang, p. 157»
3®Truman, I I , 79-80.
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M arshall’s C ontribution to  the  
Truce Arrangement o f June 19^6
A nego tiated  settlem ent was undoubtedly impeded by the  G eneralis­
simo’s eleven-day absence from Nanking, the  s i t e  o f n eg o tia tio n s. This 
disadvantage was removed, however, when Chiang Kai-shek returned  to  th a t  
c i ty  on June 3» In  d ire c t  c o n tra s t to  the  deadlock o f the  p a st several 
days, the  d isp u tan ts  quickly entered in to  th ree  agreements. M arshall 
made s ig n if ic a n t con trib u tio n s to  a l l  th e  compacts although he s t i l l  had 
not reen tered  th e  formal n eg o tia tio n s. He secured the  G eneralissim o's 
approval to  immediately dispatch an advance sec tion  o f the  Executive Head­
qu arte rs  to  Changchun, presided  over th e  Committee o f  Ih ree  when i t  agreed 
to  reopen communications in  North and C entral C h i n a , a n d  aided the  
Chinese in  arranging a f if te en -d a y  tru ce  in  Manchuria.
Chiang Kai-shek and Chou E h-la i announced th e  Manchurian tru ce  
agreement on June 6, with the  s tip u la t io n  th a t  i t  would become e ffe c tiv e  
a t  noon, June ? . ^  The purpose o f n eg o tia tio n s a t  t h i s  tim e was to  arrange 
a permanent cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s ,  but the  lik e lih o o d  o f such an achieve­
ment was jeopardized  a t  the  beginning of the  tru c e  period  ty  a week-long
39Truman gave M arshall c re d i t  fo r  arranging th e  temporary tru ce  in  
Manchuria, and s ta te d  th a t  General Henry A. Eÿroade, M arsh a ll's  ch ie f o f 
s ta f f ,  was sent to  Changchun to  supervise i t s  implementation. Ib id . . p.
80. The d ire c tiv e  o f th e  Committee o f Three provided fo r  u n re s tr ic te d  
interchange of non-m ilita ry  item s, "u n re s tr ic te d  c iv i l ia n  t r a v e l ,"  dem ili­
ta r iz a t io n  "w ithin 1,000 m eters on e i th e r  side  o f  th e  r a i l ro a d s ,"  and fo r  
completion of sp ec ified  railw ay reconstruc tion  w ith in  a period  o f th i r ty  
to  150 days from th e  s ta r t in g  date  o f  June 30, 1946. For te x t  o f agreement, 
see S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 77, pp. 642-43.
^ T e x ts  o f th e  statem ents a re  p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex 76 (a) (b),  pp. 641-42. Both documents in d i­
cated th e  mutual suspicion  and d is t r u s t  o f the  two Chinese adversaries by 
urging each o ther to  "demonstrate in  good f a i th  th e i r  in te n tio n  to  carry  
out the  agreements they  had prev iously  signed."
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Communist o ffen siv e  in  Shantung Province. A nego tia ted  settlem ent was 
a lso  im periled  by th e  fre e ly  expressed view o f some Government m ili ta ry  and 
c iv i l ia n  o f f i c i a l s  th a t  the  Communists should be suppressed by m ili ta ry  
means. M arshall was acu tely  aware o f  the  danger to  a peaceful adjustm ent 
and advised the  Government not to  re s o r t  to  an a l l - o u t  war aga in st the  
Communists. Such a course, th e  Ambassador contended, g rossly  u n d eresti­
mated th e  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f success.
When only  a few days remained before the  f if te e n -d a y  tru ce  would 
ejqpire, M arshall suggested th a t  the  time l im it  be extended so th a t  unset­
t le d  m atters  could be considered. Acting upon M arsh a ll 's  suggestion, Chiang 
Kai-shek extended th e  a rm istice  fo r  e ig h t days, u n t i l  noon o f  June 30. 
N egotiations during th is  eight-day period  were conducted in  formal meetings 
o f th e  Committee o f  Three, and i t  was during th is  in te rv a l  th a t  M arshall
JlO
form ally  reen tered  th e  nego tia tions as m ediator.
M arsh a ll 's  conferences with the  o th er members o f the Committee 
o f  Three quickly produced a se r ie s  o f agreements. For example, th e  Commit­
te e  issued  a d ire c tiv e  on June 24 which was designed to  expedite th e  work 
o f th e  tru c e  teams and th e  Executive Headquarters. In  th is  in stan ce , 
American members o f  th e  f ie ld  teams and th e  Executive Headquarters were 
granted  th e  tie -b rea k in g  vote in  m atters involving th e  "cessation  o f  hos­
til i t ie s  procedures" and th e  in te rp re ta t io n  and execution o f agreements.
This p ac t d id  not apply to  the  Committee o f  Three, however, because M arshall, 
a member o f th e  Committee, d id  not b e liev e  th a t  th e  United S ta tes Government,
S ., Department o f S ta te , O ffice  o f Public A ffa irs , "China," 
Inform ation Memorandum No. 50, May 24, 1949, p. 6 Mimeographed in  the  
f i l e s  o f Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas, D ivision o f M anuscripts, U n iversity  
o f Oklahoma L ibrary , Noman, Oklahoma.
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. l 6 l .
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through h is  ac tio n s , should bear any re sp o n s ib ili ty  in  such m atters beyond 
th e  in te rp re ta t io n  o f agreements.
The Ckxnmittee o f Three resolved a major is su e  on June 26 when 
i t  agreed to  a complete term ination  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  in  M anchuria .^  A ll 
Chinese troops were ordered to  withdraw from close  con tact with opposing 
u n its .  Ihe s i tu a tio n  e x is tin g  a t  noon on June 7 was to  serve as the  b asis  
fo r  determ ining what c o n s titu ted  th e  proper withdrawal d istances o f the  
h o s t i le  fo rces . I t  was fu r th e r  s t ip u la te d  th a t both sides would submit 
l i s t s  o f th e i r  m il i ta ry  u n its  in  Manchuria, includ ing  th e i r  s tren g th s and 
lo c a tio n s , to  the  Advance Section o f th e  Executive Headquarters in  Chang­
chun. Compliance with t h i s  p rov ision  was requ ired  w ith in  f i f te e n  days 
o f  th e  issuance o f  th e  d ire c tiv e . The Government agreed th a t  i t  would not 
move any ad d itio n a l combat u n its  in to  Manchuria, and, in  tu rn , was author­
ized to  m aintain i t s  basic  streng th  th e re  through in d iv id u a l replacem ents.
When Chiang Kai-shek and Chou E h-la i announced the  Manchurian 
tru c e  agreement on June 6, t h ^  had s tip u la te d  th a t  subsequent n eg o tia tio n s 
should be u t i l iz e d  to  reso lve  th ree  m ajor is su e s . Two of the  th ree  po in ts  
in  question  had been successfu lly  disposed of 6y June 26—the  Chinese had 
en tered  pac ts  providing fo r  th e  r e s to ra tio n  of communications in  China and
^^Ib id . For copy o f te x t  o f agreement see ib id . . Annex ?8, p. 644. 
Truman s ta te d  th a t  th e  N ational Government proposed giving the  tie -b rea k in g  
v o te  to  th e  Americans, and th a t  the  Communists concurred only because o f 
M arshall*s "p a tie n t p e rs is te n c e ." The Chinese Government had made a simi­
l a r  proposal a t  th e  beginning o f th e  cu rren t tru ce  period , and Truman held  
th e  overtu re  to  be unfortunate  because th e  "Communists, . . . , saw in  
th i s  move merely a corroboration  o f  t h e i r  charge th a t  America was tak ing  
th e  Kuomintang's side  • • • •" Thus, conditions w ith in  China had changed 
en o u ^  w ith in  a seventeen-day period (June 7-24)to  j u s t i f y  M arsha ll's  
working fo r  a proposal on June 24 which th e  P residen t had described as 
unfortunate  \dien f i r s t  made. Truman, I I ,  80-81. However, see supra , n. 33*
^*^ext o f th e  agreement i s  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex 79. pp. 644-45.
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fo r  a complete te. u ination  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Manchuria, M arshall now sought 
to  implement the  PCC m ili ta ry  reo rgan iza tion  agreement o f February, and.  ̂
th e re fo re , remove th e  th ird  o b stac le  to  a nego tia ted  se ttlem en t. Although 
in te rn a l  conditions in d ica ted  th a t  M arshall would not s u c c e e d , h e  pre­
sented a proposal to  th e  Chinese and asked them to  use i t  as a b a s is  fo r  
th e i r  d is c u s s io n s .^  The American Ambassador urged the  Chinese to  d e te r­
mine th e  sp e c ific  l o c a l i t i e s  in  Manchuria and China in  which th e i r  troops 
would be s ta tio n ed  and to  r e ta in  th e  fiv e -to -o n e  r a t io  o f troops as se t  on 
February 25. He a lso  s ta te d  th a t  the  Executive Headquarters should be 
perm itted  to  determine which Chinese and Manchurian lo c a l i t ie s  had been 
occupied since January 13 and June 7, re sp ec tiv e ly , and th a t  a l l  Chinese 
troops should be withdrawn from th e  areas so designated. M arshall asked 
th e  Government to  agree  to  two ad d itio n a l cond itions: ( l )  th a t  i t s  m ili­
ta ry  fo rces  not be moved in to  Chinese areas vacated by th e  Communists, and 
(2 ) th a t  th e  e x is tin g  lo c a l governments be preserved.
The Chinese accepted M arsha ll's  proposal as a guide fo r  th e i r  
d iscussions and were ab le  to  compromise some o f th e i r  d iffe ren c e s . Ejy
^^Factors idiich support th i s  p o s itio n  a re : ( l )  none o f th e  major
agreements were to  become opera tive  unless concurrence was reached on a l l  
th re e  m ajor is su e s , (2) Chiang Kai-shek s ta te d  th a t  p o l i t i c a l  adjustm ents 
in  th e  d ispu ted  " l ib e ra te d ” a reas would not be made u n t i l  th e  Communists 
demanded th a t  the  p lan  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  adjustm ent in  th ese  a reas should be 
determined in  advance o f  th e  Communist m ili ta ry  evacuation, (3) Chiang 
contended th a t  o th er m il i ta ry  problems should be s e t t le d  a f te r  th e  Commu­
nists had evacuated th e  lo c a l a reas re fe rre d  to^ vdxile Qiou claimed th a t  
sp e c if ic  p lans fo r  th e  reo rgan iza tion  and in te g ra tio n  o f th e  N ational 
Chinese Army should be determined p r io r  to  th e  Communist withdrawal from 
th e  lo c a l  a reas , (4) th e  Communists had not submitted a l i s t  o f th e i r  
troops fo r  dem obilization [the  Government had done so ) , a l th o u ^  M arshall 
reminded th e  Communists th a t  th i s  should have been done as ea rly  as March 
and no l a t e r  than A p ril, and (5) th e  tru c e  o f June 7, as extended to  June 
30, was about to  ex p ire . Ih is  an a ly s is  i s  based on ib id . . pp. 162-64.
^ A  copy o f  th e  Ambassador* s proposal i s  p rin ted  in  ib id . , Annex 
80 , pp. 645-46.
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June 29 only one im portant is su e  remained u n se ttled —th e  s ta tu s  o f lo c a l 
governments in  th e  a reas to  be evacuated by th e  Communists. Success in  
the  cu rren t n eg o tia tio n s  depended upon find ing  a so lu tio n  to  th i s  question , 
and M arshall so informed Chiang Kai-shek on th e  morning o f June 30. Ever 
f e a r fu l  o f th e  spread o f h o s t i l i t i e s ,  the  Ambassador advised the  General­
issim o to  agree to  a con tinuation  of th e  lo c a l governments, pending subse­
quent n eg o tia tio n s  fo r  th e i r  m odifica tion . I t  was a lso  im perative, in  
M arsh a ll's  opin ion , th a t  a permanent c e a se - f ire  be arranged ra th e r  than an 
extension o f th e  cu rren t " p a r t ia l  tru ce .
M arsh a ll 's  counsel and patience  were unavailing , however. The 
tru c e  period  eaqjired a t  noon on June 30 w ithout complete agreement having 
been reached on th e  th ird  major issu e . And as no m ajor agreement could be 
implemented u n less  concurrence was reached on a l l  th re e  major is su e s , the  
n eg o tia tio n s  since  June 7 had been f u t i l e  and M arsh a ll 's  e f fo r ts  had been 
unsuccessfu l.
Thus, th e  margin fo r  a peacefu l se ttlem en t, i f  th e re  ever was one, 
had narrowed p e rc ep tib ly  since th e  PCC agreements. R esolutions approved 
by th e  PCC in  January and February s t i l l  had not been put in to  e f fe c t :  
th e  Government had not been reorganized; no e ffe c tiv e  permanent tru c e  had 
been arranged; and p lans fo r  reo rg an iza tio n , re d isp o s itio n , and in te g ra tio n  
o f th e  Chinese m il i ta ry  fo rce  had not been determined. M arsh a ll's  remain­
ing  months in  China w itnessed a steady d e te r io ra tio n  o f  a reas in  which 
n eg o tia tio n s could be he ld , and, th e re fo re , a c o n s tr ic tio n  o f th e  a reas in  
vdiich he could serve any u se fu l purpose. V0.thin seven months from th e  
ex p ira tio n  o f th e  tru ce  on June 30, th e  M arshall M ission was term inated and 
th e  American m ediation e f fo r t  was o f f i c i a l ly  declared  to  be unsu ited  to  the
7̂ibid. . pp. 168-69.
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o b jec tiv es i t  was designed to  achieve.
Five More Months o f F ru s tra tio n  
July-November. 1 9 ^
The o b jec tiv e  o f United S ta te s  po licy  toward China was, th e re fo re , 
no c lo se r to  attainm ent on June 30 than  i t  had been when the  January- 
February accords were reached. A strong , u n ited , and democratic China had 
not been c rea ted . The Chinese, aided by M arsh a ll's  counsel, had made 
numerous agreements, but none o f th e  primary ones had been implemented on 
a permanent b a s is . Subsequent co n su lta tio n s revealed , however, th a t  
M arshall was confronted with s t i l l  a g rea te r ta sk  than th e  implementation 
o f  pacts entered in to  by the  Chinese. I t  became in creas in g ly  apparent 
th a t  an agreanent by th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists to  meet with 
each o ther c o n s titu ted  only an agreement to  ta lk .  Before the  M arshall 
M ission was term inated, th e  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s  had d e te rio ra te d  u n t i l  i t  was 
im possible to  even get th e  d isp u tan ts  to  d iscuss th e i r  d iffe ren c e s .
Although M arshall had not asked th e  P residen t to  r e c a l l  him, i t  
was evident th a t  he could not ranain  in  China much longer under th e  p re­
v a ilin g  cond itions. Chiang Kai-shek and Chou 5 i - l a i  d id  is su e  o rders on 
Ju ly  1 vdiich p ro h ib ited  aggressive a c tio n  by th e i r  tro o p s, but t h i s  en­
couraging sign was o f sh o rt d u r a t io n .^  The developments were, fo r  th e
^A lthough th e  N a tio n a lis t and Communist o rders p roh ib ited  aggres­
sive  ac tion  by th e i r  tro o p s , defensive ac tio n  was au thorized  i f  e i th e r  
m ili ta ry  fo rce  a ttacked  th e  o th er. This arrangement soon broke down be­
cause armed clashes continued. Each side  contended i t  was reac tin g  to  an 
o ffensive  maneuver by th e  o ther s id e , and, as th e  h o s t i l i t i e s  spread, i t  
became d i f f i c u l t  to  determ ine whether th e  N a tio n a lis ts  o r  th e  Communists 
were responsib le , ühe te x ts  o f th e  o rders by th e  Generalissimo and by 
Chou £kv>lai and Chu Teh a re  p rin te d  in  ib id . , Annexes 82-83, PP* 64?-48. 
W alter S. Robertson observed th a t  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  on m ili ta ry  m atters  
f i r s t  broke down in  th e  Committee o f Three, then  in  th e  Executive Head­
q u a rte rs  and th e  tru c e  teams. He s ta te d  on Mar. 4, 1948 th a t  "When th ings 
began to  d e te r io ra te  in  Nanking [tdiere th e  Committee o f  Three was working], 
they  would begin to  d e te r io ra te  in  our opera tions (those o f th e  Executive
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most p a r t ,  ominous in  na tu re . Clashes between N a tio n a lis t and Communist 
fo rces coincided with propaganda a ttac k s  on M arshall and American fo re ig n  
po licy  toward China. Some ex trem ists in  th e  Kuomintang urged the  General­
issim o to  wage a l l - o u t  war ag a in st the  Communists while sim ultaneously con­
tending th a t  M arsh a ll 's  counsel was re s tra in in g  Chiang from pursuing such 
a p o l i c y . T h e s e  charges w ith in  the  Kuomintang were more se c re tiv e , how­
ever, than those launched by the  Communists on Ju ly  ? . The Communists, 
on th is  d a te , s ta te d  th a t  measures had been in troduced in  the  American 
Congress to  a id  th e  N ational Government m i l i ta r i ly  and economically. Such 
le g is la t io n ,  th e  Communists claim ed, would encourage th e  N a tio n a lis ts  to  
seek a so lu tio n  by means o f f o r c e .^
P residen t Truman has in d ica ted  th a t  th e  Communists were c o rre c t 
in  th e i r  charges th a t  a c tio n  on th e  American le g is la t iv e  scene would en­
courage th e  N a tio n a lis ts  to  use fo rce  ra th e r  than  p o l i t i c a l  n eg o tia tio n s 
to  s e t t l e  th e  Chinese c o n f l ic t .  Unlike th e  Communists, however, th e  P res i­
dent was c r i t i c a l  o f th e  statem ents ty  Congressmen ra th e r  than o f th e
H eadquarters]. Where we had go tten  cooperation we would get delays, ex­
cuses, and v io la tio n s  o f  agreements. The breakdown th e re fo re  occurred in  
Nanking ra th e r  than  in  Peip ing ."  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , 
Hearings fo r  a Post-War Recovery Program. 19^6, P t. 2, 2090.
E s t a t e  D ^artm en t, U. S. R elations w ith China, p. 170. M arshall
l a t e r  re fe rre d  to  th e  w ar-lik e  tendencies o f th e  N a tio n a lis ts  a t  t h i s  tim e
as follow s: "The general e f fo r t  o f  the  N ational Government to  destroy  th e
power o f th e  Communist regime by m ili ta ry  a c tio n  had i t s  beginning in  June” 
o f  1946. Testimony o f May 12, 1951. before th e  Senate Committees on Armed 
Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast. 1951, P t. 1 , 659.
E s t a t e  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 170, 540. The
Communist charges were made in  r e la t io n  to  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of S. 2337 and
H. R. 6795 in  the  Senate and House on June 13 and June 14, re sp ec tiv e ly . 
These re so lu tio n s  provided fo r  le g is la t iv e  au th o riza tio n  fo r  an Army Advi­
sory Group and a Naval Advisory Group in  China and fo r  m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  
to  th e  reorganized Chinese army o f  s ix ty  d iv is io n s  as o u tlin ed  in  th e  agree­
ment hy th e  Chinese p a r t ie s  on Feb. 25, 1946. B la ir BoUes, "Influence o f 
Armed Forces on U. S. Foreign P o licy ,"  Foreign Policy  Reports. XXII (Oct.
I ,  1946), 175.
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le g is la t io n  per se . The P residen t a lso  observed th a t  M arshall was being 
handicapped by th e  comments in  Congress. M arsha ll's  "d e lica te  ta s k ,"  the  
P residen t wrote, "was made in f in i t e ly  more d i f f ic u l t "  by Congressmen who 
were urging " a ll-o u t  a id" to  N a tio n a lis t China. Noting th a t  th ese  s ta te ­
ments were ly  Americans"vdio claimed to  be fr ien d s  o f th e  Chinese people ," 
Truman s ta te d  th a t  t h e i r  ac tio n s were de trim en ta l in  two ways; (1) the  
"d ie-hards" in  China gained new confidence in  th e i r  attem pts to  sabotage 
M arsh a ll's  c e a se - f ire  e f fo r ts ,  and (2) th e  statem ents o f  congressmen could 
be used by Communists as "evidence o f  American d u p lic ity "  in  the  American 
po licy  to  m ediate.
M arshall had previously  ignored Communist a tta c k s  on American 
p o licy  toward China. He informed Chou E h-la i on th i s  occasion, however, 
th a t  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  and h is  u sefu lness as m ediator would be se rio u sly  
vtndermined un less th ese  a tta c k s  ceased. M arshall was a lso  convinced, in  
view o f th e  d e te r io ra tio n  in  th e  in te rn a l  Chinese s i tu a t io n , th a t  he needed 
an American to  a s s i s t  him, and he suggested th a t  th e  p o s itio n  of Ambassador 
to  China be f i l l e d .  Upon M arsh a ll's  recommendation. P residen t Truman 
appointed J .  Leighton S tu a rt to  th e  p o st.5% The United S ta tes Senate
5lTruman, I I ,  81.
5^S tu a rt had liv e d  in  China fo r  approxim ately f i f t y  years and a t  
t h i s  tim e was p res id en t o f Yenching U niversity  in  Peiping. M arshall has 
s ta te d  th a t  he chose S tu a rt because o f "h is  experience in  China, . . .  
h i s  c h a rac te r, h i s  p e rso n a lity  and h is  temperament." From the  p reface  
w ritte n  by Marsha l l  in  S tu a rt, p. ix .  M arshall informed S tuart toward th e  
end o f  A pr., 1946, th a t  he would want S tu a rt to  help him, and th e  two men 
ta lk ed  about the  Chinese s i tu a tio n  severa l tim es th e re a f te r .  Ihen, on 
Ju ly  4, S tuart sa id , M arshall asked him to  accept an appointment as Ambas­
sador to  Oiina. Ib id . , pp. 162-66. There a re  c o n flic tin g  opinions on the  
m att - ?f M arsh a ll 's  choice o f S tu a rt fo r  th e  p o s itio n . Wedemeyer contended 
th a t  vlcurdiall asked him in  Chungking in  Jan. o r Feb., 1946, to  become 
Ambassador to  China, and th a t  he had agreed on cond ition  th a t  he be per­
m itted  to  re tu rn  to  th e  U. S. fo r  an opera tion  to  " a l le v ia te  a s inus con­
d i t io n ."  A fter th e  opera tion , Wedemeyer s ta te d , and w hile he was w aiting
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approved the  appointment on Ju ly  11, 19^*
M arshall re a liz e d  th a t  th e  N ational Government was confronted 
with severa l s ig n if ic a n t  problems, but he a ttached  primary importance to  
the  th re a t  o f f u l l - s c a le  c iv i l  war. Consequently, he informed the  Govenv- 
ment on July  26 th a t  i t  d iould make every e f fo r t  to  end th e  h o s t i l i t i e s .
I f  t h i s  were not accomplished, M arshall sa id , C hina 's economic and finan­
c ia l  s tru c tu re  would be destroyed. And even beyond th i s  considera tion , 
c iv i l  war and th e  re s u ltin g  economic chaos would c re a te  conditions more 
b e n e f ic ia l to  the  Communists than to  th e  Government and th e  cause o f peace. 
Relying upon th e  d ire c tiv e  which c rea ted  h is  m ission to  China, M arshall 
advised th e  Generalissimo th a t  h i s  o b jec tiv e  was to  a id  the  Government in  
e s tab lish in g  a strong, u n if ie d , and democratic China. R eferring to  the  
u n se ttle d  m il i ta ry  cond ition , he s ta te d  th a t  th e  "United S ta te s  would not 
underw rite a Chinese c iv i l  war" in  o rder to  achieve th i s  goal.
in  th e  U. S. f o r  th e  appointment to  m a te r ia liz e . Under Secretary  o f S ta te  
Acheson showed him a telegram  from M arshall lA ich cancelled  h is  "prospective 
appointm ent." According to  Wedaaqyer, M arsh a ll 's  telegram  d isc lo sed  th a t  
Wedemqyer's appointment "has leaked" and was adversely  a ffe c tin g  M arsh a ll's  
n eg o tia tio n s  w ith th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists. The Communists pro­
te s te d  h is  appointment, Wedemeyer sa id , because thqy believed  h is  close  
wartime a sso c ia tio n  w ith Chiang would prevent him from being im p a rtia l and 
because he had moved N a tio n a lis t arm ies to  North China a t  the  c lose  o f World 
War I I .  Testimony o f June 11, 1951. before the  Committees on Armed Services 
and Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951# 
P t. 3# 2311-12. P residen t Truman s ta te d , however, th a t  Wedemeyer's charge 
was in c o rre c t, th a t  th e  appointment o f  Wedemeyer was never considered. 
In terv iew  with Harry S. Truman, Aug. 20, 1959* Dean Acheson, in  c o r ro  
spondence with th e  au tho r, gave a m odified version  o f  th e  above views.
Acheson sa id  th a t  M arshall d id  recommend th a t  Wedemeyer be appointed Ambas­
sador to  China and th a t  he secured Wedemeyer's ^ p ro v a l  o f such an appoint­
ment tqpon d ire c tio n  o f  th e  P resid en t. He a lso  commented th a t  Marshall 
changed h is  recommendation fo r  th e  p o s itio n  to  S tu a r t, but added th a t  "I 
do npt r e c a l l  th a t  th e  reason fo r  t h i s  change was because o f  any leak  in  
th e  nomination, nor do I  r e c a l l  what th e  a c tu a l reason was." L e tte r  from 
Dean Acheson, Dec. 20, I960.
5 3 sta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 173-74. Acheson 
pizqw inted th e  American p o s itio n  on June 4, 19^#  when he sa id , "What we
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M arshall had always emphasized th e  n ecessity  o f ending the  f r e ­
quent armed clashes before c iv i l  war spread throughout China. I t  was v i t a l ,  
he contended, th a t  economic and p o l i t i c a l  reforms be undertaken, but th e  
order o f implementation was im portant. In  th i s  resp ec t, a c e a se -f ire  was 
primary while p o l i t i c a l  and economic reforms were secondary. However, 
several days had passed and no no ticeab le  p rogress had been made on Mar­
s h a l l ' s suggestion o f Ju ly  26. Changing th e i r  approach, the  two American 
Ambassadors d irec ted  th e i r  a tte n tio n  toward securing an agreement between 
th e  Chinese p rin c ip a ls  on a p o l i t i c a l  problem. The Americans believed 
th a t  p rogress toward establishm ent o f th e  S ta te  Council, as provided fo r  
in  the  PCC re so lu tio n s , might lead  to  an agreanent fo r  th e  cessa tion  o f 
h o s t i l i t i e s .  In f a c t ,  then, M arshall and S tu a rt were now w illin g  to  solve 
a p o l i t i c a l  problem f i r s t  i f  such ac tion  would remove th e  th re a t  o f m il i ­
ta ry  c o n f l ic t .  Accordingly, Ambassador S tu a rt proposed on August 1 th a t  
a new committee [Five-Man Ckanmittee] be c rea ted  and th a t  i t  n eg o tia te  an 
agreement fo r  the  organ ization  o f th e  S ta te  Council. S tuart suggested 
th a t  he p reside  over th e  Five Man Committee, and th a t  th e  remaining member­
ship be composed of two rep re sen ta tiv e s  each o f the  Government and the  
Communists. T entative acceptance of S tu a r t 's  proposal by Chiang Kai-shek 
and Chou B i- la i  served, however, only to  r a i s e  f a ls e  hopes. The o f fe r  
was even tually  re je c te d  by a technique a lready  w ell perfec ted— q u a lif ie d  
acceptance by one Chinese p rin c ip a l vdiich denied the  cond itional demands 
of the  o th e r. Thus, th e  Five-Man Committee never met, and another e f f o r t
were doing i s  te l l in g  him IChiang Kai-shek) th a t  we were engaged in  th a t  
e f f o r t ,  bu t we were no t engaged in  an e f fo r t  which was to  finance o r to  
give a ss is ta n ce  to  c iv i l  war, because . . .  c iv i l  war would destroy every 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of surmounting the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which th e  Generalissimo had 
before him, . . . . "  Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, 
H earings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E as t. 1951, P t. 3. 1898.
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to  end th e  impasse had f a i l e d . ^
To th is  po in t in  the  n ego tia tions n e ith e r  Chinese p a rty  had 
y ie lded  enough to  f a c i l i t a t e  a re c o n c ilia tio n  o f  th e i r  views. And as long 
as th i s  condition prevailed  th e  United S ta te s  o b jec tiv e  could not be fu l­
f i l l e d .  In  so f a r  as M arshall and S tu a rt were concerned, every day was a 
c ru c ia l  one, and they  u t i l iz e d  every opportun ity  to  ge t the  N a tio n a lis ts  
and th e  Communists together. However, th e  inexorable p o s itio n s  o f the  
Chinese considerably  lim ited  th e  a lte rn a tiv e s  a v a ilab le  to  th e  American 
duo. Personal conferences continued between th e  Americans and th e  Chinese 
during August and u n t i l  S^tem ber 1 6 ,  but th e  stalem ate was not b r o k e n .  5 5  
During t h i s  six-weeks period (August-September 16) th e  Communists 
c o n s is te n tly  made two basic demands o f th e  N a tio n a lis ts : (1) th e  h o s t i l i ­
t i e s  must be ended, and (2) the  Government must agree th a t  i t  would not 
u n i la te r a l ly  modify th e  PCC reso lu tio n s . S p e c if ica lly , the  Communists 
refused  to  n e g o tia te  a p o l i t i c a l  se ttlem ent on the  S ta te  Council u n t i l  a 
pem anent tru ce  was reached. As an a l te rn a t iv e , however, the  Communists 
d id  propose th a t  th e  Committee of Ih ree  and the  Flv^Man Committee could 
be convened sim ultaneously to  d iscuss th e  arrangement o f a cease-firA  and 
th e  o rgan ization  o f the  S ta te  Council, re sp ec tiv e ly . In  ad d itio n , th e  
Communists refused  to  name th e i r  members o f the  S ta te  Council u n t i l  a tru ce  
was reached. To prevent the  Government from modifying the  PCC re so lu tio n s ,
5^S tuart, pp. 167-68. S tuart sa id  th e  American e f fo r t  f a i le d  be­
cause o f the  mutual d is t r u s t  o f th e  two Chinese parties- fo r  each o th e r , but 
he in d ica ted  th a t  th e  Communists were worse than the  N a tio n a lis ts . "Never 
in  my ejqjerience with human beings," he w rote, "have I  encountered any­
th in g  l ik e  the  susp icions on both s id e s , e sp ec ia lly  among the  Communists. "
55rhe p o s itio n s  taken by th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists during 
t h i s  six-weeks p e rio d , as summarized in  th e  two paragraphs below, a re  
analyzed in  d e ta i l  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 
184.86.
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th e  Communists in s is te d  th a t  they be assured th e  con tro l o f enough vo tes 
in  the  S ta te  Council to  veto any rev is io n  of those reso lu tio n s  unacceptable 
to  them.
The Government's p o s itio n  was ju s t  as in f le x ib le  as th a t  o f th e  
Communists. Chiang Kai-shek rea liz ed  th e  primacy given to  the  arrangement 
o f  a c e a se -f ire  by th e  Communists, but he would no t issu e  such an order 
to  h is  troops. N a tio n a lis t fo rces, th e  Generalissimo contended, were 
simply defending themselves aga in st aggressive a c tio n s  o f the  Communists. 
And idien Chiang m odified h is  p roposals, they were as unacceptable to  th e  
Communists as th e  o r ig in a l  terms had b e e n . B a s i c a l l y ,  the  Government 
was unw illing  to  make a m ili ta ry  adjustm ent u n t i l  a p o l i t i c a l  se ttlem ent 
had been reached, and th e  Communists refused  to  compromise in  p o l i t i c a l  
m atters  u n t i l  a m il i ta ry  so lu tio n  had been agreed upon.
P residen t Truman had followed th e  developments in  China through 
M arsh a ll 's  re p o rts , and he was d is tu rbed  and i r r i t a t e d  by th e  in term inable  
deadlocks. The execution o f American fo re ign  p o licy  was being thwarted
^^Hie Communists contended th a t  Government troops intended to  tak e  
over lo c a l governments in  a reas occupied by Communist troops when th e  Com­
m unists withdrew from those  a reas . This, the  Communists contended, would 
v io la te  Annex 1 o f th e  PCC reso lu tio n s  e n ti t le d  "Program fo r  Peaceful 
N ational R econstruction ," vdiich provided th a t  th e  s ta tu s  quo in  th e  lo c a l  
governments o f such occupied areas was to  be m aintained u n t i l  th e  N ational 
Government was reorganized . Ihus, th e  Communists argued, i t  was im perative 
th a t  thqy be given enou^  delegates in  th e  S ta te  Council to  prevent th e  
Government from v io la tin g  th e  PCC re so lu tio n . I b i d . . pp. 175» 182.
57ihe Government a lte re d  i t s  p o s itio n  on severa l occasions during 
th i s  period  from Aug. 1 to  Sept. 16. For example, th e  Government o ffe red  
to  work with th e  Committee o f Ih ree  to  arrange a cessa tion  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  
i f  th e  Communists would agree to  implement the  te n ta t iv e  agreements 
reached by th a t  Committee during June. Also, Chiang Kai-shek s tip u la te d  
th a t  a c e a se -f ire  agreement was a lso  dependent upon the  Communists' desig­
n a tio n  o f th e i r  de leg a tes  to  the  N ational Assembly. This body, i t  w il l  
be re c a lle d , was au thorized  by the  PCC re so lu tio n s  to  approve th e  c o n s ti­
tu tio n .
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by uncompromising views and un res tra in ed  m ili ta ry  fo rces. Truman wrote 
Chiang Kai-shek a strong ly  worded l e t t e r  on August 10 and ind ica ted  h is  
d isp leasu re  with th e  trend  o f  events. The P residen t s p e c if ic a lly  reminded 
th e  Generalissimo th a t  the  Chinese had agreed to  use democratic procedures 
to  bu ild  a u n ified  and democratic China. However, he continued, the  ex­
trem is t elements o f  both the  Kuomintang and Communist P a r t ie s  had co n sis­
te n t ly  reso rted  to  armed might to  achieve th e i r  s e lf is h  in te r e s ts .  And, 
fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e since  M arshall had a rriv ed  in  China in  December, 19^5» 
Chiang was informed th a t  i t  might be necessary fo r  the  United S ta te s  to  
change i t s  po licy  toward China. The P residen t, in  th i s  regard , wrote as 
follow s :
Unless convincing proof i s  sh o rtly  forthcoming th a t  genuine 
progress i s  made toward a peacefu l se ttlem ent o f C hina's in te r ­
na l problems, i t  must be ejqpected th a t  American opinion w ill  not 
continue in  i t s  generous a t t i tu d e  towards your n a tio n . I t  w i l l ,  
th e re fo re , be necessary fo r  me to  redefine  and explain  the  
p o s itio n  o f th e  United S ta te s  to  th e  American p eo p le .58
Chiang re p lie d  to  Truman's l e t t e r  on August 28 and s ta te d  th a t  
th e re  would be no progress in  th e  n ego tia tions un less the  Communists 
abandoned th e i r  use o f armed fo rce  to  se ize  p o l i t i c a l  power. The General­
issim o ' s l e t t e r  was h igh ly  laudato ry  o f M arshall, and th e  P re s id e n t 's  rep ly  
to  Chiang on August 31 was co rd ia l and c o n c ilia to ry . Truman re fe rre d  to  
h is  p o licy  statem ent o f  December 15, 1945, however, and repeated th e  q u a li­
f ie d  pledge made a t  th a t  t im ^ - th e  extension o f a id  fo r  th e  r e h a b i l i ta t io n  
o f C hina's in d u s tr ia l  and a g r ic u ltu ra l  economy as soon as the  th re a t  o f 
h o s t i l i t i e s  was ended and p o l i t i c a l  u n ity  was e s ta b lis h e d .59
58Truman, I I ,  82-83.
59lhe te x t  o f Chiang's l e t t e r  o f Aug. 28 and th e  one o f P residen t 
Truman on Aug. 31 a re  p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with 
China. Annexes 87-88, pp. 653-54, re sp ec tiv e ly . Truman s ta te d  th a t  M arshall
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In  the  meantime, M arshall and S tu a rt had continued to  work fo r a 
c e a se -f ire  agreement. Th^y noted in  a jo in t  statem ent on August 10, 
though, th a t  the  cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  was only th e  f i r s t  in  a s e r ie s  
o f adjustm ents th a t  was necessary. C hina's in te rn a l  economic d i f f ic u l t i e s  
and th e  re d isp o s itio n  o f  troops were c la s s if ie d  as problems requ iring  prompt 
a tte n tio n . The two Americans believed , however, th a t  a more fundamental 
is su e  than the  redeployment o f troops was th a t o f determ ining the  kind of 
lo c a l  governments in  a reas to  be evacuated ly  the  Communists tdien the  
troops were re d e p lo y e d .^
Communist a ttac k s  upon United S ta te s  p o licy  and aga in st M arshall 
as an instrum ent o f th a t  po licy  were becoming more frequen t, however, and 
th e  Ambassador's tim e was in c reas in g ly  requ ired  to  rep ly  to  the  charges. 
M arshall p a r t ic u la r ly  resen ted  Communist c ritic ism s  o f th e  surp lus p roperty  
agreement of August 30 between the  United S ta tes and th e  National Govern­
ment, and he s tro n g ly  defended th is  t r a n s a c t i o n . H e  did r e a l iz e , however, 
th a t  h is  own p o s itio n  as m ediator was untenable as long as the  United S ta tes
had a conference with Chiang a f te r  th e  Generalissimo received  th e  P re s id e n t's  
f i r s t  l e t t e r ,  and th a t  M arshall rep o rted  to  th e  P residen t a t  th a t  tim e th a t  
Chiang "seems c le a r ly  inc lined"  to  use fo rce  "as th e  only acceptable solu­
tio n "  to  th e  Chinese s i tu a tio n . Truman, I I ,  84.
^ A  copy o f  th e  te x t  o f th i s  statem ent by M arshall and S tu a rt i s  
incorporated  in to  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 84, 
pp. 648-49.
^Ifhe Communists contended th a t  th e  Aug. 30 p ac t provided fo r  th e  
extension o f American m ili ta ry  a id  to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts . M arshall had ex­
p la ined  to  Qiou E k -la i before th e  agreement was concluded th a t  th e  U. S. 
would supply th e  Government with m a te r ia ls  fo r  r é a b i l i t a t i o n  of the  Chinese 
economy, and th a t  no combat item s would be included in  th is  agreement.
Qiou was not s a t i s f ie d  with M arsh a ll 's  explanations p r io r  to  o r a f te r  the  
completion o f th e  tra n sa c tio n . The Communist spokeanan argued th a t  such 
item s as tru ck s , communications equipment, army ra t io n s , and uniforms 
would c e r ta in ly  a id  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  in  continuing th e  c iv i l  war, and th a t  
such item s had been included in  the  p a c t. Ib id . , pp. 180-81. However, see 
follow ing foo tno te  fo r  another aspect o f  th e  controversy confronting Mar­
s h a l l .
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continued to  ship m ili ta ry  supplies and equipment to  N a tio n a lis t China. 
Consequently, M arshall placed an embargo in  August on the  shipment o f com­
bat type item s to  the  N ational Governnent.
The im position o f th e  American embargo was overshadowed, however, 
by o ther developments. No pem anent so lu tio n  had been reached on any d is ­
puted po in t between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists, and, fo r  severa l 
reasons, i t  was u n lik e ly  th a t  M arshall would be ab le  to  promote an amicable 
se ttlem ent between the  Chinese. C erta in ly  M arsh a ll 's  ta sk  was made more 
d i f f i c u l t  by Chou E h-la i on September 16. On th i s  da te  Chou l e f t  Nanking, 
thus ending h is  personal conferences with M arshall and rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f  
th e  Chinese Government. Chou's departu re  served to  accentuate  an obstruc­
tio n  to  n eg o tia tio n s  th a t  had been p rev a len t to  a le s s e r  degree fo r  two 
months. The Generalissimo had been in  Kuling since  m id-July, Chou was now 
in  Shanghai, and M arshall and S tu a rt were in  Nanking. D istances between 
th e se  c i t i e s  were not g re a t, and i t  i s  by no means c e r ta in  th a t  th e  views 
o f  the  Chinese p r in c ip a ls  would have been a lte re d  by continuing th e  consul­
ta t io n s .  The tim es were c ru c ia l , however, and i t  i s  doubtful th a t  th e  r a te  
o f  d e te r io ra tio n  in  re la tio n s  between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists 
would have been any g re a te r  i f  th e re  had been d a ily  con tact between them 
a t  a common meeting p lace .
^^M arshall was repeated ly  reminded by th e  Communists th a t  he could 
not function  as a m ediator id iile  h is  government was providing m ili ta ry  a id  
to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and not to  th e  Communists. M arshall had, as in d ic a te d  
above, strong ly  defended U. S. p o licy  in  concluding th e  surp lus p roperty  
agreement o f Aug. 30, bu t he re a liz e d  th a t  the  extension o f American m ili­
ta ry  a id  under o th e r  agreements was p lac ing  h is  m ediation e f fo r ts  in  jeo­
pardy. In  t h i s  connection, he to ld  a congressional committee on Feb. 20, 
1948, th a t  th e  U. S. was placed "in  the  p o s itio n  o f  ac tin g  in  a m ediatory 
p o s itio n  on th e  one hand and shipping in  m il i ta ry  supp lies (to  th e  N ational 
Government] on th e  o th e r ."  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings 
fo r  a Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 1551*
^^Chiang Kai-shek returned  to  Nanking during th e  l a s t  week o f Sept.
136
M arshall's  e ffec tiv en ess  was fu r th e r  reduced ty  o ther develop­
ments. Chou E h-la i sen t th ree  messages to  M arshall when he l e f t  Nanking 
on September 16, and in  one of them Chou again declared  th a t  the  United 
S ta te s  was not s in cere  in  i t s  m ediation e f fo r ts .  He was p a r t ic u la r ly  
c r i t i c a l  o f the  United S ta tes fo r  sending shipping and supplies to  the  
N ational Goverment under th e  surp lus property  agreement o f August 30.
Chou a lso  to ld  M arshall th a t  he [M arshall] was ob lig a ted  to  c a l l  a meet­
ing o f  th e  Committee o f Three to  arrange a c e a se - f ire . I f  such a meeting 
were no t arranged, Chou s ta te d , he would re le a se  fo r  pub lic  inform ation a l l  
th e  im portant documents bearing on the  n eg o tia tio n s since  the  June arm i­
s tic e . M arsha ll's  pa tience  was severely  te s te d , and he to ld  th e  rep resen ta­
t iv e  [Wang Ping-nan] o f th e  Communist Party  a t  Nanking th a t  he would no 
longer to le r a te  th e  Communist procedure o f  p u b lic ly  a ttack in g  "h is personal 
in te g r i ty  and honesty o f purpose" while p r iv a te ly  urging th a t  he continue 
h is  m ediation e f fo r ts .  The P re s id e n t 's  Special R epresentative considered 
withdrawing from th e  n eg o tia tio n s , and he to ld  Wang th a t  he would do so 
i f  th e  Communists continued to  question  h is  im p a r tia li ty  as a m e d ia to r .^  
Although n e ith e r  th e  Government nor th e  Communists were w illin g  
to  accept re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  ending M arsha ll's  p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  the  nego­
t ia t io n s ,  M arshall strong ly  considered withdrawing permanently tdien Nation­
a l i s t  troops advanced aga in st Kalgan.^^ The P re s id e n t 's  Special
and Chou E h-lai re tu rned  on Oct. 21. Personal n eg o tia tio n s  between the  
Chinese leaders were suspended again on Nov. 16 and were never resumed.
6 ^ e  te x ts  o f two o f  the  messages o f  Chou E h-la i a re  p rin ted  in  
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annexes 89-90, pp. 6 5^57 . 
and th e  substance o f Chou's o ther message and M arsh a ll 's  comments to  
Wang Ping-nan i s  tre a te d  in  ib id . , pp. 186-8?.
^^Kalgan, in  th e  North China province o f  Chahar, had been occupied 
by th e  Communists sh o rtly  a f te r  V-J Day, and th e  Governnent had agreed in
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R epresentative had re so lu te ly  s tr iv e n  to  f a c i l i t a t e  a Chinese settlem ent 
through p o l i t i c a l  means, and he had never believed th a t  h is  m ission could 
be successfu lly  term inated un less a permanent tru c e  were arranged. Now 
th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis t troops were advancing on Kalgan, M arshall doubted th a t  
he could serve any u se fu l purpose by remaining in  China. He, th e re fo re , 
informed Chiang Kai-shek on October 1 th a t  he would remain only i f  the  
h o s t i l i t i e s  were stopped. Otherwise, M arshall declared , he would recommend 
th a t  th e  P residen t re c a l l  him and th a t  th e  m ediation e f fo r ts  o f  th e  United 
S ta te s  Government be ended.
Chiang Kai-shek refused  to  c a l l  o f f  th e  campaign aga in st Kalgan, 
and M arshall was convinced th a t  th e  Government was committed to  a po licy  
o f m ili ta ry  fo rce . When ensuing conferences with Chiang produced no con­
cessions to  M arsh a ll 's  suggestions, M arshall asked P residen t Truman to  
r e c a l l  him. M arsh a ll 's  message o f October 5 summarized the  p rev a ilin g  
s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  in  China and recommended th a t  th e  P residen t send th e  fo l­
lowing message to  th e  Generalissimo:
General M arshall recommends th a t  h is  m ission be term inated and 
th a t  he be re c a lle d . He has explained to  you th a t  he fe e ls  th a t  a 
con tinuation  o f  m ediation under p resen t circum stances o f ex tensive 
and aggressive m ili ta ry  opera tions would p lace  th e  United S ta te s  
Government in  a p o s itio n  where th e  in te g r i ty  o f i t s  a c tio n s  a s  rep ­
re sen te d  hy him would be open to  serious question . I  deplore th a t  
h is  e f fo r ts  to  bring peace to  China have been unsuccessfu l, bu t th e re  
must be no question  regarding th e  in te g r i ty  o f h is  p o s itio n  and ac tio n s 
^diich rep resen t th e  in te n tio n s  and high purposes o f  the  United S ta tes
June th a t  the  Communists could re ta in  th e  c i ty .  The Communists informed 
M arshall th a t  they  would in te rp re t  a con tinuation  o f  th e  N a tio n a lis t m ili­
ta ry  operations ag a in s t th e  Kalgan a rea  a s  an abandonment o f th e  Govern­
ment' s po licy  to  peacefu lly  ad ju s t a l l  u n se ttle d  is su e s . M arshall was, 
th e re fo re , confronted with th e  im p lica tion  th a t  m il i ta ry  fo rce  would be 
met in  Kind. Truman, I I ,  86. M arshall a lso  a ttached  s ig n if ic a n t impor­
tance  to  the  Communists' re fu s a l  to  name th e i r  de lega tes to  th e  N ational 
Assembly. The Assembly was scheduled to  convene in  Nov. to  approve the  
c o n s titu tio n . S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 97.
pp. 662- 63.
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Government. I ,  th e re fo re , with g rea t re g re t have concluded th a t 
he should be immediately r e c a l l e d .^
When Ambassador S tuart informed the  Generalissimo o f M arshall’s 
message to  P residen t Truman, the  Generalissimo acted  to  meet some o f Mar­
s h a l l 's  c r i t ic ism s . Chiang Kai-shek proposed a c e a se - f ire  fo r  f iv e  days 
[ l a t e r  extended to  ten  days) while p o l i t i c a l  and m ili ta ry  problems were 
being discussed. On th e  basis  o f Chiang*s o ffe r , M arshall withdrew the  
recommendation th a t  he be rec a lled  and on October 6 o ffered  a plan o f h is  
own fo r  ending th e  h o s t i l i t i e s . T h e  Generalissimo re je c ted  M arsh a ll's  
suggestions, however, and asked M arshall and S tu a rt to  d ra f t  a proposal 
embodying h is  fChiang) views. Chiang a lso  suggested th a t  the  overtu re  be 
announced as one emanating from th e  two American Ambassadors ra th e r  than 
one from the  N ational Government. M arshall and S tu a rt agreed to  Chiang's 
suggestion, but thsy  made i t  c le a r  th a t  th e  proposal represented  n e ith e r  
th e i r  views nor those o f the  United S ta te s  Government. The cycle of
^^S tate  Department, U. S. R elations with China, p. 192. James F. 
% m es. Secretary  of S ta te  a t  th is  tim e, has w ritte n  th a t  M arshall informed 
th e  P residen t in  S ep t., 1 9 ^ ,  " th a t i t  seemed u se le ss  to  ranain  in  China 
much longer [and that) P residen t Truman [had] au thorized  him (M arshall) to  
re tu rn  idienever he thought h is  m ission should be concluded." % m es, p. 
228. Truman sa id  th a t  he "was prepared to  ask M arshall to  cane home" 
before he received  the  Ambassador's message of Oct. 5* Truman, I I ,  86.
^^M arshall's proposal o f Oct. 6 provided fo r  th e  cessa tio n  of 
h o s t i l i t i e s  as soon as th e  Communists agreed to  th e  follow ing procedure:
(1) execution by the  Committee o f Three and the  Five-Man Committee o f th e  
agreements te n ta t iv e ly  reached in  June; (2) implementation o f th e  m ili ta ry  
reo rgan iza tion  and in te g ra tio n  agreement o f Feb. 25 by the  Committee of 
Three; (3) re le a se  o f i t s  l i s t  o f de leg a tes  to  th e  National Assembly; and 
(4) the  adjustm ent o f  lo c a l  government is su e s  by th e  S ta te  Council. Text 
o f  th e  proposal i s  p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. 
Annex 95, PP> 660-61. M arshall had made th e  same proposal on Sept. 27. 
Chiang refused  to  accept i t  then and d id  so again on Oct. 6 on th e  b asis  
th a t  h o s t i l i t i e s  could not be term inated u n t i l  th e  Ccanmittee o f Three 
and th e  Five-Man Committee had su ccessfu lly  completed th e i r  work. Ib id . , 
p . 193.
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neg o tia tio n s sh o rtly  completed i t s  course, however, because Chou B i- la i  
re je c te d  the  G eneralissim o 's proposal.
M arshall s t i l l  hoped th a t  personal n eg o tia tio n s  could be resumed 
between the  Chinese p r in c ip a ls , and he went to  Shanghai to  see Chou Eh- 
l a i  on October 9» The disagreem ents between th e  Government and the  Com­
m unists were too severe , however, to  be reconciled . There was no longer 
any p ro b a b ility  th a t  e ith e r  p o l i t i c a l  or m ili ta ry  d iffe ren ces  could be 
s e t t le d  to  th e  s a t is fa c tio n  of e i th e r  Chinese p a rty  un less one group 
cap itu la te d  uncond itionally . Hie d iffe ren ces  on p o l i t i c a l  issu es  a t  t h i s  
tim e involved th re e  p o in ts . F i r s t ,  the  Government agreed to  o f fe r  th e  
Communists and th e  Democratic League e ig h t and f iv e  se a ts , re sp ec tiv e ly , 
on the  S ta te  Council i f  the  Communists would immediately submit th e i r  
l i s t s  of de legates to  th e  S ta te  Council and th e  N ational Assembly. In  
th i s  connection th e  Communists demanded th a t  a t o t a l  o f fourteen  se a ts  be 
assigned to  the  two p a r t ie s .  Second, th e  Government contended th a t  i t  was 
authorized  to  u n i la te r a l ly  summon a meeting o f th e  N ational Assembly, w hile 
th e  Communists declared  th a t  the  Goverrment was not so authorized . And, 
th ird ,  th e  Government claimed th a t  th e  s ta tu s  quo o f lo c a l  government 
adm in istra tions should be a lte re d  before the  Government was reorganized, 
w hile th e  Communists argued th a t  th e  s ta tu s  quo o f th e  lo c a l governments 
should be m aintained u n t i l  a fe a s ib le  p lan  could be worked out follow ing 
th e  reo rgan iza tion  o f th e  Government. As in d ica ted  above, th e re  was a lso  
l i t t l e  lik e lih o o d  th a t  the  Qiinese d isp u tan ts  would be ab le  to  narrow th e  
area  o f disagreement on m ilita ry  is su e s . For example, th e  Communists 
demanded th a t  th e  Government c a l l  o f f  i t s  a tta c k  on Kalgan, and th a t  both 
Chinese armies re tu rn  to  th e  p o s itio n s  thqy he ld  in  China on January 13 
and in  Manchuria on June ?• Chiang Kai-shek re je c te d  both proposals.
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Further, the  Cîovernment demanded th a t  the  Committee o f Three be perm itted 
to  determine the  lo ca tio n  o f th e  Communist arm ies, and th a t  the  troops 
involved should be immediately tran spo rted  to  those a reas . This proposal 
was re je c ted  by Chou E n - la i .^
At th is  stage o f th e  neg o tia tio n s the  Chinese m inority  groups be­
came a th ird  Chinese party  to  th e  proceedings. Their o b jec tiv e  was two­
fo ld ; ( l )  to  persuade Chiang Kai-shek and Chou E h-la i to  renew th e i r  
personal conferences, and (2) to  make proposals fo r th e  considera tion  o f 
th e  two Chinese p r in c ip a ls . With the  f i r s t  o b jec tiv e  in  mind, rep resen ta ­
t iv e s  o f th e  Democratic League and the  China Youth P arty  sought to  d e te r­
mine th e  conditions under which Chou would re tu rn  to  Nanking. Third p a rty  
em issaries in  Shanghai were encouraged vdien Chou E h -la i to ld  them th a t  he 
would be w illin g  to  re tu rn  to  Nanking to  reopen n eg o tia tio n s with th e  
N a tio n a lis ts . Two developments th rea tened , however, to  n u l l i fy  th e  e f fo r ts  
o f th e  m inority  groups. One o f the  events occurred on October 10 when th e  
Government announced th a t  i t s  fo rces had captured Kalgan. The Communists 
contended th a t  th e  Government's m ili ta ry  ac tio n  proved th a t  i t  d id  not 
in tend  to  seek a nego tia ted  settlem ent o f th e  is su e s . An even g re a te r  
th re a t  to  the  re c o n c ilia tio n  o f the N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists occur­
red , though, on th e  follow ing day. For, on October 11, Chiang Kai-shek 
d irec te d  the  N ational Assembly to  convene on November 12 and adopt th e  
c o n s titu tio n  as provided fo r  under the  PCC reso lu tio n s  o f  January, 1 9 4 6 .
^"Rie above an a ly sis  i s  based on statem ents o f  Chiang Kai-shek 
and Chou B i- la i  between Oct. 2-9, 1946, found in  ib id . . Annexes 98-100,
102, pp. 663- 65, 667- 69.
89in an address before th e  opening session  o f th e  National Assembly 
on Nov. 15, 19^ ,  Chiang Kai-shek said  th a t  many attem pts had been made 
to  convene th a t  body to  adopt a new c o n s titu tio n . He s ta te d  th a t  th e  
D raft C onstitu tion  o f May 5, 1936, was scheduled to  be r a t i f ie d  on Nov. 12,
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The Communists contended th a t  the  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  the  PCC understood th a t  
a l l  Chinese p a r t ie s  were to  a c t jo in t ly  in  s e t t in g  th e  convocation da te  of 
th e  National Assembly. Therefore, th e  Communists argued, the  Government 
by i t s  u n i la te r a l  a c tio n  had v io la ted  th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  PCC re so lu tio n s . 
Conferences continued in  Shanghai, however, between th e  m inority  rep resen ta­
t iv e s  and Chou E h -la i, and Chou agreed to  re tu rn  to  Nanking on October 21 
and reopen n eg o tia tio n s  with the  Government.
N either M arshall nor S tuart had p a rtic ip a te d  in  th e  conferences 
between th e  m inority  groups and th e  Communists in  Shanghai. Ihe American 
duo, likew ise , d id  not p a r t ic ip a te  in  n eg o tia tio n s  between th e  N a tio n a lis ts , 
th e  Communists, and th e  th ir d  p a rty  groups vrtien Chou E h-la i retu rned  to  
Nanking. M arshall be lieved  th a t  an a ll-C h inese  e f fo r t  was an encouraging 
development, and th a t  th e  venture should be supported ly  a l l  in te re s te d  
p a r t ie s ,  includ ing  th e  United S ta te s . And although th e  American Ambassadors 
were only in te re s te d  observers fo r  th e  next few weeks, th ^ r  were informed 
o f  th e  proceedings by th e  m inority  groups.
1937* but th a t  th e  meeting had to  be cancelled  because o f th e  Japanese 
invasion . Subsequent m eetings o f th e  Assembly, scheduled fo r  Nov., 1940, 
and Nov. 12, 1945* a lso  had to  be abandoned, he sa id , because o f th e  Japanese 
invasion  and World War I I .  Hie te x t  o f  Chiang*s speech i s  p r in te d  in  ib id . . 
Annex 110, pp. 680-81. The Generalissimo also  declared  on Nov. 8 , 194^ 
th a t  th e  PCC re so lu tio n s  s tip u la te d  th a t  the  N ational Assembly would convene 
on May 5* 1946, but th a t  th e  meeting d id  not m a te ria liz e  because th e  Com­
m unist P arty  and th e  Democratic League would not submit a l i s t  o f  th e i r  
de lega tes to  th e  Assembly. He added th a t  the  Government had announced on 
Ju ly  4 th a t  th e  N ational Assembly would convoie on Nov. 12, and th a t  h is  
statem ent o f Oct. 11 was fo r  the  purpose o f g iving one m onth's n o t if ic a t io n  
o f  th e  event. Ib id . , Annex 108, pp. 677-78.
70carsun Chang noted th a t  th e  m inority  lead e rs  considered the  
G eneralissim o's d ire c tiv e  o f  Oct. 11 to  be a "breach o f f a i th "  on th e  p a r t  
o f  th e  Govenment because th e  th ird  p a r t ie s  had not been consulted p r io r  
to  th e  issuance o f  th e  o rd er. Carsun Chang, p. 181.
7lTruman, H, 8?.
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The minor p a r t ie s  were, however, no more successfu l in  promoting 
a se ttlem ent of th e  d iffe ren ces  between th e  Government and th e  Communists 
than M arshall and S tu a rt had been. In  le s s  than one month th e  th ird  p a r t ie s  
had given up in  t h e i r  attem pt to  mediate th e  d isp u te . No agreements were 
reached, and i t  was j u s t  a question  o f how long the  Chinese p r in c ip a ls  would 
even consent to  a con tinuation  o f  the  co n su lta tio n s .^^
M arshall and S tuart now reen tered  th e  d e lib e ra tio n s  a t  th e  General­
is s im o 's  request. Chiang Kai-shek suggested th a t  th e  Ambassadors adv ise  
him with respec t to  announcements of th e  cessa tio n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  and convo­
cation  o f  th e  N ational Assanbly. In  accordance with Chiang's request, th e  
Americans prepared a statem ent and presented  i t  to  him on November ? . The 
d ra f t  proposed an unconditional cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s ,  and th a t  th e  
N ational Assembly be convened, then  tem porarily  adjourned u n t i l  c e r ta in  
s tip u la te d  p o l i t i c a l  conditions had been f u l f i l l e d .73 Then, th e  statem ent
fZpbr a l l  p ra c t ic a l  purposes th e  m ediation o f m inority  groups ended 
on Nov. 4 when th e  Government re p re se n ta tiv e s  d id  not appear fo r  a meeting 
with th e  Communists and th e  th ird  p a r t ie s ,  although the Government had p re ­
v iously  agreed to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  m eeting. The minor p a r t ie s  d id  in f lu ­
ence Chiang Kai-shek l a t e r ,  however, to  postpone th e  convocation d a te  o f 
th e  N ational Assembly fo r  th ree  days (from Nov. 12 to  Nov. 15]* S ta te  
D ^artm ent, Ü. S. R elations with China, pp. 203-04; a lso  Truman, I I ,  88. 
Carsun Chang, a m inority  p a rty  p a r tip ip a n t in  th ese  n eg o tia tio n s , contended 
severa l yea rs  l a t e r  th a t  th e  attem pt to  rec o n c ile  th e  views o f th e  Nation­
a l i s t s  and the  Communists was begun "much too  l a t e ."  His theory was th a t  
th e  ta sk  could have been achieved only i f  th e re  had been a th re a t  o f  invasion 
th a t  would have convinced th e  Chinese p r in c ip a ls  th a t  u n ity  was needed to  
combat a common fo e . Therefore, he s ta te d , th e  re c o n c ilia tio n  attem pt was 
doomed to  f a i lu re  even in  ea rly  1946. Carsun Chang, p. 1?4.
73a copy o f t h i s  statem ent i s  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex 10?, pp. 676-77» The s tip u la te d  p o l i t i c a l  
cond itions p re re q u is i te  to  a reconvening o f th e  National Assembly were th a t :  
( l )  adequate tim e had been allowed fo r  th e  determ ination and a r r iv a l  o f 
Assembly delegates who had not y e t been se lec ted ; (2) th e  PCC Steering 
Committee had agreed to  the  reo rgan iza tion  o f  th e  S ta te  Council and th e  
Council had been abolished; and (3) th e  D raft C o n stitu tio n a l Committee had 
completed i t s  work as s tip u la te d  by th e  PCC agreements.
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continued, the  Assembly would reconvene fo r  the  purpose of adopting the  
d r a f t  c o n s titu tio n . As on numerous o th e r occasions, however, the  proposal 
was re je c ted . Chiang informed M arshall and S tu a rt th a t  he could not agree 
to  an unconditional term ination  o f h o s t i l i t i e s  because o f opposition  from 
h is  m ili ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs . Further, Chiang noted, he would oppose 
any in te rp re ta t io n  o f the  PCC reso lu tio n s  which would deny p a r t ic ip a tio n  
to  N ational Assembly de legates e lec ted  in  1936 to  adopt the  d ra f t  c o n s ti­
tu t io n  o f th a t  year.
When Chiang asked M arshall and S tuart to  rev ise  th e i r  d ra f t  o f 
November 7 in  keeping with h is  views, M arshall h e s i ta te d , consulted with 
S tu a r t, then re lu c ta n tly  agreed to  Chiang*s p lea . M arshall informed the  
Generalissim o, however, th a t  he was only performing a serv ice  s im ila r  to  
th a t  which one o f the  G eneralissim o's s t a f f  o f f ic e rs  might perform, and 
th a t  h is  co n trib u tio n  d id  not c o n s titu te  approval o f th e  contents o f  the  
red ra fte d  statem ent. îhe  d e c la ra tio n , as reform ulated by M arshall on 
November 8, met th e  same f a te  with th e  Communists as th e  one o f November 
7 had with Chiang—i t  was re je c te d .
Events moved rap id ly  to  a climax in  mid-November. Chiang Kai- 
shek had postponed the  meeting o f the  National Assembly from November 12 
to  November 15 a t  th e  in s is te n c e  o f th e  m inority  groups. On the  designated 
day th e  Assembly met in  Nanking, but th e  Communist P arty  and the  Democratic 
League sent no d e leg a tes . Chou E h-la i immediately s ta te d  the  Communist 
p o s itio n . In  one o f h is  s trongest v e rb a l a tta c k s , Chou equated th e  Kuomin- 
tang with th e  Government, and declared th a t  th e  Government had u n i la te r a l ly
7 *̂The N ational Assembly was overwhelmingly composed of Kuomintang 
d e leg a tes , but th e  D em ocratic-Socialist Party , th e  China Youth P arty , and 
some non-party groups were represen ted . Carsun Chang, pp. 185-86.
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se t and postponed the  meeting date  o f the  N ational Assembly, and th a t i t  
had now convened th a t  body. A ll th  se ac tio n s , he sa id , were con trary  to  
th e  PCC re so lu tio n s . Therefore, Chou contended, th e  National Assembly had 
been i l l e g a l ly  convened and a l l  agreements and re so lu tio n s  concluded since  
th e  January agreements had been n u l l i f ie d .  The Communist rep re se n ta tiv e  
withdrew from the  n eg o tia tio n s in  Nanking on November 16 and asked M arshall 
to  provide th e  Communist rep re se n ta tiv e s  with tra n sp o rta tio n  to  Yenan.^^ 
Chou's request was honored, and th e  Communists l e f t  fo r  th e i r  c a p ita l  c i ty  
on November 19.
The Old o f th e  M arshall Mission 
Though Chou E h - la i 's  departu re  fo r  Yenan ended a l l  serious attem pts 
to  secure a nego tia ted  se ttlem en t, M arshall remained in  China u n t i l  e a rly  
January, 19^7» He continued to  consu lt with Chiang Kai-shek, and he encour­
aged Chiang to  support th e  adoption o f  a democratic c o n s titu tio n  through 
th e  N ational Assembly. M arshall a lso  served as an agent fo r  th e  transm ission  
o f  proposals from one Chinese p a rty  to  th e  o th e r .
At th is  tim e, however, th e  Special R epresentative o f th e  P residen t 
was p rim arily  in te re s te d  in  th e  work th e  N ational Assembly was summoned to
75rruman, I I ,  88; a lso  S tu a rt, p . I 70.  A copy o f Chou E h - la i 's  
statem ent on Nov. I 6 i s  p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith 
China. Annex 111, pp. 68>-85.
^^M arshall's transm ission  o f proposals d id  no t, o f  course, c o n sti­
tu te  approval o f th e  term s p ro jec ted . For example, M arshall forwarded Chou 
E h - la i 's  o f fe r  o f  Dec. 4 to  th e  Generalissimo w ithout cmment. Chou's 
statem ent declared  th a t  th e  Communists would agree to  reopen n eg o tia tio n s  
i f  th e  N ational Assembly were d isso lved  and troop  p o s itio n s  were res to red  
to  th e  s ta tu s  o f Jan. 13, 1 9 ^ ,  in  accordance w ith th e  cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i ­
t i e s  agreement o f  Jan. 10, 1946. The impasse was complete—th e  Communists 
never a lte re d  th ese  terms td iile  M arshall was in  China, and th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
never accepted them. A copy o f  th e  Communist proposal i s  p rin te d  in  S ta te  
Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 112, pp. 685-86.
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do and in  the  c o n trib u tio n  th a t m inority  groups could make. Marshall 
believed th a t  the  Assembly should c io p t a c o n s titu tio n  based on the  PCC 
re so lu tio n s . He was convinced th a t  the  S ta te  Council should be c rea ted , 
and th a t  se a ts  fo r  th e  Communists and the  Democratic League should be 
l e f t  vacant while d iscussions were held  to  get than to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  
National Assembly. F urther, Chiang should encourage th e  th ird  party  move­
ment, and he should use  the  lead ers  o f m inority  groups in  the  Government. 
This a ss is ta n c e , M arshall observed, would a id  in  the  development o f a two- 
p a rty  gystem. The Ambassador believed th a t  Chiang Kai-shek could in  th i s  
way ju s t i f y  h is  p o s it io n  as th a t  o f  fa th e r  o f th e  country ra th e r  than merely 
th a t  o f lead er o f th e  Kuomintang o r the Government.
Although M arsh a ll 's  convictions were now based more on a sp ira tio n  
than on expectation , he was encouraged vdien th e  National Assanbly adopted 
th e  c o n s titu tio n  on December 25, 1946. The c o n s titu tio n , according to  
M arshall, included a l l  the  p rin c ip a l p o in ts  which the  Communists had con­
tended fo r ,  and was " in  a l l  major resp ec ts  . . .  in  accordance with th e  
p r in c ip le s  la id  down by the  a l l - p a r ty  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative Conference of 
l a s t  January.
77 ib id . . pp. 213, 216. Ambassador S tu a r t was p e ss im is tic , however, 
in  regard to  co n trib u tio n s  th a t  th e  th ir d  p a r t ie s  could make. They were, 
he sa id , th e  "most p a th e tic  groups" in  China. S tu a rt noted th a t  the  
m inority  groups were weakened by th e i r  lack  o f un ity ; they  were unable to  
coalesce because they  were so in d iv id u a lis t ic  and so suspicious o f each 
o th e r. Their p l ig h t was a lso  caused by a lack  o f  funds and by harrassm ent 
a t  th e  hands o f th e  se c re t p o lice  o f  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists. 
S tu a rt, pp. 184-85. Several o th e r a u th o r i t ie s  supported S tu a r t 's  th e s is  
and added th a t  p o l i t i c a l  power was based on m ili ta ry  m i ^ t .  As the  th ird  
p a r t ie s  d id  not possess arm ies, they  had no power and co n tro lled  no t e r r i ­
to ry . See Mar. 4 , 1948, testim ony o f  W alter S. Robertson, House Committee 
on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t.
2, 1079; C h'ien Tuan-sheng, p. 381; and Rosinger. Foreign Policy R eports. 
X m , 248-49.
78s ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 113, p« 688. 
This view o f M arshall was a lso  supported by Ambassador S tu a rt and Carsun
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I t  w ill be remembered, o f course, th a t  the  Communists had declared 
th a t  th e  National Assembly could nc t le g a lly  adopt a c o n s titu tio n  because 
th e  Assembly had been i l l e g a l ly  convened. N evertheless, M arshall decided 
in  l a t e  December th a t  he would make one more attem pt to  promote a renewal 
o f nego tia tions between the  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists. He informed 
P residen t Truman to  th a t  e ffe c t and suggested th a t  he should be re c a lle d  
i f  th e  e f fo r t  were unsuccessful. The P residen t concluded on the  b a s is  o f 
M arshall’s rep o rts  th a t  th ere  would be no construc tive  developments, and 
th e  M arshall M ission was term inated. Ihe speed with which Truman acted  and 
an ad d itio n a l reason fo r  h is  o rder were recorded by th e  P residen t as 
follow s:
On December 28 General M arshall suggested to  me th a t ,  i f  a next 
e f fo r t  a t  n eg o tia tio n s  which was then  being planned fa i le d , he 
should be re c a lle d  to  Washington. I t  was p la in  from h is  re p o rts , 
too , th a t  t h i s  e f fo r t  was doomed to  f a i lu r e  even before  i t  was 
ever undertaken. I  decided not to  aw ait th i s  event. On January 3 
I  in s tru c te d  th e  Secretary  o f  S ta te  (Ejymes) to  r e c a l l  M arshall fo r  
consu lta tion  on China and ’o th e r  m a tte r s .’
The ’o th e r  m a tte rs ’ were to  c o n s is t of no le s s  than th e  e n tir e  
scope of S ta te  Department a c t iv i t i e s .  For w hile M arshall was s t i l l  
on h is  way across th e  P a c if ic , I  announced th a t  he would become 
Secretary  o f S ta te .79
Chang. S tu a rt, p . 1?1 and Carsun Chang, pp. 188-89» The National Assembly 
s tip u la te d  th a t  th e  C onstitu tion  would become e ffe c tiv e  one year a f t e r  i t s  
r a t i f ic a t io n  d a te . Ihe one-year period  was to  be used to  reorganize the  
Government, to  p repare  non-Kuomintang groups fo r  p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  p o l i t i c a l  
and governmental a f f a i r s ,  and to  end p o l i t i c a l  tu te la g e  by th e  Kuoniintang.
79ihe P re s id e n t’ s d e sc rip tio n  o f events lead ing  up to  M arshall’ s 
designation  as S ecre tary  o f S ta te  i s  h i ^ l y  inform ative and i s  summarized 
below. Truman had been considering M arshall’ s appointment fo r severa l 
months, but he had decided to  take  no o f f i c i a l  ac tio n  u n t i l  th e  General had 
completed h is  assignment in  China. James F. ^ rm es had been Secretary  
since  Ju ly , 1945» but h is  working re la tio n sh ip  with th e  P residen t was s tr a in ­
ed in  December, 1945, on two p o in ts—one procedural, th e  o ther substan tive . 
S p e c ifica lly , Truman was annoyed %Aen th e  S ta te  Department b rie fed  hJm on 
r e s u l ts  o f th e  Moscow Conference a f t e r  th e  inform ation had been re leased  to  
th e  p re ss . Truman was fu r th e r  i r r i t a t e d  vdien a reading o f the  Conference 
documents revealed th a t  th e  Secretary  subscribed to  some views con tra ry  to  
h is  own. The Chief Executive has s ta te d  th a t  he had confidence in  Etymes’
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United S ta tes Poli cy. 1947-1949:
Maximum Freec. m of Action
President Truman announced on January 6, 194?, th a t he rec a lled  
General M arshall to  give an account o f the  Chinese s i tu a tio n . The P re s i­
d e n t’ s Special R epresentative l e f t  fo r  the  United S ta tes on January 8, and 
S tuart remained in  h is  p o sitio n  as Ambassador to  China.®®
M arshall’ s re tu rn  to  th e  United S ta te s  was a trium phant one fo r 
him. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee he ld  no hearing on h is  nomi­
nation  as Secretary  o f S ta te . Further, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of 
Michigan, Chairman o f th e  Committee, urged th e  Senate to  immediately confirm 
th e  appointment. The R epublican-controlled Senate did so by unanimous vo te  
on January 8, th e  date M arshall l e f t  fo r  th e  United States.® ^
a b i l i ty ,  but th a t  he was d isp leased  with the  Secretary  fo r  making fo re ign  
p o licy  and fo r  doing so w ithout consulting  o r  informing him. Without delay 
Truman o u tlin ed  th e  d u tie s  of the  P residen t and th e  Secretary  o f S ta te  and 
read  them to  th e  Secretary  on Jan. 5t 19^* Although n e ith e r  man suggested 
o r  requested Byrnes' res ig n a tio n  a t  th is  tim e, Truman has w ritte n  th a t  th e  
Secretary  suggested "some months l a t e r  . . .  th a t  h is  h ea lth  would not allow  
him to  stay  on." I t  was understood, Truman continued, " th ro u ^ o u t the  
remainder o f 1946" th a t  Cymes' would resign  "irfienever I  could designate  
h i s  successor." So, when General D w i^t D. Elsenhower, Chief o f S ta f f  o f 
th e  Army, made an in spec tion  t r i p  to  th e  Far Elast l a t e r  in  th e  y ear, th e  
P residen t to ld  him to  ask M arshall i f  he would become Secretary  o f S ta te  
when Qrmes r e t i r e d .  Elsenhower informed the  P residen t upon h is  re tu rn  
th a t  M arshall would accept the  assignment, and Truman announced th e  appoint­
ment vdien th e  China m ission was ended and w ithout asking M arshall again. 
Truman, I ,  550-53»
®®Chiang Kai-shek in v ite d  M arshall to  be h is  supreme ad v ise r the  
n i ^ t  before M arshall l e f t  China. Marshall declined  the  o f fe r  and to ld  
S tu a rt to  inform the  Generalissimo a t  the  e a r l ie s t  opportunity  th a t  he could 
not accept th e  o f fe r  because he would become Secretary  o f S ta te  upon h is  
re tu rn  to  th e  U. S. S tu a rt, pp. 177-78. M arshall had declined  a s im ila r 
o f f e r  o f th e  Generalissimo in  ea rly  Dec., 1946. The P re s id e n t 's  Special 
R epresentative d id  not be lieve  he could in fluence  th e  course o f events 
alone \dien he had been unable to  do so with th e  f u l l  backing o f  th e  U. S. 
Government. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, p. 213.
®^S|parkmen, Review o f B ipartisan  Foreign Policy C onsultations since  
Vforld War U . 1952, Senate Doc. 87, p. 21. Sen. Vandenberg showed h is
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There i s  no question , however, th a t th e  M arshall Mission fa i le d  
to  achieve i t s  o b je c tiv e . Preside:i" Truman rea d ily  accepted th is  view point, 
but he contended th a t  n e ith e r  M arshall nor American po licy  were a t  f a u l t .
The primary reason fo r  the  M ission 's f a i lu re ,  according to  the  P residen t, 
was th a t  th e  N ational Government "did not command th e  respect and support 
of the  Chinese p e o p le ." He added, in  defense o f the  American undertaking, 
th a t ;
I  am not one to  be lieve  in  the  value o f  h in d sig h t. Whether o r  
not I  was r ig h t  in  sending General M arshall to  China does not depend 
on what some th in k  thqy know today. I t  depends only on what we 
were ab le  to  know in  19^5* At th a t  time th e  b e l ie f  was general 
th a t  th e  various elements in  China could be persuaded to  un ify  th e  
country. Of course th e  s tru g g le  fo r  power would continue, but 
th e re  was no reason why the  N ational Government could not be success­
fu l  in  th is  s tru g g le , as non-communist governments had been in  Europe, 
i f  i t  attended to  the  fundamental needs o f th e  people and th e  country.
I t  seemed then th a t  i t  was th e  only p ra c t ic a l  course. Hurlqy and 
Wedemeyer led  me to  th ink  th a t  they believed so, and so did our 
m il i ta ry  and diplom atic e x p e r t s . 82
g rea t resp ec t fo r  M arshall by making th e  follow ing comment on the  day th e  
Senate confirmed M arsh a ll 's  appointment: "He (M arshall) w il l  b ring  to  h is
assignment a s to u t h e a r t ,  a shining in te g r i ty ,  a r ic h  ejqperience, and a 
life tim e  o f  ded ica tion  to  h is  country. He has always had the  t o t a l  confi­
dence o f  Congress, a s  w ell as th a t  o f  a l l  h is  m ili ta ry  and c iv i l ia n  co l­
leagues, a t  hone and abroad ." U. S ., Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 1 s t 
S e ss ., 19^7» XCHI, P t .  1, I 50. Several months l a t e r  Vandenberg a ttacked  
American po licy  toward China as not being b ip a r tis a n . I t  i s  in s tru c t iv e  
to  no te , however, t h a t  he s t i l l  was not c r i t i c a l  o f the  M arshall M ission in  
mid-1948. On June 11 o f th a t  year he sa id : " I  c e r ta in ly  have no complaint
th a t  I  was not consu lted  with respec t to  . . . China, under th e  m ission 
o f General M arshall. I  th ink  i t  i s  a f a n ta s t ic  u n re a lity  to  th ink  th e re  
can be cooperation e i th e r  between the  le g is la t iv e  branch and the  executive 
branch o r  between th e  two major p a r t ie s  in  any such sp e c ific  d e ta i l  in  
resp ec t to  the  conduct o f fo reign  a f f a i r s . " Ib id . , 80th Cong., 2nd S e s s ., 
1948, XCIV, P t. 6 , 7800.
8^Truman, I I ,  90. Acheson agreed with Truman's views but added in  
h is  testim ony o f June 4, 1951. th a t  th e  N ational Government had not given 
enou^  a tte n tio n  to  th e  "profound so c ia l revolu tion" occurring in  China, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  a reas  o f so c ia l and economic r ig h ts .  Senate Committees 
on Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings on th e  M ilita ry  S itua­
t io n  in  th e  Far E as t. 1951» F t. 3» 1839» Several o th e r prominent person­
a l i t i e s  a lso  agreed th a t  th e  m ission f a i le d , although they  disagreed on the  
reason fo r  f a i lu r e .  W alter S. Robertson said  on Mar. 4, 1948, th a t  th e
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M arshall a ttr ib u te d  th e  f a i lu re  o f the Mission so le ly  to  in te rn a l  
Chinese cond itions. His s trongest c ritic ism s  were d irec ted  toward th e  Chi­
nese p r in c ip a ls  fo r  o b stru c tin g  a negotiated  se ttlem en t. The g re a te s t 
o b stac le  to  peace, according to  M arshall, was th e  "complete, almost over­
whelming suspicion" of the  Kuomintang and the  Chinese Communist P a r tie s  fo r  
each o th e r . Because n e ith e r  p a rty  tru s te d  the  o th e r o r  i t s  m otives, cooper­
a tio n  was im possible. And without cooperation the  Chinese p a r tic ip a n ts  
considered th e  use o f armed might to  be th e  only so lu tio n . M arshall a lso  
noted th a t  h is  e f fo r ts  were hindered by th e  dominance of m ili ta ry  a u th o rity  
in  China, th e  confused and d is to r te d  rep o rts  o f armed clashes, and Communist 
propaganda. "The sa lv a tio n  o f th e  s i tu a t io n ,"  M arshall s ta te d , "would be 
th e  assumption o f leadersh ip  by the  l ib e r a ls  in  the  Government and in  the  
m inority" p a r t ie s  under the  guidance of Chiang Kai-shek. Noting th a t  th e  
c o n s titu tio n  had been adopted, M arshall s ta te d  th a t  th e  p ra c tic a l  t e s t  would 
be th e  implementation o f i t s  provisions.® ^
Communists never in tended to  work fo r  a peaceful se ttlem ent. He a lso  added 
th a t  American p o licy  demanded too much o f  the  N a tio n a lis ts  before th e  United 
S ta te s  would g ran t a id  to  them. House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hear­
ings fo r  a Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 2090-93. S tu a rt contend­
ed th a t  f a i lu r e  o f  th e  m ission was due to  the  suspicions of Chinese fo r  
each o th e r and to  th e  f a c t  th a t  Chiang Kai-shek had not in s t i tu te d  in te r ­
n a l refoim s th a t  he should have. S tu a rt, pp. I 63, 209-10. Wedamgyer has 
s ta te d  th a t  he never d id  be lieve  th e  m ission would succeed because th e  
Communists did no t in ten d  to  cooperate, and has sa id  th a t  he to ld  M arshall 
so when M arshall a rr iv e d  in  China in  1945* Senate Subcommittee o f th e  Com­
m ittee  o f the  Ju d ic ia ry , I n s t i tu te  o f P a c ific  R elations Hearings. 1951» F t.
3, 835» Rep. W alter Judd argued th a t  th e  m ission was doomed before M arshall 
l e f t  th e  U. S. in  1945, because American conditions fo r  a id ing th e  Nation­
a l i s t s ,  when p u b lic ized , made i t  po ssib le  fo r  th e  Communists to  prevent 
th e i r  attainm ent by making peace and u n ity  im possible. House Committee on 
Foreign A ffa irs , Bnergency Foreign Aid. 194?, pp. 245-46. I t  w ill  be re -  
manbered, however, th a t  Judd had been a strong supporter o f th e  M arshall 
M ission in  1945. Supra, p. 95-
®^W rshall*s views a re  contained in  h is  statem ent o f Jan. 7, 194?, 
which was re leased  sh o rtly  a f t e r  h is  d ^ a r tu r e  fo r  th e  Ü. S. A copy o f 
t h i s  statem ent i s  found in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China.
150
M arsh a ll's  ta sk  now, however, was to  concentrate  on the  form ulation 
and execution o f American fo re ign  p o licy  en to to  ra th e r  than ju s t  on th a t  
segment which re la te d  to  China. And fo r  over a year American po licy  toward 
China was frequen tly  charac terized  by indec is ion  o r in ac tio n . While M arshall 
continued to  study th e  Chinese s i tu a t io n , Ambassador S tuart urged th e  Gener­
alissim o to  c re a te  conditions favorable to  the  emergence o f l ib e r a l  elements 
to  prominent p o s itio n s  in  th e  N ational Government and to  implement basic  
reform measures. S tu a r t 's  approach, however, d id  no t c o n s titu te  any change 
from th a t  o f the  M arshall M ission. Thou^ Dean Acheson, Under Secretary  o f 
S ta te , emphasized in  March, 19^7» th a t  th e  United S ta te s  was not follow ing 
a "hands-off po licy" toward China, he l e f t  the  im pression th a t  the  Chinese 
problem was not one th a t  requ ired  urgent a tte n tio n . China was no t, he sa id , 
th rea tened  hy d e fea t by th e  Communists. Ihe Under S ecretary , in  answer to  
congressional c r i t i c s ,  noted th a t  "Ihe war with th e  Communists i s  going on 
much as i t  has fo r  th e  l a s t  twenty y ears .
Within th re e  months o f  Acheson’ s statem ent, however. S ecre tary  
M arshall expressed deep concern over th e  developments in  China. M arshall
AnnMc 113, pp. 686- 89. I f  David Nelson Rowe's c r i t ic ism  o f th e  m iss io n 's  
f a i lu r e  i s  accepted, th e re  could be l i t t l e  hope fo r  th e  success o f M arsh a ll 's  
suggested "sa lv a tio n  o f th e  s i tu a t io n ."  Noting th a t  th e  m ediation e f fo r t  
was a  s incere  one, Rowe contended th a t  th e  U. S. was u n re a l is t ic  in  try in g  
to  reshape th e  s tru c tu re  o f Qiinese p o l i t i c s  in  "our own image." One of 
th e  American o b jec tiv e s , he sa id , was to  get th e  "Kuomintang and th e  Com­
m unists to  a c t l ik e  p a r t ie s  in  a s tru c tu re  o f p a rty  p o l i t i c s ,"  lAen n e ith e r  
was a p a rty  in  th e  sense o f the  term as we understood i t .  "American Policy  
toward China," The Annal s  o f t | ie American Academy o f P o l i t ic a l  and S ocial 
Science. CCLV (J a n .,1 9 ^ 8 ) ,  l40 .
S^Comments on Mar. 20, 194?, in  answer to  questions from Reps.
Judd o f Minnesota and James G. Fulton o f Pennsylvania, in  U. S ., Congress, 
House, Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , A ssistance to  Greece Mid Turkey.
Hearings on H. R. 26l6 . 80th Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 194?, pp. 1 ^ 1 8 . C ited 
h e re a f te r  as House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings on Greeks Turkish
Aid m n .  1947.
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s ta te d  th a t  he had been studying the  Chinese c o n f l ic t  and th a t  the  choice 
o f po licy  a lte rn a tiv e s  a v a ilab le  to  the  United S ta te s  was lim ited  by in te r ­
nal Chinese cond itions, James F o rre s ta l, Secretary  o f th e  Navy, recorded 
M arsha ll's  comments as follow s:
The Secretary  o f  S ta te  s ta te d  th a t  he had been searching fo r  
a p o s itiv e  and co n stru c tiv e  formula to  deal with th e  Chinese s i tu a tio n  
idiich, he sa id , showed every sign  o f d is in te g ra tio n . We were con­
fron ted , he sa id , by the  dilemma crea ted  by th e  incompetence, in e f ­
f ic ien cy  and stubbom ess o f  th e  C entral Govenment -  q u a li t ie s  which 
made i t  very d i f f i c u l t  to  help  them. He c ite d  th e  m il i ta ry  in e p ti­
tude o f th e i r  le a d e rs , th e  cash ie rin g  o f th e  only generals who had 
produced successfu l campaigns, the  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e i r  leadersh ip  
and th e  appalling  lack  o f an o rgan iza tion  to  d ea l with th e  v ast 
and complex economic and so c ia l  problems o f  C h i n a .
While M arshall continued to  grope with th e  i n t r i c a t e  Chinese 
s itu a tio n , he did enjoy freedom from concerted Congressional c r itic ism  fo r  
severa l months. Senator Vandenberg contended when M arshall was confirmed 
as Secretary  o f S ta te  th a t  th e  Senate "should pursue what has been an ef­
fe c tiv e  b ip a r tis a n  fo re ign  policy."® ^ And although Vandenberg remarked
®^Entry o f June 26, 19^7» in  F o r r e s ta l 's  d ia ry  o f  comments made by 
M arshall before a meeting o f th e  S e c re ta rie s  o f S ta te , War and Navy. M illis  
(ed. ), pp. 285-86. Less than two weeks a f t e r  t h i s  m eeting, however, M arshall 
l a id  down th e  p r in c ip le  upon lA ich fu tu re  American p o lic y  toward China was 
based. On Ju ly  6 th e  Secretary  in fo raed  Chiang Kai-shek th a t  th e  Chinese 
would have to  make th e  "fundamental and la s tin g "  c o n trib u tio n  to  th e  solu­
t io n  o f  th e i r  problems. "The United S ta te s , " M arshall observed, "cannot 
i n i t i a t e  and c a n y  ou t the  so lu tio n  o f those  problems and can only a s s i s t  
as conditions develop which give some b e n e fic ia l r e s u l ts ."  S ta te  Department, 
U. S. R elations with China, p . 252.
Quoted in  Sparkman, Review o f B ipartisan  Foreign C onsultations 
since__Vforld War I I .  1952, Senate Doc. 8?, pi 21. In  f a c t ,  Vandenberg's 
suggested so lu tio n  o f  th e  Chinese problem on Apr, 16, 194?, was remarkedly 
simi l a r  to  M arsh a ll 's  " sa lv a tio n  o f  th e  s itu a tio n "  as s ta te d  on Jan. 7,
1947. Vandenberg sa id  th a t  th e  fu lf il lm e n t o f U. S. hopes in  China re s te d  
"upon th e  success w ith idiich Chiang Kai-shek can en large and l ib e r a l iz e  h is  
own N ational Government," excluding th e  use o f th e  Communists. U. S ., 
Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., I 947, X C m , P t. 3 , 3474. 
M ardiall had made a s im ila r statem ent bu t with th e  im portant exception th a t  
during th e  in te rim  period  fo r  e s ta b lish in g  th e  reorganized Chinese govern­
ment under th e  new c o n s titu tio n  he hoped th a t  "the  door w i l l  remain open fo r  
Communists o r  o th e r  groiqjs to  p a r t ic ip a te  i f  they  see f i t  to  assume t h e i r  
share o f re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  th e  fu tu re  o f  China." S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex 113, pp. 688- 89. Also supra , p . 149.
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l a t e r  th a t  he d id  no t know idiat the  A d m in is tra tio n 's  China po licy  was and 
th a t  he had never been consulted  about th e  form ulation o f  American p o licy  
toward China, n e ith e r  he nor th e  Congress developed a  program o f t h e i r  own.^? 
Harmonious e x e c u tiv ^ le g is la t iv e  re la t io n s  s t i l l  p rev a iled  when M arshall 
re la te d  th e  adverse cond itions in  China to  a jo in t  congressional committee
in  midp.February, 19^7* Senator Sparkman noted th a t  "No member o f th e  commit-
ftftte e s , o f e ith e r  p a rty , recommended any d if fe re n t  p o lic y ."
Meanwhile, the  s i tu a t io n  in  China continued to  d e te r io ra te  while 
th e  United S ta te s  considered idiat i t  could do.®^ As m id-19^7 drew near,
S ., Congressional Rmnnrd. 80th Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1947, XCIII,
P t. 3, 3474.  In  f a c t ,  th e  e d ito r  o f Vandenberg's p r iv a te  papers s ta te d  
th a t  " I t  appears u n lik e ly  he ever formed, even i n  h i s  own mind, a p o s it iv e  
program fo r  United S ta te s  p o licy  in  th e  Far E ast, except to  oppose Communism." 
Vandenberg , J r . ,  HP* 521-22. Sen. Vandenberg apparen tly  was a s  perplexed 
by th e  Chinese s i tu a t io n  a s  M arshall was. The S e n a to r 's  diaxy en try  o f 
Feb. 10, 1947, recorded h is  thoughts as fo llow s: " I  have no i l lu s io n s  about
C hina 's fu tu re  under any prospectus. I t  i s  th e  g re a te s t  specu la tion  o f  th e  
ages."  Ib id . .  p . 523.
®^M arshall's ^ p ea ran c e  before th e  Senate Foreign R elations Commit­
te e  and th e  House Foreign A ffa irs  Committee on Feb. 17-18 i s  t r e a te d  in  
Sparkman, Review o f B ipartisan  Foreign Po licy  Consultations .«dnee World 
War I I . 1952, Senate Doc. 87, p . 21. The most p e rs is te n t  c r i t i c  o f  A cklnis- 
t r a t io n  po licy  during M arsh a ll 's  f i r s t  s ix  months as S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  was 
Rep. Judd. He contended th a t  th e  U. S. was o b lig a ted  to  in c rease  i t s  a id  to  
China i n  recogn ition  o f  C hina's e f fo r t  in  Wbrld War I I  and from th e  stand­
p o in t o f  th e  se c u rity  o f  th e  U. S. House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , 
Hearings on Greeks Turkish 1947, p . 49.
®9u. S. p o licy  toward China, according to  S tu a r t, "was h e s i ta n t  o r 
wavering" throughout 1947. S tu a rt had to ld  M arshall i n  J a n ., 1947, th a t  
only th re e  courses were open to  th e  U. S. : (1) m il i ta ry  advice to  th e
N a tio n a lis ts , w ith economic a id  conditioned upon reform s p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  
lo c a l  govenm ents; (2) th e  o p p o rtu n is tic  one o f "wait and see"; and (3) 
complete withdrawal from p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  C hina's in te rn a l  a f f a i r s .  Of th e  
th re e  courses, S tu a rt to ld  M arshall th a t  he p re fe rred  th e  f i r s t  one and 
"would much p re fe r  th e  th ir d  to  th e  second. " S tu a r t, pp. 178-84. S tu a r t 's  
d u tie s  since  M ardiall had l e f t  China consis ted  p rim a rily  o f  sending d is ­
patches to  M arshall and d e liv e rin g  th e  S e c re ta ry 's  memos to  Chiang. Some 
o f  S tu a r t 's  most in fo rm ative  re p o rls  a re  published in  S ta te  Department,
U. S. R elations w ith China. Annexes 121-23, 125, 128, pp. 729-32, 735-36,
74P Ï6I
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M arshall contended th a t  the  United S ta te s  should extend economic a ss is ta n c e  
to  th e  National Government. In  June such a program was being stud ied  in  
"considerable d e ta i l ,"  but i t s  development was delayed by the  u n se ttled  
s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  in  China and by American governmental reg u la tio n s . Mar­
sh a ll  re fe rred  to  h is  f ru s tra t io n  in  th i s  m atter severa l years l a t e r  as 
follow s:
Our d i f f ic u l ty —my d if f ic u l ty —was g e ttin g  th e  necessary sup­
p o rt from th e  various f in a n c ia l agencies o f  th e  Government with 
idiich I  had to  d ea l, and i t  took months to  g e t th e  necessary agree­
ments from th e  Advisory Board [N ational Advisory Council on I n te r ­
n a tio n a l Monetary and F inancial Problems}, which i s  th e  Secretary  
o f  th e  Treasury, th e  head o f th e  Federal Reserve Board, th e  P residen t 
o f  th e  Import-E)qport Bank, and a rep re se n ta tiv e  o f the  S ta te  Depart­
ment. 90
I t  was a t  t h i s  junctu re  o f American-Chinese re la tio n s  th a t  M arshall 
asked Lieutenant General A lbert C. Wedemeyer to  make a fac t-fin d in g  m ission 
to  C h i n a . A f t e r  some h e s ita tio n , Wedemeyer agreed to  M arsh a ll 's  req u est, 
and P residen t Truman d irec te d  th e  emissary on Ju ly  11 to  study th e  p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic, psychological and m ili ta ry  s i tu a tio n  in  China. The P re s id e n t 's  
in s tru c tio n s  in d ica ted  th a t  th e  executive branch would commit i t s e l f  to  no
99Marshall o r ig in a lly  planned to  develop an economic a ss is ta n ce  
program through th e  various U. S. Govenment departm ents, and decided to  
work th r o u ^  Congress [China Aid Proposal o f Feb., 1948} only when th e  
Bureau o f  th e  Budget could not "find  a fa c tu a l b a s is"  fo r  th e  funds which 
he sought. Testimony o f  May 10, 1951. before Senate Committees on Armed 
S erv ices and on Foreign R elations, Hearings- M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast. 1951, P t. 1, 465* P residen t Truman has a lso  s ta te d  th a t  some d i f f i ­
c u lty  was encountered in  securing U. S. Government c learances (p a r t ic u la r ly  
from th e  Department o f th e  Treasury} fo r  a ss is ta n ce  to  th e  N ational Govern­
ment. In terview  with P residen t Truman, Aug. 20, 1959#
93-According to  Ambassador S tu a r t, th e  Wedemqyer t r i p  had been e i th e r  
h a s t i ly  conceived o r  inform ation about i t  had been w ithheld. S tu a rt s ta te d  
th a t  th e  news o f th e  m ission "came as a  sudden and almost e n tire ly  unexplained 
announcemmrt. " Ihere  had been no co n su lta tio n  w ith S tu a rt o r  th e  N ational 
Government on th e  t r i p  o th e r  than  a " te rs e  message” which S tu a rt had received  
sh o rtly  before th e  Wedemeyer p a rty  l e f t  fo r  China. Ih is  message asked th e  
N ational Govenment to  approve th e  m ission. S tu a r t, p . ?2.
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more than  a  program o f economic assistance*  In  o rder to  q u a lify  fo r  Ameri­
can a id  th e  Chinese Government would have to  p resen t " sa tis fa c to ry  evidence 
o f e ffe c tiv e  measures looking towards Chinese r e c o v e r y . "^2
Wedemqyer spent one month in  China. He v is i te d  th ro u ^ o u t th e  
country, and ta lk ed  w ith Government o f f i c i a l s  and p r iv a te  c it iz e n s  o f both 
the  United S ta te s  and China. C onditions, he noted, were much worse than  
thqy had been when he was l a s t  in  China (May, 1946), and th e  National 
Government had made l i t t l e  p rogress in  carry ing  out p o l i t i c a l  re fe ra s  and 
s ta b il iz in g  th e  economy. The Chinese government had, th e re fo re , not complied 
with e a r l i e r  American p o licy  d e c la ra tio n s  Wiich s tip u la te d  th a t  continuing 
economic a ss is ta n c e  depended upon th e  execution o f p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
re fe ra s  in  China. N evertheless, Wedamqyer recommended th a t  the  United 
S ta te s  should extend m oral, advisory , and m a te ria l support (economic and 
m ilita ry )  to  th e  N ational Government.
The executive branch o f th e  United S ta te s  Govenment was not ready, 
however, to  make th e  " ra d ic a l change" in  po licy  lAich Wedemeyer t h o u ^ t  was
92a copy o f Wedemqyer*s in s tru c tio n s  i s  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, 
U. S. R elations with China, pp. 255-56. Wedemqyer has w ritte n  th a t  M arshall 
f i r s t  asked him to  make a survqy o f  cond itions which would serve as a b a s is  
fo r  fu tu re  p o licy  toward China. When Wedemeyer asked M arshall vh at i n f o r ­
m ation he could "uncover" which was not a v a ila b le  to  th e  U. S. th r o u ^  e x is t­
ing  f a c i l i t i e s ,  M arshall "adm itted" th a t  c e r ta in  congressmen (p a r t ic u la r ly  
Rq). Judd and Sen. S ty le s  Bridges) were "accusing th e  A dm inistration o f p u r­
suing a negative  p o lic y  in  China" and "were compelling a rea p p ra isa l o f  
U. S. p o lic y ."  Wedemeyer s ta te d  th a t  he agreed to  make th e  survqy only be­
cause he t h o u ^ t  "a ra d ic a l  change o f  p o lic y  was envisaged" and th a t  h is  
recommendations would provide th e  b a s is  fo r  th a t  change. Wedemeyer, pp. 
382-83.
93wedemeyer‘ s r ^ jo r t  to  th e  P residen t on Sept. 19, 194?, s ta te d  th a t  
th e  U. S. should no t become involved in  any way in  th e  f r a t r i c id a l  war, and 
f o r  t h i s  reason American m il i ta iy  advice should be c a rr ie d  on "outside  opera­
t io n a l  a re a s ."  He a lso  recommended th a t  Manchuria be placed under a f iv e -  
Power Guardianship o r  under a United Nations T rusteeship i f  the  Guardian­
ship p roposal were no t accep tab le . A copy o f  Wedemeyer* s rep o rt i s  p r in te d  
in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 135» PP* 764-814.
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necessary , and h is  rep o rt to  the  P residen t was siç>pressed. A lth o u ^  
M arshall was c r i t ic iz e d  fo r  not re le as in g  th e  Wedmeyer rep o rt, h is  g re a t-  
e s t  challenge now came from Republicans who strong ly  recommended th e  develop­
ment o f  a China a id  program. Ihe time was Novanber, 19^7; th e  occasion was 
th e  hearings before th e  House fb reign  A ffa irs  Committee on proposed le g is ­
la t io n  to  extend emergency a id  to  Europe. R ^u b lican  Committee members con­
tended th a t  the executive program should be amended to  include a ss is ta n c e  
to  China. M ardiall in fom ed  the  Committee th a t  the  A dm inistration d id  not 
want a demand fo r  China a id  to  im peril passage o f  th e  European proposal. 
Ih e re fo re , he s ta te d , considera tion  was being given to  in troducing  a pro­
posal a t  a l a t e r  da te  fo r  the  extension o f  a id  to  China. The issu e  was 
reso lved  ty  a compromise—when M arshall promised th a t  he would p resen t a 
China a id  program to  th e  n«ct session  o f Congress, th e  Republicans agreed 
to  cooperate with th e  A dm inistration on a ss is ta n ce  to  Europe. ̂ 5
9^*The te x t  o f Wedemeyer* s rep o rt was not made av a ila b le  u n t i l  th e  
re le a se  in  Aug., 1949, o f  th e  S ta te  Departm ent's White Paper on re la t io n s  
between th e  U. S. and China. M arshall ju s t i f i e d  the  suppression o f  the  
re p o rt on Nov. 12, 194?, on th e  b asis  th a t  he d id  not b e liev e  th a t  i t  was 
"to  th e  b est in te r e s t  o f  th e  Chinese Govenment o r to  our own Government to  
re le a se  i t , "  and because many o f  th e  f a c ts  upon which th e  repo rt was based 
were obtained in  "extreme confidence." House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , 
H earings. Bnergency Foretgr^ Aid. 194?, pp. 31-32. The Department o f S ta te  
l a t e r  s ta te d  th a t  i t  suppressed the  rep o rt because the  Guardianship proposal 
would c o n s titu te  an infringem ent o f Chinese sovereignty  and because i t  
opposed th e  in c lu s io n  o f  th e  U. S. S. R. a s  one o f th e  Five Powers. S ta te  
Department, U. S. R elations with China, p . 260. Notable among those  who 
supported M arsha ll's  ac tio n  in  sipp ressing  th e  re p o rt was Sen. Vandenberg.
In  a l e t t e r  to  Sen. William Knowland o f  C a lifo rn ia  on Dec. 11, 1948, he 
wrote th a t  he had never seen th e  Wedemqrer re p o rt, bu t th a t  he had heard 
M arshall give a "complete paraphrase" o f i t ,  and th a t  he was s a t is f ie d  " th a t 
i t s  re le a se  would have been a serious blow to  Chinese-American re la tio n s  
. . . .  some o f  h i s  recommendations would have go tten  us in to  some se rious 
tro u b le  -  even th e  fa c t  o f th e i r  p roposa l."  Vanderberg, J r . ,  pp. 527-28,
95lhe p o s itio n  taken hy th e  R epublican-controlled  House Foreign 
A ffa irs  Committee on th e  need fo r  a id  to  Qiina i s  explained in  U. S ., Con­
g ress , House, Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Bnergency F o r^g n  Aid. 80th 
Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1947, Be?t. 1152 to  accompany H. R. 4604. Cited h e re a f te r
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M arshall’ s pledge to  p resen t a China a id  proposal to  Congress was 
f u l f i l l e d  in  February, 1948. The P re s id e n t’ s message to  Congress on Febru­
a ry  18 and th e  Secretary  o f S ta te 's  testim ony before  congressional commit­
te e s  on Februazy 20 described  the  s i tu a t io n  in  China as g r a v e . A d m i n i s ­
t r a t io n  lead ers  se rio u s ly  doubted th a t  th e  N ational Government could be
re s to re d  to  i t s  former p o s itio n  in  China. In f la t io n  had not been checked,
«
China’s foreign-exchange holdings were being reduced, and p o l i t i c a l  re fe ra s  
were not being made. Morale was d e te r io ra tin g , and th e  c iv i l  war was 
spreading in  scope and in te n s i ty .  I t  i s  understandable, th e re fo re , th a t  
th e  A dm inistration was perplexed as to  what i t  could do. A decision  was 
made immediately, however, th a t  ru led  ou t th e  use o f  American combat fo rces 
and th e  extension o f lo n g -te ra  economic a ss is ta n c e . Speaking d ire c tly  to  
th e se  p o in ts , M arshall to ld  a congressional hearing :
We must be prepared to  face  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  th e  p resen t 
Chinese Goverment may not be successfu l in  m aintaining i t s e l f
a s  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Bmergencv Foreign Aid. 194?, Kept. 
1152.  Ind iv idua l c r it ic ism s  were voiced by Judd in  testim ony o f Nov. 12,
14 before  the  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , H earings. Bnereency 
Foreign Aid. 194?, pp. 25, 27, 239-56, and by Bap. John M. Vorys o f Ohio 
on Nov. 18 before  ib id . .  pp. 294-95* O bjections were a lso  made by Vandenberg 
on Nov. 24, 1947* c ite d  in  U. S ., Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 1 s t 
S e ss ., 1947, XCIII, P a rt 9* 10704. For o th e r  c r i t ic ism s  see VQJliam C. 
B u l l i t t ,  "A B qw rt to  th e  American People on China, ” L ife . XXIII (October 
13 , 1947) , I 5I - 52 , 154.  M arshall p resen ted  th e  p o s itio n  o f th e  Administra­
t io n  before  a j o in t  meeting o f th e  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
and th e  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  on Nov. 10 and 12, 1947. He 
viewed th e  problems o f  th e  European and Chinese a re a s  as being d is s im ila r , 
and, th e re fo re , req u irin g  d if fe re n t  types o f a id . ^ e c i f i c a U ^ ,  M arshall 
s ta te d  th a t  Western Europe needed funds to  purchase izqiorts and to  su s ta in  
t h e i r  in d u s tr ia l  p roduction . Ihe Chinese, he contended, were not th rea tened  
w ith any immediate lo s s  o f im ports, bu t in s tead  were confronted with 
”extreme i n f l a t i o n .” Ihe problem, M arshall observed, was how to  help  the  
Q iinese and s t i l l  g e t a seventy p e r cen t e ffe c tiv e  re tu rn  in  th e  use o f 
American funds. House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings. Emergency 
Foreign Aid. 1947, pp. 7-23*
9^Copies o f  te x ts  o f Truman's and M arsh a ll 's  statem ents a re  p rin te d  
in  S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations w ith China. Annexes 175 (a) and 175 
(b ), pp. 981- 85.
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against the Communist fo rce  o r  o th e r opposition  th a t  may a r is e  in  
China • • • • I t  can only be concluded th a t  the  p resen t Government 
ev idently  cannot reduce the  Chinese Communists to  a com pletely neg-. 
l ig ib le  fa c to r  in  China. To achieve th a t  o b jec tiv e  in  th e  Immediate 
fu tu re  i t  would be necessary fo r  th e  United S ta te s  to  underw rite th e  
Chinese Goverment* s m ili ta ry  e f f o r t ,  .  . . , as w ell as th e  Chinese 
economy. Ihe United S ta te s  would have to  be prepared v ir tu a l ly  
to  take over the  Chinese Goverment and adm in ister i t s  economic, 
m ili ta ry  and goverm ental a f f a i r s .
An attem pt to  underw rite th e  Chinese economy and th e  Chinese 
Goverment* s m il i ta ry  e f fo r t  rep re sen ts  a burden on th e  U. S. economy 
and a m ilita ry  re s p o n s ib ili ty  which I  cannot recommend as a course 
o f  ac tio n  fo r  th i s  Goverment.
Present developments make i t  u n lik e ly , . . . . , th a t  any amount 
o f  United S ta te s  m il i ta ry  o r  economic a id  could make th e  p resen t 
Chinese Goverment capable o f re e s ta b lish in g  and then  m aintaining 
i t s  con tro l th ro u ^ o u t  a l l  o f  C h i n a .  97
Secretary  M arshall was a lso  convinced th a t  American a ss is ta n ce  was 
o f secondary importance. The Chinese, he contended, must undertake th e  
" v i ta l  measures" fo r  th e  re s to ra tio n  o f peace to  th e i r  country and the  
development o f s ta b le  economic conditions.^®  Further, M arshall judged th a t  
th e  se cu rity  o f  th e  United S ta te s  was jeopardized  more by th e  developments 
in  Rirope than i t  was by those in  China. Therefore, Congress must f i r s t  
consider th e  recovery program fo r  Europe. The Secretary  o f  S ta te  emphasized 
th i s  po in t when asked i f  he p re fe rre d  th a t  Congress la y  th e  Ghina recom­
mendations aside  and "proceed with th e  European recovery program." Yes, 
M arshall rep lied , " I f  th a t  i s  th e  only way you can do th e  European recovery 
program w ithin  a reasonably sh o rt tim e.
97 ib id . .  pp. 382-83.
^®Marshall described  th e  " v i ta l  measures" as fo llow s : The Chinese 
Goverment should "develop a  base o f  goverm ent th a t  i s  no t r e s t r ic te d  to  
a small group, th a t  i s  cleaned rqp in  i t s  execution o f goverm enta l functions 
and elimi na te  gross co rrup tion , bu t more p a r t ic u la r ly ,  th a t  i t  takes 
very d e f in i te , a c tiv e  considera tion  o f  th e  land problem o f  th e  peasan try . " 
Comment on Feb. 20, 1948, before House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings 
for_a Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 1562- 63.
99Marshall*s answer on Feb. 20, 1948, to  a question  o f Rep. Jacob 
K. J a v i ts  o f  New York before ib id . , pp. I 562, I 57I .
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On the  b a s is  o f  th i s  a n a ly s is  o f in te rn a l  Chinese cond itions and 
what th e  United S ta te s  could not o r  should not do, th e  A dm inistration p re ­
sented a China proposal to  Congress fo r  i t s  considera tion . Ihe o b jec tiv e  
o f th e  measure was se t  fo rth  on February 20 as fo llow s:
I t  i s  th e  purpose o f  t h i s  Act to  provide immediate a id  to  
China to  re l ie v e  human su ffe rin g , to  a s s i s t  in  re ta rd in g  economic 
d e te r io ra tio n , and to  a ffo rd  th e  people o f China an opportun ity  to  
i n i t i a t e  measures o f  se lf -h e lp  necessary to  re b u ild  the  bases fo r  
more s ta b le  econamic conditions.!®®
Ihus, though th e  A dm inistration se rio u sly  doubted th a t  th e  N ational 
Government could long endure, i t  recommended th a t  $570,000,000 be made 
a v a ila b le  fo r  expenditure by th e  Chinese over a fifteen-m onths period . Of 
th i s  t o t a l ,  $510, 000,000 would be au thorized  to  finance  th e  izq w rta tio n  o f 
food, m edicines, and in d u s t r ia l  m a te r ia ls . I t  was suggested th a t  another 
$60,000,000 be a llo c a te d  to  provide c a p ita l  fo r  key in d u s t r ia l  and t r a n s ­
p o r ta tio n  reco n stru c tio n  projects.^® ^
The Congress, as a u n i t ,  had p rev iously  been g enera lly  u n c r i t ic a l  
o f  American p o licy  toward China and had t a c i t l y  accepted i t .  This semi- 
quietude was now rep laced , however, by in c reas in g  opposition  to  th e  execu­
t iv e  p roposal. ̂ ®  ̂ Congressional c r i t i c s  were jo ined  by prominent w itnesses
!®®U. S ., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Tœçt_of_Pro- 
posftd Q iina Aid Mil and Backgreund Information on Economic Am «̂ .stance 
Program fo r  China ICommittee P r in tL  80th Cong.. 2nd S e ss .. 1 9 4 8. p. 7.
C ited  h e re a f te r  a s  House Committee on Bbreign A ffa irs , Proposed China Aid 
TH11, 1948. A lth o u ^  th e  A dm inistration proposal contained no reference  
to  m il i ta ry  a ss is ta n c e , M arshall to ld  th e  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  
on Feb. 20, 1948, th a t  China would need m il i ta ry  supp lies and th a t  th i s  
program would f re e  th e  N ational Government to  use i t s  own resources a t  i t s  
own d isc re tio n  to  purchase m il i ta ry  item s. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations 
with China. Annex 175 (b ), pp. 984-85.
!®!nouse C<mimittee on Foreign A ffa irs , Proposed China Aid  B i l l . 1948, 
p. 13.  The S ta te  Department b i l l  s t ip u la te d  th a t  th e  fifteen-m onths period  
would end on June 30, 1949*
^®^One is su e  was resolved w ithout much d i f f ic u l ty .  That was th e  
dec ision  to  include  China a id  in  th e  measure providing fo r  European a s s is -
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before  committee hearings, and th e  s tro n g est congressional anti-A dm inistra- 
t io n  sentim ent was in  th e  House o f R epresen tatives. Ihe fo ca l p o in t of 
c z i t ic ia n  centered  on m il i ta ry  a id : Should th e  United S ta te s  extend m ili­
ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  to  th e  N ational Government? I f  so, what form should th e  
a ss is ta n c e  take?
though th e re  was no serio u s  opposition  to  th e  extension o f economic 
a ss is ta n ce  to  China, some prominent w itnesses contended th a t  m il i ta ry  a id  
was necessary in  o rder to  make economic a id  e ffe c tiv e . Strong support was 
a lso  voiced fo r  th e  proposal th a t  th e  United S ta te s  provide o p era tiona l 
advice to  Chinese m il i ta ry  fo rces in  th e  f ie ld .  Contrary to  Adminis­
t r a t io n  w ishes, th e  House o f  R ^ re s e n ta tiv e s  approved o f th ese  suggestions 
and amended the  o r ig in a l b i l l  on th re e  v i t a l  p o in ts . Ihe House version  o f 
th e  b i l l  provided fo r :  (1) th e  extension o f m ilita ry - ty p e  a id  to  th e  Nation­
a l  Goverment, (2) superv ision  o f  th e  a id  by an American m il i ta ry  m ission, 
and (3) m il i ta ry  advice to  N a tio n a lis ts  troops w hile in  combat.
tance . U. S ., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign A lia ir s ,  Foreign 
A ssistance Act o f  1948. 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., 1948, Rept. I 585 to  accom­
pany S. 2202. C ited h e re a f te r  a s  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , For­
eign  A ssistance Act o f  1948. 1948, Rqpt. I 585.
non-congressional supporters o f  th e  th e s is  th a t  th e  China a id  
program ^ o u ld  d i r e c t ly  provide fo r  American m il i ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  included 
Generals Wedemeyer, (Hen E. fidgerton, C la ire  Ghennault, and former c iv i l  
government o f f i c i a l s  C larence Gauss and William C. B u l l i t t .  House Committee 
on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a  Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 
1898-99, 1910- 12, 2067, 2167. 2179, 2215- Ï 7.  Among th e  R epresentatives who 
backed th i s  view were Judd, c i te d  in  U. S ., Record. 80th Cong.,
2nd S ess ., 1946, XCIV, P a r t  3 , 3331^32, and John Davis Lodge o f  Connecticut, 
c ite d  in  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a  Post-War Recov­
e ry  Program. 1948, P t. 2 , 2075. Among those who advocated American opera­
t io n a l  advice to  Chinese m il i ta ry  fo rce s  in  th e  f i e ld  were Judd, c ite d  in  
U. S ., Congresfrioiiyil 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., 1948, XCIV, P a rt 3,
3331^ 32, and Oiennault and B u l l i t t  in  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , 
Hearings f o r  a  Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 1907-O8 , 2215. 17.
b i l l  passed th e  House on Mar. 20, 1948, and au thorized  an 
app ropria tion  o f  $150, 000,000 p rim arily  fo r  m ilita ry - ty p e  a id  and $420,000,000 
f o r  e c o n o m i c  a id . House Committee on fb re ign  A ffa irs , Foreign A ssistance
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United S ta te s  po licy  would have been a lte re d  considerably i f  th e  
House b i l l  had become law. The Senate Foreign R elations Committee re je c te d  
th e  Hous»>passed measure, however, and unanimously reported  a b i l l  to  th e  
Senate ^diich siqaported the  A dm inistration on th e  th ree  c o n tro v e rs ia l p o in ts . 
Passage o f  the  Senate Committee's b i l l  by the Senate was followed by i t s  
adoption in  conference committee on A p r il  1, 1 9 4 8 . Congressional  approv­
a l  o f th e  conference rep o rt was given in  both Houses on A pril 2, and P re s i­
dent Truman signed th e  China Aid Act o f  1948 on A pril 3»^^^
Act o f  1948. 1948, Rept. 1585» PP* 1-2, 12. The A dm inistration had con­
s i s te n t ly  refused to  give m i l i t a ^  advice to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  troops in  
combat. For example, see testim ony o f  Acheson, Mar. 20-21, 194?, in  House 
Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings on Greek-Turkish Aid 1947, pp*
16- 18. M arshall had s ta te d  the  U. S. p o s itio n  on Feb. 20, 1948, lAen th e  
China a id  program was in troduced before  Congress. He c la r i f ie d  th is  p o in t 
on May 10, 1951* tdien he AYpTainmH vdiy th e  U. S. should not p lan , p rocure , 
d e liv e r , and supervise U. S. m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n ce  to  China in  add ition  to  
g iving m ili ta ry  advice to  N a tio n a lis t combatants. "As I  r e c a l l  General 
Wedemeyer's e s tim a te s ,” M arshall s ta te d , "about 10,000 o f f ic e rs  and o th e rs  
would be necessary to  oversee and d ire c t  those various o p e ra tio n .” And, 
he added, "At th a t  tim e, our own m il i ta ry  p o s itio n  was e x tra o rd in a rily  weak 
. . . .  we had one and a  th ird  d iv is io n s  in  th e  e n tire  United S ta te s ."  Sen­
a te  C w m ittees on Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. M ili­
ta r y  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far East. 1951, P t. 1, 465*
copy o f  th e  b i l l  repo rted  to  th e  Senate by th e  Foreign Rela­
t io n s  Committee on Mar. 25 i s  found in  U. S ., Congress, Senate, Committee 
on Foreign R elations, A B ill  to  Promote th e  General W elfare. National 
I n te r e s t ,  and Foreign Policy  o f  th e  United S ta te s  by providing Aid to  China. 
80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., 1948, Rqpt. 102o, Amended Report o f th e  Committee 
on Foreign R elations on S. 2393* H e rea d e r c ite d  a s  Senate Committee on 
Foreign R elations, A m n  to  Promote th e  General Welfare . . . , 1948,
R ^ t .  1026. The adopted Conference Committee version  i s  p rin te d  in  U. S ., 
Congress, House, Foreign A ssistance Act o f  1948. 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss .,
1948, Rept. 1655, Conference Report to  accompany S. 2202. H ereafter c ite d  
as House, Foreign A ssistance Act o f 1948. Conf. R ept., Rept. 1655*
China Aid Act of 1948 was incorporated  as T it le  IV o f Public 
Law 472 e n ti t le d  th e  Foreign A ssistance Act o f 1948. I t  authorized 
$338, 000,000 fo r  economic a id  idiere th e  A dm inistration proposal had asked 
fo r  $510, 000, 000, and i t  reduced th e  period  o f  coverage from f i f te e n  months 
as asked by M arshall to  twelve. The Act om itted th e  A dm in istra tion 's 
request f o r  $60,000,000 fo r  reco n stru c tio n  p ro je c ts  and in se r te d  au th o ri­
za tio n  f o r  $125, 000,000 to  be appropria ted  fo r  use "on such te rn s  as th e  
P residen t may detexm ine." The China Aid Act i s  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department,
I6 l
Although th e  A dm inistration had won th e  f i r s t  big t e s t  with i t s  
c r i t i c s ,  severa l fa c to rs  should be noted. F i r s t ,  th e  United S ta te s , which 
had abandoned i t s  e f fo r ts  to  m ediate th e  d isp u te  in  China, narrowed i t s  
po licy  even fu r th e r  by re je c tin g  th e  a l te rn a t iv e  o f d ire c t  o r extensive 
m il i ta iy  m e a s u r e s . S u b s t a n t i a l  American a ss is ta n c e  had been advocated 
by th e  A dm inistration fo r  economic and r é a b i l i t a t i o n  purposes only . Second, 
Congress had p a r t ic ip a te d  in  the  fo im ulation  o f  the  new po licy  and could 
now be held  accountable fo r  i t s  success o r  f a i lu r e .  Ihe P residen t and th e  
S ecre tary  o f S ta te , i f  they  p re fe rred , could dism iss any fu tu re  req u ests  on 
b é a l f  o f  the  Chinese Govenment as being in c o n s is te n t w ith American p o licy  
toward China i f  th e  requests  were incom patible w ith th e  China Aid Act o f
U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 179, pp. 991-93» Acheson said  on June 4, 
1951, however, th a t  only $275*000,000 was appropria ted  fo r  economic a id  in  
th e  Foreign Aid A ppropriations Act o f  1949 (Putdic Law 793), signed by th e  
P residen t on June 28, 1948. Ihe f u l l  $125,000,000 was appropria ted , he noted, 
" é i c h  presumably would be fo r  m il i ta ry  purposes, " making a t o t a l  appro­
p r ia t io n  o f  $400,000,000. I t  w i l l  be remembered th a t  th e  A dm inistration had 
recommended a grand t o ta l  o f  $570,000,000. Senate Committees on Armed 
Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings- M iH tarv  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far
f e s t ,  1951, P t. 3 . 1854- 55.
lO^There was only  one subsequent major e f f o r t  in  Congress to  sub­
s ta n t ia l ly  a l t e r  th e  a id  program as  provided in  th e  China Aid Act, and i t  
was defeated  by execu tive opposition . Ihe occasion was th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f 
S. 1063 on Feb. 25, 1949, by Sen. Pat McCarran o f  Nevada. This measure, 
i f  passed, would have provided a loan  o f $1,500,000,000 to  N a tio n a lis t China 
fo r  economic and m il i ta ry  purposes. I t  would a lso  have authorized  American 
o f f ic e rs  to  d ire c t  N a tio n a lis t combat fo rce s . F if ty  Senators, evenly 
div ided  between Democrats and Republicans, urged Sen. Connally on Mar. 10 
to  perm it th e  Fbreign R elations Committee to  f u l ly  consider the  measure. 
Connally, Chairman o f  th e  Committee, asked Sec. Acheson to  inform th e  Com- 
miittee o f  th e  A dm in istra tion 's  views on th e  b i l l .  Acheson in fo raed  Connally 
on Mar. 15 th a t  th e  A dm inistration opposed th e  b i l l  fo r  th e  follow ing rea­
sons: (1 ) th e  N ational Government could no t d e fea t th e  Communists i f  p a s t
a c tio n s  were any measure o f  performance, (2) th e re  was no evidence th a t  th e  
U. S. could a l t e r  th e  tren d  o f events by fam ish in g  ad d itio n a l m il i ta ry  a id  
and th a t  such a id  would only prolong the  su ffe rin g  o f  th e  people, and (3) 
th e  U. S. could no t commit i t s e l f  to  a program o f d ire c t  p a r t ic ip a tio n  on 
a m il i ta ry  b a s is . Acheson's l e t t e r  i s  p rin te d  i n  S ta te  Department, U. S. 
R elations with China. Annex 186, pp. 1053-54.
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1 9 4 8 .^ ^  Third, the  A dm inistration considered the  problems o f  China to  be 
secondary to  those o f Borope in  so f a r  as  American n a tio n a l in te r e s t  ana 
se cu rity  were concerned. Fourth, th e  Chinese were reminded th a t  t h ^  would 
have to  do more to  solve th e i r  own problems.
A dditionally  im portant fo r  th e  purpose o f th is  study, however, i s  
th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  American A dm inistration only committed i t s e l f  to  two addi­
t io n a l  m odifications i r  United S ta te s  p o licy  toward China p r io r  to  the  f a l l  
o f th e  N ational Govenment. One o f th e se  commitments-—re je c tio n  o f a c o a li­
t io n  government in  China with C<mmunist p a r t ic ip a tio n —was made on August 
12, 1948. M arshall sen t a d ire c tiv e  to  Ambassador S tu a rt on t h i s  occasion 
which s ta ted  th a t  th e  United S ta tes "must not d ir e c t ly  o r in d ire c t ly  give 
any im plica tion  o f  support, encouragement o r a c c e p ta b ility "  o f any Chinese 
government idiich included Communist p a r t i c ip a n ts .^ ^  The second American
^ ^ I n  f a c t ,  th e  Chinese urged an in c rease  in  American a id  on severa l 
occasions a f t e r  th e  passage o f the  China Aid Act o f  1948, and M arshall and 
Acheson [then Secretary  o f  S ta te ) re fe rre d  in  l a t e  O c t., 1948, and on Apr.
21, 1949, re sp ec tiv e ly , to  th e  fa c t  th a t  U. S. p o licy  had been e s tab lish ed  
by th e  China Aid Act o f 1948 and th a t  increased  a ss is ta n c e  would be contrazy 
to  th e  ezqpressed in te n t  o f Congress. I b i d . . pp. 280-86, 30?. Vandenberg 
a lso  reacted  unfavorably to  the  Chinese req u ests  fo r  increased  m ili ta ry  a id  
because he d id  not be lieve  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  were cooperating w ith the  U. S.
In  a l e t t e r  to  Sen. Knowland on th i s  p o in t on Oct. 21, 1948, he [Vandenberg) 
wrote th a t  w ithout N a tio n a lis t cooperation any ^ p ro p r ia t io n  o f  ours " is  
a sheer waste o f our own substance.” There were, he sa id , " lim its  to  our 
resources and boundaries to  our m irac le s . " Vandenberg, J r . , pp. 52^29 .
^^^On two l a t e r  occasions (Aug. 12, 1948, and Jan. 12, 1949) the  
U. S. found i t  necessary to  s ta te  th a t  i t  would no t again serve as m ediator 
in  China, e i th e r  on a u n i la te r a l  b a s is  o r  jo in t ly  with Great B rita in , France, 
and th e  Soviet Union. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, pp.
279. 291.
^ 4 ( a r s h a l l  had been asked in  a p re ss  conference on Mar. 10, 1948, 
lA ether American po licy  s t i l l  favored a  c o a lit io n  govenment in  China.
M arsh a ll 's  rep ly  and a p re ss  re le ase  by th e  Department o f  S ta te  on Mar. 11 
d id  no t s a t is fy  th e  newspapermen. So, P residen t Truman was asked th e  same 
question  a t  h i s  p ress  conference on Mar. 11. The P re s id e n t 's  rep ly  d id  no t 
d e f in i te ly  answer th e  question , a l th o u ^  i t  d id  serve a s  a b a s is  fo r  Mar­
s h a l l 's  d ire c tiv e  to  S tu a rt on Aug. 12 re fe rre d  to  in  th e  te x t  above. P residen t
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commitment made d e f in i t iv e  lA at had been apparent fo r  sev era l months# That 
i s ,  th e  United S ta te s  declared  th a t  i t s  po licy  toward China would be deter-- 
mined as conditions developed# Ambassador S tu a rt was n o tif ie d  to  th a t  
e ffe c t  by M arshall on August 13# 19^*  M arshall described  th e  th ink ing  o f  
th e  Department o f S ta te  a t  t h i s  tim e as follow s:
# # #, i t  i t  no t l ik e ly  th a t  th e  s i tu a t io n  w il l  make i t  pos» 
s ib le  f o r  us a t  t h i s  junctu re  to  fo ra u la te  apy r ig id  p lans fo r  our 
fu tu re  po licy  in  China# Developments in  Qiina a re  obviously entezv- 
in a  in to  a  period  o f  extreme f lu x  and confusion in  idiich i t  w il l  be 
im possible with su re ty  to  perceive  c le a r ly  f a r  in  advance th e  
p a tte rn  o f  th in g s to  come and in  idiich th i s  Government must pre> 
serve a  maximum freedom o f  action#
In  essence, then# th e  D ^artm ent o f S ta te  had adopted a hands-o ff 
p o licy  to  g ive th e  United S ta te s  freedom o f a c tio n  in  i t s  re la tio n s  with 
th e  N ational Goverment# This was th e  American a t t i tu d e  when M arshall 
resigned as  S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  on January 3» 1949. And i t  was th e  view 
of h i s  successor. Dean Acheson#
Truman sa id  in  h is  p re ss  conference on Mar# 11 th a t  h i s  Statement o f  Dec# 15# 
1945# which served as th e  b a s is  fo r  th e  M arshall Mission# was s t i l l  valid#
In  answer to  fu r th e r  questioning# Truman sa id  th a t  " I t  was no t th e  p o lic y  
o f th e  U# S# to  urge th e  N ational Goverment o f China to  tak e  Communists 
in to  th e  Goverment#* He then  added th a t  he hoped th a t  th e  Chinese l ib e r a l s  
would be taken  in to  th e  Chinese Goverment# I b id . . pp# 272-73*
^^Q uoted  from Marshall* s d ire c tiv e  o f Aug# 13 to  S tuart#  Ib id # #
p# 280#
llZ g ^n , L evere tt S a lto n s ta ll  o f  M assachusetts to ld  Acheson on June 2, 
1951# th a t  h i s  " le t  th e  dust s e t t le "  s ta tm e n t before  a  p r iv a te  meeting 
o f  R epresentatives i n  1949 had bew  in te rp re te d  a s  being U* S# p o licy  toward 
China. Then he asked Acheson lAen that^ po licy  was changed to  a more 
aggressive p o licy  a g a in s t th e  Chinese Communists# Acheson* s r ^ l y  was 
g i» n a r  to  th a t  o f M ardiall* s d ire c tiv e  to  S tu a rt on Aug# 13 which i s  
re fe rre d  to  in  th e  tex t#  Acheson s ta te d  th a t  he was not advocating a  p o lic y  
lAen he used th e  phrase " l e t  th e  du st se ttle # "  " I t  was a phrase#" he jsaid# 
"i* ich  I  used to  describe , my own in a b i l i ty  to  see very  f a r  in  th i s  s itu a tio n #  " 
Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign Relations# H earings. 
M jllltarv S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951# Pt# 3# I 765- 66#
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Secretary  Acheson*s " in a b i l i ty  to  see very f a r  in  th i s  s itu a tio n "  
was sho rt liv e d . N a tio n a lis t re s is ta n c e  on the  mainland collapsed in  the  
spring  and summer o f  1949, and Chiang Kai-shek and h is  fo llow ers f le d  to 
Formosa. Acheson recognized the  g rav ity  o f th i s  development idien he s ta te d  
th e  basic  p r in c ip le s  vdiich should guide th e  United S ta tes  in  i t s  form ulation 
o f  p o licy  toward China. % e S e c re ta ry 's  statem ent o f  August 5, 1949, 
s tr ik in g ly  sim ilar to  th e  American t r a d i t io n a l  p o licy , read as follow s:
1. The United S ta te s  d e s ire s  to  encourage in  every fe a s ib le  
way the  development o f China as an independent and s ta b le  na tion  
ab le  to  p lay  a ro le  in  world a f f a i r s  su ita b le  fo r  a g rea t and f re e  
people.
2. The United S ta te s  d e s ire s  to  support th e  c rea tio n  in  China 
o f economic and p o l i t i c a l  conditions which w il l  safeguard basic  
r i ^ t s  and l ib e r t i e s  and p rog ressive ly  develop the  economic and 
so c ia l w ell-being  o f  i t s  people.
3. The United S ta te s  i s  opposed to  th e  sub jection  o f China 
to  any fo re ign  power, to  any regime ac tin g  in  th e  in te r e s t  o f a 
fo reign  power, and to  th e  dismemberment o f China by any fo reign  
power, whether by open o r  c landestine  means.
Ihe a rc h i te c ts  o f American p o licy  had h is to r ic a l ly  sought to  fu r­
th e r  th e  development o f a s ta b le , strong , and democratic China, fr ie n d ly  
to  th e  United S ta te s . They were now confronted with an un friend ly . Com­
m unist regime. American decision-m akers had t r a d i t io n a l ly  opposed th e  
exaction  o f spheres o f in te r e s t  in  China ty  fo re ig n  powers, and they  were 
now faced with th e  China mainland e ffe c tiv e ly  co n tro lled  by an indigenously- 
developed anti-American regime. N a tio n a lis t China, vdiich had been saved 
from ex te rn a l aggression during World War U ,  had succumbed to  in te rn a l  
fo rces  fou r years l a t e r .  In  re tro sp e c t, th e re  were l im its  o f course to
^ 3 u ,  S ., Department o f  S ta te , Statement by Secretary  o f S ta te  Dean 
Acheson on th e  China White Ps^er, P ress Release No. 6o4, Aug. 3, 1949 
(Mimeographed), in  th e  f i l e s  o f  Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas, D ivision o f 
M anuscripts, U n iversity  o f  Oklahoma L ibrary , Norman, Oklahoma. The Chinese 
P eo p le 's  Republic was proclaimed by th e  Chinese Communists on Oct. 1, 1949, 
and th e  U. S. reaffirm ed  i t s  recogn ition  o f th e  N ational Government as the  
le g a l  government o f  China(Formosa)on Oct. 4, 1949. S tu a rt, p . 2?3.
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what both the  United S ta te s  and the  N ational Govemnent could do and would 
do. There i s  a lso  the  assessment o f  what was done. A dditional fa c e ts  o f 
t h i s  s to ry  a re  re la te d  in  subsequent chap ters.
CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES MUITART ASSISTANCE. 1945-1949 
Background
The United S ta te s  during Wbrld War H  emphasized the  short-range 
goal o f i t s  po licy—v ic to ry  over Japan. Thus, th e  A dm inistration lo g ic a lly  
assigned a pre-em inent p o s itio n  to  th e  m ili ta ry  fa c to r  in  i t s  re la tio n s  with 
China. M ilitaxy  union o f  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and Chinese Communists was 
encouraged so th a t  t h e i r  combined power m i^ t  be d irec te d  against Japan.
When Vforld War I I  was su ccessfu lly  te im inated , th e  United S ta te s  
m odified i t s  o b jec tiv e . America then  s tre ssed  i t s  long-range goal—th e  
development o f a strong , un ited  and democratic China. Though the  Adminis­
t r a t io n ,  as during Wbrld War H .  encouraged cooperation between the  Nation­
a l i s t s  and th e  Chinese Communists, th e re  was a s ig n if ic a n t  post-war d if ­
ference—th e  co llab o ra tio n  should be p o l i t i c a l  as w ell as m ili ta ry . Ameri­
can spokesmen repeated ly  a sse rte d , however, th a t  post-w ar China meant th e  
Republic o f China under th e  leadersh ip  o f Chiang Kai-shek.
The change a f t e r  Wbrld War H  in  the  o b jec tiv e  o f  United S ta te s  
p o licy  toward Qiina was accompanied ty  a m odification  o f  th e  means to  achieve 
th e  o b jec tiv e . Thou^ th e  United S ta te s  had p rim arily  used m ilitaxy  r e ­
sources tc  implement i t s  po licy  during World War I I .  i t  never chose to  do 
so a f te r  V-J Day. M arshall was sen t to  China in  December. 1945. to  a s s i s t  
th e  Chinese in  carxying ou t th e i r  agreement o f October. 1945. His in s tru c ­
t io n s  in d ica ted  what he and the  United S ta tes would do and what th e  United
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S ta te s  expected th e  Chinese p r in c ip a ls  to  do. M arsh a ll 's  d ire c tiv e  pro­
vided th a t  ( l )  M arshall would help  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Commu­
nists to  arrange a cessa tio n  o f h o s t i l i t i e s ;  (2) when th e  tru ce  was secured, 
th e  Chinese would rep lace  the  one-party  tu te la g e  o f th e  Kuomintang with a 
government includ ing  o th e r p o l i t i c a l  elements, and M arshall would o f fe r  
advice on how to  in te g ra te  th e  two a m ie s ; and (3) as p rogress was made to ­
ward reorganizing  th e  government and am y along these  l in e s  the  United 
S ta te s  would extend m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n ce  to  China. American m ili ta ry  a id  
was in te rp re te d  to  mean both tec h n ic a l and m ate ria l a id . In  ad d itio n , and 
no t determined by progress toward p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta ry  reo rgan iza tion , the  
United S ta te s  agreed to  a s s i s t  th e  N ational Government to  occupy a reas 
l ib e ra te d  from th e  Japanese and to  r e p a tr ia te  Japanese troops and c iv i l ­
ia n s .^
A fter th e  f a i lu r e  o f th e  M arshall M ission, th e  United S ta te s  t e r ­
minated i t s  po licy  o f  m ediation. During th e  next two y ears  (1947-1949) 
th e  United S ta te s  continued i t s  po licy  o f  m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  to  th e  N ational 
Govemnent, ju s t  as i t  had done in  varying degrees during th e  M arshall Mis­
sion . American policy-m akers k ^ t  one basic  fa c to r  in  mind, however, 
th ro u ^ o u t  th e  post-w ar (1945-1949) period—th e  United S ta te s  would not 
assume re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  th e  p o licy  o r  ac tio n s  o f th e  Chinese Government.
Ihe m il i ta ry  conditions in  China during December, 1945-1949 and 
th e  American m ili ta ry  co n trib u tio n  to  th e  N ational Government during th a t  
period  a re  y e t to  be to ld . These fa c e ts  o f  the  China s to ry  and o f American 
p o licy  toward China w il l  be t re a te d  in  th e  remaining pages o f  th i s  chap ter.
^Supra. pp. 105-07»
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D isin teg ra tio n  o f th e  N a tio n a lis t 
M ilita ry  Machine
Although th e  N ational Goverment was confronted with many per­
p lexing problems a t  th e  end o f Wbrld War U  and a t  th e  beginning o f th e  
M arshall M ission,^ i t  a lso  had some s ig n if ic a n t  advantages. Dean Acheson, 
speaking before th e  National Press Club in  January, 1950, described th e  
favorab le  aspects o f th e  s i tu a tio n  as follow s:
"Dio broad p ic tu re  i s  th a t  a f t e r  th e  war, Chiang Kai-shek emerged 
as th e  undisputed lea d e r o f  th e  Chinese people. Only one fa c tio n , 
th e  Communists, up i n  th e  h i l l s ,  ill-e q u ip p e d , ragged, a very  small 
m ili ta ry  fo rce , was determ inedly opposed to  h is  p o s itio n . He had 
overwhelming m il i ta ry  power, g re a te r  m ili ta ry  power than  any r u le r  
ever had in  th e  e n tir e  h is to ry  o f  China. He had tremendous economic 
and m ili ta ry  stqpport and backing fmm th e  United S ta te s . He had th e  
acceptance o f  a l l  o th e r fo re ign  co u n tries , id ie ther s in c e re ly  o r  in ­
s in ce re ly  in  th e  case o f th e  Soviet Union i s  no t r e a l ly  m a te ria l 
to  t h i s  m atte r. 3
Ambassador S tu a rt be lieved  th a t  th e  N ational Govenxaent s t i l l  
re ta in ed  a favorab le  p o s itio n  v i s - a -v is  th e  Chinese Communists idien M arshall
^Without question  many o f  C h ina 's unsolved problems were m ili ta ry  
ones. The N ational Government was confronted w ith o th e r  s i tu a t io n s , how­
ever, th a t  were e i th e r  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, o r psychological in  c h a rac te r.
In  some in stan ces th e  m ili ta ry , p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and psychological fa c to rs  
tended to  merge. Where th i s  was tru e  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  id e n tify  th e  
prim ary determ inant i n  th e  development o f  problems so th a t  rem edial a c tio n  
could be taken. A l i s t i n g  o f some o f  th e  ta sk s  to  be undertaken and o f 
some o f  th e  cond itions under ib ic h  thqy were undertaken i s  in d ic a tiv e  o f  
th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and com plexities fac ing  th e  Kuomintang Government: r e ­
p a tr ia t io n  o f  th e  Japanese in  China; occiqiation o f  th e  a reas  l ib e ra te d  from 
th e  Japanese; th e  need f o r  governmental reforms and fo r  in d u s tr ia l ,  a g ri­
c u ltu ra l  and tra n sp o rta tio n  r e h a b i l i ta t io n ;  the  th r e a t  o f  a prolonged c iv i l  
war with th e  Chinese Communists; Soviet occupation o f  Manchuria; acce le r­
a ted  in f la t io n ;  a waivweaiy populace; and a refugee population  accompanied 
by th e  d is lo c a tio n  o f  maiqpower.
^Address on Jan. 12. Bundy ( e d .), p . 177* Wedemeyer agreed with 
Acheson's statem ent th a t  both Chiang Kai-shek and th e  N ational Government 
d id  have popular support on V-J Day and fo r  a period  th e re a f te r .  T es ti­
mony on June 11, 1 9 ^ ,  Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on Foreign 
R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  the  Far E ast. 1951» F t. 3,
2356.
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l e f t  China in  January, 19^7* to  became Secre tary  o f State* In  th is  
connection, he noted th a t :
I t  (N ational Government) was, » * *, th e  le g a lly  recognised 
government o f China with a l l  o f  th e  p re s tig e  and th e  m a te ria l re* 
sources idiich t h i s  implied* I t  had more t e r r i to r y  and la rg e r  arm ies, 
f a r  b e t te r  equipped, and th a t  was supplemented by a navy and an a i r  
fo rce  iddch, however in f e r io r ,  were lack ing  to  th e  o th e r side*
M arshall agreed with S tu a r t 's  analysis*  He s ta te d  in  1951 th a t  th e  Nation­
a l i s t s  were "a t the  very  peak o f th e i r  m ili ta ry  successes and t e r r i t o r i a l  
expansion" when he l e f t  China in  January, 194?*^ The N a tio n a lis ts  in  e a r ly  
1947, according to  M arshall, had more men under aims than  th e i r  opponents. 
Ih e ir  equipment, aims and ammunition were superio r in  q u a li ty  and s u f f i ­
c ie n t in  q u an tity  %hen compared to  th a t  o f th e  Communists*
General M arshall observed, however, t h a t  he had informed th e  
Generalissimo repea ted ly  th a t  th e  N ational Government was weakening i t s e l f  
by i t s  m il i ta ry  campaigns. Qy committing i t s e l f  to  th e  Manchurian and North 
China campaigns, th e  Chinese Government was overextending i t s  l in e s  o f  
supply anH communications. ̂  Another m atter re la te d  to  th e  m il i ta ry  s i tu a t io n  
whinh se rio u s ly  d is tu rb ed  M arshall was th e  d isp ro p o rtio n a te  p e r cent o f th e
4stuart, p . 209.
■5a study o f  th e  maps on pp. 277-81 re v e a ls  th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
g radually  extended t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l  co n tro l th ro u ^ o u t  China proper W iile 
M arshall was in  China except fo r  th e  North China province o f Chahar. Ihe 
Chinese Communists o cc iç ied  th e  North China province between Aug. 15, 1945, 
and Jan. 15, 1946, and completed t h e i r  conquest o f  most o f  Manchuria befo re  
M arshall re tu rned  to  th e  United S ta te s  in  Ja n ., 1947.
^estim oqy  o f  May 11-12, 1951, before th e  Senate Committees 
on Aimed Services and on Foreign B ela tions, Hear i ngs. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  
In  thm Far fo s t .  1951, P t .  1 , 548-49$ 659-60. Acheson in  a  statem ent on 
■Tmiia ii, 195^, ‘suppoitad M arsh a ll 's  p o s itio n  and added th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts ' 
m il i ta iy  v ic to r ie s  were harmful in  both th e  m il i ta iy  and p o l i t i c a l  sense*
The O iinese Government, Acheson noted, had n e ith e r  th e  troops to  g a rriso n  
th e  captured a reas nor th e  ad m in istra to rs  to  govern them. Ib id . . 1951-,
P t. 3. 1852.
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Government's budget which was a llo ca ted  fo r  m ili ta ry  purposes* In  th is  
connection M arshall to ld  Chiang Kai-shek on December 1, 1946, th a t  th e  
m il i ta ry  e f fo r t  o f  th e  Government "was consuming about seventy p e r cent" 
o f  th e  budget. F u rthe r, M arshall sa id , t h i s  development con tribu ted  to  
increased  in f la t io n  a t  th e  tim e th a t  th e  Govenment was seeking loans from 
th e  United S ta te s . Ihere  was, in  M arsh a ll 's  view, th e  th re a t  o f economic 
exhaustion. He to ld  Chiang th a t  un less m ili ta ry  expenditures were reduced 
th e  economy would probably co llap se  before the  N a tio n a lis ts  destroyed th e  
Communists.^ M a rsh a ll 's  counsel on both p o in ts—m ili ta ry  overextension and 
heavy expenditures f o r  the  armed fo rces  i n  p roportion  to  t o ta l  spending— 
did  no t d e te r  Chiang, however, from subsequent m il i ta ry  ventures.®
The N a tio n a lis t m il i ta ry  v ic to r ie s  during th e  period  o f th e  M arshall 
M ission proved to  be spurious ones a s  M arshall had p red ic ted . Defensive 
maneuvers and g u e r r i l la  t a c t i c s  o f th e  Chinese Communists in  1946 and e a rly  
194-7 developed g radually  in to  a  general o ffen siv e  in  l a t e  1947 and 1948.
E sta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 211- 12. Chiang 
Kai-shek re je c ted  M arsh a ll 's  an a ly sis  o f  th e  m il i ta ry  s i tu a tio n , and, 
according to  th e  co lm n  o f  a  New T ort Urnes correspondent, Chiang remained 
hi ^ ly  c o n fid o it t h a t  Govenment fo rces  would d e fea t th e  Communists. The 
correspondent, Henry R. Lieberman, sa id  Chiang estim ated  in  S ep t., 1947, 
th a t  i t  would "probably tak e  from s ix  months to  a year" f o r  th e  N ational­
i s t s  to  "suppress" th e  Communists. New York Times. S ^ t .  11, 1947, p . 1?.
O
A prominent Chinese a n a ly is t  o f  economic conditions in  China 
viewed th e  p roportion  o f  m ili ta ry  to  t o t a l  spending as being d e s tru c tiv e  
o f  any attem pt to  s t a b i l i s e  th e  economy o f  h is  homeland. He believed , 
however, th a t  M arsh a ll 's  f ig u re  o f 70 p e r cent was too h i ^ .  Chang Kiam 
Ngau, using  s t a t i s t i c s  compiled by th e  Chinese M in istry  o f  Finance, s ta te d  
th a t  th e  m ili ta ry  expenditures f o r  th e  y e a r 1946 cosqprlsed 59*9 p e r cen t o f 
th e  t o t a l  ou tlay . He added th a t  th e  1 9 ^  f ig u re  compared favorably  w ith th e  
1941-1944- average o f  60 p e r cent fo r  m il i ta ry  spending. Chang fh r th e r  
noted, however, t h a t  th e  e n t i r e  a w  a llo c a te d  in  th e  1946 budget f o r  m ili­
ta ry  purposes was spent in  f iv e  months due to  renewed m ili ta ry  c lashes 
re s u ltin g  from th e  breakdown in  n eg o tia tio n s between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and 
th e  Chinese C om unists. Chang Kia^Ngau, pp. 155-56.
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The Mandate o f  Heaven began to  s l ip  from Chiang K ai-shek 's grasp as the  
N a tio n a lis t fo rces proved incapable o f  stopping th e  advance o f Mao T se-tung 's  
tro o p s .^  January 1, 19^9, the  Communists had captured severa l s tra te g ic  
Manchurian and China proper c i t i e s ,  includ ing  Chinchow, Ssupingchieh, Chang­
chun, Mukden, Tsinan and Hsuchow. S hortly  a f te r  th e  key North China c i ty  
o f  T ien ts in  f e l l  [January 15J th e  Generalissimo r e t i r e d ,  and Li Tsung-jen 
assumed the  d u tie s  o f P residen t in  accordance with th e  c o n s titu tio n  adopted 
on December 25, 19^*  Li immediately began n eg o tia tio n s  with th e  Communists 
to  "d iscuss peace arrangem ents," but found th a t  Mao Tse-tung equated "negoti­
a tio n "  with "unconditional s u r r e n d e r . W h e n  th e  co n su lta tio n s co llapsed , 
th e  Communist fo rces  crossed the  Yangtze River on A p ril 20, drove south 
and captured Nanking and S h an ^ a i w ith in  a few days. The N a tio n a lis t m ili­
ta ry  machine d is in te g ra te d  Wien th e  Communists crossed  the  Yangtze River. ̂
^Maps on p p .261-84. in d ic a te  th e  ex tsn ^ o n  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  co n tro l 
by th e  Communists during th e  period  Jan . 15, 1947-Mar. 19, 19^*
^ ( ^ o  Tso-tung' s p roposals f o r  peace were e i ^ t  in  number and 
ca lled  fo r abeütdfn of th e  c o n s titu tio n  o f  Dec. 25, 19^6, punishment o f war 
c rim ina ls  [including  Chiang K ai-shek), and displacem ent o f th e  Kuomintang 
govenment by one o f th e  Communists. These conditions were f i r s t  proposed 
by Mao in  a statem ent e n ti t le d  "On Peace in  China" on Jan. 14, 1949. T h ^  
were adopted in  th e  form o f a re so lu tio n  by the  C en tra l Committee o f the  
Chinese Communist P arty  in  mid-March, 1949, and given to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
on Apr. 15* The re so lu tio n  embodying th e  Communist demands, and o th er 
p e r tin e n t re so lu tio n s  o f th e  C entral Committee a re  tre a te d  in  Brandt and 
O thers, pp. 440-45*
^Wedemeyer s ta te d  on June 11, 1951* th a t  he believed th e  primazy 
reason fo r  th e  m il i ta ry  d e fea t o f th e  Government's fo rces  was "lack o f 
s p i r i t . " "In my jud g n en t," he noted, "thqy could have defended th e  Yangtze 
River w ith broom sticks i f  they  had th e  w il l  to  do i t . "  Senate Committees 
on Aimed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita rv  S itu a tio n  i n  
th e  Far Ehst. 1951# F t. 3, 2329* Ambassador S tu a rt, vho was in  Nanking 
Wien th e  Communists crossed th e  Yangtze, observed th a t  th e  e ffec tiv en ess  
o f  N a tio n a lis t opposition  to  th e  c ro ssing  o f  th e  r iv e r  was destroyed by 
" p o l i t ic a l  b ickering , d ese rtio n s  o r  b e tra y a ls , [and) d iso rd e rly  r e t r e a ts ."  
S tu a r t, p . 242.
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A lth o u ^  several, a d d itio n a l b a t t le s  were f o u ^ t ,  the  Communists occupied 
most o f  th e  remainder o f  China during th e  summer and early  fa ll*  The 
N a tio n a lis ts , th o ro u ^ ly  defeated , r e t i r e d  to  Foraosa and e stab lish ed  th e  
c a p i ta l  o f  th e  Republic o f China a t  T aipei.
The Government's con tro l o f th e  China mainland had been ended.
Ih is  i s  unquestioned. D iversity  o f  opinion a r is e s  only when one seeks 
to  analyze the  reasons fo r  th i s  development. I t  would indeed be a tenuous 
th e s is  to  contend th a t  th e  Government co llapsed  so le ly  because o f i t s  m il i ­
ta ry  d e fe a ts . One can not properly  deny, however, th a t  th e  downfall o f  th e  
N a tio n a lis ts  was hastened by th e i r  f r l l u r e  on th e  b a t t le f ie ld .  Ihus, th e  
f i e ld  o f  combat— ju s t  l ik e  th e  conference tabl& —must be weighed as one o f 
th e  components o f  th e  c o n f l ic t  in  China. Ih is  assessment i s  a r e la t iv e  one 
and ra is e s  severa l questions. In  so f a r  as m ilita rism  le d  to  th e  co llap se  
o f th e  N a tio n a lis ts , to  what ex ten t d id  they  co n tribu te  to  th e i r  own down- 
f e l l?  Were C hiang's fo rces  overwhelmed by la rg e r  armies o r  were thqy o u t-  
maneuvered and o u tfo u ^ t?  Did th e  N ational Government lack  aims, ammuni­
t io n  and equipment o r  d id  i t  unwisely use th a t  irtiich i t  had? Were the  
N a tio n a lis ts  betrayed o r  d id  they d i lu te  th e i r  own streng th  th ro u ^  de­
fection?^^
•̂ ■̂ One m ust, in  assessing  th e  reasons f o r  the  Government's f a l l ,  
a lso  tak e  in to  account th e  m ilitax y  s tra te g y  and ta c t ic s  o f  th e  Communists: 
i s o la t io n  o f  N a tio n a lis t  garrisons in  c i t i e s ;  d es tru c tio n  o f  l in e s  o f  com­
m unications to  N a tio n a lis t-h e ld  c i t i e s ;  th e  use o f g u e r r i l la  t a c t i c s  w hile 
Communi s t  fo rces were anal! and poorly  equipped; enqihasis upon d e s tru c tio n  
o f  N a tio n a lis t s tren g th  ra th e r  than  iq>on se izu re  o f te rz ito z y ; and, in  
general, avoidance o f  d ec is iv e , show-down b a t t le s  u n t i l  1946-1949. For 
thorough treatm ent o f t h i s  su b jec t, see l iu ,  pp. 250-53; a lso , Bdwaid L. 
Katzenbacfa and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Bevolutlonazy S tra tegy  o f Mao Tse- 
tung ,"  P o l i t ic a l  Science Oiia r ta r ly . LXX (S ep t., 1955), 325-30. I t  has a lso  
been charged th a t  th e  U. S. " lo s t"  China to  th e  Communists. The au thor 
has t r e a te d  and w il l  continue to  t r e a t  th i s  m atte r thzrou^ p e rtin e n t re fe iv  
ences zrather than  th z o u ^  sp e c ific  d iv is io n s  o f  the  work.
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Chiang K ai-shek 's t o t a l  m ili ta ry  fo rce  was never outnumbered by 
th a t  o f  the  Communists during th e  M arshall M ission. Qie aggregate manpower 
streng th  o f  the  N a tio n a lis ts  versus th e  Communists d id  p ro p o rtio n a te ly  
decrease during t h i s  period , bu t th e  Government s t i l l  h e ld  an edge in  troop 
to ta l s  o f 3,000,000 to  1,500,000 in  December, 1946. I t  was only a f t e r  
M arshall l e f t  China in  January, 194?, and then  n#t u n t i l  th e  w in ter o f 
1948-1949» th a t  th e  manpower su p e rio rity  o f  the  combatants was reversed .
The N a tio n a lis ts  had alm ost a  th ree  to  one numerical su p e rio rity  idien 1948 
began but overwhelming lo sse s  in  a fo u r and on»>half months period  (mid- 
September, 1948-January, 1949) re su lte d  in  a  Communist s iq )e rio rity  in  combat 
e ffe c tiv e s  o f one and on»<half to  one by February 1, 1949. A dditional heavy 
lo sse s  fu r th e r  decreased N a tio n a lis t marpower from 1,500,000 (includ ing  
500,000 serv ice  troops) on February 1, 1949* to  an estim ated  880,000 men in  
e a rly  May, 1949.^^ The Communists met l i t t l e  re s is ta n c e  th e re a f te r ,  and 
th e  Govenment reached i t s  n a d ir  o f manpower streng th  when th e  Republic o f 
China was es tab lish ed  on Formosa with an estim ated 500,000 troops.
In  so f a r  as th e  N a tio n a lis ts  m i l i t a r i ly  con tribu ted  to  t h e i r  own 
d ec lin e  and d e fe a t, one must look beyond th e  mere number o f  men under arms
l^The r e la t iv e  s tren g th  o f th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and the  Communists fo r  
Dec., 1946, i s  based on testim ony o f M arshall on May 12, 1951, befo re  th e  
Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. 
Military Situation th a  Far Bast. 1951, F t . 1 , 659» Other s t a t i s t i c s  a re  
estim ates o f  the  U. S. Dq>artment o f  th e  Army and a re  c ite d  in  S ta te  Depart­
ment, U. S. R elations with China, pp. 322- 23.
S ., Department o f  S ta te , The Renuhiio o f  China. Department o f 
S ta te  P ub lica tion  No. 6844-, Far E astern S e ries  81 (Washington: Ü. S. 
Govenment P rin tin g  O ffice , 1959), p . 1 . The Goverment m aintained th a t  
i t  had lo s t  i t s  manpower su p e rio rity  (2,180,000) over th e  Communists 
( 2, 600, 000) by June, 1948, whereas th e  Communists contended th a t  th e  
N a tio n a lis ts  s t i l l  h e ld  a 1 .3 :1  advantage (3,650,000 to  2,800,000) as o f 
th a t  d a te . Communist s t a t i s t i c s  revealed , however, t h a t  t h e i r  own fo rces 
had gained a 0 .3 :1  le a d  (1,490,000 to  4,000,000) by June, 1949. H u , 
p . 254.
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and in  ^ e c i f i c  b a t t le s .  S tra te g ic  and t a c t i c a l  m istakes and th e  lack  o f  
coordination  o f command channels c o n s titu te d  se rio u s l im ita t io n s . Viola,- 
t io n s  o f o rders , f a i lu r e  to  ex p lo it t h e i r  advantage o f  a i r  and naval supe­
r io r ity  and to  provide proper tra in in g  f o r  r e c ru i ts  a lso  were s ig n if ic a n t 
hindrances to  th e  success o f  the  Goverment. Another primary weakness o f  
th e  N a tio n a lis ts  was th e i r  inadequate grasp o f lo g is t i c  requirem ents.
Thou^ i t  i s  im portant to  take  these  weaknesses in to  account when analyzing 
th e  N a tio n a lis t co llap se , i t  i s  a lso  izqw rtan t to  keep two a d d itio n a l 
p o in ts  in  mind. F i r s t ,  th e  Government's m ili ta ry  p o s itio n  was im paired by 
a m ultitude  o f  fa c to rs , and th e  d e b il i ta t in g  e f fe c t  o f  th e  c o n s titu en ts , 
s in g u la rly  and jo in t ly ,  gained s treng th  from each o th e r . Second, many o f  
th e se  defec ts  were apparent during th e  M arshall M ission, and th e  Americans 
brought them to  th e  G eneralissim o's a t te n tio n . I t  was only a f t e r  th e  Ameri­
can m ediation e f fo r t  was ended, however, th a t  th e  t o t a l  impact o f  th e  weak­
nesses was f e l t .
Some prominent United S ta te s  o f f i c i a l s  c o n s is te n tly  m aintained 
th a t  th e  National Goverment made i t s  basic  m istake ju s t  as World War I I  
was term inated. The Chinese Goverment, i t  was contended, emphasized th e  
n e ce ss ity  o f accomplishing \* a t  was considered to  be a  "m ilita ry  im possib il­
i t y " —the  ejqoeditions occupation o f Manchuria and North China. M a r^ a ll  
a d ^ s e d  Chiang in  1946 th a t  th e  undertaking would f a i l  because th e  Govern­
ment could no t keep th e  sipp ly  l in e s  open in  so v a s t an a rea . Major General 
David Barr supported th i s  view two years l a t e r .  "The hopelessness o f th e  
s i tu a t io n  in  Manchuria" le d  Barr to  urge Chiang to  withdraw h is  troops from 
th a t  area  in  March, 1946. Chiang Kai-shek ramalned convinced th ro u ^ o u t 
1946, however, th a t  th e  p lan  was sound. And M arshall s t i l l  believed  sev era l 
y ears  l a t e r  th a t  he had c o rre c tly  assessed  th e  N a tio n a lis t 's  basic  weakness.
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[N a tio n a lis ts ]  wrecked them selves, " M arshall sa id  in  1951» by attem p­
tin g  a "m ilita ry  ia q w ss ib ili ty  . • • . th^y f e l l ,  you m i^ t  say, o f  t h e i r  
own w e i^ t .
Chiang Kai-shek changed h is  views on s tra te g y  in  e a rly  1 9 ^ ,  bu t 
th i s  development came too l a t e  to  stem th e  Communist advance. In  f a c t ,  th e  
G eneralissim o's rev ised  judgment was made a f t e r  he had re linqu ished  th e  
presidency. Chiang had r e t i r e d  in  January, 19^9, and Id Tsung-j en had 
assumed con tro l o f  th e  N ational Govemnent. Retirement fo r  Chiang, however, 
meant only th e  o f f i c i a l  renunciation  o f  co n tro l. His in fluence  was s t i l l  
g re a te r  among th e  m il i ta ry  fo rces  and th e  bureaucracy than th a t  of Id . Id 
was denied th e  resources he needed—monqy, m il i ta ry  personnel, m il i ta ry  sup­
p l ie s ,  and a u n ifie d  command. In  essence, then. Id Tsung-jen had re sp o n sib il­
i t y  fo r  th e  Government, but he d id  no t have a u th o rity  to  use a l l  i t s  
resou rces. Prospects fo r  a  concerted  N a tio n a lis t e f fo r t  were a lso  d e a l t  
a se rious setback by a clash  in  s tra teg y —Id urged a stand ag a in st th e  Com­
m unists in  South China w hile Chiang advocated th e  use o f Formosa as a b astio n  
from vfaich to  continue th e  f ig h t .
There were confusion and lack  o f  u n ity  in  th e  N a tio n a lis t camp, 
a development idiich in  p a r t  may be a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e re  were
^^These views o f  Marshall and Barr a re  recorded in  th e  May 14 and 
June 22, 1951, t r a n s c r ip ts  o f  hearings before th e  Senate Committees on 
Anted Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings^ M j^ntary S itu a tio n  in  
th e  Far E ast. 1951, P ts . 1 and 4, r e ^ e c t iv e ly ,  pp. 688 and 2961. M arsh a ll's  
opinion was a lso  supported by Acheson on June 7. 1951, i n  ib id . .  P t. 3,
2145. Barr, sen io r o f f ic e r  o f th e  U. S. Army Advisory M ission in  1948, 
became d ire c to r  o f  th e  Jo in t  United S ta te s  M ilita ry  Advisory Group in  l a t e  
1948.
^^Based on observations o f  Ambassador S tu a r t, General Barr and F. F. 
Liu, th e  Chinese m il i ta ry  h is to r ia n . See S tu a r t, pp. 216-17, 227-28;
B a rr 's  re p o rt to  Secretary  Acheson in  e a rly  1949, p rin te d  in  p a r t  in  S ta te  
Department, Ü. S. R elations with China, p. 336; and Idu, pp. 265-67,
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two heads o f s ta te  In  1949—one o f f i c i a l ,  th e  o th er u n o f f ic ia l .  The con­
fusion  and d isu n ity  were m anifest in  o th e r ways, however, and even before 
Chiang Kai-shek r e t i r e d  as p re s id en t. C hiang's extreme lo y a lty  to  graduates 
o f Whampoa M ilita ry  Academy helped to  in te n s ify  th e  schism which had p re ­
v a ile d  among th e  m ili ta ry  o f f ic e rs  fo r  a long tim e. The Generalissimo demoiv 
s tra te d  h is  favortism  to  members o f th e  Whampoa Group in  severa l ways:
(1) they  received choice s t a f f  and f i e ld  appointm ents, (2) Chiang de fe rred  
to  t h e i r  advice, and (3) non-Whampoa genera ls  were given low supply p r io r i ­
t i e s .  Non-Whaapoa generals strong ly  resen ted  th ese  p ra c tic e s  hy Chiang 
because they  believed  he made h is  dec is ions on th e  b a s is  o f personal and 
p o l i t i c a l  considera tions ra th e r  than on th a t  o f m ili ta ry  competence.
As d e b il i ta t in g  to  th e  M ilita ry  e f fo r t  as th ese  p ra c tic e s  were, 
th e  di^arm ony and in ep titu d e  were compounded by a d d itio n a l developments. 
C on flic ting  d ire c tiv e s  were p a r t ic u la r ly  d is ru p tiv e . I t  was not uncommon 
f o r  f i e ld  commanders to  g e t d ivergent o rd ers  on th e  same b a t t l e  p lan  from 
th e  Generalissimo, th e  M in ister o f  Defense, and th e  Supreme General S ta f f .  
Coordinated e f fo r ts  were fu r th e r  h indered vhen Chiang issued  o p e ra tio n a l 
o rd ers  w ithout in fo m in g  th e  M in ister o f  Defense o r  th e  Supreme General
^^Views o f  th e  non-Whampoa generals were supported hy severa l promi­
nen t a u th o r i t ie s  w ith eaqperlence in  China. For example, see S tu a r t 's  
re p o rt to  M arshall on Aug. 10, 1948, and B a rr 's  rep o rt in  e a r ly  1949, to  
S ecre tary  o f  S ta te , r e ^ e c t iv e ly ,  in  S ta te  Department. Ü. S. R elations with 
China. Annex l 6 l ,  p . 885 and p . 337. A lso, E b rr 's  testim ony on June 22,
1951# in  Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign B ela tions, Hear- 
i y s .  M iy ty rv  Si tu a t io n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 4, 3024; l iu ,  pp. 244- 
4^, 2^1- 63.  D irec tly  re la te d  to  t h i s  p o in t was th e  contention  o f C h 'ien  
Tuan-dieng th a t  a  p o l i t ic a l- m i l i ta r y  s tru g g le  was being waged to  secure 
co n tro l o f  th e  Govemmoit. He s ta te d  th a t  th e  lead e rs  o f  th e  Vbampoa Group 
had "always adopted p o l i t i c s  a s  th e i r  p ro fessio n  ra th e r  than  a c tiv e  m ili­
ta ry  command." f a r th e r ,  he noted, th e  b a t t l e  was in c e ssa n tly  waged ly  th e  
Whampoa Group, th e  C. C. Clique and the  P o l i t ic a l  Science Clique. C h 'ien  
Tuan-sheng, pp. 129-32.
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S ta f f  th a t  he had done so.^®
The d iso rd e r in  the  high command was a lso  p reva len t in  the  f ie ld ,  
and the  confusion can be a ttr ib u te d  in  p a r t  to  th e  c o n flic tin g  o rders t h ^  
received . F ie ld  commanders were confused as to  which d ire c tiv e  to  implement. 
Commanding generals added to  the  chao tic  cond itions, however, by sending 
ambiguous in s tru c tio n s  to  o ther u n i ts .  General Barr described  one o f these  
in s tan ces  in  which th e  p r in c ip a l f ig u re  was General Wei lA-huang, the  g a rr i­
son commander a t  Mukden. In  early  October, 1948, th e  C am unists had en­
c irc le d  th e  N ationalist-occup ied  c i ty  o f  Changchun (north  e a s t o f Mukden] 
and were exerting  strong  pressure  on th e  N a tio n a lis ts  p o s itio n s  south o f 
Mukden. The Generalissimo ordered Wei Li-huang to  a tta c k  westward from 
Mukden in  o rder to  r e l ie v e  the  Communist p ressu re  fu r th e r  south. Wei L i- 
huang delayed h is  o ffen s iv e  opera tion  th ir te e n  days and sen t confusing 
in s tru c tio n s  to  th e  Changchun g a rriso n . The Changchun commander was 
in s tru c te d  to  break ou t o f  th e  Communist encirclem ent by mounting an a ssa u lt 
"immediately befo re , during  o r immediately a f te r "  h i s  (Wei Li-huang] a ttac k  
was launched. Barr d id  no t d isc lo se  idiat the  Changchun g a rriso n  d id , but 
lA atever i t  was proved to  be in e f fe c tiv e . Changchun cap itu la te d  eleven 
days a f t e r  Wei Li-huang in i t i a t e d  h is  o ffensive .
The o v e ra ll N a tio n a lis t p o s it io n  was a lso  weakened hy th e i r  pro­
longed re lia n c e  upon defensive measures. This was p a r t ic u la r ly  tru e  where 
th e  Communists a ttacked  c i t i e s  tdiich th e  N a tio n a lis ts  had committed them­
se lves to  g a rriso n . Goverment troops dug in  w ith in  th e  c i ty  w alls and 
w aited fo r  r e l i e f  to  come. Indec ision , in ac tio n , in e p titu d e  and demoralize^ 
t io n  permeated th e  ranks o f  b a t t le  u n i ts  in  l a t e  1948 and throughout 1949.
Iflfiarr^s re p o r t  i n  early  1949 to  Secretary  o f  S ta te  in  S ta te  Depart­
ment, Ü. St Belatioioa w ith China, p . 330. Also Liu, pp. 258-59.
p .  3 3 3 ,
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Carsiin Chang has v iv id ly  described th e  s i tu a t io n  as i t  ex is ted  in  ^ r i l -  
May, 1949* He sa id  th a t  the  V ice-M inister o f  th e  M in istry  o f  Defense and 
the  Deputy Chief o f  S ta f f  to ld  him th a t :
Ihey (Goverment troops] kqpt w ith in  th e  c i ty .  A fte r a few 
days' f ig h tin g , they  sen t telegram s asking fo r  reinforcem ents 
• • . • When th e  commander o f th e  am y o f reinforcem ents received 
th e  o rd er to  go, he o ffe red  th e  excuse th a t  he must w ait t i l l  h is  
supplies o f  food and ammunition were brought up to  th e  proper le v e l .
I t  would be many days, th e re fo re , before th e  reinforcem ents got under 
way. Qsr the  tim e t h ^  a rriv ed  a t  t h s i r  d e s tin a tio n , th e  am y defend­
ing  th e  c i ty  had a lready  been beaten h7 th e  Communists, and so th e  
am y th a t  had been sen t in  by way o f  reinforcem ent simply jo ined  
in  th e  surrender. That was how i t  accomplished i t s  m ission o f 
reinforcem ent 120
Prolonged N a tio n a lis t m il i ta ry  re s is ta n c e  was fu r th e r  weakened 
by th e  unw illingness o r  th e  in a b i l i ty  o f th e  troops to  f ig h t .  According 
to  Major General Barr, Chinese so ld ie rs  were poorly  fed  and paid , f r e ­
quently  inadequately  tra in e d , and became d is illu s io n e d  o f  ever being d is ­
charged. Defection and d ese rtio n  weakened th e  p ressu re  th a t  could be 
brought on a l l  f ro n ts  and thereby h u r t  th e  m il i ta ry  c a p a b ili ty  o f th e  u n i ts  
th a t  otherw ise could have f o u ^ t  successfu l engagements. ̂
20carsun Chang, p. 240. Ihe Nationalist reliance upon the defense 
of c it ie s  has been variously c la ssified  as the "walledmcity complex,” "wall 
psychology,” and "positional warfare.” See Truman, U , 89; Barr's te s t i­
mony of June 22, 19$L, in  Senate Committees on Amed Services and on Foreign 
Relations, Hearings. M ilitary Situation in  the Far East. 1951f Pt. 4, 2977: 
and lAu, p. 254*
2lB arr a lso  s ta te d  th a t  he had l i t t l e  success in  tra in in g  th e  Chi­
nese m ili ta ry  to  stoclqpile m unitions and food. Testimony o f  June 22, 1951» 
in  Senate Committees on Amed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, H earings. 
M in ta rv  s i tu a t io n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. P t. 4, 2969, 2983, 3023-24. 
Wedemeyer agreed with B a rr 's  statem ents r e la t iv e  to  th e  lo g is t ic s  problem. 
Wedemeyer's testim ony o f  June 11, 1951» in  i b i d . . P t. 3» 2329. Ih is  m atte r 
o f  lo g is t ic s  was th e  sub jec t o f  a heated  controversy between Barr and Admiral 
Oscar Charles Badger. Badger was a  ranking naval commander in  th e  P a c if ic  
during Wbrld War U ,  was responsib le  f o r  naval dem obilisation  and c lo s in g  
up naval bases a f t e r  World War U ,  and was commander o f  U. S. naval fo rce s  
in  th e  Western P a c if ic  from Dec., 1947, to  O ct., 1949. Badger contended 
th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  l o s t  many b a t t le s  because o f  inadequacy o f svq}plies 
due to  slow American shipm ents, and Barr countered with Ûie statem ent th a t
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The American M ilita ry  C ontribution 
In troduction
Aaerican m ili ta ry  course o f  ac tio n  toward China during th e  
period  December, 194^1949, was c a rr ie d  out in  severa l fonas and was based 
on both executive and le g is la t iv e  a c ts . Some phases o f  th e  China program 
were completed w hile M arshall was in  China, while o th ers  were in i t i a t e d  
during th e  M arshall M ission and continued a f t e r  th e  m ediation e f fo r t  had 
ended. In  a d d itio n , some American measures o f  a ss is ta n c e  were both i n i t i a t ­
ed and implemented a f t e r  th e  M arshall M ission had been term ina Led.
I t  ^ o u ld  be noted a t  t h i s  p o in t, however, th a t  th e re  was one ta sk  
th a t  th e  United S ta te s  Government was not w illin g  to  undertake in  o rd er to  
implement i t s  p o licy  toward China. N either th e  executive nor the  l e g is la t iv e  
branch endorsed th e  commitment o f American troops to  th e  s tru g g le  in  China. 
That i s ,  American tro o p s were never used on th e  b a t t l e f i e ld ,  ̂  nor were 
o f f ic e rs  o r  e n lis te d  men au thorized  to  lead  o r  advise Chinese u n its  w hile 
in  combat. Eveiy m il i ta ry  d ire c tiv e  issu ed  a f t e r  General S t i lw e ll ' s r e l i e f  
in  1944 contained th e  p rov ision  th a t  American troops would not be used to
no b a t t l e  was l o s t  by Chiang*s fo rces  during h is  year in  China due to  th e  
lack  o f  ammunition o r  equipment. To th e  con tra ry , he noted, the  N ational­
i s t s  " l i t e r a l ly  l e f t  hundreds o f  thousands o f  tons o f  ammunition" a t  
SanQ>ingchieh [Mar. 12, 1948) and a t  Tsinan [Sept. 23-24, 1948). Comments 
by Badger on June 19, 195L» in  ib id . ,  P t . 4, 2728, 2762 and by Barr on 
June 22, 1951, in  i b i d . , pp. 296O , 2986- 87.
^ A s  in d ic a te d  by General Wedemeyer, however, some " f r ic t io n "  d id  
develop idien American f a c i l i t i e s  were used to  redeploy N a tio n a lis t troops 
a f t e r  Wbrld War H  to  occupy areas l ib e ra te d  from th e  Japanese. Supra, pp. 
74. 75.  • M arshall re fe r re d  to  one in c id e n t in  which he sa id  the  Chinese 
Communists a ttacked  a  convoy in  1946 enroute from Peiping to  T ien ts in .
Testimony o f  May 11, 1951, in  Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on 
Foreign R elations, H earings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far East. 1951, F t.
1, 543.
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support th e  " f r a t r i c id a l  war" in  China.
"Die A dm in is tra tion 's unw illingness to  m i l i t a r i ly  in te rvene  in  China 
was in  accord with t r a d i t io n a l  American p o licy . In  ad d itio n , th e  United 
S ta te s  had committed i t s e l f  in  l a t e  19^5 to  mediate th e  d ispu te  between the  
N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists, and m ediation and m ili ta ry  in te rv en tio n  
were incom patible. Though the  term ina tion  o f m ediation in  19^7 removed one 
ob stac le  to  m ili ta ry  in te rv en tio n  i f  th e  Americans had so desired , the  United 
S ta te s  never reversed  th e  p o s itio n  i t  had taken a t  th e  end o f Vforld War I I .  
That i s .  th e  United S ta te s  re je c te d  th e  th e s is  th a t  C hina's d i f f i c u l t i e s  
could be solved fay m il i ta ry  means.
M a r^ a ll  was a lso  concerned about th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  th e  Soviet 
Union would make strong accusations regarding any prolonged presence o f 
American troops in  China. With th i s  i n  mind, he wrote P resident Truman in  
e a r ly  1 9 ^  th a t  th e  China Theater o f  O perations should be replaced fay a 
m il i ta ry  advisory group. Such a c tio n , th e  Ambassador noted. A ould be taken 
" in  o rder to  avoid th e  in e v ita b le  Russian rec rim in a tio n s” s im ila r to  those 
made fay th e  Soviets ag a in s t the  use o f B ritish  troops in  Greece. M arshall 
added th a t  a t  some fu tu re  da te , when conditions warranted such a c tio n , the  
United S ta te s  should evacuate a l l  m arines from China except tra n sp o rta tio n , 
reconnaissance and lo c a l  guard u n its .
The Ambassador's appraisal, o f  what th e  United S ta te s  should do was 
a r e a l i s t i c  assessment o f  i t s  m il i ta ry  c ^ a b i l i t y  a t  th e  tim e. I t  was h i ^ l y  
u n lik e ly  th a t  American pub lic  opinion would have siqiported the  su b s ta n tia l
^3supra. Chapter I I ,  n. 77. The laist se rious e f fo r t  to  modify 
A dm inistration p o licy  on th i s  p o in t was made during congressional debates 
on th e  China Aid in  1948, and i t  f a i le d .  Supra, pp. 158-60»
^^*Truman, H ,  77» M arsh a ll's  d ispatch  was dated  Feb. 9.
181
use o f  United S ta te s  aimed fo rces on the  Chinese mainland. Pressure fo r  
dem obilization had been so g rea t th a t  approximately seven m illio n  men had 
been discharged from th e  aimy by m ld - i^ r l l ,  1946. According to  P residen t 
Truman, t h i s  was th e  "most remarkable dem obilization In  th e  h is to ry  o f th e  
world, o r  'd is in te g ra tio n , ' I f  you want to  c a l l  I t  th a t .
I t  had been necessary  to  s ta tio n  some American troops on arr’ near 
th e  China mainland a f t e r  V-J Day u n t i l  I t  was detezmlned how the  Jaoar.cae 
would re a c t  to  su rrender tezms. As soon as th i s  detezm lnatlon was made, the  
number o f  American m il i ta iy  personnel In  China was d ra s t ic a l ly  reduced. 
According to  P residen t Truman the  United S ta te s  m il i ta iy  fo rce  In  China was 
reduced from I t s  peak streng th  o f 113,000 so ld ie rs , s a i lo r s  and marines In  
l a t e  1943 to  le s s  than 12,000 In  December, 1946. Ih ls  number was fu r th e r  
reduced when th e  m arines were withdrawn In  th e  summer o f 194? and when th e  
m ili ta ry  advisory m issions were term inated In  l a t e  1948.
Technical A ssistance 
Bie United S ta te s  a s s is te d  th e  N ational Govemnent tv».rough a
% b ^ .  I ,  509* For an a n a ly s is  o f dem obilization from V-J Day 
to  Jan. 8 , 1946, see supra, pp. 67- 70. According to  a pub lic  opinion samp­
lin g  re leased  Dec. I 5, 1948, ly  th e  American I n s t i tu te  o f  Public Opinion 
[Galliqi P o ll) ,  21 p e r cen t o f those Interview ed had not "heard o r  read 
about th e  c iv i l  war In  China," and 20 p e r cent o f  the  79 p e r cent who were 
Infoimed on th i s  p o in t d id  not know lA ether th e  N a tio n a lis ts  were winning 
o r  lo s in g . Only 45 p e r  cent o f those  who had heard o f th e  c iv i l  war thought, 
th a t  th e  f l u t i n g  In  China was a " re a l th re a t"  to  world peace. Mildred 
Strunk (ed .y , "The Q u a rte r 's  P o lls ,"  Public Opinion Q uartorly- XTTT (Spring,
1949), 158.
^ S t a t e  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 114, p . 694. 
R ^ . A. J .  Sabath o f  I l l i n o i s ,  Chairman o f  th e  House Rules Committee, s t i l l  
d id  not b e liev e  th a t  th e  U. S. had gone f a r  en o u ^ . In  a  l e t t e r  to  P residen t 
Truman on Aug. I 7 , 1946, he urged th e  P residen t to  withdraw a l l  troops from 
(M na. The s i tu a tio n  In  China, Sabath noted, was a grave one, f r a u ^ t  "with 
p e rilo u s  and explosive p o te n t ia l i t i e s ,"  and th e  re te n tio n  o f  American troops 
In  O dna was not l ik e ly  "to co n trib u te  to  p a c if ic a tio n  o f  th e  country. "
From The Papers o f  Harry S. Truman, Box 0-768, Folder 150-Mlscellanoous 
(1945-1946), Harry S. Trtman l ib ra ry , Independwce, Mo.
182
v a r ie ty  o f  tec h n ic a l a ss is ta n c e  measure*' and services* American troops 
aided in  disaxming and r ^ a t r l a t i n g  th e  Japanese* N a tio n a lis t fo rces  were 
tran sp o rted  in  American p lanes and sh ips to  occ'jpy th e  a reas l ib e ra te d  from 
th e  Japanese* American m arines performed numerous guard duties* United 
S ta te s  o f f i c ia l s —p a r t ic u la r ly  Marshall* S tu a rt* ' Robertson and Qyroade— 
a s s is te d  in  arranging  and implementing temporary tru c e s  between th e  combat­
an ts  during th e  M arshall M i s s i o n * M a r s h a l l  advised th e  M ilita ry  Sub­
committee (created by th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative Conference) in  i t s  attem pt 
to  dev ise  an a c c s ta b le  p lan  fo r  th e  reo rgan iza tion  and in te g ra tio n  o f  th e  
Chinese armies* And fo r  over two years United S ta te s  Army* Navy and A ir 
Force personnel worked through o f f i c i a l ly  es tab lish ed  miachinezy to  adv ise  
and t r a i n  N a tio n a lis t axmed fo rces  ou ts id e  combat zones*
Bedeplovment and Oumrd Duty. P rev a ilin g  conditions on V-J Day 
requ ired  th a t  N a tio n a lis t  troops be moved in to  Japanese-held t e r r i to r y  to  
prevent th e  occupation o f these  a reas  by th e  Chinese Ccmnnunists* The United 
S ta te s  Government s t ip u la te d  th a t  i t s  personnel and f a c i l i t i e s  would be 
used to  e3q>edite th e  undertaking by the  Chinese Government* American 
o f f i c i a l s  realized* however* th a t  severa l p o te n tia l  developments m ight endan­
ger fu lf il lm e n t o f United S ta te s  policy* There was th e  fe a r  th a t  th e  
N ational Government would se rio u s ly  weaken i t s e l f  by m il i ta ry  overextension 
and thereby deprive i t s e l f  o f th e  means needed to  r e s to re  and m aintain  peace* 
The redeployment o f  N a tio n a lis t so ld ie rs  a lso  involved th e  r is k  th a t  qxiradic 
h o s t i l i t i e s  between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Cconaunists m i ^ t  de­
velop in to  a general c iv i l  war* fip ia lly  d is tu rb in g  was th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  
Americans would be a ttack ed  by th e  Comnuunists o r  would become involved in
^^The s to ry  o f arranging and implementing tru c e  agreements was an 
in e x tr ic a b le  p a r t  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  n eg o tia tio n s  and has been tre a te d  above* 
Supra, pp* 104-06, 110-46.
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b a t t le s  between th e  two Chinese an a les . As the  United S ta te s  a n tic ip a te d  
th ese  contingencies. I t  took steps to  prevent th e i r  occuirence. Wedemeyer's 
o rders  subordinated h i s  au th o rity  to  th a t  o f M arshall, stopped th e  t r a n s ­
p o rta tio n  o f N a tio n a lis t troops to  North China by th e  United S ta te s , and 
s tip u la te d  th a t  subsequent American a c tio n  In  th is  connection depended upon 
th e  progress made by M arshall In  th e  m ediation e f fo r t .  Movement o f the  
G eneralissim o's so ld ie rs  In to  Manchuria was au thorized , pending th e  withdraw­
a l  o f  Soviet fo rce s .
Chiang K ai-shek 's armies were In  th e  southwestern p a r t  o f  China 
a t  the  end o f World War I I ,  and th e i r  redeployment was a major undertaking. 
Wedemeyer Informed P residen t Truman In  e a r ly  1946 th a t  the  Manchurian phase 
o f  th e  p ro je c t would be completed on September 1, 1946, and th a t  lo g is t i c a l  
support fo r  these  troops would be discontinued  on October 31 o f th e  same 
y e a r . ^  I t  was repo rted  sev era l years l a t e r  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  had 
acconq}ll^ed I t s  o b jec tiv e  th ro u ^  tran sp o rtin g  N a tio n a lis t troops by a i r  
and by sea to  Peiping, Nanking, S h a n ^ a l, Tienbsin, Tslngtao, Chlnwangtao and 
Formosa.
Another American undertaking was le s s  spectacu lar than th a t  o f 
Chinese redeployment, but th e  fu lf il lm e n t o f  th e  venture was undoubtedly 
j u s t  as v i t a l  to  th e  e a r ly  post-w ar successes o f the  N a tio n a lis t regime.
For I t  was through th e  assumption o f various guard d u tie s  by the  United
^B ased  on P residen t Truman's In s tru c tio n s  to  M arshall on Feb. 12, 
1946. Truman, H ,  77.
^^Marshall's testimouy of May 11, 1951. recorded In Senate Commit­
tees on Armed Services and on Foreign Relations, Hearings- Military situa­
tion  In the Far E ^ . 1951. Pt. 1, 556-57; also see Francis H. Russell, 
Address Cno t it le j  before the In stitu te of International A ffairs, Univer­
s ity  of looming, Laramie, Hycmlng. Aug. 12, 1949. p. 3 (Mimeogra^^) In 
the f i le s  o f Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas, Division of Manuscripts, Unlveiv 
s ity  of Oklahoma Library, Norman, Oklahana. Cited hereafter as Address by 
Frmnds H. Russell, Aug. 12, 1949.
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S ta tes m arines th a t  Chiang's  so ld ie rs  were re leased  to  occupy the  l ib e ra te d  
a reas and to  a s s i s t  in  re p a tr ia tin g  th e  Japanese. The m arines, upon request 
o f the  Chinese Government, p ro tec ted  p o rts  and railw ay l in e s  designated 
as e s s e n tia l  to  the  movement o f troops and siq)p lies. Coal mines were guard- 
ed u n t i l  September, 1946, and so were th e  f a c i l i t i e s  necessary  fo r  tra n s ­
p o rta tio n  o f the  fu e l from North China to  th e  c i t i e s  and in d u s tr ia l  c en te rs  
o f  C entral China. The l in e  of supply to  and from Executive Headquarters a t  
Peiping was a lso  p ro tec ted  by United S ta te s  m ili ta ry  personnel.
R epatria tion . Ihere  were approxim ately 3,000,000 Japanese c iv i l ­
ians and m ili ta ry  personnel in  China on V-J Day. Their number alone in d i­
ca te s  how tremendous th e  ta sk  o f r e p a tr ia t io n  was. C oncentration on quan­
t i t y  per se . however, obscures a l l  th e  th ings th a t  had to  be done to  make 
th e  ven ture  a successfu l one.
The Japanese so ld ie rs  had to  be disarmed and tra n s fe rre d  to  p o r ts  
o f embarkation th a t  were already  crowded with Japanese c iv i l ia n s .  Housing, 
meals and m edical a tte n t io n —includ ing  in o cu la tio n —were requ ired . Shipping 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  th o u ^  oveivburdened, were badly needed. Coordination o f  th e  
e f fo r ts  o f  numerous o f f i c i a l s  and a p t tim ing o f  the  various phases o f  th e  
p ro je c t were e s se n tia l .
Completion o f  th e  ta sk  was due in  g rea t measure to  th e  a ss is ta n c e  
o f th e  United S ta te s  during the  M arshall M ission. Only 200,000 Japanese 
had been re p a tr ia te d  idien Marshall f i r s t  a rr iv e d  in  China. General Wedemeyer 
d irec ted  th e  program u n t i l  May, 1946, and m aintained c lose  con tact with 
M arshall th r o u ^  rad io  and personal ta lk s .  Wedoaeyer a lso  had the  coopera­
t io n  o f Chiang Kai-shek, th e  Executive Headquarters, o f f i c i a l s  o f th e  United
E s t a t e  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 114, pp. 693- 
94; a lso  Address by Ftmncis H. R ussell, Aug. 12, 1949, p . 3» The U. S. 
withdrew from Executive Headquarters in  Ja n ., 1947, sh o rtly  a f te r  th e  Mar­
sh a ll  M ission was term inated .
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S ta te s  Navy, and th e  Supreme Commander fo r  the  A llied  Powers [General 
MacArthur]. The evacuation was completed in  l a t e  1946, and P residen t Truman 
announced th a t  2,936,438 re p a tr ia te s  had been tran sp o rted  to  th e i r  homeland 
in  sh ips under the  co n tro l o f HacArthur in  Japan and th e  United S ta te s  
Seventh F le e t .3^
Observations about th e  number o f  Japanese re p a tr ia te d  must be 
q u a lif ie d  by a refe rence  to  those who were not re tu rned  to  th e i r  homeland. 
Japanese c iv i l ia n s  were not expelled  i f  thqy had c e r ta in  s k i l l s  and i f  th e i r  
re te n tio n  was requested  by th e  Chinese G o v e r n m e n t . I n  ad d itio n , a r e la ­
t iv e ly  small number o f  J ^ a n e se  so ld ie rs  were re p a tr ia te d  from Manchuria 
because Soviet troops were not withdrawn from th a t  a rea  u n t i l  th e  end of 
A pril, 1946.^^
M ilita ry  Advisory M issions. The basic  concept underlying th e
31sta tanen t by Truman, Dec. 18, 1946, p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, 
U. S. R ela tions with China. Annex 114, pp. 692-93* I t  was noted elseid iere , 
however, th a t  the  number o f Japanese eape lled  was s l ig h t ly  lower than  th e  
fig u re s  c ite d  by th e  P residen t: 1,233*244 m ili ta ry  and 1,750,306 c iv i l ia n s
fo r  a t o t a l  o f 2,983,550. Ib id . .  Annex 71 (d),  p . 633*
32in order not to  d is ru p t the  economic l i f e  o f th e  countzy, th e  
N ational Government re ta in e d  some Jsqsanese c iv i l ia n s  (number not revealed] 
who were In d u s tr ia l ,  communications and mining tech n ic ian s . I t  was o r ig i­
n a lly  e^qpected th a t  th e se  eaqperts would be re p a tr ia te d  i&en Chinese rep la ce ­
ments had been tra in e d . I b id . . Annex 71 (d ) , pp. 63^33* Paul M. A. 
L inebarger strong ly  opposed th e  adm in istra tion  o f  t h i s  p lan  on th e  b a s is  
th a t  too  la rg e  a numbw o f tech n ic ian s were withdrawn and not rep laced . The 
d is lo c a tio n  could have been prevented, he noted, by u t i l i z in g  American o r  
United Nations personnel. F a ilu re  to  do t h i s ,  when accompanied by esqpulsion 
of Japanese tech n ic ian s and tro o p s , "destroyed th e  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
system under which th e  N a tio n a lis ts  proposed to  o p e ra te ."  Psychological 
W arfare, p . 257.
33Acheson sa id  on June 4, 1951. th a t  700,000 Japanese troops were 
in  Manchuria on V-J Day. Senate Committees on Aimed Serv ices and on Foreign 
R ela tions, Hearings- M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951. F t. 3, 1845.
No a u th o r i ta t iv e  da ta  i s  av a ila b le  on what happened to  these  Japanese 
so ld ie rs , bu t i t  "has been .assumed" th a t  they  were shipped to  S ib e ria  by 
th e  Soviet Union. S ta te  D ^artm ent, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 71
(d),  p . 633*
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M arshall Mission was th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Communists would 
honor th e i r  agreement o f October, 19^5t to  s e t t l e  t h e i r  d iffe ren ces  by 
n eg o tia tio n  and to  in te g ra te  th e i r  axmies* On th e  b a s is  o f t h i s  assumption 
o f Chinese in te n tio n s , th e  United S ta te s  agreed to  a s s i s t  th e  Chinese in  
the  reo rgan iza tion , in te g ra tio n  and re d isp o s itio n  o f  th e  new aimed fo rces . 
The United S ta te s  cautioned, however, th a t  i f  f r a t r i c id a l  w arfare continued, 
i t s  advice would not be extended to  m il i ta ry  u n its  on the  b a t t l e f ie ld .
As th e  Chinese aim ies were never u n if ie d , and as th e  United S ta te s  would not 
a s s i s t  th e  Communist army, to  what ex ten t did th e  United S ta te s  m i l i ta r i ly  
advise th e  N ational Government?
World War H  had been ended only one month when exp loratory  ta lk s  
were held  to  determine i f  th e  United S ta te s  would consider e s tab lish in g  
m ili ta ry  advisozy m issions in  China. P residen t Truman gave some encourage­
ment to  Ambassador T. V. Soong on th i s  occasion. The P residen t a lso  noted, 
however, th a t  h is  a u th o rity  to  a c t u n i la te r a l ly  was lim ite d  to  th e  du ra tion  
o f  th e  emergency follow ing th e  term ina tion  o f h o s t i l i t i e s .  S tud ies were 
in i t i a t e d  in  th e  United S ta te s  and China to  decide i f  advisory groups should 
be c rea ted , and i f  they  were, to  determ ine Wiat t h e i r  s iz e , function  and 
composition should be. Meanwhile, M arshall had a rr iv e d  in  China and had 
formed some opinions o f  h is  own. He recommended to  Truman on February 9« 
1946, th a t  th e  China Theater o f  O perations should be replaced  by m il i ta ry  
advisory groups. In  ad d itio n , Marrfian  informed th e  P residen t th a t  a t  h is  
(M arsh a ll 's )  request Wedemeyer was " u n o ff ic ia lly  organizing* an advisory 
team in  N ank ing .^  In  le s s  than th re e  weeks from th e  date  o f M arsh a ll's
^^*President Truman's rep ly  o f  Feb. 12 to  M arsh a ll 's  d ispatch  of 
Feb. 9 s ta te d  th a t  th e  Jo in t  Chiefs o f  S ta f f  were studying th e  s i tu a tio n  
and th a t  M arshall would be asked to  comment on th e  rrecosw endations o f th a t  
stucly. Truman, H ,  77* For treatm ent o f  Tram ai's conference w ith Ambassador 
Soong on Sept. 14, 1945, see supra, p . 73* For M arsh a ll 's  rep o rt to  the  
P residen t see supra, p . 180.
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rep o rt to  P resident Truman, th e  United S ta te s  took ac tio n  to  provide tech n i­
c a l advice fo r  m odernization o f th e  Chinese m ili ta ry  o rgan ization .
On February 25, 1946, th e  P residen t d irec ted  the  S ec re ta rie s  o f  
War and th e  Navy "to  e s ta b lish  jo in t ly  a Ü. 8. M ilita ry  Advisory Group to  
China, * and in s tru c te d  th e  Secretary  o f S ta te  to  make th e  necessary arrango» 
ments w ith the Chinese Govemnent.  The s iz e  o f  th e  m ission was lim ited  to  
a maximum streng th  o f one thousand o f f ic e rs  and men un less otherwise author­
ized  by th e  P residen t. Truman's reason fo r  c rea tin g  the  m ission was eop­
pressed  in  h is  d ire c tiv e  as follow s:
The o b jec t o f  t h i s  Advisory Groiq> w ill  be to  a s s i s t  and advise 
th e  Chinese Govenment in  th e  development o f  modem aimed fo rces fo r  
th e  fu lf il lm e n t o f  those o b lig a tio n s  lAich may devolve upon China 
under in te rn a tio n a l agreements, . . .  fo r  th e  establishm ent o f ade­
quate  con tro l over l ib e ra te d  a reas  in  China, includ ing  Manchuria, 
and Formosa, and fo r  th e  maintenance o f  in te rn a l  peace and s e c u r i t y . 35
The executive o rder was issu ed  under th e  P re s id e n t's  war power, a 
fa c t  i&ich in  i t s e l f  ra is e d  th e  question  o f i t s  l i f e  esqieetancy. Therefore, 
A dm inistration o f f i c i a l s  sought congressional au th o riza tio n  fo r  con tinuation  
o f th e  program a f t e r  th e  P re s id e n t's  war powers expired. Ambassador Mar­
s h a l l  wrote th e  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  th a t  th e  a ss is tan ce  
requested  derived "n a tu ra lly "  from th a t  provided to  China during Wbrld War 
I I  and would "stqjplement th e  e f fo r ts  o f th e  Chinese them selves." In  te r s e  
l anguage he s ta te d , as in d ica ted  below, why passage o f  th e  le g is la t io n  was 
im portant to  the  implementation o f American p o licy  toward China.
The a ss is ta n c e  . . .  au thorized  in  th e  b i l l  would be ca rried  
ou t i n  accordance w ith the  program o f reo rgan iza tion  and in te g ra tio n
3 5 sta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations with China, pp. 339-ho. I s s u ­
ance o f  th e  p re s id e n tia l  d ire c tiv e  came a t  a most opportune time (Feb. 25, 
1946} in  so f a r  a s  in te rn a l  Chinese conditions ancl th e  M arshall M ission were 
concerned* I t  w il l  be re c a lle d  th a t  th e  M ilita ry  Sub-Committee (with Mar­
sh a l l  a s  i t s  advisor) had agreed on th e  same d a te  on a p lan  fo r  p a r t i a l  
dem obilization, in te g ra tio n  and redeployment o f  a l l  m il i ta ry  u n its .  Suora. 
p . 109
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o f N ational Government and Chinese Communist arm ies as agreed upon 
hy Government and Communist re p re se n ta tiv e s .
VQ.thout passage o f th e  b i l l  th e  P residen t and m yself [sic ) would 
lack  au th o riza tio n  to  ca rry  th ro u ^  a phase o f American po licy  to ­
ward China idiich appears v i t a l  to  th e  success o f our announced
p o lic y . 36
Congressional a c tio n  on the  proposals under study only p a r t i a l ly  
f u l f i l l e d  ad m in istra tiv e  req u ests . Though a Naval Advisory Group was 
au thorized  hy th e  79th C o n g r e s s , n e i t h e r  th e  79th nor th e  80th Congress 
granted s ta tu to ry  au th o riza tio n  fo r  th e  c re a tio n  o r continuation  o f  th e  Army 
Advisory Group in  C h in a .^  The A dm inistration, however, had not completely
3^Iaken from M arsh a ll 's  statem ent o f  June 14, 1946, in  congressional 
hearings on H. R. 6795. 79th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., p rin te d  in  U. S ., Congress, 
House, Committee on Ib re ign  A ffa irs , Aaalgtjnp- China to  Modernize Her Armed 
Forces. 79th Cong., 2nd Sees., 1946, H. Rent. 2)61 to  accompany H. R. 6795, 
p . 2. C ited h e re a f te r  a s  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , A ssisting  
China to  M odem ^e Her Aimed Forces. 1946, H. Rapt. 2361. Supporting s ta te -  
ments on H. R. 6795 were a lso  made hy S ecre tary  of S ta te  %rmes. Under 
S ecre tary  o f S ta te  Acheson, Secretary  o f  War Robert P. P a tte rso n , and th e  
Vice Chief o f  Naval O perations Dewitt Ramsey, who spoke on b A a lf  o f  th e  
Navy Department. I b id . .  pp. L>3*
37L eg isla tive  au th o riza tio n  fo r  establishm ent o f  th e  Naval Advisory 
Group was provided fo r  by Public Law 512, 79th  Cong., 1 s t  Sees., which the  
P residen t signed on Ju ly  16, 1946. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with 
China, p . 340.
^ E x ecu tiv e  a ttem pts f a i le d  to  secure s ta tu to ry  au th o riza tio n  fo r  
th e  M ilita ry  Advisory Groiq) lAen H. R. 6795 and S. 2337 d ied  in  1946 with 
th e  end o f th e  79th Cong., 2nd Sess. Renewed e f fo r ts  (H. R. 2313 and S.
759] in  th e  60th Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1947, a lso  ended in  f a i lu r e  a l th o u ^  th e  
House d id  pass E. R. 2313» Ib id . I t  i s  l ik e ly  th a t  th e  Senate opposed 
estahllahm ent of th e  M ilita ry  Advisory Grmqp on th e  b a s is  th a t  the  re so lu ­
t io n s  8iq>ported in te g ra tio n  o f  th e  Chinese arm ies. Sen* Harry P. Cain o f  
Washington ra ise d  t h i s  question  severa l y ears  l a t e r  when he asked both 
M arA all and Acheson %diy they  had siq>ported H. R. 6795 in  as much as  the  
re so lu tio n  d id  support amalgamation o f  th e  Chinese m il i ta ry  fo rces . M arshall 
and Acheson gave s im ila r  r e p l ie s .  They sa id  H. R. 6?95 would have provided 
American a ss is ta n c e  to  help  th e  Chinese do what they had agreed to  do. This, 
i t  w i l l  be re c a lle d , was th e  signing o f  an agreement on Feb. 25, 1946, in  
which th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists had agreed to  demobilize p a ^  o f 
th e i r  ground fo rce s  and to  combine th e  remainder in to  f i f t y  N a tio n a lis t and 
te n  Communist d iv is io n s . I t  w ill  a lso  be re c a lle d  th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis t-  
Communist pact was never c a rr ie d  out because th e  Chinese d id  not implement 
th e i r  own agreement. Record o f May 12 and June 7» 1951, re sp ec tiv e ly , in  
Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ili­
ta ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, F t. 1, 602-04, and P t. 3, 2133-3**»
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r e l ie d  on congressional a c tio n  in  th ese  in s tan c es . Acting on the  p re s i­
d e n tia l  d ire c tiv e  o f February 25» 19^6» the  m ili ta ry  se rv ices c rea ted  an 
Amy Advisory Group—includ ing  amy» a i r  and supply adv isers—and a Naval 
Advisory Group. These m issions perfom ed  the  American m ili ta ry  advisory 
d u tie s  in  China u n t i l  th e  Jo in t United S ta te s  M ilita ry  Advisory Group 
JUSMAG was fo m a lly  e s tab lish ed  on November 1» 1948.39 The m ili ta ry  
s i tu a tio n  in  China was rap id ly  d e te r io ra tin g  in  l a t e  1948, however, and 
JUSMAG was withdrawn from China before the  end o f  th e  year.
Though th e  m il i ta ry  advisory u n its  were e s tab lish ed  during the  
M arshall M ission, th e i r  co n trib u tio n s were made p rim arily  a f te r  the  Mission 
was term inated . In  ad d itio n , th e  advice o f th e  United S ta te s  m ili ta ry  teams 
was rendered p rim arily  on b d ia lf  o f a  m il i ta ry  o rgan ization  (N a tio n a lis t 
Army) d if fe re n t  from th a t  %diich the  advisory  u n i ts  had been crea ted  to  
u ltim a te ly  serve—the in te g ra te d  Chinese am y. This development occurred 
because M arshall had been unable to  g e t the  Chinese p r in c ip a ls  to  honor 
t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  and m ili ta ry  agreements. As a r e s u l t ,  th e  Chinese never 
reorganized th e i r  government and am ed fo rces  in  a fo m  m utually acceptable 
to  them selves.
The s r te n t  to  which th e  American teams could advise and a s s i s t  th e  
Chinese was lim ite d  by the  fa c t  th a t  M arshall served in  a m ediatory capacity . 
M arshall was freq u en tly  reminded by th e  Communists, p a r t ic u la r ly  a f te r  
June, 1946, th a t  he and th e  United S ta te s  were ac tin g  in  a manner p a r tis a n  
to  th e  N ational Government. The se rv ice s  th a t  th e  advisory teams could
39of th e  f iv e  components o f JUSMAG, th re e —A ir Advisory D ivision, 
Ground Forces Advisory D ivision, and Combined Service Forces Advisory 
D ivision [Stqjply]—c o n s titu ted  a con tinuation  o f  c e r ta in  wartime a ss is ta n c e . 
A fou rth—Naval Advisory D ivision—was a post-W orld War U  c re a tio n . The 
f i f t h  JU9IAQ u n it—Jo in t Advisory S ta ff—was brought in to  being when JUSMAG 
was e s tab lish ed .
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render were fu r th e r  lim ite d  by th e  ban on any a c tio n  by American personnel 
which would involve the  United S ta te s  in  f r a t r i c i d a l  w a r .^  Since Chinese 
w arfare was predominantly th a t  o f ground fo rce s , American po licy  with regard  
to  th e  function ing  o f  th e  Axvy Advisory Group i s  p a r t ic u la r ly  revealing* 
During th e  M arshall M ission th e  A ny  Advisory Group gave a ss is tan ce  tdiich 
f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  o rgan iza tion  and function ing  o f Chinese Ground Forces Head­
q u a rte rs  and th e  establishm ent and opera tion  o f  m ili ta ry  schools. The 
Group had no au th o rity  during the  M ission, however, to  give any advice con­
cerning th e  o rgan iza tion  o r  equipment o f th e  Chinese ground fo rces, nor was 
i t s  personnel perm itted  to  d ir e c t ly  p a r t ic ip a te  in  tra in in g  these  u n its .  
These l im ita tio n s  iqx)n th e  Amy Advisory Group were removed a f te r  th e  i n ­
a c tiv a tio n  o f  th e  Executive Headquarters in  January, 194?,^^ but th e  pro­
h ib it io n  upon advising  u n i ts  in  combat was never l i f t e d .  This l a s t  r e s t r i c ­
t io n  app lied  to  American o f f ic e rs  as w ell as to  e n lis te d  men. Major General 
David Barr, sen io r o f f ic e r  o f  th e  Amy Advisory Group and l a t e r  d i re c to r  o f 
JUSMAG, s ta te d  the  na tu re  o f h is  d u tie s  as follows^
I  d id  not observe th e  Chinese N a tio n a lis t fo rces  a c tu a lly  in  
b a t t le .  I  observed them out o f b a t t l e  on many occasions, and I  
inspected  th e i r  t ra in in g , exercised  superv ision  over th e  tra in in g ,
^ A m y  u n its  had been p ro h ib ited  from becoming involved in  th e  
Chinese am ed c o n f l ic t  since th e  end o f  World War U ,  and th e  same r e s t r i c ­
t io n  was placed  on th e  300-man naval advisory  team au thorized  fay Public Law 
512 in  Ju ly , 1946. This e a rly  l im ita t io n  d id  no t apply to  U. S. a i r  fo rce  
personnel, however. I t  was no t u n t i l  Aug., 1946, th a t  M arshall ordered 
withdrawal o f American a i r  ad v isers  idio had been a s s is t in g  Chinese f i l t e r  
groups "ac tiv e ly  engaged* in  opposing th e  Communists. S ta te  Department,
U. S. Re1̂ t.jons irith Chinn, p . JkJ»
^^The Peiping Executive Headquarters, under th e  Chinese agreement 
o f  Feb. 25, 1946, was responsib le  f o r  o rgan iz ing , equipping and tra in in g  
Chinese ground fo rces u n t i l  th e  Headquarters was a b o li^ e d . And although 
th e  U. S. d id  remove some r e s t r ic t io n s  on i t s  advisory  personnel a f t e r  th e  
M arshall M ission ended, American p a r t ic ip a tio n  i n  tra in in g  cen ters  was 
p rim arily  lim ite d  to  th e  a rea  south o f  th e  Yangtze B iver. I b id . . pp. 346-
47.
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and inspected  some p laces.
I  a s s is te d  in  th e  p repara tion  o f p lans; lA at should be done, 
but 80 f a r  as th e  a c tu a l Implementation o f  th e  p lan s , n e ith e r  1 
nor any o f my people could be th e re . I  was not responsib le  fo r  
opera tiona l a c t iv i t i e s .
The American advisory teams made severa l co n trib u tio n s to  th e  
implementation o f United S ta te s  po licy  toward China. Among the  more 
im portant were th e  follow ing: th e  establishm ent of t ra in in g  cen ters  fo r
a l l  m ili ta ry  branches and p a r tic ip a tio n  in  th e  a c t iv i t i e s  o f those cen ters ; 
th e  in s tru c tio n  o f  troops on a d iv is io n a l le v e l;  ̂  reo rgan iza tion  o f th e  
Chinese Naval and Ground Forces Headquarters; tra in in g  o f  personnel to  
o p era te , m aintain and re p a ir  naval v e sse ls ; providing advice designed to  
he lp  develop e ffe c tiv e  siq)ply techniques and procedures; and in d o c tr in a tio n  
o f  Chinese o f f ic e rs  with the  p r in c ip le s  and methods used by Americans to  
organize and in s t ru c t  anuy, a i r  fo rce  and naval fo rces.
^^estim ony  o f June 22, 1951. in  Senate Committees on Aimed Services
and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings, M lllta rv  S itu a tio n  and the  Rhr E ast. 
1951» F t. 4, 2959- 60, 2963.  Elsewhere Barr noted th a t  he personally  advised 
th e  Generalissimo on o p era tiona l a f f a i r s .  In  so f a r  as re sp o n s ib ili ty  was 
concerned, Barr was sub ject to  d ire c tio n  by th e  U. S. Ambassador. Bair com­
mented on th is  p o in t a s  follow s: "Our Ambassador (S tu a rt)  was th e  over­
r id in g  agency in  China o f the  United S ta te s . I  was an agency (s ic ) o f  th e
J o in t  Chiefs o f S ta f f  repo rting  d ire c tly  to  th e  Jo in t Chiefs o f S ta f f ,  w ith
th e  Ambassador exerc is ing  supervisory co n tro l over me and my keeping no 
s e c re ts  from the  Ambassador. " Ib id . . pp. 3027, 3031*
^3ihe an a ly s is  p resented  by th is  and th e  succeeding paragraph, 
except lAere noted otherw ise, i s  based on excerp ts o f th e  f i nal  re p o rts  o f 
JUSMAG, p rin te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China, pp. 341-51*
^*^*Marshall s ta te d  on Feb. 20, 1946, th a t  axmy adv isers  had had 
a u th o rity  " fo r q u ite  some time" to  t r a in  Chinese troops on th e  d iv is io n a l 
le v e l  in  non-combat zones. House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings 
fo r  a  Post-War Recovery Program. 1946, P t. 2, 1369. Chennault, a strong 
c r i t i c  o f  American p o licy  idiich denied th e  use o f  advisory teams in  operas 
t io n a l  a reas , to ld  th e  same committee on Mar. 10, 1946, however, th a t  th e  
ad v ise rs  "p rin c ip a l d u tie s  seem to  be to  give le c tu re s  in  classrooms in  
Nanking," while th e  f i t t i n g  was going on "thousands o f  m iles away." Ib id . .
p . 2236.
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As ex tensive as th ese  achievements were, t h ^  rep resen ted  a per­
formance below th a t  which th e  adv isers had ejqpected to  a ttad n  and only de­
layed  the  d is in te g ra tio n  o f  the  N a tio n a lis t m il i ta ry  fo rce . F ina l re p o rts  
o f  th e  components o f JUSMAG sta ted  th a t  th e  Ground Forces Headquarters 
operated  in  a "barely  s a t is fa c to ry  manner. " Ihe Navy, i t  was s ta te d , was 
never combat te s te d , and sh ips were denied freedom o f  opera tion  a f te r  l a t e  
1946 out o f fe a r  th a t  sh ips and personnel would be handed over to  th e  Com­
m unists. According to  th ese  records th e  Air Force "never a tta in e d  s a t i s ­
fa c to ry  operating  standards"—i t  bombed, s tra fe d  and dropped supp lies from 
a l t i tu d e s  too high to  achieve accuracy. The only troop tra in in g  cen te r th a t  
produced s a tis fa c to ry  r e s u l ts  was the  one e s tab lish ed  on Formosa by th e  
N a tio n a lis ts  in  Ju ly , 19^7* N a tio n a lis t e ffec tiv en ess  was a lso  im paired by 
th e  impressment by lo c a l  commanders o f co n scrip ts  enroute to  army cen te rs  
and by th e  unw illingness o f  commanders to  perm it t h e i r  men to  remain in  th e  
tra in in g  cen te rs  fo r  any "appreciable p e rio d ."  Another d i f f ic u l ty  fac ing  
American ad v ise rs , re la te d  by M arshall in  e a rly  1948, was th a t  many so ld ie rs  
were un tra ined . The N a tio n a lis ts  put men in to  b a t t l e  too qu ick ly , he s ta te d , 
"sometimes w ith in  tw enty-four hours o f  th e  time he a r r iv e s  th e re  ( tra in in g  
c e n te r) .
M aterial A ssistance 
2hd United S ta te s  provided th e  N ational Goverxnent w ith a tremen­
dous v a r ie ty  o f  m ili ta ry  supp lies a f t e r  V-J Day: sm all arms and a r t i l l e r y
with ammunition, non-nuclear bombs, a i r c r a f t ,  tanks and o ther motor v e h ic le s , 
naval v e sse ls , communications equipment, m edical supp lies , c lo th in g  and 
o th e rs . Total m il i ta ry  g ran ts  and c re d i ts  au'Uiorized from V-J Day to  March
45comments on Feb. 20, 1948, c ite d  in  i b i d . . p . 1570.
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21, 1949, amounted to  approxim ately $998,700,000. Of th i s  t o t a l  $797,700,000 
was in  g ran ts  and $201,000,000 in  c r e d i t s . ^
The aggregate value o f a id  rendered by th e  United S ta te s  was con­
siderab ly  h igher than  th ese  f ig u re s  in d ic a te , however. For example, th ese  
to ta l s  do not include th e  sa le s  o f su rp lus m il i ta ry  equipment unless th e  
tra n s fe rs  were made on c re d it  term s. Thus, the  f ig u res  c i te d  above exclude 
the  sa le s  o f  surp lus m il i ta ry  equipment with an American procurement value 
o f $102,047,487 and an u ltim ate  United S ta te s  re a l iz a t io n  o f $6,700,000.
The monetary evaluation  o f  United S ta te s  a id  to  th e  N ational Government a lso  
excludes th e  value o f  6,500 tons o f  ammunition tra n s fe rre d  a t  no cost to  the  
Chinese by th e  m arines in  North C hina.^7
^ S e e  Appendix I I ,  pp. 275-76. The A dm inistration was opposed to  
th e  au th o riza tio n  o f any a d d itio n a l m ili ta ry  a id  to  China between Mar. 21, 
1949, and th e  outbreak o f the  Korean war in  June, 1950. However, P residen t 
Truman d id  sign  th e  Mutual Defense A ssistance Act o f 1949 (Public Law 329, 
81 st Cong., 1 s t  Sess.) in  O ct., 1949, which au thorized  $75,000,000 fo r  m ili­
ta ry  purposes a t  th e  P re s id e n t 's  d is c re tio n  in  th e  "general area  o f  China." 
This Act was p rim arily  intended to  provide a id  fo r  European coun tries and 
was amended by Congress to  include  China. A dm inistration and Congressional 
view points a re  thoroughly covered in  U. S ., Congress, House, Committee on 
Foreign A ffa irs , H earings, on H. R. 5748 and H. R. 5895. A B il l  to  Promote 
th e  Foreign Policy  and Provide fo r  th e  Defense and General Welfare o f  th e  
U. S. by Fbm iahing MLUtary A ssistance to  Ftareien Nations [Mutual Defense 
A ssistance Act o f  1949J* 81st Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1949: U. S ., Congress,
House, Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , A B il l  to  Promote th e  Foreign Po licy  
and Provide fo r  th e  Defense and General Welfare o f  th e  U. S. bv Fam ishing  
M ilita ry  A ssistance to  Fbrelgn Nations. 81 «t Cong.. Ifit Sass.. IQhQ. H.
Rept. 1265* on H. R. 5895# P t. 2, pp. 68-70; Ü. S ., Congress, Senate, Com­
m ittees  on Fbreign A ffa irs  and on Aimed Serv ices, An Act to  Promote th e  
Foreign Po licy  and Provide fo r  th e  Defense and General W elfare o f  th e  U. S. 
by Fhm idiing  M ilita ry  A ssistance to  Foreign N ations. 8 l s t  Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 
1949, 5. Rept. 1068, on H. R. 5893: and U. S ., Congress, House, M utu^ De­
fense A ssistance Act o f  1949. 81st Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1949, Rept. 134o, Con- 
ference Report to  accooq>any B. R. 5895»
^7lhe 6,500 to n s  o f ammunition was tra n s fe rre d  to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
between ^ r . - S e p t . ,  1947. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China.
Annex I 7I ,  pp. 940-42. Surplus m il i ta ry  equipment was made av a ilab le  when 
lendUlease was term inated , and th e  f ig u re s  c ite d  a re  based on s t a t i s t i c s  
a v a ilab le  on Oct. 31, 1949» Under th e  agreements to  purchase surplus m il i ­
ta ry  equipment th e  N a tio n a lis ts  bought th e  follow ing: 130,000,000 rounds
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An assessment o f th e  American co n trib u tio n  should I'u rther note th a t 
no monetary value can be placed iqion sev era l types o f a s s is ta n c e . This 
category o f United S ta te s  a id  inc ludes: (1) planning the  redeployment o f
N a tio n a lis t troops fo r  th e  occupation o f a reas l ib e ra te d  from the  Japanese;
(2) devising the  Japanese re p a tr ia tio n  program; (3) th e  a id  con tribu ted  
by th e  m arin .% in  North China in  the  fo ra  o f occupation and guard duty: and 
(4) m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  rendered by M arshall, Wedemeyer, Robertson and Qyroade 
and by th e  m il i ta ry  and naval advisory g ro tp s. And, f in a l ly ,  the  United 
S ta te s  in d ire c t ly  provided m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  through i t s  economic a id  
program. For in  t h i s  way th e  United S ta te s  made i t  p o ss ib le  fo r  th e  Nation­
a l i s t s  to  f re e  some o f th e i r  funds fo r  th e  purchase o f m ili ta ry  supp lies .
M aterial Aid during the HarahaH M ission. M ilita ry  a ss is ta n c e  to  
China during th e  M arshall M ission was governed to  a considerable ex ten t by 
th e  concept underlying th e  M ission. In  t h i s  connection i t  w il l  be re c a lle d  
th a t  M a r^ a l l  was sen t to  China to  he lp  th e  p r in c ip a ls  s e t t l e  th e i r  d i f f e r ­
ences th r o u ^  p o l i t i c a l  n eg o tia tio n s , no t th ro u ^  the  use o f  armed m i ^ t .
An a c t by th e  P re s id e n t 's  f e c i a l  R epresentative in  mid*1946 to  uphold h is  
p o s itio n  as m ediator fu r th e r  de lim ited  th e  m a te ria l a ss is ta n ce  a v a ila b le  to  
th e  N ational Government. I t  was on t h i s  occasion th a t  M arshall imposed an 
embargo on th e  shipment o f  casbat-type  item s to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  during the
o f  r i f l e  ammunition f o r  $656, 499»27 (procurement c o s t-$6 ,564,992.58) under 
co n trac t dated June 25, 194? (shipped Ju ly  14 and Aug. 11]; 150 C-46 a i r  
p lanes fo r  $750,000 [procurement co st -  $34,800,000] under co n trac t dated  
Dec. 22, 1947.  A dditional purchases o f  sm all a ra s  and a r t i l l e r y  ammunition,
178 a i r c r a f t  and 683 engines, and ordnance equipment were made fo r  $5,308,148.11 
(procurement c o st -  $60,682,494.96) between Jan. 1, 1948, and Oct. 31* 1949»
U. S ., Department o f  S ta te , "Summary o f  United S ta te s  Goverment Economic 
and M ilita ry  Aid Authorized fo r  China since  1937,” (Mimeographed) 1950, p.
17, from Ihe Papers o f  Harry S. T ra a n , Box O-7O8 , Folder 150 (1950-53),
Harry S. Truman l ib r a r y ,  Ind^>endence, Mo. H ereaH er c i te d  as "Summary o f 
U. S. Government Economic and M ilita ry  Aid Authorized fo r  China since 1937, ” 
1950, from The Papers o f  Harry S. Truman.
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l a s t  f iv e  months o f h is  s tay  in  China.
M ilita ry  a ss is ta n c e  during th e  M arshall Mission consisted  o f  both 
g ran ts  and c re d i ts .  United S ta te s  a id  was advanced in  th e  form o f se rv ice s  
and a broad assortm ent o f  m ili ta ry  m a te r ia l. The United S ta te s  Navy fu r­
nished the  N a tio n a lis ts  w ith supp lies valued a t  approxim ately $17,700,000 
under the  Sino-American Cooperative O rganization Agreement CsACOj. D elivery 
o f  th e  item s, co n sis tin g  p rim arily  o f  ordnance, was made between September 
2, 1945, and March 2, 1946. Though a r t i c l e s  were tra n s fe rre d  before th e  
M arshall Mission was e s tab lish ed , a v a ila b le  f ig u re s  do not in d ic a te  what 
percentage o r t o t a l  o f th e  shipments had been made before M arsh a ll's  a r r iv a l  
in  China on December 21, 1945. I t  i s  reasonable to  assume, th e re fo re , th a t  
th e  e n tire  $17,700,000 can no t be included in  th e  t o t a l  United S ta te s  a id  
de liv ered  during th e  M arshall M ission, and, o f  course, th e  Mission can not 
be c re d ite d  w ith having o rig in a te d  th e  A greem ent.^
American m il i ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  was provided fo r  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
during th e  M arshall M ission under two o th e r  arrangem ents. On o f these  
in s tan ces  occurred idien th e  American army withdrew from west China. The 
United S ta te s  so ld  th e  Chinese Goverment a v a r ie ty  o f  expeditionary  sop- 
p l ie s —excluding combat m a te r ia l s  fo r  $25,000,000. C la ss if ie d  as a c re d i t ,  
$20,000,000 was a cc red ited  to  th i s  agreement, and a $5,000,000 down payment
^ T h e  embargo, iiqposed in  Aug., 1946, was not l i f t e d  u n t i l  May 26, 
1947, f iv e  months a f t e r  th e  end o f th e  M arshall M ission. And, according to  
Acheson's comments on June 5, 1951, d e liv e r ie s  o f  m ili ta ry  a id  were "extreme­
l y  lim ited" from th e  end o f  th e  embargo u n t i l  Jan. 1, 19^8, with th e  
e x e r t io n  o f th e  shipment, o f  th e  130, 000,000 rounds o f  sm all aims ammunition. 
Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on Foreign R elations, Hearings. 
M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951* P t .  3, 19^*8-49.
^SACO a id  was in  th e  foim o f  a g ran t, and $14,000,000 o f th e  t o t a l  
consisted  o f ordnance sup p lies  and equipment. A oreakdown o f the  item s 
d e liv ered  i s  given in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex
171, p . 940.
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vas incorporated  in  th e  surplus p roperty  sa le s  agreement o f  August 30»
1946, to  cancel p a r t  o f  th e  United S ta te s  indebtedness to  C h in a .^
Lend-lease g ran ts  and c re d i ts  co n s titu ted  th e  remaining means o f  
m ili ta ry  a ss is tan ce  to  th e  Chinese Government during th e  M arshall M ission. 
T otal len d -lea se  fu rn ished  between V-J Day and March 21, 1949, amounted to  
$513, 700,000 in  g ran ts  and $181,000,000 in  c re d i ts ,  o r  a t o t a l  of 
$694, 700, 000. ^  China was the  re c ip ie n t o f se rv ices and goods valued a t  
$489,932,000 between V-J Day and December 31, 1945» Thus, the  l a s t  f ig u re  
given c o n s titu te s  th e  value  o f len d -lea se  se rv ices  and goods provided and 
tra n s fe r re d  to  China from V-J Day through th e  f i r s t  te n  days o f M arsh a ll 's  
s tay  in  C h in a .^  A dditional item s and se rv ices, valued a t  $204,768,000, 
were made av a ilab le  during  the  remaining year o f th e  M arshall Mission and 
a f t e r  i t  was term inated .
^ I b id . . Annex 185, P» I 05I .
51see i^pendiz H ,  p. 275.
f ig u re  $489,932,000 was determined by th e  follow ing procedure: 
A ll len d -lea se  rendered China from Mar. 11, 1941, to  Dec. 31, 1945, was 
m il i ta ry  len d -lea se . T o ta l cost o f  such a id  was $1,335,632,000 during t h i s  
period  and $845,700,000 fo r  th e  sh o rte r  period  o f  Mar. U ,  1941, to  Sept.
2, 1945.  Hence, th e  c o s t o f len d -lea se  from Mar. 11, 1941, to  Dec. 31,
1945 t$ l, 335, 632, 000) minus th e  c o st o f  such a ss is ta n ce  from Mar. 11, 1941, 
to  Sept. 2 , 1945, C$845,700,000) leaves $489,932,000. As M arshall d id  not 
a r r iv e  in  China u n t i l  Dec. 21, 1945, and as len d -lease  s t a t i s t i c s  a re  no t 
broken down in to  c a teg o rie s  fo r  th e  M ission p e r se . i t  i s  im possible to  
determine exac tly  how much o f th e  a ss is ta n c e  between Sept. 2 and Dec. 31, 
1945 ( $ ^ 9, 932, 000) was furnished in  th e  f i r s t  te n  days a f t e r  M arshall 
landed a t  Chungking. The sum $1,335,632,000 i s  c ite d  in  U. S ., P resid en t, 
1945-53 (Truman), Twenty-Second Lend-Lease Report to  Congress. 1945, House 
Doc. 663, p . 17* The d e riv a tio n  o f  len d -lease  fo r  Mar. 11, 1941, to  Sept.
2, 1945, was based on S ta te  Department, U. S. H alations w ith China. Annex 
185, pp. 1043-44, 1046.
^3ihe f ig u re  $204,768,000 was derived by su b trac tin g  $489,932,000 
from $694, 700,000 (value o f  m ili ta ry  len d -lease  fu rn ished  a f t e r  V-J Day).
See A^endix H , p. 254, for lend-lease to ta l after V-J Day. I t  i s  impos­
sib le  to determine idiat lend-lease aid was provided for ^ e c if ic  periods 
after Dec. 31, 1945, because o ffic ia l reports after that date are based
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M ilita ry  len d -lea se  vas provided in  a v a r ie ty  o f  ways during th e  
M arshall M ission. N a tio n a lis t troops were tran sp o rted  by a i r  to  occupy 
areas l ib e ra te d  from th e  Japanese. The c o st o f the  a i r l i f t  was approxi­
m ately $300, 000,000.  A dditional a ss is ta n ce  was provided to  re p a tr ia te  
Japanese so ld ie rs  and c iv i l ia n s .  V ehicles and ammunition valued a t  
$68,000,000 and $50,000,000, re sp e c tiv e ly , were fu rn ished  out o f American 
stq}plies in  th e  Far E a s t . ^  The United S ta te s  a lso  continued to  t r a n s fe r  
equipmwit to  two programs in i t i a t e d  during Ubrld Nhr H .  Delivexy o f  equip­
ment f o r  th ir ty -n in e  Chinese d iv is io n s , approxim ately f i f t y  per cen t complete 
on V-J Day, was re a liz e d  by l a t e  December, 1945. The o th e r  p ro jec t i n i t i a t e d  
during World War I I —th e  tr a n s fe r  o f p lanes to  develop th e  8 l/3 -g roup  pro­
gram fo r  th e  Chinese A ir Force—was not completed during th e  M arshall Mis­
sion .
I t  should be fu r th e r  noted th a t  m il i ta ry  len d -lea se  was fu rn ished  
on a reim bursable b a s is  a f te r  June 28, 1946. The M ilita ry  Aid Agreement o f 
th i s  d a te  au thorized  an aaqoenditure o f  $25,000,000 to  a s s i s t  th e  N ational­
i s t s  in  occupying l ib e ra te d  a reas  between June 30 and October 31, 1946. An 
a d d itio n a l $15,000,000 was provided to  t r a i n  Chinese m il i ta ry , a i r  fo rce  
and naval personnel between June 30, 1946, and December 31, 194?.^^
on "defense a id ."  This term [defense a id )  included len d -lea se  app rop ria tions 
by Congress to  th e  P resid en t, p lus a ss is ta n c e  th r o u ^  th e  War and Navy 
Departments, th e  M aritime Commission, th e  Coast Guard, and funds pledged 
by fo re ig n  governments to  finance th e  procurement o f  a ss is ta n c e  on a cash 
reimbursement b a s is .
54u* S ., P res id en t, 1945-53 (Truman), Twenty-Second Lend-Lease B». 
p o r t  to  Congress. 1945, House Doc. 663, p . 16. Truman s ta te d  on Dec. 18,
1946, however, th a t  most o f  th e  diipm ents o f  N a tio n a lis t troops to  occiqjy 
l ib e ra te d  a reas "bad been made o r  s ta r te d  when General M arshall a rr iv e d . "
S ta te  Department, n . s .  tu ia t^o n s with China. Annex 114, p . 69O.
^ ^ e x t  o f  ag re raen t i s  found in  U. S ., P re s id en t, 1945-53 (Truman), 
Twenty-Th ird  Rano r t  to  Confresa on Lend.l#ase O perations, fo r  th e  Period
Se n t. 30. 1946 (Nhdbington: U. S. Government P r in tin g  O ffice , 1946), 
House Doc. 41, pp. 75-76. Thouf^ n eg o tia tio n s  fo r  a se ttlem ent o f Chinese lend- 
le a se  ware begun on June 28, 1 9 ^ ,  cu rren t lenct-lease re p o rts  in d ic a te  th a t  no 
adjustm ent has been made.
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M atqrial Aid a f t e r  th#  Marshal % e United S ta te s  cojv>
tinned  to  provide m a te ria l a id  to  China during M arsh a ll 's  two years as 
Secretary  o f  S ta te  Wannary, 19^7-January, 1949], includ ing  th e  f u l f i l l ­
ment o f lencUlease o b lig a tio n s  incurred  before  th e  apd o f th e  M arshall Mis­
sion . M ilita ry  a ss is ta n c e  a lso  included th e  abandonment o f 6,500 tons o f 
ammunition to  the  N a tio n a lis ts  in  North China in  194? and the  sa le  o f sur­
p lu s  m ili ta ry  equipment to  th e  Chinese Government in  1947-1949.^  The 
prim ary means o f  a ss is ta n c e , however, was in  the  form o f  two new g ran ts .
Two g ran ts  to ta l in g  $266,300,000 were in i t i a t e d  in  1947 and 1948. 
Congress authorized th e  P residen t on Ju ly  16, 1946, to  t r a n s fe r  271 naval 
v e sse ls  to  th e  Chinese Goverment. An agreement was signed between the  two 
goverm ents on December 8, 1947, to  implement th is  s ta tu te ,  and 13I  v e sse ls  
w ith a procurement co st o f  $141,315*000 were tra n s fe rre d  as o f December 
31, 1948. D eliveries included destroyer e sc o rts , p a tro l  sh ips and landi ng 
c r a f t .
The United S ta te s  made one more e f fo r t  to  m i l i ta r i ly  a s s i s t  the  
N ational Goverment during M arsha ll's  tenu re  as Secretary  o f State* Even 
th o u ^  th e  Achini s t r a t io n  d id  not seek au th o riza tio n  to  extend ad d itio n a l 
m il i ta ry  a ss is tan ce  to  China, i t  agreed in  1948 to  support congressional 
demands fo r  such a id . Ececutive and le g is la t iv e  cooperation produced th e  
China Aid Act which th e  P residen t signed on i ^ r i l  3» 1948. This Act
^ S u p ra . p. 193.
E s t a t e  Department, Ut s .  Rela tio n s  wi th  China. Annex 172, pp. 969, 
971.  Public Law 512 o f  th e  79th Cong., 2nd S ess., requ ired  only th a t  the  
P residen t ge t congressional approval where v esse ls  tra n s fe rre d  were la rg e r  
than  destroyer e sc o rts . The Secretary  o f  th e  Navy iF o rre s ta l)  was authoru 
iz e d  ly  Executive Order o f th e  P residen t on i ^ r .  25, 1947, to  izq)lement the  
s ta tu te ,  "subject to  concurrence by th e  Secretazy o f  State (M arsha ll).” 
Copies o f  th e  a c t o f  Congress and Executive Order a re  p rin te d  in  ib id . , 
Annex 171, pp. 943-45#
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authorized  a g ran t o f  $12$,000,000 to  be used "on such terms as the  P re s i­
dent may determ ine, " and th e  f u l l  amount was appropria ted  on June 28, 1 9 4 8 .^  
R esp o n sib ility  fo r  i n i t i a t i n g  th e  a c q u is itio n  o f supplies under 
th e  China Aid Program re s te d  e n tir e ly  with th e  Chinese Government* A d ec is­
ion  to  t h i s  e f fe c t  was made Iqr P residen t Truman, and i t  was co n s is ten t w ith 
th e  views expressed by executive o f f i c i a l s  during congressional hearings on 
th e  China Aid Act* Ihe A dm inistration was opposed to  any ac tio n  on i t s  
p a r t  which would in d ic a te  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  was assuming re s p o n s ib ili ty  
fo r  th e  p o lic ie s  o r  a c ts  o f  th e  N ational Government* P residen t Truman be­
lie v ed  th a t  h is  d ec is io n  in  th i s  connection was now [a f te r  passage o f th e  
China Aid Act) f u l ly  siqjported by Congress* The P residen t eoqplained h is  
p o s itio n  a s  follow s in  a l e t t e r  to  Senator S ty les Bridges*
A ll ad m in is tra tiv e  checks and co n tro ls  re la te d  to  t h i s  program 
(China Aid Act) * * * w il l ,  o f  course, have to  be c a rr ie d  out in  a 
manner c o n s is te n t w ith th e  c le a r ly  s ta te d  d e s ire  o f th e  Congress 
th a t  a s s is ta n c e  fu rn ished  under t h i s  program s h a l l  no t be construed 
as an eoq>ressed o r  Im plied assumption by th e  United S ta te s  o f  any 
re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  p o l ic ie s ,  a c ts ,  o r  undertakings o f  th e  Republic 
o f  China o r  f o r  cond itions which may p re v a il  in  China a t  any time* 59
Thou^ th e  N ational Government was requ ired  to  i n i t i a t e  in d iv id u a l 
req u ests  f o r  a id , th e  United S ta te s  co n tro lled  th e  disbursement o f funds* 
American p o licy  s t ip u la te d  th a t  th e  Chinese Government could e ith e r  procure 
item s o r have United S ta te s  governmental agencies perform t h i s  function .
Upon completion o f  th e  procurement p rocess, however, requests  fo r  payment 
and documentation s iç p o rtin g  th e  purchase had to  be subm itted to  the
^ S e e  supra, pp* 156-63, fo r  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  a t t i tu d e  o f th e  Admiiw 
i s t r a t i o n  and th e  Congress towaztl a id  fo r  China during e a rly  1 9 ^  and th e  
re la te d  a u th o riza tio n  and appropria tion  measures p e rta in in g  to  th e  China 
Aid Act*
^ E x c e rp t from l e t t e r  o f P residen t Truman dated Ju ly  28, 1948, to  
Sen. Bridges o f New Hampshire, Chairman, Senate Commsittee on ap p ro p ria tio n s, 
c i te d  in  U* S*, Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess*, 1948, ZCI7,
P a rt 12, A5082*
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Départaient o f S ta te . I f  th e  Department approved th e  claim , i t  d ire c te d  the 
United S ta te s  Treasuiy D ^artm ent to  honor th e  r e q u i s i t i o n .^  The United 
S ta te s  fu r th e r  co n tro lled  th e  disbursem ent process under th e  China Aid Pro­
gram by de termi ni ng th e  p r ic e  China had to  pay fo r  the  item s. According to  
B rigadier General T. S. Timbeiman, th e  United S ta te s  app lied  the  p r ic in g  
formula th a t  had been used since  rnidml947 to  iaqjlement th e  a id  programs fo r  
Œreece and Turkey. The p rescrib ed  r a te s  were, he noted, as  fo llow s:
1) Items e n ti r e ly  su rp lus to  th s  needs o f  th e  United S ta te s  
aimed fo rces  a re  sold  a t  surp lus p r ic e s , averaging te n  per cent o f 
19^5 procurement co st p r ic e .
2) Item s s to red  as war reserve , i . e . ,  needed to  equip u n its  
in  event o f  a m o b ilisa tio n , a re  so ld  a t  19^5 procurement co st 
p r ic e .
3) Items needed fo r  cu rren t use o f  th e  United S ta te s  armed fo r­
ces and idiich i f  disposed o f  must be rep laced  immediately a re  so ld  
a t  cu rren t replacement c o s ts .
4) . . .  item s lA ich a re  not a v a ila b le  in  stock  must be procured
and a re  charged to  th e  fo re ig n  goverznent a t  th e  exact p r ic e  charged 
by th e  m anufacturer, p lu s  any co sts  involved fo r  handling and sh ip - 
jd n g .o l
^ F to a  June 2 to  Ju ly  28, 1948, only th e  Chinese Government was 
au tho rised  to  procure js i li ta x y  sxqiplies under th e  Chin# Aid Act. On Ju ly  
28th P residen t Truman au tho rised  U. S. goverm en ta l agencies to  acqu ire  
suqpplies fo r  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  i f  requested  to  do so by th e  Chinese Govern­
ment. U. S. p o l iq r  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  procedure f o r  procurement and pay­
ment i s  based on l e t t e r s  o f  th e  above d a te s  from Truman to  Sec. M arshall. 
Copies o f  th e  l e t t e r s  a re  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with 
China. Annex I 71, Secs. VU, I ,  pp. 947, 949^-50.
^Timbeiman was Chief o f  O perations Group, P lans and Operations 
D ivision , O ffice , Chief o f  S ta f f ,  U. S. Angy. His comments, made In  a  s ta te ­
ment subm itted to  th e  House Committee on Fbreign A ffa irs  on June 21, 1949, 
a re  p r in te d  In  i b i d . . Annex 174, p . 979* Sen. Khovland o f  C r lifo m la  l a t e r  
s tro n g ly  c r i t ic iz e d  th e  iaq)lementatlon o f  th e  p r ic in g  formula when he s ta te d  
th a t  Greece and Turkey were charged only  l/lO th  th e  p r ic e  pa id  by China fo r  
th e  same equipment. The S e n a to r 's  c r i t ic is m  was p a r t i a l ly  answered by a 
S ta te  Department docimrent which noted th a t  th e  Chinese p rim arily  s o u ^ t  
item s whidi were no longer i n  surp lus stocks o f  th e  U. S. axmy. Ihus, th e  
N ational Goverment was charged th e  p r ic e  necessary  to  rep lace  th e  item s 
I f  tra n s fe rre d  from th e  U. S. aimy o r  th e  m anufactu rer's  p r ic e  i f  purchased 
c o o ae rc ia lly . I&iowland's comments o f  June 22, I 95I ,  a re  found in  Senate 
Coeemittees on Armed Services and on Foreign fie la tio n s, Hearigjg8,_ g ü j^ g 2 [ 
S itu a tio n  in  th e  Fbi» Bn«t. 1951, P t. 4 , pp. 3043-44; f o r  A6 in i s t r a t lo n  
explanat io n  see S ta te  Department, U. S. R ela tions w ith China. Annex 172,
p . 974^
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There vas some delay in  i n i t i a t i n g  th e  shipments o f m ili ta ry  sup­
p l ie s  purchased under th e  China Aid P r o g r a m * B i e  lag  in  i n l t i a i  d e liv e r­
ie s  vas due in  p a r t  to  th e  lap se  o f tim e betveen th e  approval o f au thoriza­
tio n  and expropria tion  measures by United S ta te s  governmental o f f ic ia ls*  
P residen t Truman signed th e  China Aid Act on A pril 3* 1 9 ^ ,  but Congress 
d id  not pass th e  app rop ria tions a c t u n t i l  June 19* The P residen t signed 
th e  exprcp idations b i l l  on June 28 and n o tif ie d  th e  Chinese Ambassador on 
June 29 o f  th e  term s governing the  t r a n s fe r  o f th e  $123,000,000 in  g ran ts 
to  th e  National Goverment* Chinese o f f i c i a l s  in  Washington a lso  co n trib ­
u te d  to  th e  delay  in  e a rly  shipments* In  attem pts to  secure supplies a t  
th e  lo v e s t p o ss ib le  p r ic e . N a tio n a lis t rep re se n ta tiv e s  in  Washington defer­
red  p lac ing  th e i r  o rders u n t i l  they  had checked v ith  severa l p o ss ib le  com­
m ercia l sources. General Timbeiman s ta te d  th a t  on one occasion the  Chinese
°^There vas considerab le  controversy over th e  "delay" in  diipments 
under t h i s  program* Ambassador S tu a r t, i n  China a t  th e  tim e, s ta te d  th a t  
d e liv e r ie s  vere  "extremely slov*" Wedemeyer accused th e  A dm inistration o f 
" th v a rtin g  th e  in te n t  o f  th e  China Aid Act by delaying th e  shipment o f 
m unitions to  China u n t i l  th e  mad o f  th a t  c r i t i c a l  year (1948)*" S tu a rt, 
p . 244; Wedemeyer, p* 379* Several R ^ re s e n ta tiv e s  a lso  a ttacked  th e  taardy 
im ploaentation o f  th e  program, s ta tin g  th a t  "No arms o r  ammunition * * • 
reached th e  Chinese fo rces  u n t i l  Dec*, 1948, e i ^ t  months a f t e r  th e  la v  
vas passed* " This ar^port vas signed by sev era l m inority  members o f  th e  
House G o n it te e  on fb re ig n  A ffa irs : C harles A* Baton, Robert B* C h iperfie ld , 
John M* Vozys, F rancis P* Bolton, Laurence H* Smith, Chester E* Merrov, 
W alter H* Judd, John Davis Lodge, and Donald L* Jackson* U* S*, Congress, 
House, Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Extension o f  th e  Rironman Recovery 
Program. 81st Cong*, 1 s t  Sess*, 1949» H. Rept* 323» Pt* 2, M inority Vievs 
to  accompany H* R* 3748, p* 4* There i s  some evidence, hovever, th a t  th e  
shipments vere n o t a s  l a t e  o r  as inadequate as th e  congressional m inority  
re p o rt in d ic a te d , and th a t  th e  U* S* vas not a lto g e th e r  responsib le  fo r  
th e  delays which d id  develop* These p o in ts  a re  t r e a te d  belov:
^^L etter o f  Charles E* Bohlen, Counselor, Department o f  S ta te , to  
Sen* Bridges, dated  Ju ly  1, 1948* P rin ted  in  U. S*, Congressional R^norri, 
80th Cong., 2nd Sess*, 1948, XCIV, Pt* 12, A5O8O-8I* The Chinese d id  not 
submit a request f o r  v ith d ra v a ls  from program funds u n t i l  Ju ly  23» 1948, but 
they  d id  use some o f  th e  money p r io r  to  t h i s  da te  to  pay fo r  m ili ta ry  
m a te ria l a lready  purchased* S ta te  Departmmit, U. S* R elations v ith  China. 
Annex 1?2, p* 972*
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"delayed p lacing  th e i r  o rder fo r  a a a ll  a » s  and accesso ries fo r  about a 
month" while t h ^  canvassed a v a ilab le  p r ic e  in d e x e s .^
In  sp ite  o f  o b stac les  to  th e  a cc e le ra tio n  o f d e liv e r ie s , two s ig n if­
ic a n t  shipments vere made even before  th e  N ational Government requested  
any withdrawals o f  funds to  pay fo r  th e  m ili ta ry  m a te ria l. Two v e sse ls  
loaded with 10,000 tons o f  an a ll arms and a r t i l l e r y  l e f t  Hawaii fo r  China 
on Ju ly  3 and Ju ly  16, 1 9 ^ .^ ^  As in d ica ted  by Table 3» th e  monetary 
va lu a tio n  o f monthly shipments increased  rap id ly  during l a t e  1946—from 
approxim ately $1,900,000 in  September to  $7,000,000 in  October and $20,600,000 
in  November. D e liveries reached t h e i r  peak during December when $28,219,000 
in  supp lies were made a v a ila b le  to  th e  N ational Government. £(sr December 
31, 1946, a few days before  M arshall resigned a s  Secretary  o f  S ta te , approxi­
m ately $61,000,000 in  m ili ta ry  m a te ria l had been tra n s fe rre d  under the  
China Aid P rogram .^
^^himbexman* s statem ent to  House Committee on fb re ig n  A ffa irs  on 
June 21, 1949, re fe rre d  to  an o rder prepared during A ug.-Sept., 1946, and 
i s  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, n . s .  R^lationa Chjinn. Annex 1?4, 
p . 976. One o rder, subm itted to  th e  U. S. Department o f th e  Azmy in  Ju ly , 
1948, was no t f i l l e d  u n t i l  Nov. B arris  eaqplanation  o f  th e  delay  was th a t  
th e  N a tio n a lis ts  subm itted a rev ised  l i s t  fo r  sm all aims and ammunition i: .  
Sept. a s  item s requested  were not immediately a v a ila b le , and used th i r t y  
days "shopping around" to  see i f  thqy could buy stq>plies tro a  "w ildcat 
o u t f i t s  before t e l l in g  th e  (U. S.) Government to  go ahead." Testimoqy o f 
June 22, 1951» in  Senate Committees on Aimed Services and on Foreign Rela­
t io n s , Hearings, w n t a ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951» F t. 4-, 3037-36.
^^S tate  Department, Ü. S. RAigtjimnm with China. Annex 172, p . 973*
^ I te m s  shipped through Dec. 3I» 1946, were procured by Ü. S.
Government agencies as fo llow s: Aimy, $40,018,200.09: Navy, ^ ,8 4 6 ,0 0 0 .0 0 ;
A ir Ebrce, $ ï ,  735» 639* 56; Bureau o f  Federal S içp ly , $ 7 6 1 ,2 1 6 .9 7 ; and O ffice  
o f  th e  Foreign L iquidation  Commissioner, $1 ,215 ,73^ * 65* The Chinese Govern­
ment procured th e  remaining $13,360,000.11 in  supp lies which were shipped 
th ro u ^  Dec. 3I» 1946 . Shipments included sm all aims and ammunition ( in  
Ju ly , O c t., Nov., and Dec.] , a r t i l l e r y  ammunition, a i r c r a f t ,  a i r c r a f t  spare 
p a r ts ,  a v ia tio n  g aso lin e , communications equipment, naval and m edical sup­






































*Based on s t a t i s t i c s  found in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations 
with China. Annex I 7I ,  Secs. XVI-XH, pp. 953-69.
made.
^A vailable records do not in d ic a te  month in  which shipment was
®Total was low because shipments were suspended during most o f  
March a t  th e  req u est o f  Acting P re ^ d e n t Li Tsung-jen w hile th e  Executive 
Yuan was being reorgan ized . I b id . . Annex 172, p . 974.
November and December, 1948, however, th e  N a tio n a lis ts  were on 
th e  defensive and were being soundly defeated  in  p ra c t ic a l ly  evezy m il i ta ry  
engagement. Tremendous lo sse s  in  m il i ta ry  equipment were o f f s e tt in g  th e  
shipments to  th e  mainland. S ecre tary  Acheson described th e  s i tu a tio n  as 
follow s on June 4 , 1951 î
th e  end o f  1948 th e  stru g g le  in  North China had v i r tu a l ly  
ended with th e  coqplete  co llap se  o f  th e  N a tio n a lis t axmies. Eighty 
p e r cent o f  a l l  th e  m a te ria l which we had fu rn ished , both during 
th e  war (VIbrld Har H )  and a f te r ,  to  th e  N ational G ovem ent, was 
l o s t ;  and seven ty -five  per cent o f  th a t  i s  estim ated to  have been
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captured by th e  Communists.
At th e  request o f  th e  Chinese Qoverxment shipments were made to  
Fomosa a f te r  December, 1948, to  prevent stocks from f a l l in g  in to  the  hands 
o f  th e  Communists. Monthly d e liv e r ie s  fo r  e a rly  1949, according to  Table 
3 , never d id  reach the  t o ta l s  amassed during November and December, 19^#  
N evertheless, over $25,000,000 in  m il i ta ry  supp lies and equipment were d is ­
patched to  th e i r  d e s tin a tio n  during January-A pril, 1949» "Die t o t a l  
$125, 000,000 appropria ted  under th e  program was d isbursed  by th e  Department 
o f  th e  Treasury as o f  A pril 1, 1 9 4 9 .^  November 1 m a te ria ls  purchased 
fo r  $115, 823,200 had been shipped to  China and Formosa.
^^Statement by Acheson, p rin te d  in  Senate Committees on Amed Serv­
ic e s  and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E aq t. 1951, P t. 3 , IB56.  E b rre s ta l, th en  Secre tary  o f Defense, re fe rre d  
to  th e se  d isa s tro u s  lo s se s  o f equipment by th e  Chinese in  h is  d iazy  en try  
o f  Nov. 26, 1948, lAen he s ta te d  th a t  "equipment f o r  th i r ty - th re e  d iv is io n s , 
includ ing  297,000 r i f l e s ,  a  la rg e  amount o f  autom atic weapons, 105 and 155 
m illim e te r guns and a n t ia i r c r a f t  weapons" had been captured by th e  Commti- 
r is ts .  M iU is (ed. ) , p . 533»
^ T h e  U. S. Treasury d isbursed  th e  $125,000,000 to  U. S. agencies 
and th e  Chinese Qoverxment as follow s: (1) Ü. S .—Azmy, $64,595,178.25;
Navy, $6,892,020.00; A ir Force, $7,750,000.00; Bureau o f Fedezml Sxqjply, 
$13, 765, 522. 12; O ffice o f  Foreign L iquidation  Commissioner, $2,690,910.88; 
and (2) th e  Chinese Qoverxment— $29,306, 368. 75» The Chinese Qoverxment 
then  a llo ca ted  th e  t o t a l  sum fo r  purchase o f item s fo r  th e  follow ing am s 
o f  th e  Qoveirxment as fo llow s: A ir Force, $28,000,000; Azmy, $87,500,000;
and Navy, $9,500,000. S ta te  Depaztment, Ü. S. R elations with China. Annex 
171, pp. 952- 53, and Annex 172, p . 973»
69"snmmary o f  United S ta te s  Oovexnment Ecoxiamic and M ilitazy  Aid 
A uthorised fo r  China since  1937, " 1950, p . 17, from The Papers o f  Harry S. 
Truman. Acheson sa id  on June 5, 1951, th a t  $4,500,000 o f th e  o r igina l  
pra n t s t i l l  remained unshipped on Feb. 28, 1951» He xioted, however, th a t  
$3 , 500,000 o f  th e  t o t a l  were in  procurement. Senate Committees on Amed 
SeiTVices and on Foreign Relatioxis, Hear in g s . M iljta z ?  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast, 1951, P t. 3 , 1929- 30.  A ctually , P residen t Tzixman suspended a l l  m ili­
ta z y  a ss is ta n ce , o ther than  th a t  no t d e liv ered  under th e  Chixxa Aid Act, to  
Fomosa on Jan. 5, 1950, and d id  not l i f t  th e  suspension u n t i l  th e  Commu­
n is t  a tta c k  on Korea in  June, 1950. Stuaxrt, pp. 269, 274.
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C hina's problems vere not J u s t  p o l i t i c a l  and m ili ta ry  ones, how­
ever. And United S ta te s  po licy  toward China was not framed with only th ese  
two fa c to rs  In  mind. American p o licy  makers a lso  perceived adverse economic 
conditions and sought to  lessen  th e i r  se v e rity . The follow ing chapter I s  
an assessment o f lA at th e  United S ta te s  d id  In  th e  economic f ie ld .
CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CHINA,
I 9U5- I 949
United S ta te s  Economie Pol ic y ;  P o s itiv e  
and Negative Aspects. 194^1949
United S ta te s  post-w ar p o licy , as  sp ec ified  ty  P residen t Truman 
in  December, 1945, recognized th a t  China needed fo re ign  economic a ss is ta n ce  
to  r e v i ta l iz e  i t s  economy. Vd.th th i s  o b jec tiv e  in  mind, M arsha ll's  in s tru c ­
t io n s  s tip u la te d  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  would consider Chinese req u ests  fo r  
c re d i ts  and loans designed to  strengthen C hina's economic p o s itio n  as soon 
as China showed p rogress toward reorganizing  th e  government and the  army.
As in  th e  case o f  m iU taxy a ss is ta n ce , economic a id  was to  be extended to  
th e  Govemmmit as reorganized under the  re so lu tio n s  o f  th e  P o l i t ic a l  Consul­
t a t iv e  Conference.
Implementation o f United S ta te s  economic a ss is ta n c e  on th i s  b a s is  
meant support o f a c o a lit io n  government. This p o in t was brought out by a 
l e t t e r  from th e  Department o f S ta te  on October 2, 1946, lAich Senator Know- 
land read  in to  th e  record  o f  congressional hearings on May 11, 1951» The 
S ta te  Department l e t t e r  was signed by VÆLlliam L. Clayton, A ssistan t Secre­
ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r  Economic A ffia rs , and was in  rep ly  to  one from Admiral 
W. W. Smith, Chairman o f the  United S ta te s  Maritime Commission. Sm ith 's 
l e t t e r  asked th e  Department to  express i t s  views on th e  extension o f  c re d it  
to  China b7 th e  Maritime Commission fo r  th e  purchase o f  v e sse ls  under the  
Merchant Ship Sales Act o f 1946. C lay ton 's rep ly  was as follow s:
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Ihe Department o f  S ta te  has no ob jec tio n  to  th e  n ego tia tion  
and conclusion o f  a c re d i t  fo r  the  above purpose*
In  accordance with general po licy  toward c re d i t  a ss is ta n ce  to  
China, however, th e  Department requests  th a t  any tr a n s fe r  o f war- 
b u i l t  commercial-type v e sse ls  to  China on a c re d i t  b a s is  be sub­
j e c t  to  th e  follow ing proviso : ' I t  i s  the  d e s ire  o f th e  United
S ta te s  Government th a t  these  ccnmerciaL*type v e sse ls  be destined  
fo r  a un ited  and democratic China under a c o a lit io n  government.'1
The a u th o risa tio n  o f  American economic a ss is ta n c e  to  China during 
th e  M arshall M ission was marked by a r e la t iv e ly  q u ie t and recep tiv e  home- 
f ro n t .  There was no organised Congressional opposition  to  the  g ran ting  
o f economic a id  to  th e  Republic of China, and A dm inistrative agencies r e -  
qwnded favorably . M arshall was acclaimed fo r  th e  good job he was doing in  
China ah en he re tu rned  to  th e  United S ta te s  in  March, 1946, to  secure mater­
i a l  a id  in  support o f h is  m ission. And though M arshall d id  p lace an embargo 
on th e  shipment o f  combat-type item s to  China in  August, 1946, t h i s  a c tio n  
d id  no t apply to  economic a ss is tan ce .
A fter th e  American m ediation attem pt was ended in  Januazy, 1947, 
th e  United S ta te s  withdrew i t s  siqiport from a l l  e f f o r ts  to  c re a te  a Chinese 
c o a lit io n . P o l i t ic a l  overtu res were rep laced  with m il i ta ry  and economic 
a ss is ta n c e . Ecoromic a ss is ta n ce  was extended with a tw o-fold  o b jec tiv e  in  
mind: ( l )  to  al* .eviate th e  su ffe ring  o f th e  Chinese people, and (2) to
encourage Chinese se lf -h e lp .
From t h i s  da te  I January, 19471 u n t i l  th e  N ational Government f e l l ,  
American o f f ic ia l  s were b a s ic a lly  guided by th re e  fa c to rs .  F i r s t ,  th e
^& d.th 's l e t t e r  re fe rre d  to  th e  extension o f  a c re d it  o f  $76,000,000 
fo r  th e  purchase o f  159 w ar-b u ilt v e s se ls . Senate Committees on Aimed Serv­
ic e s  and on Foreign R ela tions, Hearings. M ilita ry  S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far 
E ast. 1951, F t. 1 , 553* S ta te  Department po licy  was changed but no t u n t i l  
a f t e r  the  M a r* a ll  M ission. Acheson to ld  the  ame committees on June 5*
1951# th a t  C .ny ton 's l e t t e r  was superseded by ^ne from A ssis tan t Secretary  
Garrison Norton to  â a ith  on kpr» 18, 1947» Smith, Acheson sa id , was advised 
"to  go ahead and tr a n s fe r  th e  dtxips.” I b id . . P t. 3, 1930.
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Chinese economic problem was considered to  be p rim arily  an in te rn a l  one. 
Ih o u ^  th e  United S ta te s  recognized th a t  the  N ational Government needed 
fo reign  a ss is ta n ce  to  help  r e v i ta l iz e  i t s  economy, American o f f i c i a l s  d id  
not be lieve  th a t  the  N a tio n a lis ts  could achieve th a t  o b jec tiv e  hy re ly in g  
so le ly  on ex te rn a l support. I t  i s  t ru e  th a t  th e  United S ta te s  used much 
o f 1947 in  try in g  to  s p e c if ic a lly  determine what measures would b est a id  th e  
N a tio n a lis t cause. M arshall had decided in  early  Ju ly , 1947, however, th a t  
th e  Chinese would have to  make th e  "fundamental and la s tin g "  co n trib u tio n  
to  th e  so lu tio n  o f  t h e i r  own problem.^ Second, American statesmen contended 
th a t  th e  d is t r e s s  o f th e  masses could not be removed nor could a s ta b le  
economy be a tta in e d  as long as th e  c iv i l  war continued. Thus, i t  was 
im perative th a t  th e  N ational Government, through i t s  own e f fo r ts ,  f in d  some 
means o f  ending th e  m il i ta ry  c o n f l ic t .  Success in  th i s  endeavor would per­
m it th e  d iv ers io n  o f war revenue to  reco n stru c tio n  and r e h a b il i ta t io n  pro­
je c ts .  And, th i r d .  S ecre tary  M arshall cautioned th a t  American economic 
a ss is ta n ce  should not be considered to  be e ith e r  a r  express o r im plied 
assumption by th e  Ihiited S ta te s  o f  any r e ^ n s i b i l i t y  fo r  p o lic ie s  o r a c tio n s  
o f  th e  Goverment o f  China. ̂  Qy e a r iy  1948 the  American A dm inistration 
concluded th a t  economic a id  to  China should not be made a v a ilab le  on a 
long-range b a s is . Congress supported t h i s  view vdien i t  passed th e  China 
Aid Act in  A pril, 1948. This l a s t  p o in t i s  w ell s ta te d  by the  rep o rt o f  
th e  Senate Foreign R ela tions Committee lAich was subm itted to  th e  Senate by 
i t s  Chairman, Senator Vandenberg, on March 25, 1948:
^Supra. Chapter XU, n. 85.  Also see M arsh a ll's  comments o f Feb.
20, 1948, in  n. 98.
-^M arshall's advice was follow ed and given th e  e f fe c t  o f law in  
Sec. 402 o f  th e  China Aid Act. The S e c re ta ry 's  comments were made before 
th e  House Committee o f  Foreign A ffa irs  on Feb. 20, 1948, and a re  p r in te d  in  
S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 175 (b ), pp. 983-85*
The China Aid Act i s  p r in te d  in  i b i d . . Annex 179, PP* 991-93*
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Under th e  p resen t circum stances, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  develop a 
p ra c t ic a l ,  l o n g - te n ,  ovei^>all program fo r  C hina 's economic recovery, 
p red ica ted  upon o u ts ide  a ss is ta n ce  from th e  United S ta te s . We must 
deal with developments as th^y unfold . As in  a l l  fo re ig n .a id  pro­
grams, we must make i t  p la in  th a t  our commitments a re  confined to  
th e  t e n s  o f t h i s  l e g i ^ t i o n . ^
Thus, as in d ica ted  above. United S ta te s  p o licy  was f i n  in  both i t s  
p o s itiv e  and negative a sp ec ts . There i s ,  moreover, some ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  
th e  b e l ie f  th a t  th e  negative p o s itio n  o f  th e  United S ta te s  course o f 
ac tio n  was le s s  f le x ib le  than th e  p o s itiv e  one. This l a s t  point—^ a t  th e  
United S ta te s  would no t do to  implement i t s  policy—req u ire s  fu r th e r  elabora­
t io n  on two p o in ts : ( l )  re fu sa l to  extend a currency s ta b i l iz a t io n  loan ,
and (2) r e s t r ic t io n s  on th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  economic ad v iso rs .
N a tio n a lis t o f f i c i a l s  were p a r t ic u la r ly  in s i s te n t  during and a f t e r  
19^7 t h a t  the  United S ta te s  provide a currency s ta b i l iz a t io n  loan . The 
N ational Government contended th a t  th e  Chinese had more confidence in  s i lv e r  
than in  paper currency. Therefore, i t  was sa id , a s i lv e r  loan could be 
used to  absorb some o f  th e  paper currency and re s to re  th e  confidence o f 
th e  Chinese people in  th e  monetary system. United S ta te s  o f f i c i a l s  o f 
th e  S ta te  and Treasury Departments c o n s is te n tly  opposed such a loan and one 
was never made. The United S ta te s  p o s itio n  on th is  is su e  was th a t  th e  
currency c r i s i s  was e s s e n t ia lly  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  in te r n a l  budget d e f i c i t ,  
no t th a t  o f  a shortage o f fo re ig n  exchange. Consequently, massive d e f ic i t  
spending would have to  be c u rta ile d  before a monetaxy measure would have 
any appreciab le  e f f e c t .  F arther, American personnel noted, th e  extension 
o f  a s i lv e r  loan might subsequently involve th e  United S ta te s  i n  a "moral 
re s p o n s ib i li ty ” to  provide la rg e r  amounts o f s i lv e r  to  develop a new cur­
rency. In  ad d itio n , American executives observed th a t  th e re  was no assurance
^Hhioted from Sparkman, aeview o f B ipartisan  Foreign Policy  Consul­
ta t io n s  since Wprld War U . 1952, Senate Doc. 87, p . 22.
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th a t  the  N a tio n a lis t budget would be balanced even i f  the  United S ta te s  
provided enough s i lv e r  to  completely rep lace  th e  paper currency in  c irc u la ­
t io n .  Nor, fo r  th a t  m atte r, could th e  United S ta te s  even be sure th a t  th e  
N ational Government would not a t  a l a t e r  d a te  use paper currency to  finance 
i t s  d e f i c i t . 5
The negative aspec t of th e  United S ta te s  course o f a c tio n  was a lso  
apparent in  regard  to  th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f American economic adv iso rs. A 
d is t in c t io n  was made by th e  United S ta te s , however, between th e  assignment 
o f  a "supreme economic adv iser" to  th e  N ational Government and th a t  o f  per­
sonnel with supervisory  and advisory fun c tio n s in  connection with various 
a id  programs. M arshall believed th a t  th e  Chinese were more disposed to  
r e ly  upon ex te rn a l a ss is ta n c e  than upon th e i r  own e f f o r t s .  He he ld  o th e r 
re se rv a tio n s  on ih e  designation  o f an American as a "supreme economic adv is­
e r , " however, and he informed Ambassador S tu a rt accordingly  on January 12, 
1948:
Mother American o b jec tio n s to  th e  extension o f  a currency s t a b i l i ­
z a tio n  loan to  China were: ( l )  World p r ic e s  and m arket conditions were too
u n stab le  fo r  a currency system based on s i lv e r .  The ex te rn a l value o f such 
a system, i t  was noted, would be adverse ly  a ffe c te d  by fo re ign  cond itions 
which were not re la te d  to  those i n  China. (2) China was a member o f th e  
In te rn a tio n a l Monetary Fund and had committed i t s e l f  " in  p r in c ip le  to  th e  
s t a b i l i ty  o f exchange r a te s  in  terms o f  g o ld .” Therefore, th e  United S ta te s  
contmided, both na tions would be v io la t in g  Idieir own commitments i f  China, 
w ith American a ss is ta n c e , e s tab lish ed  a s i lv e r  standard  currency. Based on 
re p o r ts  o f  conferences between o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  Departments o f  S ta te  and th e  
Treasury in  Ju ly , 1947, and Feb., 1948, p r in te d  in  S ta te  Deparrtment, U. S. 
R ela tions with China, pp. 36?-69, and in  Annex 177, pp. 987-89. Clarence 
E. Gauss, Ambassador to  China immediately before Gen. Hurley and subsequent­
ly  a  board member o f th e  Export-H qw rt Bank, a lso  opposed a currency s t a b i l i ­
z a tio n  loan  to  China. He s ta te d  during congressional hearings on th e  pro­
posed China Aid Act th a t  th e  Chinese could no t embark on a currency s t a b i l i ­
za tio n  program u n t i l  th e re  was a " c e r ta in  degree" o f  peace and s t a b i l i ty  in  
th e  country. Testimony o f Mar. 8, 1948, in  House Committee on Foreign 
A ffa irs , HMrtngw fo r  a Post-Vhr Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 2194. The 
A dm inistration gave i t s  f in a l  answer to  suclx a loan  idien Sec. Acheson i a -  
foxmed Congress i n  M ar., 1949, th a t  th e  executive branch was opposed to  a 
proposed $1,500,000,000 loan  to  China which included $500, 000,000 fo r  as­
s is ta n c e  toward s ta b il iz in g  th e  Chinese currency gystem. Supra. Chapter 
m ,  n. 107.
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There a re , • • • , two obvious and se rious disadvantages to  
appointment o f a  ' saprm e  economic adviser* : F i r s t ,  th e re  i s  the
basic  question  o f  how e ffe c tiv e  under p resen t circum stances in  China 
he can be and secondly, and more isqxxrtant, th e  strong  i=q)lication 
th a t  h i s  presence would ca rry  o f  continuing United S ta te s  re sp o n sib il' 
i t y  fo r  economic, f in a n c ia l  and governmental s i tu a t io n  in  China, a 
re sp o n s ib ili ty  tdiich th e  United S ta te s  cannot assume and which 
China and o ther co u n tries  must not be m isled to  b e liev e  has been o r  
i s  going to  be assumed.°
Ihough th e  United S ta te s  had made some tec h n ic a l and advisory 
personnel av a ila b le  fo r  the  implementation o f a id  programs, p a r t ic u la r ly  
fo r  UNRRA, American p o licy  on th ese  m atte rs  was reexamined during and a f t e r  
th e  China a id  hearings in  1948. M a rsh a ll 's  views, as expressed to  Ambassador 
S tu a rt, a re  p a r t ic u la r ly  rev ea lin g . The S ecre tary  wrote on May 7, 1948, 
th a t  th e  United S ta te s  should th in k  in  term s o f  th re e  d if fe re n t  kinds o f 
personnel and fu n c tio n s . F i r s t ,  te c h n ic a l personnel would oe needed in  
advisory c a p a c itie s  f o r  reco n stru c tio n  p ro je c ts . I t  was in  th i s  a rea , Mar­
sh a ll  be lieved , th a t  th e  g re a te s t  number o f  Americans should be used in  
advisory p o s it io n s . Second, American adv iso rs should no t be assigned to  
Chinese Government agencies th a t  d is tr ib u te d  American a id  commodities.
United S ta te s  personnel in  th ese  in s ta n c e s , M arshall sa id , A ould be employed 
by th e  United S ta te s  m ission involved and should confine themselves to  
observation  and rep o rtin g  d u tie s . And, th i r d ,  basic  f i s c a l  and o th er p o licy  
problems, includ ing  th e  reduction  o f  m il i ta ry  expenditures, could not be 
solved th r o u ^  te c h n ic a l advice. &ideavors f o r  improvements along these  
l in e s ,  M ardiall noted, should be l e f t  to  "continuous e f f o r t  . . .  by w ell- 
timed inform al p ressu re  a t  top  le v e ls ,  e .g . ,  by th e  Chief o f  the  ECA Mis­
sion  and top fiabassy o f f i c i a l s .
^S ta te  Department, U. S. R ela tions wi th  China. Annex 178 (a ) , p .
990.
7 lb id . .  Annex 178 (b ), pp. 990-91*
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I t  i s  now w ell e s tab lish ed , o f course, th a t  American economic 
a ss is ta n ce  was not a panacea fo r  C hina's economic and f in a n c ia l  problems* 
China was, as has been noted e a r l ie r ,  a m il i ta ry  th e a te r  and an arena o f  
p o l i t i c a l  in tr ig u e  and propaganda charges* China was a lso , however, in  
need o f  economic assistance*  The remaining pages o f t h i s  chapter w ill  
analyze th e  economic and f in a n c ia l cond itions in  China and the  American 
e f fo r t  to  a r re s t  th e  d e te r io ra tio n  in  th ese  areas*
Economic D eterio ra tio n  in  N^tionaHmt China
There was some ju s t i f i c a t io n  on V-J Day fo r  guarded optimism th a t  
China, under c e r ta in  cond itions, would be ab le  to  recupera te  economically 
and f in a n c ia l ly  from e i ^ t  years o f war*® But as th e  post-w ar period  len g th ­
ened  i t  became in creas in g ly  evident th a t  the  N ational Government was con­
fron ted  with a foe more form idable than  i t s  enemy during World War II*  In  
ad d ition , th e  Republic o f  China re ta in e d  a l l  th e  problems o f previous years* 
The cumulztive e ffe c t  c f  the  R epublic 's economic i l l s —both o ld  and curren t— 
sapped th e  v i t a l i t y  o f , and th e  popular enthusiasm fo r , th e  regime o f  Chiang 
Kai-shek while help ing  to  generate  the  Communist upsurge* I t  i s  not always 
eaqy to  determine whether a p a r t ic u la r  f a c to r  was a cause o r  a r e s u l t  o f 
C hina's economic sta tus*  There i s  i r r e fu ta b le  evidence, however, th a t  
economic corrosion and i t s  psychological impact were m ajor determ inants o f 
th e  N a tio n a lis t co llap se .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  understand how th e  N ational Government re ta in ed  
i t s  equilibrium  as long as i t  did* Any one o f  sev era l fa c to rs , i f  un­
checked, could have caused se rious repercussions* But China was not so 
fortunate*  C o llec tiv e ly , and nearly  in c e ssa n tly , d iverse  elements in te ra c te d
®Supra, pp* 62. But  see pp* 6 > 64 .
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upon each o th er u n t i l  th e  R epublic 's economic s t a b i l i ty  and popular support 
were irrep a ra b ly  damaged. These fo rces included th e  follow ing: skyrocketing
p r ic e s , voluminous note is su e s , a d e te r io ra tin g  currency exchange r a te ,  
g ro ss ly  inadequate revenue means, and th e  steady dep le tion  o f fo re ign  
exchange rese rv es . At one time o r another and in  varying degrees th e re  were 
d e le te rio u s  consequences—c iv i l  dem oralization and impoverishment, stagnated 
production, governmental read iness to  r e ly  on d e f i c i t  financing and fo reign  
a ss is ta n c e , a fragmented economy, and p e c u la t io n  and hoarding.
D rastic  measures were needed o f  course, bu t thqy did not m a te ria l­
iz e .  F a ilu res  in  th e  m il i ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  a reas were p a ra lle le d  by those 
in  th e  economic sphere. The people su ffe red , became apathetic  toward th e  
N ational Government, and withdrew th e i r  support from i t .  According to  
Ambassador S tu a r t, th e  masses became d isconso la te  and cared fo r  n e ith e r  
th e  Kuomintang nor Communist ideology. The Chinese, he s ta ted , wanted only 
"peace" and "mere bodily  e x i s t e n c e . H e n r y  R. Lieberman, New York Times 
correspondent, noted in  e a r ly  1948 th a t  th e  lo s s  o f  popular confidence had 
p r e a d  to  some o f  Chiang K ai-shek 's former s p p o r te r s .  Lieberman wrote 
th a t  he had ta lk s  with some o f  these  peopl»—businesanen, bankers, i n t e l ­
le c tu a ls  and tech n ic ian s—and had been to ld  th a t  Chiang once had been 
considered a "sacrosanct p o l i t i c a l  p m b o l." Thus, though c ritic ism  had
^S tu art, pp. 181, 189-90. Roger D. Lapham, Chief o f th e  ECA 
M ission to  China fo r  adm inistering  th e  China Aid Act, agreed w ith S tu a rt. 
Lapham added th a t  th e  Chinese were in te re s te d  p rim arily  in  food and second­
a r i l y  in  governments. "The g rea t m ajo rity  o f  them ,” he observed, "are more 
in te re s te d  in  lA ere th e i r  next meal i s  coming from than  they a re  in  what 
p a r ty  co n tro ls  t h e i r  c e n tra l  government." Lapham, "The Chinese S itu a tio n  
As I  Saw I t , "  Paper read before th e  Commonwealth Club o f C a lifo rn ia , San 
Francisco, C a l i f . , S p t .  8 , 1949, p. 5, (Mimeographed] in  the  f i l e s  o f 
R p . Helen Qahagan Douglas, D ivision o f  M anuscripts, U niversity  o f  Oklahoma 
l ib ra ry ,  Norman, Okla. C ited  h e re a f te r  a s  Lapham, "The Chinese S itu a tio n  
As I  Saw I t , "  S p t .  8, 1949.  Lapham h e ld  th is  p o s itio n  from May 5, 1948, 
to  June 30, 1949*
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been lev e led  a t  the  Government and some o f i t s  o f f i c i a l s ,  Chiang had not 
been a ttacked . This p ra c tic e , the  co lum nist's  sources in d ic a te d , no longer 
p rev a iled . Lieberman's inform ation revealed  th a t  the  G eneralissim o's lo s s  
o f personal p re s tig e  was due to : ( l )  the  N a tio n a lis ts ' m il i ta ry  d e fe a ts ,
(2) mounting in f la t io n ,  and (3) the  Government's in ep titu d e  in  f in a n c ia l  
m atte rs .
The paramount post-w ar econ<mic problem—h y p e rin fla tio n —was c le a r­
ly  in d ic a te d  by s p ir a l l in g  p ric e s , in c reas in g  d is p a r ity  between th e  exchange 
ra te s  o f  American and Chinese monetary u n its , and un in te rrup ted  d e f ic i t  
financing . Though the  R epublic 's economic co llap se  was not determined 
so le ly  by economic causes th ese  fo rces  d id  co n trib u te  s ig n if ic a n tly  to  th a t  
downfall. F urther, N a tio n a lis t a c tio n  and in ac tio n  aided the  in f la tio n a ry  
process.
P rices  soared to  such h e ig h ts  during 1945-1949 th a t  not even th e
terms " in f la tio n "  and "hyperin fla tion" seen to  possess th e  q u a l i t ie s  req u i-
1 1site  fo r  dep ic ting  the  tre n d  toward. A Department o f  S ta te  p u b lica tio n  
s ta te d  th a t  wholesale p r ic e s  in  S h an ^ a i increased  more than seven tim es 
during 1946 and th a t  th e  growth during th e  year averaged approxim ately
lO lieberm an's column in  New York Times. Mar. 2, 1948, p. 14.
S tu a rt repo rted  to  M ar^ia ll on Dec. 21, 1948, th a t  Chiang had lo s t  th e  con­
fidence o f  th e  " p o l i t ic a l ly  conscious c it iz e n s"  and th a t  o f  "most o f f i c i a l s  
o f  a l l  ranks in  Government. ” S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations with China. 
Annex 165 ( f ) ,  p . 898.
^ A n a ly s is  o f th e  years 1937-194? i s  in d ic a tiv e  o f  th e  p a tte rn .
For example, a  rep o rt by a sen ior s t a f f  o f f i c i a l  o f  UNRRA, using  s t a t i s t i c s  
o f  th e  C entra l Bank o f  China, s ta te d  th a t  wholesale p r ic e s  o f  basic  com­
m odities f o r  th e  period  Nov., 1945-Oct., 194?, ro se  44.3 tim es over those 
o f  th e  preceding two-year period  o f  S e p t., 1943-Aug., 1945. Further, th e  
rep o rt declared , p r ic e s  f o r  the  period  Ju ly , 1937-Oct., 194?, increased  
58, 474- f o ld  o r  5,847,400 p e r cen t. The f ig u re s  fo r  1937-1945 a re  fo r  
Chungking; those fo r  1946-194? a re  fo r  S h a n ^ a i. P rice , "UNRRA in  China," 
UNRRA, O perational A nalysis Papers, No. 53, A pr., 1948, p . 79*
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twelve per cent per m o n t h . % e  a cc e le ra tio n  continued a f te r  M arshall 
l e f t  China in  January, 19^7. February, 19^7» according to  Chang Kiau- 
Ngau, wholesale p r ic e s  in  Shanghai alm ost doubled every s ix ty  to  n ine ty  
days. At the  end o f th e  year, he noted, the  le v e l o f  id io lesale  p r ic e s  in  
th e  same c ity  had r is e n  to  nearly  f i f te e n  tim es th a t  o f  th e  preceding Decem­
ber and had r is e n  tw ice as much during 19^7 as they  had during 1946.13
There was no pem anent r e l i e f .  The year 1946 was a c ru c ia l one 
in  many resp ec ts  fo r  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  masses, and the  in f la t io n  
in  p r ic e s  was ju s t  one measure o f t h e i r  p recarious s ta te .  A prominent 
Chinese economist has declared  th a t  in f la t io n  was so bad in  S h an ^ a i in  
October, 1946, th a t  r e t a i l e r s  refused to  s e l l  t h e i r  merchandise a t  o f f i c i a l  
p r ic e s . "Even th e  re s ta u ra n ts ,"  he observed, "refused to  do business.
Ihe economic in se c u r i ty  facing  the  businessmen was amply a tte s te d  to  by a
In s ta te  Department, D. S. R ela tions wi th  China, pp. 221, 36I .  A 
work p r ^ a r e d  under th e  d ire c tio n  o f  th e  Chief H is to rian  o f  UNRRA s ta te d  
th a t  th e  general index number o f  wholesale p r ic e s  o f  basic  commodities 
in  Shanghai, using  Jan .-June , 1937 average as a  base o f  1, soared from 
5,713 in  Dec., 1946, to  63,796 in  Dec., 1947. Wbodbridge, I I ,  394.
13chang Kia^Ngau, pp. 72, ?4. Harry B. P rice  removed a l l  complexity 
from th e  explanation o f  t h i s  m atter a s  fo llow s: "The Chinese d o lla r  de­
p re c ia te d  so ra p id ly  in  purchasing power th a t  a December 1 9 ^  d o lla r  was 
worth considerably  le s s  than one per cen t o f a January 1945 d o l l a r . "
C ited in  Wbodbridge, H ,  398. I t  i s  probably sgpparent th a t  the  author 
has commonly used s t a t i s t i c s  r e la t iv e  to  th e  s i tu a tio n  in  Shanghai. This 
p ra c tic e  has been follow ed fo r  two basic  reasons: ( l )  a v a ilab le  sources
c i t e  f ig u re s  fo r  3iangfrai more c o n s is te n tly  than  those fo r  o ther a reas , and
(2 ) S h a n ^ a i was th e  f in a n c ia l  nerve cen te r  o f th e  Chinese Republic. How­
ever, Chang Eia-Ngau does compare p r ic e s  in  f iv e  co as ta l c i t i e s  with those 
o f f iv e  in te r io r  m u n ic ip a litie s , and in  a l l  in stan ces p r ic e s  in  the  c o as ta l 
c i t i e s  g re a tly  exceeded those o f  th e  i n te r io r  urban a reas  in  S ep t., 1947.
As fo r  th e  ru ra l  reg ions, Chang KLa^Ngau in d ica ted  th a t  th e i r  economic t r e a t ­
ment by th e  N a tio n a lis ts  was b a s ic a lly  s im ila r  to  th a t  o f  th e  Government's 
m il i ta ry  policy—in  both in stan ces th e  ru ra l  a reas were p ra c t ic a l ly  aban­
doned to  th e i r  own f a te .  The ru ra l  a reas  re :^ n d e d , he noted, by hoarding 
t h e i r  products and by re so r tin g  to  a b a r te r  economy. Chang Kia^Ngau, pp.
99- 103.
l^chang Eia^Ngau, p . 60.
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United S ta te s  Govemaent p u b lica tio n . According to  th i s  1949 source, whole» 
sa le  p ric e s  in  Shanghai in  August, 1948, were more than th ree  m illio n  tim es 
those o f th e  period  January-June, 1937* In  ad d itio n , i t  was noted, p ric e s  
in  th e  same c i ty  had increased  more than  fo r ty -f iv e  tim es during the  f i r s t  
seven months o f  1948.^5
I n f la t io n  was fu r th e r  r e f le c te d  by an in c rease  in  th e  cost o f 
l iv in g . l iv in g  expenses in  S h an ^ a i during th e  f i r s t  q u a rte r  o f 19^ ,  fo r  
example, rose  185 p er cen t and 200 p e r cen t, re sp e c tiv e ly , fo r  in d u s t r ia l  
and occupational workers and fo r  s a la r ie d  employees. C learly  uncon tro lled , 
commodity p r ic e s  shot upward during th e  f i r s t  q u a rte r  o f  1949, and the  cost 
o f  l iv in g  in  Shanghai increased  . .f ty  tim es in  the  same th ree  months.
In s ta te  Department, Ü. S. R ela tions with c^jina. p. 399. ihe  in f la ­
t io n  o f  p r ic e s  c i te d  fo r  th e  f i r s t  seven months o f 1946 remained unchecked 
throughout th e  remainder o f  th e  y ear. £y th e  end o f Dec., 1948, p r ic e s  in  
S h a n ^ a i were 26.6 tim es th e  Aug. 19, 1948, le v e l .  U. S ., Congress, House, 
Third Heport to  Congress o f  th e  Pcannmie Cooperation A;j^lni s t r a t io n .  fo r  
th e  Q uarter Baded Dec. 31. 19W. 8 1 s t Cong.. 1 s t  S ess .. 1949. House Doc.
179. p . 77# C ited  h e re a f te r  as U. S . , Congress, House, Third Heport . . .  
o f  th e  Economic Coopération ni s t r a t io n . 1949, House Doc. 179#
l^ S ta t i s t i c s  used fo r  1948 were c ite d  in  U. S ., Congress, House, 
Third Oii^ r te r ly  Report to  Congress on th e  United S ta te s  Foreign R e lie f 
Program, fo r  th e  Q u y te r  Mar ,  31. 1948. 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., 1948,
House Doc. 782, p . 68.  C ited h e re a f te r  a s  U. S ., Congress, House, Third 
Q uarterly Report . . .  On th e  U. S. Foreign R e lie f  Program. 1948, House Doc. 
782.  l iv in g  expenses f o r  S h a n ^ a i in  1949 were taken from U. S ., Congress, 
House, Fourth Report to  Cenp*ess o f  th e  Economic Coopérât Ahnjni s t r a t i o n . 
f o r  th e  Period Jan . L-Anr. 2 . 1949. 8 1 st Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1949, House Doc. 
308, p . 78.  C ited  h e re a f te r  as U. S .,  Congress, House, Fourüi Report . . .  
o f  th e  Ebanomin Coooerat&nn iHmj|jds t r a t io n .  1949, House Doc. 308. The d is ­
p ropo rtiona te  w age-price re la tio n sh ip  in fluenced  the  Government in  e a rly  
1947 to  a d ju s t th e  earnings o f  i t s  employees on a monthly b a s is  with re fe r ­
ence to  th e  c o s t o f  l iv in g  index. The r e s u l t  was an in c rease  in  th e  Govern­
m en t's  p a y ro ll o f  CNC $125,000,000,000 p e r month fo r  th e  period  ^ r . - A u g . , 
1947, and an Increase  o f  CNC $85,200,000,000 and CNC $871,800,000,000 p e r 
month, re sp ec tiv e ly , f o r  th e  periods S ^ t .-D e c . ,  1947, and J a n . - ip r . ,  1948. 
The Govemaent, th r o u ^  th e  adoption o f  an autom atic wage in crease  on th e  
b a s is  o f  th e  c o st o f l iv in g , tz ie d  to  e x tr ic a te  i t s e l f  from one d i f f ic u l ty  
I low morale o f  th e  c iv i l  servan ts) by plunging i t s e l f  in to  another [con trib ­
u tin g  to  th e  p e rp e tu a tio n  o f  an autom atic in c rease  in  the  wage-price 
s p i r a l ) .  Chang Kia-Ngau, pp. 155-57#
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The Increasing  d isp a r ity  between th e  exchange r a te s  o f  American 
and Chinese monetary u n i ts  a lso  rev ea ls  the  acce le ra tin g  pace o f  in f la t io n .  
Diough a perusal o f  Appendix I  w ill  esqplain the  alarming tre n d , a b r ie f  r e f ­
erence w ill  be made to  some se lec ted  time periods. Whereas a United S ta te s  
d o lla r  would purchase twenty CNC d o lla r s  a t  th e  o f f i c i a l  r a te  and CNC 
$1,320 on the  a c tu a l market when M arshall f i r s t  a rriv ed  in  China in  1943, 
both th e  o f f i c i a l  and black  market r a te s  s te a d ily  climbed upward during th e  
M arshall M ission. When M arshall l e f t  China in  January 1947, th e  o f f i c i a l  
and black market ra te s  o f  exchange had r is e n  to  CNC $3,350 and CNC $6,790, 
re sp ec tiv e ly , fo r  one American d o l la r .  Die d isp a r ity  increased  th e re a f te r  
u n t i l  th e  o f f ic ia l  r a te s  o f exchange fo r  one United S ta te s  d o l la r  reached 
CNC $7, 094,625 by mi(i.August, 1 9 ^  and GY $240 in  January. 1949. Corre­
sponding a c tu a l market f ig u re s  were CNC $8,683,000 and GY $700, re sp ec tiv e ly .^ ^
Other fa c to rs  re f le c te d  and con tribu ted  to  th e  adverse economic 
p o s itio n  o f  th e  N ational Govemaent. Two a d d itio n a l fa c e ts  o f th e  s to ry — 
budget d e f i c i t  and no te  expansion—deserve sp e c ia l considera tion , however.
As the  post-W brld War I I  period  lengthened, c iv i l  war spread and 
mounted in  in te n s i ty .  Govemaent revenue increased , bu t, as  in d ica ted  fay 
Table 4, expenditures ro se  a t  a  g re a te r  r a te .  The Government's revenue 
shortage climbed from CNC $1,106,696,000,000 when M arshall a rr iv e d  in  China 
in  December, 1945. to  CNC $4,697,802,000,000 %rtien he l e f t  in  January, 1947.
l?See j^pendix I ,  pp. 272-73. For explanation o f  gold yuan W ) 
f ig u re s , see ib id . .  n . c . According to  a U. S. Government p u b lica tio n , th e  
GY on ^ r .  1, 1949* was d ep recia ting  f a s te r  than  i t  could be p r in te d , U.
S ., Congress, House, Fourth Report . . .  o f  th e  Economic Cooperation Admin­
i s t r a t i o n . 1949, House Doe. 308, p . 78. Chang Kia-Ngau c ite d  C entral Bank 
o f  China s t a t i s t i c s  idiich leave l i t t l e  doubt on th i s  score. The o f f i c i a l  
and a c tu a l market exchange ra te s  had r is e n  from GY $240 and GY $700, re ­
spectively, per U. S. d o l la r  in  J a n .,  1949, to  GY $205,000 and GY $813,880 
per U. S. d o lla r  in  Apr», 1949. Chang D.amNgau, p . 383*
218
Revenue as per cent o f expenditure had fa l le n  from $2.8 to  )8 .0  during the  
same period . According to  Table 4 th e re  s t i l l  was no b a s is  fo r  optimism >dien
the  United S ta tes  Congress passed th e  China Aid Act in  A pril. 1 9 ^ . 18
TABLE 4
GOVERNMENT REVENUE, EXPENDITURE, DEFICIT, AND REVENUE 










Percent o f  
Expenditure
1945 1.241,389 2,348,085 1,106,696 52.8
1946 2,876,988 7 , 574,790 4,697,802 38.0
1947 14,064,383 43.393,895 29 ,329,512 32.4
1948 220, 905,475 655,471,087 434, 565,612 34.8
*Based on Tables 23 and 49 in  Chang Kia-Ngau, pp. 71, 158. 
S ta t i s t i c s  fo r  1 9 ^  a re  fo r  Ja iu -Ju ly .
^ l o s e  observation  w il l  rev ea l th a t  Govemnent expenditure in  
1946 increased  by 3*2 tim es over th a t  o f  1945 while th e  r a te  o f  revenue 
growth during 1946 was only 2 .3  tim es th a t  o f  th e  preceding y ear. Fur­
th e r , N a tio n a lis t expenses during 194? in creased  by 5*7 tim es over th a t  
o f 1946 w hile income during 194? only increased  by 4 .9  tim es over th a t  o f  
th e  preceding year.
S ignificance must a lso  be a ttached  to  the  f a c t  th a t  the  N ational 
Government re l ie d  h eav ily  on non-tax , and p rim arily  non-recurring , sources 
o f  revenue. This was p a r t ic u la r ly  t ru e  during 1945 and th e  period  o f  th e  
M arshall M ission. These sources o f  Government income included rem ittances 
from overseas Chinese, sa le s  o f p roperty  form erly held  by Japanese and
^^M ilitary  co llap se  o f  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  in  e a r ly  1949 was accom­
panied by d es tru c tio n  o f  th e i r  economic p o s it io n  as w e ll. Ambassador 
S tu a rt wrote o f th e  s i tu a t io n  as follow s : "In  i ^ r i l  (1949) the  Govemaent
had an income o f f iv ?  p e r  cent o f  i t s  eoqpenditures, bu t more than th i s  
amount was expended in  i t s  c o lle c tio n ."  S tu a r t, p . 226.
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c o lla b o ra tio n is ts  during World War I I ,  and proceeds from sa le s  o f fo re ign  
excbange^^ and surplus American s to re s  which th e  Chinese had purchased from 
th e  United S ta te s . Thou^ Table 5 shows th a t  th e  non-tax revenue declined  
from 1945 th ro u ^  194?. th e  percentage was s t i l l  h i ^  in  1947*
TABLE 5
TAX REVENUE, NON-TAX REVENUE, AND REVENUE FROM SALES 
OF BONDS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL REVENUE, 1945-194?»
Item 1945 1946 194?
Tax Revenue as Percent o f 
T otal Revenue^ 8 .2 42.3 65.0
NoiwTax Revenue a s  Percent of 
T o ta l Revenue 66.7 57.6 30.8
Revenue from Sales o f  Bonds as 
Percent o f  T otal Revenue ... j s l 0.1 4.2
T otal 100.0 100.0 100.0
^Percentages fo r  noiv tax  revenue a re  given in  Chang Kia-Ngau,
Table 49, p . I 58. Other percentages were based on s t a t i s t i c s  given in  ib id .
^^Indirect tax es (customs, s a l t ,  and connodities] c o n s titu te d  more 
than  seven ty -five  percen t o f  t o t a l  ta x  revenue during 1945-194?, whereas 
d i r e c t  tax es [business, income, land , in h eritan ce) never comprised more than  
22.3  percen t o f  t o t a l  ta x  income. TMs r ^ re s e n te d  a  percentage drop from 
99*5 fo r  in d ire c t  tax es in  1936-193? and an in crease  from 0 .6  fo r  d ire c t  
tax es fo r  th e  same period . Based on ib id . .  Table 50, p . I 60.
l^The Govem nent's economic s ta tu s  was p a r t ic u la r ly  d isru p ted  by 
th e  d ra in  on i t s  fo re ign  exchange re se rv es . This condition  ex is ted  during 
l a t e  1945 th ro u ^  e a rly  194? because th e  N a tio n a lis ts  s o u ^ t  to  combat 
in f la t io n  by se llin g  gold, thereby absorbing excess currency from c irc u la ­
t io n .  T hereafter, th e  Government procured im ports w ith fo re ign  exchange 
reserv es because the  low le v e l  o f  exports had not provided th e  necessary  
means o f  payment. Reserves o f  gold and U. S. d o lla rs  held  b7 China on 
V-J Day amounted to  US $900,000,000. The follow ing to ta l s  [ a l l  f ig u re s  in  
US $) rev ea l th e  ex ten t o f  th e i r  steady dep le tio n  a s  o f  th e  d a tes  in d ica ted : 
J a n .,  194? -  $450,000,000; O c t., 194? -  $300,000,000; Apr. 1, 1949 -  
$160, 000, 000.  The 1949 f ig u re  was re le a sed  by th e  C entra l Bank o f China. 
S ta te  D^>artment, U. S. R elations with ChlM . pp. 222, 370, 403. An 
an a ly s is  o f  s t a t i s t i c s  [ a l l  f ig u re s  in  US $] given by Oiang Eia^Ngau he lps 
to  c la r i f y  th e  above comments on Chinese ejqports. Revenue from exports
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Two fa c to rs  a re  prom inently evident in  any fu r th e r  an a ly sis  o f 
th i s  phase o f  economic d e te r io ra tio n  in  N a tio n a lis t China—th e  d isp ropo rtion ­
a te  per cen t o f t o t a l  revenue a llo c a te d  to  m ili ta ry  purposes and th e  huge 
note esqpansion to  finance  those ven tu re . M arshall had warned Chiang Kai- 
shek in  December, 19^6, th a t  th e  N ational Government was th rea tened  with 
economic exhaustion u n less  i t s  m il i ta ry  po licy  was more r e a l i s t i c a l ly  ad­
ju s te d  to  i t s  f in a n c ia l  c ap ab ilitie s .^ ®  The commonly expressed opinion in  
subsequent years was th a t  continuing in f la t io n  was p rim arily  caused by th e  
ever in c reas in g  budget d e f i c i t ,  and th a t  the  d e f i c i t  was acce lera ted  by 
th e  tremendous ou tlay  fo r  m ili ta ry  purposes. A dd itiona lly , N a tio n a lis t 
o f f i c i a l s  con tribu ted  to  th e  in f la tio n a ry  process by issu in g  unbacked bank
f e l l  from $169,000,000 in  19^5 to  $149,900,000 in  1946. The encouraging 
recovery in  19^7 ($230, 000,0001 was followed by a dw p to  $170,000,000 in  
1948. Income from s a le s  o f  merchandise abroad fo r  1946-19^ averaged le s s  
than  th a t  f o r  1935-1936, but th e  y ie ld  during 1946-1948 was considerably  
h igher th an  th a t  from th e  same source during 1937-1943. Chang Kia-Ngau, 
^ p e n d ix  D, Table D-2, pp. 384-85*
^®It w ill  be re c a lle d  th a t  th e  p roportion  o f m il i ta ry  to  t o t a l  
expenditures by th e  N a tio n a lis ts  i n  1946 was h e ld  to  be somewhat h igher by 
M arshall (70 per cen t] than  by Chang Kia-Ngau (59*9 p e r c e n t] . Supra, p p . 169- 
170.  Chang continued to  hold to  a  more conservative f ig u re  in  comparisons 
o f  subsequent years , to o . For examq)le, M arshall estim ated on Nov. 12,
1947, th a t  70 to  80 p e r  cent o f  th e  N a tio n a lis t income was being used fo r  
th e  m lll ta z y  e f fo r t .  However, Chang s ta te d  th a t  m il i ta ry  eoqpenditures fo r  
th e  months o f  J a n .-Ju ly , 1948 (lAen m il i ta ry  engagements were more numerous 
and more widespread) had junqped to  only  68*5 p e r cent o f  th e  t o t a l  Govern­
ment eoqpenses. M a rsh a ll 's  assessment i s  contained in  h is  statem ent o f 
th e  above d a te  before House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings. Baereencv 
Fareigm Aid. 1947, pp. 23-24. Views o f  th e  Chinese banking o f f i c i a l  a re  
found in  Chang Kia-Ngau, p . 155» I t  i s  worth no ting , too , th a t  Major General 
Lowell vr. Books contended th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts , by e a rly  1948, were spend.
Ing 80 p e r  cent o f t h e i r  income on war. Books was Deputy D irector General 
and Chief Executive O ffice r  o f UNBBA from Jan. 1-Dec. 31* 1946, and Direc­
to r  Geuex'al u f  UNBBA from Jan. 1 , 1947, to  Sqpt. 30, 19^*  Statement o f  
Mar. 8 , 1948, before House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a 
Post-War Becoverv Program. 1948, P t. 2, 2l60.
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notes to  finance th e  c iv i l  w ar.^ l Harlan Cleveland, J u s t  returned from 
China, summed th e  views on these  and o th e r  po in ts  on March 8, 1 9 ^ ,  as 
fo llow s:
Ihe main f a c to r  in  the  in f la t io n ,  o f course, i s  th e  tremendous 
proportion  o f  th e  n a tio n a l budget, and even o f the  note c irc u la tio n , 
th a t  i s  spent d ir e c t ly  fo r  m ilitax y  purposes, and th e re fo re  spent 
fo r  notv-productive purposes, in  th e  economic sense.
The d ep rec ia tio n  i s  due to  th e  tremendous em ission o f unbacked 
bank no tes on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  Government in  o rder to  shore up th e i r  
m il i ta ry  campaign. The main fa c to r  i s  th e  tremendously increas ing  
no te  c irc u la t io n  with no comparable in c rease  in  production. In  
f a c t ,  th e  very  dep rec ia tio n  o f th e  currency destroys th e  in cen tiv e  
to  p ro d u c e .^
Thus, th e  v ic io u s cycle o f runaway in f la t io n  was caused by th e  
in te ra c t io n  o f th e  foregoing and o th e r f a c to r s ,  includ ing  th e  lo s s  o f 
popular confidence in  th e  a b i l i ty  o f the  Government to  s ta b i l iz e  th e  s itu a ­
t io n . The business community was paralyzed , many ru ra l  a reas r e l ie d  on 
b a r te r ,  and the  f ix e d  income groups su ffe red  extreme hardsh ips. A United 
S ta te s  Congressional p u b lica tio n  o f 1949 described  c e r ta in  aspects o f  th i s
^ I h e r e  would seem to  be l i t t l e  question  but th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
re so rte d  to  th e  p r in tin g  p ress  to  finance  th e  budget d e f i c i t .  According to  
Chang Kia-Ngau, N a tio n a lis t  CNC $ note is su e s  fo r  p e r tin e n t years a re  as 
fo llow s: 1945 -  $842,400.000,000; 1946 -  $2,694,200,000,000; 194? -
$29,462,400,000,000; and 1948 [Jan .-Ju ly ) -  $374,762,200,000,000. Chang 
Kia-Ngau, Appendix B, Table B-1, p . 374. Am W ssa^r S tu a rt repo rted  to  
M a r^ a l l  on Oct. I 5, 1948, th a t  th e  q u a n tity  o f  monqy in  c irc u la tio n  in  
N a tio n a lis t China in  O ct., 1948, was " fiv e  tim es as g rea t as th a t  in  c i r ­
cu la tio n  on Aug. 19 , 1948. "This money, " S tu a rt sa id , " i s  not going back 
to  th e  Goverment in  taxes nor in to  th e  production e n te rp r ise  but r a th e r  
i s  accumulating and id le  in  th e  c i t i e s  bu ild ing  up in f la tio n a ry  p ressu re  
,  . . . "  S ta te  Department, U. S. R ela tions w ith China, Annex 1 ^  (c ) ,  
p . 879.
^K ouse Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a Post-War 
Recovery Program, 1948, P t. 2, 2171. Cleveland was D irec to r o f th e  UNRRA 
China O ffice  from May 1, 1947, to  Feb. 24, 1948. Views s imi lar  to  those  
expressed by Cleveland above a re  found in  th e  follow ing sources: U. S .,
Congress, House, Third Report . . .  o f  th e  Economic Cooperation Administra­
t io n . 1949, House Doc. 179. p . 76: House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs . Pro­
posed China Aid B i l l . 1948, p . 13; P rice , "UNRRA in  China," UNRRA, Opera­
t io n a l  A nalysis Papers, No. 53, ^ r . , 1948, p . 82; and Chang Kia-Ngau, 
p . 71*
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development as follow s:
The Chinese have n o t, fo r  much longer than a decade, been able 
to  take fo r  g ran ted , as Americans tak e  fo r  granted , th a t  th e  basic  
p o l i t i c a l  o rder o f th e  p resen t i s  s ta b le , and th a t  a l l  p r iv a te  ca l­
cu la tio n s  can be based on such an assumption. Thus, th e  Chinese 
commercial c la s s  cannot make long-term  c o n tra c ts  with confidence th a t  
th e  Chinese s ta te  w il l  endure as long as th e  c o n tra c t. They cannot 
lend on th e  assumption th a t  money w i l l  r e ta in  any ca lcu lab le  value 
lAen repayment i s  due. The in te l le c tu a l  c la sse s  cannot look forward 
to  reasonable se c u rity  on a moderate sa la ry  fo r  th e  economic aspects 
o f p ro fess io n a l s ta tu s  a re  vdioUy in secu re . Business deals beyond 
a narrow lo c a l a rea  a re  in h ib ite d  by th e  u n c e r ta in tie s  o f th e  ever- 
s h if t in g  f ro n ts  o f th e  v a r ie ty  o f  wars.23
A dditional developments con tribu ted  to  economic d e te r io ra tio n  in  
N a tio n a lis t China. Among th e  fa c to rs  which a re  not d iscussed in  th i s  work 
a re  th e  follow ing : th e  low CNC ra te s  fo r  r e t i r in g  piq)pet currency a t  the
end o f  World War I I  and th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  c irc u la t io n  o f puppet cv rrrrcy  
as le g a l  tender was perm itted  u n t i l  th e  conversion period  ended; th e  in a b il­
i t y  and/or unw illingness o f  o f f ic ia l s  o f th e  c e n tra l and lo c a l governments 
to  enforce c e n tra l goverm ent d ire c tiv e s ;  and th e  re s is ta n c e  o f vested  
in te r e s ts  to  change. Other developments and p ra c tic e s  idiich a re  not d is ­
cussed in  th is  connection include: th e  lo s s  o f productive and d is t r ib u t iv e
f a c i l i t i e s  through d e te r io ra tio n , d e s tru c tio n  and th e  lo s s  o f t e r r i to r y  to  
th e  Communists; d iv e rs io n  o f p riv a te  c a p i ta l  in to  non-productive channels 
o f f in a n c ia l  specu la tion  and hoarding o f goods; in a b i l i ty  of th e  C entral 
Bank o f  China to  reg u la te  th e  money m arket; and th e  f a i lu r e  o f ra tio n in g  
and p r ic e  con tro l measures.
^%ouse Subcommittee on Foreign A ffa irs , The S trategy  and T actics 
o f World Communism. Siq>plflment m, 1949, House Doc. 154, p. 20.
^ ^ o r  treatm ent o f  th ese  and o th e r re la te d  fa c to rs , see Chang Kia- 
Ngau, e sp ec ia lly  pp. 6?-68.
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Implémentation o f American Economic P o licy . 194S-1949
In troduction
United S ta te s  economic p o licy  toward China from V-J Day through 
1949 was implemented th r o u ^  tec h n ic a l and m a te ria l a ss is ta n c e  measures 
and was based on both executive and le g is la t iv e  a c ts . D irect and in d ir e c t  
channels were used to  ca rry  out the  American course o f a c tio n . One pro­
gram (UNRRA.], undertaken in  cooperation with o th e r n a tio n s , was in i t i a t e d  
before the  M arshall M ission was created . Ihough a ss is ta n ce  under th e  term s 
o f t h i s  in te rn a tio n a l compact was not completed during M arshall’s s tay  in  
China, over h a lf  o f th e  u ltim ate  t o t a l  tonnage was d e liv ered  during th e  year 
o f 1946. Other economic programs were au thorized  and in i t i a t e d  during th e  
M arshall M ission, but in  most in stan ces supply t r a n s fe r s  were only p a r t i a l l y  
f u l f i l l e d  ïdien M arshall l e f t  China i n  Januazy, 194?. In  ad d itio n , s l i ^ t l y  
over twenty p e r cent o f  th e  t o t a l  United S ta te s  economic a ss is ta n ce  from 
V-J Day th ro u ^  1949 was authorized  iA ile  M arshall was S ecre tary  o f S ta te .
The United S ta te s  au thorized  a t o t a l  o f  $1,509,000,000 in  economic 
a id  to  China between V-J Day and March 21, 1 49. Of th i s  amount, $799,000,000 
was provided through g ran ts , and $710,000,000 was extended in  th e  fozm o f  
c r e d i t s . C r e d i t s  were advanced as follow s: (1) those includ ing  sa le s
o f United S ta te s  Govemnent surp lus p roperty , $75,500,000;^^ (2) those
25see Appendix H ,  p . 275- Ihe discrepancy o f  $500,000,000 in  th e  
t o t a l  a id  in  th e  c re d i ts  advanced between th e  f ig u re s  given In  A ^endix  H  
and those c ite d  above I s  accounted fo r  by th e  f a c t  th a t  Ebqport-Ihgwrt Bank 
c re d i ts  o f $500, 000,000 were au thorized  but never u t i l i z e d ,  fig u res  given 
In  Appendix H  r ^ r e s e n t  monetary evaluations o f  a id  au thorized , p a r t i a l l y  
o r completely used as o f  Mar. 21, 1949, and, as  in d ica ted  l a t e r ,  a id  which 
was not subsequently d iscontinued . The Export-Import Bank c re d i t  sum i s  
d iscussed  below.
^^Though th e  United S ta te s  so ld  su rp lus p roperty  ( procurement 
co st -  $977, 300, 000] to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  fo r  an agreed u ltim a te  re a l iz a t io n
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excluding American su rp lus sa le s , $134,500,000; and (3) Export-Import Bank 
c re d i ts ,  $500, 000, 000.
As in  th e  case o f m ilitax y  a ss is ta n c e , however, the  f ig u res  
given above do not accu ra te ly  r e f le c t  th e  f u l l  ex ten t o f American economic 
a id  a f t e r  V-J Day to  th e  Republic o f China. These to ta l s  do not include  
any monetary evaluation  o f th e  a ss is ta n ce  rendered by American advisory 
personnel. Nor do th e  to ta l s  include the  con trib u tio n s o f th e  United S ta te s  
to  United Nations programs in  China, such as  th e  In te rn a tio n a l C h ild ren 's  
Baergency Fund, th e  In te rn a tio n a l Refugee O rganization, and th e  World Health 
O rganization.
Economic A ssistance During th e  M arshall Mission
Economic a ss is ta n c e  au thorized  by th e  United S ta te s  fo r  China 
to ta l le d  $677, 600,000 from th e  tim e M arshall was appointed th e  P re s id e n t 's  
Special R epresentative to  th a t  country u n t i l  th e  Mission was term inated .
The f u l l  amount was in  th e  foim o f c re d i ts .
o f $205, 300, 000, various agreements provided th a t  only $75, 500,000 o f  th e  
t o t a l  would be repaid  in  annual currency in s ta llm e n ts . The U. S. agreed to  
tak e  i t s  remaining payments amounting to  $129,800,000 ($205,300,000 minus 
$75, 500, 000) in  th e  fozm o f goods and se rv ices  and as an o f f s e t  ag a in st 
Amexlcan wartime indebtedness to  China. In  ad d itio n , the  $129,800,000 
d iffe ren c e  was to  be reduced by China s e t t in g  a sid e  funds which th e  U. S. 
would use  (over a twenty year period) fo r  resea rch , c u ltu ra l  and educational 
a c t iv i t i e s  in  China and to  acqu ire  p roperty  in  China. See i^ e n d ix  H ,  
p . 275 a lso  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex I 85 , pp. 
1048-49.
^7This sum excludes $16,000,000 o f  th e  $82,800,000 in  Export- 
Import Bank c re d its  l i s t e d  under Item No. 8 in  j^pendix  I I ,  p . 275. The 
sm aller sum was au thorized  by th e  U. S. on Mar. 21, 1945, but arrangements 
fo r  d isbursing  th e  $16,000,000 s t i l l  had no t been made when M arshall l e f t  
China in  Ja n ., 1947. Therefore, c re d i ts  r ^ re s e n te d  by th i s  sum w ill  be 
d iscussed  below under th e  sec tio n  tr e a tin g  th e  extension o f  a id  to  China 
a f t e r  M arshall became Secretary  o f  S ta te . S ta te  Department, Ü. S. R elations 
with China. Annex 185, p . 1047. The t o t a l  o f  $677,600,000 a lso  excludes 
th e  g ran t o f  $474,000,000 through UNRRA a s  l i s t e d  under Item No. 6 in  
Appendix H ,  p. 275, because UNRRA funds were au thorized  fo r  th e  use o f
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There was a s ig n if ic a n t d iffe ren c e , however, between the  author^ 
iz a tio n  and th e  ijq)lem entation o f economic a ss is ta n c e  programs during th e  
M arshall M ission. For example, $500,000,000 [Ebq)ort-Import Bank c re d i ts  1 
o f th e  $677, 600,000 t o t a l  was never u t i l i z e d .  F u rther, a id  covered by th e  
remaining $177, 600,000 had only been p a r t i a l ly  d e liv ered  by th e  time 
M arshall departed to  become Secretary  o f  S ta te . Thus, United S ta tes 
economic a ss is ta n ce  to  China during th i s  period  was made av a ila b le  p rim arily  
th r o u ^  in d ire c t  channels [UNRBA). We w i l l  now tu rn  our a tte n tio n  to  an 
an a ly s is  o f  th e  a id  programs re fe rre d  to  in  t h i s  p a ra g ra ^ .
M arshall made a personal p lea  fo r  the  au th o riza tio n  o f  the  
$500, 000,000 Export-Import Bank c re d i ts  when he re tu rned  to  th e  United S ta te s  
in  March, 1946. VSLth th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative  Conference having apparen tly  
ended on a  successfu l no te . General M arshall urged th e  Export-Inqport Bank 
to  loan  th e  amount in d ic a te d  to  Chinese Govenment agencies and p r iv a te  
in te r e s t s  fo r  c e r ta in  r e h a b i l i ta t io n  and reco n stru c tio n  p ro je c ts . The 
Bank, w ith th e  approval o f th e  N ational Advisory Council, earmarked $500,000,000 
to  be used on sp e c if ic  p ro je c ts  ^ p ro v ed  by the  Bank p r io r  to  June 30, 1947» 
A uthorization  fo r  th e  f u l l  c re d i t  ex tension  expired on th i s  da te  in  June, 
however, because th e re  was no "reasonable assurance" th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
could r ^ a y  th e  loan . Clarence £. Gauss, an o f f i c i a l  o f  th e  American lending 
organ, e laborated  on th i s  p o in t as fo llow s:
In  th e  1945 Iaq)ort-Eqx)rt Bank Act, the  Congress wrote in  a 
p rov ision  th a t  th e  Bank should make loans only where, in  th e  judgment 
o f  th e  Board o f D irec to rs  o f  th e  Bank, th e re  was reasonable assurance 
o f  repayment. At th e  tim e th a t  we earmarked th e  $500,000,000 fo r  
China a t  th e  in s tan ce  o f  General M arshall, we had hoped he had been 
ab le  to  perform a m iracle ; th a t  he had been ab le  to  m ediate and
UNRRA ra th e r  than  fo r  sp e c if ic  n a tio n a l s ta te s .  Thus, an assessment o f  the  
use o f  th ese  funds i s  more meaningful than  th a t  o f  t h e i r  au th o riza tio n .
This p o in t i s  t re a te d  below.
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bring  about peace in  th a t  country. I f  we had had peace th e re , 
we would have had s t a b i l i ty ,  we could have invested  our $500, 000,000 
in  China, c a re fu lly , p ro je c t by p ro je c t,  follow ing i t  always to  
th e  end use , with a  reasonable assurance o f  repayment. However, 
vhen China embarked upon a c iv i l  war .  . . ono could no t fe e l  th a t ,  
i f  th e  resources a v a ila b le  to  China a t  th a t  tim e were going to  be 
thrown in to  th a t  c i v i l  war, th e re  was any assurance idiatsoever o f
repayment. 28
As in d ica ted  above, an a d d itio n a l $177,600,000 in  economic 
a ss is ta n ce  was au thorized  by the  United S ta te s  fo r  China during the  M arshall 
Mission, but i t s  d e liv e ry  was only p a r t i a l ly  completed during th is  pe riod . 
Ih is  sum included a id  under four separa te  programs, each o f  idiich i s  l i s t e d  
and d iscussed  below. Die c re d i ts  were as fo llow s: (1) lencUlease -  
$51,700,000; (2) Ebqport-ljqxirt Bank C red its  -  $66,800,000; (3) sa le s  o f 
c iv i l ia n  su rp lus p roperty  -  $55,000,000; and (4) sa le s  o f dockyard supp lies 
and f a c i l i t i e s  -  $4,100,000.
Goods valued a t  approxim ately $50,000,000 were e i th e r  in  pro cur» , 
ment o r  aw aiting shipment in  China when World War I I  ended. An agreement 
between th e  United S ta te s  and China on June 14, 1946, au thorized  th e  d e liv ­
ery  o f th e  supp lies idiich would streng then  the  economy. These len d -lea se  
"p ipeline" c re d i ts  included  loans fo r  c iv ilia n - ty p e  in d u s t r ia l  and a g ri­
c u ltu ra l  commodities, w ith th e  t o t a l  allow able being even tually  ra ise d  to  
$51, 700, 000.  According to  a  Department o f S ta te  p u b lica tio n , however, th e
^G auss s ta te d  a lso  th a t  th e  N ational Government made requests  fo r  
id e n tic a l  sums a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a l  au th o riza tio n  had e3q>ired, but th a t  a l l  
subsequent Chinese req u ests  were tu rned  down fo r  th e  same reason as given 
above. Textdmony o f Mar. 8 , 1948, before  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , 
Hearings f o r  a  Post-War Becoverv Program. 1948, P t. 2, 2177-78. Die views 
o f  Gauss were a lso  supported in  U. S .,  Congress, House, Report o f A c tiv it ie s  
o f  th e  N ational Advisory Council on In te rn a tio n a l Monetary and Mnanniai 
Problems, àpr» 1, 1947-Sept. 30, 1947, 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., 1948, House 
Doc. 501, p . 6; Truman, H ,  79* and by James K. P en fie ld , D e ^ ty  D irec to r 
o f  th e  O ffice  o f  Far E astern  A ffa irs , Department o f  S ta te , in  a statem ent 
o f  Nov. 22, 1947, befo re  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings. 
Btergency Foreign Aid. 1947, p . 349*
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"p ipeline" c re d its  were "only p a r t ia l ly  drawn upon by January, 194?. "^9
Unlike the  Export-Ii^x)rt Bank c re d i ts  re fe rre d  to  above, th e  Bank 
did authoirize and make a s e r ie s  o f  sm aller loans to  th e  Chinese Government 
during th e  M arshall M ission. M arshall, as in  th e  case o f  th e  $500,000,000 
c re d i ts ,  had recommended th a t these  tra n sa c tio n s  be arranged. C ontracts 
fo r  goods and se rv ice s , valued a t  $66,800,000, were approved by the  Bank 
between January 3-March 13, 1946. The la rg e s t  a u th o riza tio n s  were io r  raw 
cotton ($33.000,000) and railw ay re p a ir  m a te r ia ls  ($16,700,000), and th e  
remain i ng $17,100,000 was a llo c a te d  fo r  cargo v e sse ls , coal mining equipment, 
and engineering equipment and se rv ices . When M arshall l e f t  China fo r  the 
l a s t  tim e, however, $54,600,000 o f  the  au tho rized  $66,800,000 s t i l l  had not 
been drawn.
2 9 sta te  Dq)artment, U. S. R elations w ith China, p . 363. An o f f i c i a l  
p u b lica tio n  o f an e a r l i e r  da te  in d ica ted , however, th a t  th e re  had been sub­
s ta n t ia l  shipments under th e  "p ipeline" agreement p r io r  to  M arsha ll's  f in a l  
departu re  fo r  th e  U. S. This source s ta te d  th a t  goods valued a t  $40,117,000 
had been shipped by Sept. 30, 1946. U. S ., P residen t, 1945-53 (Truman), 
Twenty-Third Report . . .  on Lend-Lease O perations. 1946, House Doc. 41, p . 
17* An iqjdated v e rs io n  (to J a n ., 1950) o f  th e  summary o f  a id  given in  
^ p e n d ix  H ,  p . 275, revealed  th a t  $50, 300,000 o f  th e  t o t a l  $51,700,000 
"p ipeline" shipments had been made as o f Nov. 23, 1949. "Summary o f  U. S. 
Govemaent Economic and M ilita ry  Aid Authorized fo r  China since 1937," 1950, 
from The Papers o f  Harry S. Truman, p. 9.
^^Referring d ir e c t ly  to  these  Baiüc c re d i ts ,  a  Department o f S ta te  
p u b lica tio n  s ta te d  th a t  M ardiall was "able to  use th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  Ameri­
can economic a id  as a bargaining p o in t in  t ry in g  to  achieve h is  p o l i t i c a l  
o b je c tiv e s ." S ta te  D ^artm ent, U. S. R elations with China, p . 226, a ls o , 
ib id . . Annex 185, p* 1047.
3^ Ib id .. p . 363* Another $16,000,000 was au thorized  fo r  th e  use 
o f Tungli Chemical Industry , L td ., on Mar, 21, 1945, but i t  was not im ple­
mented in  any amount u n t i l  1947 a i^ e r  Marshall had re tu rned  to  the  U. S.
On Dec. 3I* 1 9 ^ -M a rs h a l l  resigned  as S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  in  ea rly  J a n .,  
1949L-$65,400,000 o f  th e  t o t a l  $82,800,000 ($66,800,000 authorized  during 
th e  M arshall Û .ssion p lu s  $16,000,000 re fe rre d  to  above) had been d isbursed . 
I b i ^ . . Annex I 85, p . 1047. F urther, as o f Dec. 31, 1949, $67.400,000 had 
been d isbursed . The balance o f  $15.400,000 included most o f  the  $16,000,000 
c re d it  to  th e  chemical firm . "Summary o f  U. S. Government Economic and 
M ilita ry  Aid Authorized fo r  China since 1937. " 1950. from The Papers o f  
Harry S. Truman, p . 10.
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In  ad d itio n  to  th e  a u th o riza tio n s  and d e liv e r ie s  re fe rred  to  above, 
th e  United S ta te s  sold China a wide v a r ie ty  o f surp lus p roperty  under an 
agreement o f August 30, 1946. Procurement value o f th e  item s tra n s fe rre d  
was $900,000,000. Ihouggh th e  ne t r e a l iz a t io n  to  th e  United S ta te s  was 
$3-75»000, 000, only $55, 000,000 was in  th e  form o f c re d i ts .
Ihe co n trac tu a l arrangement au thorized  th e  sa le  o f supplies needed 
by expeditionary  fo rce s , but i t  sp e c if ic a lly  p ro h ib ited  th e  tra n s fe r  o f conu- 
b a t m a te ria l, v e sse ls  and a i r c r a f t .  S a les included those  o f fixed  in s t a l ­
la t io n s  and movable p roperty  loca ted  on seventeen P a c if ic  is la n d s  and in  
China and In d ia . Motor v e h ic le s , construc tion  equipment and a i r  fo rce  sup­
p l ie s  and equipment comprised more than  one-ha lf o f th e  t o t a l  sa le s . Other 
item s included communications and e le c t r i c a l  equipment, to o ls , in d u s tr ia l  
machinery, medical equipment and chem icals. Though th e  shipments were 
la rg e  in  q u a n tity  and value , they were, n ev erth e less , " ju s t  beginning to  
a rr iv e "  idien M arshall l e f t  China in  January, 194?.^^
3^Ihe n e t r e a l iz a t io n  to  th e  U. S. a l l  f ig u re s  i n  U. S. equ iva len ts 
was determined as fo llow s: ( l )  China agreed to  a $150,000,000 o f f s e t  a g a in s t
th e  U. S. wartime indebtedness to  China (estim ated by P residen t Truman to  
be CNC $150, 000, 000, 000, th e  indebtedness was incu rred  lAen th e  Chinese 
Qovemment provided Chinese currency to  f a c i l i t a t e  th e  construction  o f  U.
Sm Anqr in s ta l la t io n s  and th e  feeding o f  American tro o p s): (2) th e  Natioi>> 
a l i s t s  agreed to  make $20,000,000 a v a ila b le  to  th e  U. S. over a period  o f 
twenty years fo r  research , c u ltu ra l  and educational a c t iv i t i e s  in  China; and
(3 ) th e  N ational Government agreed to  make $35,000,000 a v a ila b le  to  th e  
U. S. during th e  ensuing twenty years fo r  th e  purchase o f  p roperty  in  China 
and fo r  U. S. Goverment eoqienses in  China. IM s t o ta l  o f  $205,000,000 was 
reduced to  a n e t o f  $175,000,000 when th e  U. S. agreed to  s e t  aside  
$30, 000,000 fo r  China to  use in  paying th e  cost o f shipping and se rv ices 
a r is in g  out o f th e  t r a n s fe r  o f p roperty . S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations 
w ith Chi pa A n n e x  I 85, pp. 1048-49; a lso  p o licy  statem ent by P residen t 
Truman on Dec. 18, 1946, in  i b i d . . Annex 114, p . 692.
33 ib id . . p . 363. This source s ta te d  elsewhere, however, th a t  p rop ­
e r ty  o r ig in a lly  valued a t  $240,000,000 was "turned over, fo r  the  most p a r t ,"  
to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  befo re  Aug. 31, 1946, and th a t  these  tran sac tio n s  con­
s t i tu te d  p a r t  o f th e  agreement o f  Aug. 30, 1946. I b id . . Annex I 85, p . 1048. 
I t  was th i s  p a r t ic u la r  agreement th a t  th e  Chinese Communists had p ro te s te d  
so s trong ly  lA lle  M arshall was in  China. Supra, pp. 134-35»
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One o th er program o f economic a ss is ta n ce  was in i t i a t e d  by th e  
United S ta te s  during th e  M arshall M ission. On May 15. 1946, the  O ffice o f 
th e  R)reign L iqu idation  Commissioner lOFLCl made a minor c re d i t  arrangement 
with th e  Chinese Government idiich au tho rized  the  sa le  o f su rp lus dockyard 
f a c i l i t i e s  a t  S h an ^ a i and Tsingtao. This OFLC agreement provided th a t  th e  
Chinese Goverment would make r e s t i tu t io n  in  t h i r t y  y early  payments. There 
was one p rov iso , how ever^the United S ta te s  m i^ t  a t  i t s  d isc re tio n  request 
sp e c ified  goods and se rv ices  fo r  United S ta te s  Navy and o th e r Goverment- 
owned v e sse ls  in  p lace  o f  th e  cash in s ta llm e n ts .
The one program th ro u ^  idiich the  United S ta te s  made i t s  g re a te s t  
con tribu tion  in  economic a ss is ta n ce  to  China during th e  M arshall M ission, 
however, was th e  United Nations R e lie f and R eh ab ilita tio n  A dm inistration 
(UNRRA). Though th i s  in te rn a tio n a l organ was c rea ted  in  November, 19^3» th e  
f i r s t  shipload o f  UNRRA supp lies d id  no t reach China u n t i l  November, 19^5. 
sh o rtly  before M arshall was appointed as P residen t Truman's Special Repre­
se n ta tiv e  to  C h i n a . D e l i v e r i e s  increased  markedly during th e  next y ear, 
and th e  American co n trib u tio n  to  China, throufdi UNRRA, during th e  M arshall 
M ission was su b s ta n tia l throuf^i both tec h n ic a l and m a te ria l a ss is ta n ce  
measures.
In  so f a r  as top  ranking o f f i c i a l s  o f  UNRRA were concerned, the  
p o s itio n  o f  D irec to r General was always f i l l e d  w ith an American. I t  i s  
a lso  worthy o f  note th a t  th e  d u tie s  o f  o th e r prominent o f f ic e s  o f  UNRRA,
3 ^ a le s  under t h i s  agreement were completed by Oct. 31, 1948, and 
a t  th a t  tim e to ta l le d  on ly  $4,100,000. S ta te  Department, U. S. Relatioi^s 
with China. Annex 185, p . 1049.
35Forty->four nations signed the UNRRA agreement in  Wellington on 
Nov. 9t 1943. and the sp ecific agreement between China and UNRRA was made 
on Nov. 13, 1945.  Copies of these two docummits are printed in  Wbodbridge, 
TTT, i^ end ix  Three, 23-32, and ^pendix Seven, 26&.7O.
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with sp e c if ic  refe rence  to  China, were supervised by Americans during th e  
M arshall Mission. These posts included th e  O ffice o f Far Eastern A ffa irs , 
th e  China R elief M ission, and th e  Surplus Procurement O ffice r in  China. 
F a rth er, th e  United S ta te s  provided approxim ately tw o-th ird s o f  the  UNRRA 
te c h n ic a l and siq)ervisoiy personnel who served in  China during th e  M arshall 
M ission.^7 These s t a f f  members a s s is te d  th e  Chinese in  d is tr ib u tin g  com­
m odities fo r  consumption and in  in s ta l l in g  c a p ita l  goods.
United S ta te s  m ateria l a id  th r o u ^  UNRRA d if fe re d  from th e  programs 
p rev iously  re fe rre d  to  in  th a t  UNRRA a ss is ta n c e  was made a v a ila b le  in  th e  
fo ra  o f g ran ts . Ihe t o t a l  United S ta te s  co n trib u tio n  to  China through UNRRA 
during th e  l i f e  o f  t h i s  in te rn a tio n a l o rgan iza tion  was $474,000,000.^^
3^EtLrectors General o f  UNRRA were Herbert H. Lehman, F io re llo  H. 
LaOuardia, and Major General Lowell W. Rooks. Other U. S. s t a f f  and po si­
t io n s  h e ld  were: J .  Franklin  Ray, J r .  (C hief, O ffice o f  Far Eastern A ffa irs ] ;  
Benjamin H. Kizer (China R e lie f Mission, Oct. 24, 1944-May 15, 19461. Other 
Americans tdio he ld  t h i s  post were: J .  F rank lin  Ray, J r . ,  Acting D irec to r,
May 16, 1946-July 28, 1946; Major General QELen E. Edgerton, Aug. 27, 1946- 
May, 1947; and Harlan Cleveland, May 1, 1947-Feb. 24, 1948. The Surplus 
Procurement O ffice r i n  China was George S t. Louis. Ib id . .  l U ,  Appendix 
One, 3, 7, 15. 18.
37xhe number o f  Americans serving in  these  e d a c i t i e s  during th e  
M ardiall M ission, and th e  U. S. percentage ( in  b rackets) o f  th e  t o t a l  UNRRA 
fo rce  in  China fo r  th e  corresponding p erio d  were as fo llow s: Dec. 31.
1945 -  167 (66); June 30, 1946 -  767 (63I ;  Dec. 31. 1946 -  812 (61). In  
f a c t ,  Washington, D. C ., was th e  only lo ca tio n  >diere th e  percentage o f 
American UNRRA personnel was g re a te r  than  i t  was in  China. I t  i s  a lso  
in te re s t in g  to  note th a t  th e  U. S. percentage o f the  t o t a l  worldwide UNRRA 
personnel only c o n s titu te d  31 p e r cent, 35 p e r cent, and 37 per cen t, r e ­
spectively on the  same d a te s . I b i d . . H I ,  i^ e n d ix  Ten, 415-17* Books 
s ta te d  on Mar. 8 , 1948, th a t  th ese  personnel always had a Chinese superio r. 
House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a Post-War Recovery Pro­
gram. 1948, P t. 2, 2158.
38gstimated c o st o f  th e  UNRRA China program, excluding adm inistra­
t iv e  c o s ts , was $658, 400, 000.  This f ig u re  was reached by adding th e  co st 
o f th e  procurement o f  goods ($526,800,000) to  th e  insurance and shipping 
expenses ($131,600,000). The American co n trib u tio n  o f  $474,000,000 i s  
based on th e  S ta te  D epartm ent's 'estim ate  th a t  as th e  U. S. con tribu ted  
approxim ately 72 p e r cen t o f  th e  world-wide UNRRA fund, th e  U. S. th e re fo re  
co n trib u ted  72 p e r cen t o f th e  $658,400,000 provided by UNRRA to  China. On
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^p ro x lm ate ly  e igh ty  p e r cent o f these  funds were expended fo r  food, 
c lo th in g , and in d u s t r ia l  r e h a b i l i ta t io n , with a g r ic u ltu ra l  r e h a b i l i ta t io n  
and medical siq)plies accounting fo r  the  remainder* In d u s tr ia l  r e h a b i l i ta ­
t io n  expenditures alone accounted fo r  over th ir ty -tw o  p e r cent o f  the  t o t a l
o u t la y *
Food, raw co tton , and waterway and railw ay tra n sp o rt equipment 
c o n s titu te d  the  bulk o f  d e liv e r ie s  in  th e  e a rly  stages o f  the  program, 
w hile a g r ic u ltu ra l  and in d u s t r ia l  r e h a b i l i ta t io n  supp lies were emphasized 
toward th e  end o f  th e  p ro jec t*  Although only 77*363 long tons o f  UNRRA 
su p p lie s  were discharged in  China during 19^5* d e liv e r ie s  increased  rap id ly
t h i s  b a s is , th e  U* S* p a r t  i n  th e  UNRRA China program amounted to  $474,000,000* 
S ta te  Department, Ü* 5* R elations with China. Annex 185, p* 1046* I t  i s  
ap p ro p ria te  a t  t h i s  p o in t—in  l i ^ t  o f  th e  S ta te  Department estim ates above— 
to  make a d is t in c t io n  between the  U* S* au th o riza tio n s  and app rop ria tions 
fo r  a l l  UNRRA so th a t  th e  a c tu a l d e liv e r ie s  o f  goods to  China re fe rre d  to  
below w i l l  be more meaningful* Ihe U* S* authorized  and appropria ted  
$2,700,000,000 fo r  th e  world^wide use o f  UNRRA* One-half ($1,350,000,000] 
o f  th e  t o t a l  American au th o riza tio n  was approved 17 months before  M arshall 
agreed to  go to  China, and th e  o th er o n e -h a lf was au thorized  a f t e r  M arshall 
had accepted th e  assignment bu t before he had a rr iv e d  in  China* Also 
$800,000,000 o f  th e  t o t a l  appropria ted  was approved by Congress 17 months 
W fore  th e  M arshall M ission was c rea ted , w hile another $550,000,000 was 
appropria ted  a f t e r  M arshall had accepted th e  assignment but before he 
a rr iv e d  in  China* The remaining $1,350,000,000 was appropria ted  a f te r  
M arshall a rriv ed  in  China with the  l a s t  ap p rop ria tion  o f $465,000,000 being 
approved on Ju ly  23, 1946* Vfoodbridge, I ,  112-15*
39Based on f ig u re s  av a ila b le  in  S ta te  Department, U* 5* R elations 
w ith China. Annex 185, P* 1046. The UNRRA program was ex tensive in  scope, 
includ ing  e f fo r ts  to :  prevent famine and epidemics, r e s e t t l e  d isp laced
persons, re s to re  tra n sp o rta tio n  and communication f a c i l i t i e s ,  provide 
s h e l te r , and co n stru c t pub lic  u t i l i t i e s ,  among others* W .llian  M* Clayton, 
A ss is tan t S ecre tary  o f  S ta te  a t  th e  tim e, spoke o f one o f th e  more serious 
a sp ec ts  o f  th e  Chinese s i tu a tio n  facing. UNRRA sh o rtly  a f te r  V-J Day* "I 
th in k ,"  he s ta te d , " th a t China could absorb almost any amount o f  re l ie f*
You ju s t  could no t do a  cooqplete job  in  China* A ll you can do i s  to  do the  
b e s t you can ." Testimony o f  Nov* 14, 1945, in  U* S ., Congress, House,
Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Haar^ngs on H. R> 4649. A B il l  to  ihab le  
th e  United S ta te s  to  Further P a r t ic ip a te  in  th e  Work o f  the  United Nations 
R e lie f  and R eh ab ilita tio n  A dm inistration. 79th Cong.* 1 s t Sess*. 1945. 
p p . 23-24*
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during th e  follow ing y ear. Approximately 2,452,300 long tons had been t r a n s ­
fe rre d  when th e  program was completed, and over f i f ty - f iv e  per cent o f t h i s  
t o ta l  was d e livered  during 1946 vdiile M arshall was in  China. ̂  Though UNRRA 
personnel t r ie d  to  d is t r ib u te  siqjplies to  Chinese liv in g  in  both N a tio n a lis t-  
and Communist-controlled a reas , th is  noit-d iscrim inato iy  o b jec tiv e  was not 
achieved. The Communists received  two to  th ree  per cen t, by w e i^ t ,  and 
four to  f iv e  per cen t, by value , o f th e  t o ta l  UNRRA China supp lies.
Economic A ssistance While M arshall 
Was Secretary  o f  S ta te
Bconanic a ss is ta n c e  to  China during 1947-49 consisted  o f th e  con­
tin u a tio n  o f  programs p rev iously  au thorized . This a id  was su b s ta n tia l , and, 
i t  w il l  be re c a lle d , consisted  o f  len d -lea se  "p ipeline" c re d i ts ,  Export- 
Import Bank c re d i ts ,  s a le s  o f  c iv i l ia n  surp lus p roperty , and UNRRA g ran ts . 
F urther, th e  United S ta te s  i n i t i a t e d  a d d itio n a l measures during the  tim e 
M arshall was Secretary  o f  S ta te . P residen t Truman in d ica ted  toward th e  
end o f  th e  M arshall M ission what American po licy  would be.
^ P r i c e ,  "UNRRA in  China, " UNRRA, O perational A nalysis Paper, No.
53. A pr., 1948, pp. 38-40. The anphasis, in  tonnage, placed by UNRRA on 
food fo r  th e  Chinese i s  in d ica ted  by th e  follow ing s t a t i s t i c s .  Figures in  
b rackets rep resen t th e  t o t a l  discharge o f  a l l  UNRRA supplies fo r  th e  p e riods 
in d ic a te d : Nov.-Dee., 1945 -  58,534 (77,363); 1945-1946 -  076,945 (1,429,356); 
1945-1947 -  1 , 162,399 (2, 452, 300) . I t  was a lso  noted th a t  th ese  supp lies 
were "programmed,” and th a t  they  were siq>plemented by an ad d itio n a l "sev era l 
thousand to n s o f m iscellaneous foods" ih ic h  were procured from U. S. m il i ­
ta ry  su rp luses on th e  v arious P ac ific  Is la n d s . I b id . . pp. 38, 125.
^^A lthou^  th e re  was "energetic , continuous, and conscientious 
e f fo r ts "  to  c a n y  ou t t h i s  "poüqy" o f non-discrim ination  in  r e la t io n  to  
a rea  o f  dom icile, UNRRA made no attem pt "to  c a lc u la te , th e o re tic a l ly , what 
m i ^ t  have been a wholly equ itab le  percentage" o f  supplies to  be d is tr ib u te d  
to  th e  people in  Communist-controlled reg ions. Ib id . .  pp. 47, 65. 66. Rooks 
s ta te d  on Mar. 8 , 1948, th a t  UNRRA* s attem pt to  d e liv e r  supp lies in to  th e  
Communist a reas  was " la rg e ly  prevented" b7  the  opposition  o f  N a tio n a lis t 
m il i ta ry  a u th o r i t ie s .  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a 
Post-War Recovery Program. 1945, P t. 2 , 2163.
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• • • We a re  pledged not to  in te r f e r e  in  th e  in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  o f 
China. Our p o s itio n  i s  c le a r . While avoiding involvement in  
th e i r  c iv i l  s t r i f e ,  we w ill  persevere with out p o lic y  o f help ing  
the  Chinese people to  bring  about peace and economic recovery in  
th e i r  country.
As ways and means a re  presen ted  fo r  co n stru c tiv e  a id  to  China, 
we w il l  give them c a re fu l and sympathetic considera tion  . . . .
When conditions in  China improve, we a re  prepared to  consider a id  
in  carry ing  ou t o th e r p ro je c ts , u n re la ted  to  c iv i l  s t r i f e ,  vdiich 
would encourage economic reco n stru c tio n  and reform in  China and 
idiich, in  so doing, would promote a general rev iv a l o f  commercial 
re la tio n s  between American and Chinese businessmen.^^
In  ad d ition , th e re  remains th e  a n a ly s is  o f American economic po licy  toward
China during 19^9 when M arshall, fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e in  over th ree  y ears ,
was no longer a sso c ia ted  w ith e i th e r  the  form ulation o r th e  implementation
o f United S ta te s  po licy .
The N a tio n a lis t p o s itio n  s te a d ily  d e te r io ra te d —p o l i t ic a l ly ,  
m i l i ta r i ly ,  and economically—during M arsh a ll 's  two y ears  as S ecre tary  o f  
S ta te . Ih is  s ta te  o f a f f a i r s  would seem to  imply, on th e  basis  o f Truman's 
statem ent o f December, 1946, th a t  th e  United S ta te s  would not advance addi­
t io n a l  a id  to  China as cond itions were no t improving. Thou^ th i s  d ra s t ic  
s tq )  was not taken, th e re  were some d iffe ren ces  between th e  economic pro­
grams during M arsh a ll 's  two years as Secretary  o f  S ta te  and those o f  p re ­
vious y ears . F i r s t ,  th e re  was a considerable decrease in  the  value o f 
a id  authorized during 1947-48 idien compared w ith th a t  approved while M arshall 
was in  China. Second, economic a ss is ta n c e  was au thorized  p rim arily  in  
th e  form o f  g ran ts  during 1947-48 and p r in c ip a lly  as c re d i ts  during th e  
M arshall M ission. Third, a u th o riza tio n s  o f economic a id  a f t e r  M arshall l e f t  
China in  1947 overwhelmingly provided fo r  d ir e c t  implementation, whereas 
au th o riza tio n s fo r  implementation p r io r  to  th a t  time were almost equally
4'2statflment on U. S. p o licy  toward China, Dec. 18, 1946, p r in te d  
in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with China. Annex 114, p. 694.
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divided between d ire c t  and In d ire c t means. I t  should a lso  be remembered 
In  th i s  connection th a t th e re  was a long period  a f t e r  M arsha ll's  r e c a l l  in  
which the  United S ta te s  was reassessing  i t s  o v e ra ll po licy  toward China.
Area p r io r i t i e s  and world-wide commitments, as w ell as sp e c if ic  conditions 
in  China, were appraised th ro u ^ o u t 194?, and th e  t o t a l  o f new au th o riza tio n s  
during th a t year was small lAen compared with th a t  o f  1946.
New au th o riza tio n s fo r  economic a id  to  China during M arsh a ll's  
two years as Secretazy o f  S ta te  [January, 194?-January, 19493 were valued 
a t  $357,400,000. Grants comprised $325,000,000 o f th e  t o t a l ,  >diile c re d i ts  
co n stitu ted  th e  remaining $32,400,000. One measure, th e  China Aid Act o f 
1948, accounted fo r  $275, 000,000 o f  th e  au thorized  t o t a l .
C red its were made av a ilab le  in  th e  amounts o f  $16,000,000 by th e  
Export-Import Bank and $16,400,000 by th e  United S ta te s  Maritime Commission. 
Ihe Export-Import Bank tran sac tio n  was con^pleted so th a t  the  Yungli Chemi­
c a l Industry  could purchase machinery and equipment and pay fo r  th e  se rv ices 
connected with i t s  in s ta l la t io n  and opera tion . F u lfillm en t o f th e  terms 
o f  th e  agreement was no t re a liz e d , however, during th e  tim e M arshall was 
Secretary  o f S t a t e . ^  The Maritime Commission c re d i t  was approved in  A pril, 
1947, and was based on th e  Commission's a u th o rity  under th e  p rov isions o f 
th e  Merchant Ship Sales Act o f 1946. T hrou^ th i s  arrangement th e  Chinese 
Government purchased fo r ty - th re e  surp lus w ar-b u ilt v e sse ls  fprocurmnent 
co st -  $77, 300, 000} fo r  $26,200,000. Only $16,400,000 o f th e  sa le s  p r ic e , 
however, was on Maritime Commission c re d it  term s.
^3supra. pp. 150- 55 .
^ u n r a . th is  chaq>ter, nn. 27 and 31»
^5rhe balance o f  $9,800,000 ($26,200,000 minus $16,400,000) was 
paid  in  cash, o f  idiich $4,200,000 had been obtained th r o u ^  an Eiqport-Import
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As in d ica ted  above, however, American economic a ss is ta n ce  to  China 
during 1947-48 consisted  p rim arily  o f  g ran ts . Of th e  $325,000,000 in  
g ran ts  au thorized  by th e  United S ta te s , $3,600,000 was con tribu ted  th r o u ^  
in d ire c t  channels. Aid in  th i s  amount was made av a ila b le  by th e  Board o f  
T rustees fo r  R eh ab ilita tio n  A ffa irs  IBOTRA], an in te rn a tio n a l  body e s tab ­
lish e d  by th e  Chinese Goverment when UNRRA opera tions were term inated on 
December 31* 1 9 4 ? .^  BOTRA was c rea ted  to  ca rry  out long-term  re h a b i l i ta t io n  
p ro je c ts  idiich had been sponsored by UNRRA, includ ing  programs fo r  th e  
production o f  farm machinery, development o f th e  f ish in g  in d u stry , and th e  
manufacture o f  pharm aceutical s t^ p lie s .  Plans were drawn up to  a id  the  
Chinese in  re s to rin g  i r r ig a t io n  and communication f a c i l i t i e s  in  the  a reas 
p rev iously  flooded by th e  Yellow R iver. Very l i t t l e  was accomplished in
Bank c re d i t .  S ta te  Department, U. S. R ela tions with China. Annex 185, P» 
1049. The sum o f $4,200,000 i s  included in  th e  c re d i ts  re fe rre d  to  on pp.
226 above. Inform ation a v a ilab le  th r o u ^  another U. S. Government p u b li­
ca tio n  dated  Aug. 4, 1948, in d ica ted  a s l i ^ t  discrepancy, however, in  th e  
f ig u re s  r ^ re s e n t in g  th e  extension o f  c re d i ts  by th e  Maritime Ccanmission 
($18,800,000) as compared with those above ($16,400,000). The 1948 source 
a lso  In d ica ted  th a t  th e  N ational Government was slow in  u t i l i z in g  a v a ila b le  
c re d i ts ,  a s  only $7, 000,000 o f  th e  $18,800,000 had been u t i l i z e d  as o f 
Mar. 3* 1948. U. S ., Congress, House, Report o f  A c tiv it ie s  o f  th e  N ational 
Advisorv Council on In te rn a tio n a l ym p^^yv and Problems. Oct. 1.
1947-Mar. 31. 1948. 80th Cong.. 2nd S e ss .. 1948. House Doc. 737. P. 16.
C ited h e re a f te r  as U. S . , Congress, House, Report o f . . .  th e  N ational 
Advisory Council on International. Monetary and F inancial Problems. Oct. 1 . 
1947-Mar. 31. 1948. 1948. House Doc. 737.
^A ccording to  th e  o f f i c i a l  h is to ry  o f  UNRRA, a s t a f f  was main­
ta in ed  in  China u n t i l  A pr., 1948, to  c lo se  out th e  o rg a n iz a tio n 's  adminis­
t r a t iv e  reco rds. UNRRA, according to  t h i s  source, was disbanded because 
th e  p a r t ic ip a tin g  n a tio n s  were " in creas in g ly  unable o r  unw illing  to  main­
ta in  a t  a  h i ^  le v e l th e  cooperative approach which had been es tab lish ed  
during th e  war (World War H i . "  Wbodbridge, I I ,  551* UNRRA a llo ca ted  
$5,000,000 o f  i t s  funds to  BOTRA fo r  use in  China. The Department o f 
S ta te  used th e  same formula to  determine th e  U. S. co n trib u tio n  through 
BOTRA th a t  i t  used to  a sc e r ta in  American a ss is ta n ce  through UNRRA. Supra, 
n . 38; a ls o . Appendix H ,  p. 275.
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th i s  l a s t  in s tan ce , however, because th e  m ili ta ry  s i tu a tio n  s te a d ily  d e te r-  
io ra te d  during 1948-49.^7
Personal needs o f  the  Chinese were p ra c t ic a l ly  un lim ited , and the  
United S ta te s  u t i l iz e d  d ire c t  g ran ts to  provide th e  populace with v i t a l  
svqpplies. Post-UNRRi r e l i e f  a ss is ta n c e , fo r  example, included the  d e liv e ry  
o f c e re a ls , seeds, p e s tic id e s  and medical supplies under th e  Foreign R e lie f 
P rogram .^  The opera tion  cost $46,381,000, and ce rea ls  accounted fo r  75»5 
per cent ($35,412,900) o f th e  t o t a l .  A dditional expenditures were incu rred  
as fo llow s: m edical supplies -  11.2 per cen t I$5,185,300), shipping co s ts  -  
10.9 per cent ($5,084,500), and seeds and p e s tic id e s  -  2 .4  per cent 
($698, 300) . Though the  program was slow in  developing, d e liv e r ie s  were 
stepped iq) during th e  f i r s t  q u a rte r  o f 1948 and completed sh o rtly  a f t e r  the
47vibodbridge, I I ,  450-51» Also, testim ony o f  Harlan Cleveland on 
Mar. 8, 1948, in  House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hearings fo r  a Post- 
War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 21?2.
4®An aggregate o f $46,400,000 was appropria ted  by Congress fo r  the  
Foreign R e lie f  Program. P. L. 84, 80th Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., a llo ca ted  
$28,400,000 fo r  China on May 31, 1947, and $18,000,000 was provided under 
P. L. 393, 80th Cong., 1 s t S ess ., on Dec. 23, 1947» S ta te  Department,
Ü. S. R elations with China. Annex 185, p* 1049» The A dm inistration s o u ^ t  
r e l i e f  a ss is ta n ce  fo r  France, I t a ly  and A ustria  in  Nov., 1947, bu t i t  d id  
not seek such a id  fo r  China because executive o f f i c i a l s  be lieved  th a t  China 
could use i t s  fo re ig n  reserves to  make commodity purchases u n t i l  th e  China 
problem could be considered sep ara te ly  from Europe in  th e  spring o f  1948 
(China Aid Program). When th e  Senate Committee on A ppropriations and th e  
House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  urged th a t  China be included in  the  
European in te rim  a ss is ta n c e  program, however, th e  S ta te  Department complied, 
concluding th a t  China should be included in  th e  in terim  program "to con­
serve i t s  dwindling reserves o f  fo re ign  exchange fo r  purchases o th e r than 
commodities needed fo r  cu rren t consunq^tion. " For views o f  S ta te  Department, 
see i b i d . . p . 367, and U. S ., Congress, House, Report o f . . .  th e  N ational 
Advisorv Council on I n t e r n a Monetary and Financial Problems. Oct. 1. 
1947-Mar. 31. 1948. 1948. Houje Doc. 737. p p .  1 8 - 1 9 » The p o s itio n s  taken 
by th e  House and Senate Committees a re  based on U. S ., Congrers, House, 
Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Biergency Foreign Aid. 80th Cong., 1 s t  Sess», 
1947, Rapt. 1152, p . 14; U. S ., Congress, House, The Foreign Aid Act o f 
1947. Conference Report to  Accompany S. 1774. 80th Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1947, 
Rapt. 1161, p . 8; and U. S .,  Congress, Senate, Committee on A ppropriations, 
Third Supplem ental A ppropriations Bi U .  Rm o r t  to  Accompaay H. R, 4748.
80th Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1947, Rapt. 808, p . 2.
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middle o f th a t  y e a r . ^  The United S ta te s  a lso  supervised th e  d is tr ib u tio n  
o f a p p l i e s  and worked with the  Chinese to  e s ta b lish  a ra tio n in g  and price-- 
co n tro l system fo r  severa l o f  the  c o as ta l c i t i e s .  Funds from th e  sa le  o f 
goods in  these  urban a reas  were used to  finance r e l i e f  and work r e l i e f  pro­
j e c t s . ^
the United S ta te s  developed one o th er program to  economically 
a s s i s t  th e  Chinese Government “vdiile M arshall was Secretary  o f S ta te .
M arshall honored the  pledge he made to  Congress during the  European in terim  
a id  hearings in  l a te  19^7» and both he and P resident Truman urged Congress 
in  February, 1948, to  support th e  A dm in istra tion 's  China a id  proposal cur­
re n t ly  before them. Congress cooperated with the  A dm inistration and approved 
th e  general recommendation, but the  le g is la t iv e  branch d ra s t ic a l ly  reduced
^ P e rcen tag es  were determined by the  au thor on th e  b as is  o f s t a t i s ­
t i c s  given in  S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with Annex 185, P»
1049. Shipments valued a t  $4-,368,556 had been made by Dec. 31, 1947. The 
f ig u re  rose  rap id ly  to  $24,794,835 by Mar. 31, 1948, and to  $37,021,725 
as o f  June 30, 1948. A ll f ig u re s  excluded cost o f shipping. U. S ., Congress, 
House, Second Report to  Conprass on th e  United S ta te s  Foreign R e lie f Pro­
gram. fo r  th e  Period Oct. 1 . 1947-Dec. 31. 1947. 80th Cong., 2nd S ess ., 1948, 
House Doc. 612, p . 10; U. S ., Congress, House, ühird Qiiar tf tr ly Report . . . 
on th e  U. S. Foreign R e lie f  Program. 1948, House Doc. 782, p . 6; Ü. S ., 
Congress, House, Fourth Q uarterly  Report to  Congress on th e  United S ta te s  
For_eiga_Relief Program, fo r  th e  Period Apr. 1-June 30. 1948. 80th Cong.,
2nd S e ss ,, 1948, House Doc. 783, P* C ited h e re a f te r  as  U. S . , Congress, 
House, Fourth Q uarterly  Report . . .  on th e  Ü. S. Foreign R elief Program. 
fo r  th e  Period Apr. 1-June 30. 1948. 1948, House Doc. 783» A S ta te  Depart­
ment source s ta te d , however, th a t  d e liv e r ie s  under th e  program were completed 
"during th e  f i r s t  h a lf  o f  1948." S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations with 
China. Annex 185, P» 1049.
^Am erican r e l i e f  personnel "svçiervised and c lo se ly  observed every 
phase o f th e  program," bu t th e  Chinese were s p e c if ic a lly  infoxued th ro u ^  
an agreement o f  Oct. 27, 1947, th a t  th e  U. S. Goverrment "would undertake 
no re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r  th e  success o f th e se  urban programs." U. S ., Congress, 
House, Fourth Q uarterly  Report . . .  on th e  U. S. Forai m  R e lief Program, 
fo r  th e  Period Apr. l^June  30. 1948. 1948. House Doc. 783. p . 37. S c tn c t  
o f  th e  agreement w ith China (A rt. 2, p a r . ( f ) )  i s  p rin te d  in  U. S ., Congress, 
House, Third Q uarterly  Report . . .  on th e  U. S. Foreign R e lie f Program.
1948, House Doc. 782, p . 70.
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th e  executive request fo r  a ss is ta n ce  to ta l l in g  $570,000,000. N evertheless, 
Congress approved a g ran t o f $338,000,000 to  China, and th i s  was th e  la rg e s t  
s in g le  d ire c t  g ran t o f  economic a ss is ta n c e  th a t  the  United S ta te s  had made 
to  China since M arsh a ll 's  re tu rn  to  th e  United S ta te s . F u rthe r, the  sum 
was the  h i p e s t  t o t a l —in  e i th e r  g ran ts  o r  c re d i ts —th a t  th e  United S ta te s  
had d ire c tly  a llo ca ted  fo r  any one program o f economic a ss is ta n c e  to  China 
a f te r  V-J Day. Diere was a considerable d iffe ren c e , however, between th e  
fig u res  contained in  th e  b i l l s  o f  a u th o risa tio n  and app rop ria tion . Congress 
au thorized  a g ran t o f  $338,000,000 on A pril 3, 19^8, but th e  app ropria tion  
measure o f  June 28 reduced th e  amount to  $275 ,000 ,000 .^
A ssistance to  China under t h i s  le g is la t iv e  enactment was appro­
p r ia te d  fo r  a period  o f  one y ear. I t  was, th e re fo re , not intended to  be a 
long-range p rog ram .^  Nor was the  a ss is ta n c e  designed, o f  i t s e l f ,  to  be a
^R epublican  Congressmen, i t  w i l l  be re c a lle d , had used th e  European 
in terim  a id  hearings i n  l a t e  1947 to  spur th e  A dm inistration to  develop 
and p resen t an a id  program fo r  China to  th e  Congress. Ih o u ^  the  Depart­
ment o f  S ta te  had been working on such a  program, M arshall was not ready 
to  ask Congress f o r  measures o f  iaq>lementation in  1947 because he wanted 
Congress to  dispose o f  th e  a id  proposal fo r  Ehrope before i t  turned i t s  
a tte n tio n  to  a ss is ta n c e  to  China. Ihese m atte rs  and o th e rs  re la te d  to  th e  
le g is la t iv e  h is to ry  o f  the  b i l l  have been tre a te d  in  supra, pp. 156.63
52According to  th e  Department o f  S ta te  th e  China Aid Program was 
regarded "as a measure which might become e i th e r  th e  f i r s t  stage  o f la rg e r  
and more co n stru c tiv e  endeavors o r th e  conclusion o f la rg e -sc a le  United 
S ta te s  a id  to  the  Chinese Government. " S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations 
irith  China, p . 387. Hie A dm inistration asked fo r  a program o f  f i f te e n  
months' du ration , and Congress reduced th e  period  to  twelve months. Spokes­
men fo r  th e  Department o f  S ta te  contended during th e  China a id  hearings th a t  
th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  fu tu re  a ss is ta n c e  would depend iqpon fu tu re  cond itions.
When questioned id iether a f in a l  term ination  da te  fo r  d i r e c t  r e l i e f  to  China 
could be e s tab lish ed , M arshall r q i l i e d  as fo llow s: "Not a t  th e  p resen t
tim e. I  would say i t  would be a m atte r fo r  a  complete resurvqy idien we see 
what has happened during th e  period  o f  t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  ap p ro p ria tio n ."  
Testimony o f  Feb. 20, 19^8, before House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs , Hear­
ings fo r  a  Post-War Recovery Program. 1948, P t. 2, 1564.
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panacea fo r  C hina's economic problems* B asica lly , the  United S ta te s  hoped 
to  r e l ie v e  the  su ffe rin g  o f the  Chinese people which had re su lte d  from 
in f la t io n  and the  sc a rc ity  o f goods* The United S ta te s  believed  th a t  r e l i e f  
in  th ese  two areas would give th e  Chinese Government an opportun ity  to  
i n i t i a t e  measures vAich were necessary to  e s ta b lish  more s ta b le  economic 
conditions* dhus, a id  under t h i s  1948 Act was designed to  supplement the  
e f fo r ts  o f the  Chinese but not to  be a su b s ti tu te  fo r  se lf-h e lp .
There was no delay, however, on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  A dm inistration 
while th e  N ational Government determined what i t s  supplementary e f fo r ts  
would be* On the  con tra ry , th e  United S ta te s  acted  with considerable speed 
in  i n i t i a t i n g  some aspec ts  o f th e  China Aid Program* In  fa c t ,  severa l 
measures were undertaken before Congress passed the  app rop ria tion  b i l l  and 
a lso  p r io r  to  the  b i l a t e r a l  agreement e s tab lish in g  th e  program*^3 For 
example. P residen t Truman a llo ca ted  $36,500,000 to  th e  Economic Cooperation 
A dm inistration in  l a t e  ^ r i l ,  1948, to  provide China w ith major commodities* 
The ECA A dm inistrator, Paul G* Hofikan, acted  quickly and a llo ca ted  
$34, 500,000 o f  th e  t o t a l  on May 7 fo r  c e re a ls , r ic e ,  co tton  and petroleum* 
F urther, Roger D* Lapham was appointed Chief o f th e  ECA Mission to  China 
on May 5* amd he a rr iv e d  in  China on June 7* In  a d d itio n , an American sur­
vey m ission was studying the  f e a s ib i l i ty  o f  p ro je c ts  f o r  in d u s tr ia l
33lhe a u th o riza tio n  measure was The China Aid Act o f 1948 and was 
incorpora ted  as T it le  IV o f P* L* 472 e n t i t le d  th e  Foreign A ssistance Act 
o f 19W* Congress passed th i s  law on Apr* 2, 1948, bu t i t  d id  no t enact 
th e  appropria tion  measure (The Foreign Aid A ppropriations Act o f  1949,
P. L* 793) u n t i l  l a t e  June, 1948* Suora. Chapter m ,  n . IO6* Thou^ the  
b i la t e r a l  agreement to  implement th e  program was not signed u n t i l  Ju ly  3* 
1948, th e  U* S* and Chinese Governments had agreed in  an exchange o f  notes 
on Apr, 30, 1948, to  continue in  e f fe c t  th e  app licab le  p rov isions o f  th e  
agreement o f  Oct. 27, 1947# governing U. S* fo re ig n  r e l i e f  assistance*  Text 
o f th e  Ju ly  3 arrangement i s  p r in te d  in  S ta te  Department, U* S* R ela tions 
with China. Annex 181, pp* 994-1001*
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reconstruction  by mid • June. ̂
Economic a ss is ta n c e  to  China under th e  China Aid Act was divided 
in to  th ree  major ca teg o rie s . The $275,000,000 gran t was o r ig in a lly  a l lo ­
cated as follows: ( l )  d e liv e ry  and d is tr ib u t io n  o f  commodities -  $203, 800, 000,
(2 ) in d u s tr ia l  reco n stru c tio n  and replacement -  $67, 500, 000, and (3 ) ru ra l  
reco n stru c tio n  -  $2 , 500, 000.^5 S u b s tan tia l p rogress was made in  th e  d e liv ­
ery  o f supplies during th e  period  M arshall remained as Secretary  o f S ta te , 
but concrete developments were le s s  apparent in  th e  in d u s tr ia l  and ru ra l  
reco n stru c tio n  p ro je c ts . A ll th ree  phases o f th e  China Aid Program req u ire  
some c la r i f ic a t io n .
Procurement a u th o riza tio n s  amounting to  $1,191,000 were issued  
fo r  in d u s tr ia l  equipment during 1948, but expenditures were made only fo r  
p re -p ro je c t engineering se rv ice s . This p a r t  o f  th e  ECA program was suspended 
con^ le te ly  on December 21, 1948, p rim arily  because o f  th e  u n c e rta in tie s  
caused by th e  d e te r io ra tin g  m ili ta ry  s i tu a t io n . 5^ American co n trib u tio n s
5% . S ., Congress, House, F i r s t  Report to  Congress o f th e  Economic 
Cooperation AHpi;lnistratjo n . fo r  th e  Q uarter Bided June 30. 1948. 80th Cong., 
2d S e ss ., 1948, House Doc. 784, pp. 6O-6I .  Also, l e t t e r  o f Charles E.
Bohlen, Counselor, Department o f S ta te , dated Ju ly  1, 1948, to  Sen. S ty les 
Bridges, p r in te d  in  U. S .,  Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 2d S e ss ., 1948, 
XCIV, P a rt 12, A5081. The p re s id e n tia l  a llo c a tio n  o f  $36,500,000 was cov­
ered by Sec. 406 o f  th e  China Aid Act idiich authorized  th e  P residen t to  
d ir e c t  th e  Reconstruction Finance Corporation to  advance $50,000,000 to  
ca rry  ou t the  p ro v isio n s o f  th e  Act u n t i l  Congress appropria ted  th e  f u l l  
amount o f  $275,000,000. Copy o f  te x t  o f  th i s  s ta tu te  i s  p rin te d  in  S ta te  
Department, Ü . S. R ela tions w it h  C ^ in a . Annex 179, pp« 991-93» A llocation  
o f  th e  remaining $238,500.000 ($275,000,000 minus th e  RFC advance o f  
$36, 500,000 in  Apr», 1948) was made b7 P residen t Truman on Ju ly  I 6 , 1948. 
L e tte r  o f Truman to  th e  Secretary  o f  th e  Treasury (John W. Snyder) on Ju ly  
16, 1948, p r in te d  in  U. S ., Congressional Record. 80th Cong., 2nd S ess .,
1948, ICIV, P art 12, A5O82.
55ihe remaining $1,200,000 of the to ta l of $275,000,000 was a llo ­
cated fbr administration in  Washington, 0. C., and in  China. State Depart­
ment, U. S. Relations with  Qiina. Annex 185, P» IO50.
56)fonetary a llo tm en ts were au thorized  fo r  the  construction  and 
rebu ild ing  o f  tra n sp o rt f a c i l i t i e s ,  power p la n ts , f e r t i l i z e r  p ro je c ts , and
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In  the  ru ra l  areas were a lso  minor, bu t not because the  o v e ra ll operation  
was suspended. The Rural Reconstruction Program, as o f  December 31» 1948, 
had been issued  ECA procurement au th o riza tio n s  o f $900,000 but very l i t t l e  
o f the  amount had been expended when th e  year ended. In  f a c t ,  th e  Program 
was only emerging from th e  planning s ta te .  Some o f th e  delay can be a t t r i b ­
uted to  o rg an iza tio n a l and procedural m atte rs : (1) th e  b i la te r a l  planning
agency [The Jo in t Commission on Rural Reconstruction} was not e stab lished  
u n t i l  August 4, (2) th e  American members o f th e  body were not appo in ted , 
u n t i l  September 16, and (3) th e  Commission d id  not hold  i t s  f i r s t  meeting 
u n t i l  October 1.57
coal and m etal mining e n te rp r is e s . L e tte r  from William Foster, Deputy 
A dm inistrator o f ECA, dated  Sept. 13, 1949» to  Sen. William F. Knowland, 
found in  U. S ., Congressional Racorri. 81 st Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1949» ICV,
P a rt 10, 12871. C ited h e re a f te r  $s l e t t e r ,  Foster to  Xnowland, Congres^ 
lonal Rmcord. 81st Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1949» ICV, P a rt 10. Also, Ü. S ., 
Congress, House, Third Report . . .  o f  th e  Economic C o o p e r a t i o n  A rfw in is -  
t r a t io n .  1949» House Doc. 179, p . x i .
57l6ss than $50,000 o f th e  U. S. funds a llo c a te d  fo r  ru ra l  recon­
s tru c tio n  had been ejqpended as o f  Mar. 21, 1949. Most o f  the  expenses 
were met th ro n g  w ithdrawals from coun terpart funds es tab lish ed  by the  
N ational Govemnent. £|y Feb. 25, 1949» 379 ap p lica tio n s  fo r  a ss is tan ce  
had been made, and th e  Jo in t  Commission on Rural R econstruction (JCRR) had 
acted  favorably  upon 37 o f th m . Some o f  these  p ro je c ts  included i r r ig a t io n  
and dike re p a ir ,  o rgan iza tion  o f producers ' cooperatives, d is tr ib u tio n  o f 
improved seed v a r ie t ie s ,  animal d isease  c o n tro l, re fo re s ta tio n , land reclap- 
m ation, and surveys o f r u r a l  h ea lth  p rob laas. Planning occupied most of 
th e  time o f  those a sso c ia ted  w ith t h i s  p a r t  o f th e  China Aid Program during 
1948, but s ig n if ic a n t  changes were n o ticeab le  during 1949. Ih o u ^  consider­
ab le  d i f f ic u l ty  developed in  securing coun terpart funds from th e  Chinese 
Government, th e  Deputy D irec to r o f ECA s ta te d  th a t  "the most a c tiv e  p a rt"  
o f  U. S. economic a ss is ta n c e  to  China in  mid- and l a t e  1949 was conducted 
th ro u ^  th e  JCRR. L e tte r , Foster to  Knowland, Congressio n a l Raeord. 81st 
Cong., 1 s t S ess ., 1949» ICV, P a rt 10, 12871; a lso , U. S ., Economic Coopera­
t io n  Achi n is t r a t io n ,  "Report on th e  Program o f Rural R econstruction in  
China," Apr. 1, 1949» pp. i ,  1-5 [Mimeographed) in  th e  f i l e s  o f  Rep. Helen 
Gahagan Douglas, D iv ision  o f M anuscripts, U niversity  o f  Oklahoma L ibrary, 
Noman, Oklahoma. Y. C. James Yen, a Chinese member o f .the JCRR, lauded 
th e  co n trib u tio n  made by th e  Commission to  th e  w elfare o f  th e  Chinese 
people. "Report by Mr. Y. C. James Yen, " found in  Minutes o f th e  Meeting 
o f  th e  American Chinese Committee o f th e  Mass Education Itovement, I n c . ,
Jan. 13» 1950» pp. 5-6» (Mimeographed) Papers o f Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas,
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Die commodities program under ECA a ss is ta n ce  provided funds to  
finance th e  im portation  o f food, co tton , petroleum , co a l, f e r t i l i z e r ,  
p e s tic id e s  and medical supp lies . P r io r i t i e s  were assigned to  d e liv e r ie s  
o f  food ( r ic e , wheat and f lo u r)  and co tton  during 1946. Food was necessary 
not only to  si^iport th e  ra tio n in g  program in  c o a s ta l c i t i e s  which had t r a d i ­
t io n a l ly  r e l ie d  upon im ports fo r  sustenance, but a lso  to  provide the  Chinese 
Govemnent with revenue secured through commodity sa le s . Shipments o f co tton  
were needed to  m aintain  production and employment in  C hina 's ch ie f modern 
industry—te x t i l e  m anufacture—and to  provide item s fo r  home consumption 
and e3qx>rt.
Procurement au th o riza tio n s  under the  commodity program were w ell 
ahead o f  schedule idien M arshall resigned  as Secretary  o f S ta te , and shipments 
d id  not lag  f a r  b ^ iind  th e  estim ates. I t  was estim ated by the  Economic 
Cooperation A dm inistration th a t  th e  co st o f ECA im ports in to  China would 
average $20,000,000 monthly. As o f  December 31, 1946, commodity funds 
to ta l l in g  $194,000,000 had been au tho rized  fo r  procurement, and siq)plies 
valued a t  $112,000,000 had a rriv e d  in  China. Expenditures fo r  co tton  amounted 
to  $52, 700, 000, id iile  r ic e ,  wheat and f lo u r  accounted fo r  an ad d itio n a l 
$37,000,000.58
Two a d d itio n a l m atters p e rta in in g  to  th e  o v e ra ll China Aid Program
Folder: General, China, D ivision o f  M anuscripts, U n iversity  o f Oklahoma
L ibrary , Noiman, Oklahoma.
^^These f ig u re s , based on a Feb ., 1949, re p o r t, represented  th e  
cost o f  299,036 b a le s  o f  co tton , 129,000 tons o f r ic e ,  and 107,000 tons o f 
wheat and f lo u r . S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations w ith China. Annex 184, 
pp. 1010, 1023-24. S lig h tly  h igher au th o riza tio n  and lower expenditure 
f ig u re s  were given, however, in  an ECA re p o rt o f  May I 6 , 1949. According 
to  th e  l a t e r  ECA re p o r t , th e  procurement o f commodities had been au thorized  
as o f Dec. J l ,  1946, idiereas only $95,500,000 had been expended as o f th a t  
da te . U. S ., Congress, House, Third Report . . .  o f th e  Economic Coopera­
t io n  AHmin^strati^on. 1949, House Doc. 179, i^)pendix E, p . 158.
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req u ire  b r ie f  comment. F i r s t ,  the United S ta te s  took ex tra  p recautions to  
in su re  th a t  th e  a c t iv i t i e s  o f the  ECA M ission in  China would not c o n f l ic t  
with th e  o b jec tiv e s  o f American po licy  toward China. Lapham, the  ECA Chief 
in  China, s ta te d  th e  American p o s itio n  on th is  po in t as follow s:
I t  (China Aid Act) . . .  requ ired  the  Chief o f th e  China Mission 
to  keep in  c lo se  touch with Ambassador S tu a rt in  o rder th a t  our 
a c t iv i t i e s  should in  no way c o n f l ic t  with our fo re ign  p o licy  objec­
t iv e s  with resp ec t to  China. Not only was our Mission in  constant 
touch with our Embassy in  Nanking, w ith Admiral Badger, commanding 
our Naval fo rces in  th e  Far & s t ,  and with th e  M ilita ry  Attaches 
assigned to  our Embassy but our e ig h t reg iona l o f f ic e s  were in  
d a ily  con tact with our Consul-Generals s ta tio n ed  in  th e i r  a r e a s . 59
Second, th e  United S ta te s  developed e lab o ra te  techniques fo r  the  supervision 
and co n tro l o f th e  commodity and in d u s t r ia l  reco n stru c tio n  programs. P a r t ic u ­
l a r  a tte n tio n  was given to  th e  food ra tio n in g  program, with every phase 
o f th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f supp lies being s t r i c t l y  stq>ervised and c a re fu lly  
checked to  ensure d e liv e ry  to  the  in tended  re c ip ie n ts . Though adm inistered 
by o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  Chinese Government, th e  ECA China Mission m aintained 
su rv e illan ce  over th e  re c e ip t ,  p rocessing , d is tr ib u t io n  and end-use o f a l l  
commodity shipments th a t  a rr iv e d  in  China. ̂
The in d u s t r ia l  replacement and reco n stru c tio n  program was a lso  
c lo se ly  supervised, a l th o u ^  funds were expended only fo r  p re -p ro je c t engi- 
needng se rv ice s . A jo in t  committee o f  two Americans and th re e  Chinese 
in v ite d  a p p lica tio n s  fo r  p ro je c ts  from both p r iv a te  and pub lic  e n te rp r ise s  
in  China. The jo in t  committee se lec ted  th e  J . G. White Engineering
59Lapham, "The Chinese S itu a tio n  As I  Saw I t , "  Sept. 8, 1949, p . 1. 
Lapham added th a t  th e  EGA s t a f f  received  "much valuab le  a ss is ta n ce  and ad ­
vice* from many Americans (businessmen, m edical m issio n aries) who had liv e d  
in  China fo r  many years and %dio understood lo c a l  cond itions. Personnel 
were d is tr ib u te d  among e ig h t c i t i e s ,  he noted, and never exceeded 100 Ameri­
cans and 400 non-Americans. I b id . . p . 4 .
^ A l l  phases o f  th e  China Aid Program were jo in t ly  supervised by 
th e  EGA M ission, and i t s  Chinese co un te rpart, th e  Council fo r  U. S. Aid
21*4
Corporation o f New York C ity as i t s  consu ltan t and re fe rre d  a l l  p ro jec t 
p e ti t io n s  to  the  New York fixvi fo r  approval o r re je c tio n . Successful a p p li­
can ts subsequently chose a "p ro jec t e n g in eer,” sub ject to  th e  approval o f 
th e  jo in t  committee and th e  ECA China M ission. The p ro je c t engineer was 
responsib le  fo r  con stru c tio n  and fo r  securing and in s ta l l in g  equipment and 
m a te ria l. F in a lly , reg u la tio n s  s tip u la te d  th a t  th e  jo in t  committee would 
not take  ac tio n  a t  any stage of th e  procedure u n t i l  the  J . G. White Ehgi- 
neering Corporation had made i t s  recommendation.^^
Economic A ssistance a f te r  M arsh a ll 's  Resignation 
N either Congress nor the  P residen t approved any measures during 
1949 to  in c rease  th e  t o t a l  o f  economic a ss is ta n ce  to  China bqyond th a t  p re ­
v iously  au thorized  and appropria ted . Both branches o f the  United S ta te s  
Government d id  sanction  th e  continuation  o f  th e  China Aid Program, but Ameri­
can a id  was too l im ite d  to  a r r e s t  th e  d e te r io ra tin g  s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s  in  
N a tio n a lis t C h i n a . T h e  value o f economic a id  de livered  to  China under the
CCUSA). Food was d is tr ib u te d  through th e  ra tio n in g  program to  nearly  
13, 000,000 people in  seven major c i t i e s —Peiping, T ie^.tsin, Tsingtao,
Ranking, Swatow, Shanghai and Canton. S ta te  Department, U. S. R elations 
with China. Annex 184, pp. 100?, IOI6.
^^ Ib id . . pp'. 1033- 34.
G^The China Aid Program, o r ig in a lly  au thorized  fo r  one year, was 
continued through th e  passage o f P. L. 47, S ls t  Cong., 1 s t  Sess. This le g is ­
la t io n ,  approved on Apr. 19, 1949, provided th a t  th e  unexpended po rtion  
o f th e  China Aid funds could be made a v a ila b le  a t  th e  d isc re tio n  o f the  
P residen t through Feb. 15, 1950» "Summary o f U. S. Government Economic 
and M ilita ry  Aid Authorized fo r  China since 1937," 1950, from The Papers 
o f  Harxy S. Truman, p . 14. The House Committee on Foreign A ffa irs  favorab ly  
supported continuing th e  China Aid Program. Views o f Committee members 
a re  recorded in  U. S .,  Congress, House, Committee on Foreign A ffa irs ,
th e  China Aid Act o f  1948. 81 st Cong., 1 s t  S ess ., 1949, Rept. 329. 
One o th e r  attem pt was made to  extend $500,000,000 to  China to  c re a te  a 
monetary s ta b i l iz a t io n  fund, but A dm inistration opposition  succeeded in  
defea ting  th e  measure. Supra. Chapter H I ,  n. 107, and Chapter V, n . 5»
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BCA program dropped to  a monthly average o f  approxim ately $3,000,000 to  
$4,000,000.^^ When S h a n ^ a i f e l l  to  th e  Communists in  May, 1949, BCA 
commodity shipments d estin ed  fo r  th a t  c i ty  were d iverted  to  Japan, Korea 
and Hong Kong fo r  fu tu re  sa le . Subsequent m il i ta ry  advancesby th e  Communists 
re su lte d  in  th e  s h i f t  o f  the  commodity and r u r a l  reco n stru c tio n  programs to  
Formosa in  the  f a l l  o f  1949. %  the  end o f th e  year more than o n o -th ird  of
th e  t o ta l  BCA a id  was s t i l l  u n o b lig a te d .^
^3L etter, F oste r to  Knowland, Congressional Record, 8IstCaig,,]sb Sess. 
1949, ICV, P a rt 10, 12871. The monthly average o f d e liv e r ie s  valued a t  
$3,000,000 to  $4,000,000 con trasted  sharply w ith th e  o r ig in a l ECA estim ates 
monthly o f  $20,000,000. Supra, p. 242.
^ $ 93, 500,000 (34 per cen t) o f th e  o r ig in a l  $275, 000,000 was s t i l l  
unobligated  as o f Jan. 6 , 1950. Procurement a u th o riza tio n s  on th i s  da te  
were a s  fo llow s: commodities -  $169,657,000; JCRR ( ru ra l  reco n stru c tio n )-
$1,803,000; engineer se rv ice s  ( in d u s tr ia l  reco n s tru c tio n ) -  $1,567,000.
The remainder o f th e  $275,000,000 ($8,473,000) was a llo c a te d  to  pay f re ig h t  
charges and to  pay th e  tu i t io n ,  subsistence and re tu rn  passage to  China 
fo r  se le c te d  c i t iz e n s  o f  China to  study in  acc red ited  in s t i tu t io n s  o f  
h i ^ e r  lea rn in g  in  th e  U. S. "Summazy o f  Ü. S. Government Economic and 
M ilitazy  Aid Authorized fo r  China since  1937, " 1950. from Ihe Papers o f  
Harry S. Truman, pp. 13-14.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
Chronologically, th e  M arshall M ission rep re sen ts  a very short 
period  in  American r e la t io n s  with China. General M arshall a rr iv e d  in  China 
on December 21, 19^5. and he departed fo r  th e  United S ta te s  on January 8, 
1947. During th i s  pe riod  M arshall was th e  dominant p e rso n a lity  in  the  fo r ­
m ulation and implementation o f  American po licy—p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and 
m ili ta ry —toward China. He re tu rned  to  th e  United S ta te s  as S ecre tary  o f 
S ta te , a p o s itio n  he h e ld  u n t i l  e a rly  January, 1949. His counsel on Chinese- 
American a f f a i r s  during 1947-48 c a rr ie d  g rea t w e i^ t  among most United S ta te s  
o f f i c i a l s ,  and he c o rre c tly  p red ic ted  th e  u ltim a te  tre n d  o f  events in  China.
N evertheless, few developments in  recen t United S ta te s  fo re ign  
p o licy  have evoked a more c o n tro v e rs ia l re a c tio n  among Americans than th e  
M arshall Mission and subsequent American fo re ig n  p o licy  toward China during 
1947- 1949. I t  i s  im portant to  remember, however, th a t  th e re  was no organ­
ized  opposition  to  th e  M arshall M ission u n t i l  long a f t e r  i t s  te rm ina tion . 
Further, opposition  to  America's China p o licy  beyond th a t  rep resen ted  by 
the  M arshall M ission d id  not coalesce u n t i l  approxim ately one y ear a f t e r  
M arshall had re tu rned  to  th e  United S ta te s .^
^Several c r i t i c s  charged th a t  th e  United S ta te s—not th e  Chinese 
Govemnent—"lost*  China. Thou^ th e i r  accusations were phrased d if fe re n t­
ly ,  th e  substance o f  t h e i r  comments was th e  same: Ihe United S ta te s  Depart­
ment o f  S ta te  and Communists in  th e  Kremlin and Tenan had conspired to  de­
l iv e r  China to  th e  Communists; th e  conspiracy ex is ted  during World War U  
and a  reading o f th e  re p o r ts  o f  United S ta te s  Foreign Service O ffice rs  in
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American Policy; C onsistent o r  V ariable?
United S ta te s  po licy  toward China during th e  M arshall Mission 
d iffe re d  in  severa l re sp ec ts  from th a t  of e a r l ie r  American p o licy . F i r s t ,  
t r a d i t io n a l  po licy  was charac terized  by i t s  opposition  to  non-Chinese 
forces t h i  s o u ^ t  to  dominate a l l  o r p a r t  o f China th r o u ^  m ili ta ry  o r economic 
means. The American course o f ac tio n  during th e  M arshall Mission was spe- 
cificaPy d irec te d  toward in te rn a l  Chinese problems th a t  were p o l i t i c a l ,  m il i ­
ta ry  and economic in  n a tu re  and lAich th rea tened  to  destroy  th e  Republic o f  
China from w ith in . Second, th e  United S ta te s  d id  not become involved in  
th e  domestic a f f a i r s  o f  China p r io r  to  World War U .  American ac tio n  was 
predom inantly in  th e  fo m  o f p ro te s ts ,  diplom atic no tes, m in is te r ia l
China and th e  Y alta Agreement proved i t ;  and American appeasement o f th e  
Communists during the  M arshall M ission and the  subsequent "w ishful, do- 
nothing p o liq r"  was su b s ta n tia ted  by the  White Paper. In  l a t e  19^9 and 
th e re a f te r ,  c r it ic ism  freq u en tly  degenerated in to  b i t t e r  a ttac k s  upon per­
sonal in te g r i ty  and denied th a t  th e re  could be any e rro rs  in  judgment.
Ihe c h arac te r o f Truman, M arshall, Acheson and Vincent were th e  ones most 
freq u en tly  a s sa ile d . See Joseph Raymond McCarthy, Am erica's R etreat from 
V ictory; The Storv o f  George Ca t j ^ t t  Mar s h a l l  (New York: The Devins
AHair fVimpany, Thtt ChinàTstorv (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1951): end John T. Flynn, While You S le p t. Our Tragedy in  A sia and 
Who Made I t  (New York: Bie Devin-Adair Conqsany, 1951). A dditional critJU
cisms during 1948-1951 were th a t  M arshall d e a lt  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  th e  f in a l  
crushing blow Wien he imposed th e  embargo on American shipments o f m ilita z y  
item s to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  in  Aug., 1946; th a t  China f e l l  because th e  United 
S ta te s  d id  no t give m oral support to  the  N ational Goverment; and th a t  th e  
White Paper was issu ed  to  "white-wash” th e  United S ta te s ' "w ishful, do- 
nothing p o lic y ."  See memorandum o f  Aug. 21, 1949, signed by Senators S ty les  
Bridges o f  New Hampshire, Pat McCarran o f Nevada, Kenneth Wherry o f Nebraska, 
and VS.Hiam E. Knowland o f  C a lifo rn ia  in  U. S ., Congressional Record. S ls t  
Cong., 1 s t  S e ss ., 1949, ICV, P art 15, A5451; statem ent o f May 18, 1949, by 
Senator VfiJLliam E. Jenner o f Indiana in  ib id . .  P a rt 5, 6391; and statem ent 
o f  Bridges on Aug. 7, 1948, in  i b i d . . 80th Cong., 2nd S e ss ., 1948, XCIV,
P art 12, A5079. Also, see comments o f  Senators Owen Brewster o f Maine on 
June 5, 1951, and Bourke Hickenlooper o f  Iowa on June 7 , 1951, in  Senate 
Committees on Aimed Services end on Fbreign R elations, Hearings. M ilita ry  
S itu a tio n  in  th e  Far E ast. 1951, P a rt 3, pp. 1950-54 and 2145, re sp sc tiv e ly . 
Other views unfayorable to  American p o licy  toward China and to  American 
personnel connected w ith th a t  p o licy  haye been c ite d  in  supra. Chapters H  
and m .  S pec ific  a tte n tio n  i s  c a lle d  to  suora. Chapter H I ,  nn. 22, 81,
82, 95. 103 and I 07.
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agreements and t r e a t i e s .  In  ad d itio n , lim ite d  economic and m ilita ry  a s s i s ­
tance was made a f te r  1936. % ere  was a s ig n if ic a n t  change in  United S ta te s  
po licy , however, during World War I I  and th e  M arshall M ission. In  try in g  
to  promote a coordinated m ili ta ry  e f fo r t  o f th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese 
Communists ag a in st Japan during World War I I ,  th e  United S ta te s  became 
d ire c tly  involved in  in te rn a l  Chinese a f f a i r s .  American po licy  was fu r th e r  
m odified during th e  M arshall M ission when th e  United S ta te s  d ire c tly  used 
i t s  personnel, p re s t ig e  and resources in  an attem pt to  b ring  about p o l i t i c a l  
as w ell as m ili ta ry  c o llab o ra tio n  between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and the  Chinese 
Communists. Third, th e  long-range o b jec tiv e  during th e  M arshall M ission 
d iffe re d  from e a r l ie r  p o licy . No longer was the  United S ta te s  s a t is f ie d  
with j u s t  a China f re e  from ex te rn a l th r e a ts .  Now, i t  was envisaged, China 
should be a u n if ie d , democratic China, strong  enou^  to  rep lace  Japan as 
th e  s ta b il iz in g  fo rce  in  th e  Far East.
American p o lic y  toward China a f t e r  the  M arshall Mission was simi­
lar to  th a t  preceding World War I I  in  two re sp ec ts . F i r s t ,  th e  United S ta te s  
in  1947-49 had l i t t l e  o r  no o f f i c i a l  con tac t with th e  Chinese Communists. 
When M arshall came home in  January, 194?, th e  United S ta te s  m ediation e f fo r t  
was ended. Ambassador S tu a rt had no in s tn ic t io n s  to  b ring  th e  Chinese 
to g e th er f o r  fu r th e r  co n su lta tio n s . Second, th e  United S ta te s , though con­
tin u in g  to  recognize th e  N ational Government, was re lu c ta n t  to  become too 
deeply involved in  in te rn a l Chinese a f f a i r s .  As in d ica ted  by l a t e r  develop­
ments, t h i s  meant th a t  the  United S ta te s  would provide m ili ta ry  item s and 
advice and economic a ss is ta n c e  to  the  N a tio n a lis ts , but th a t  the  United 
S ta tes would not use American troops in  combat o r to  lead  N a tio n a lis t troops 
in  combat.
Ihe basic  d iffe ren ce  between American po licy  toward China p r io r
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to  World War I I  and th a t  during 1947-49 was in  the  c o n tro llin g  in fluence , 
though sh o rt- liv e d , th a t  Congress had on th e  American Administration* United 
S ta te s  p o licy  p r io r  to  World War I I  was p rim arily  form ulated and implemented 
through executive machinery* Though United S ta tes p o licy  a f te r  th e  M arshall 
M ission continued to  be p rim arily  what th e  A dm inistration advocated, the  
Congress d e f in i te ly  detexnined some asp ec ts  of United S ta te s  po licy  in  la te  
1947 and early  1948* This was p a r t ic u la r ly  tru e  with regard to  th e  Congres­
s io n a l demand fo r  m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n ce  to  China during th e  China Aid Hearings. 
Ejy August, 1948, however, th e  A dm inistration had taken the  p o s itio n  th a t  i t  
could not fom  a r ig id  program to  help  th e  National Government in  i t s  strug­
g le  with the  Communists* American p o lic y , i t  was h e ld , would have to  be 
charted  as conditions developed* There was some Congressional re s is ta n c e  
to  th e  A dm in istra tion 's dec ision , but Congressional opposition  played no 
dec is iv e  ro le  in  American p o licy  toward China a f te r  th e  China Aid Act of 
A pril, 1948*
American co n trib u tio n s to  th e  r e c t i f ic a t io n  o f the  Chinese s itu a ­
t io n  were both m u ltifo ld  and m u ltifo m . P o l i t ic a l ,  economic and m ilita ry  
a ss is ta n ce —adviso iy , te c h n ic a l and m a te ria l—were made av a ilab le  to  the  
Chinese* N evertheless, the  American e f f o r t  fa i le d  and l e f t  in  i t s  wake a 
number o f challenging questions and frequen tly  challenged answers* What 
d id  th e  United S ta te s  seek to  achieve through sending M arshall to  China?
What were th e  assumptions th a t  the  United S ta tes had made r e la t iv e  to  the  
Chinese s itu a tio n ?  What were th e  problems th a t  would have to  be solved in  
o rder fo r  th e  United S ta te s  to  re a l iz e  i t s  basic  aims? Why were the  objec­
t iv e s  o f  American p o licy  not achieved? Subsequent comments c o n s titu te  an 
attem pt to  answer th ese  questions*
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United S ta te s  Ob.lective s^nHinp Marsh a l l  to  China 
The post-V -J Day o b jec tives  o f  United S ta te s  p o licy  toward China 
had been se t during World War I I ,  but measures to  implement them had been 
subordinated to  those necessary to  th e  war e f f o r t .  VHth th e  war ended, 
the  United S ta te s  emphasized a dual goa l: (1) th e  c rea tio n  o f  a strong ,
un ited , and democratic China, includ ing  Manchuria; and (2) th e  replacement 
o f Ja^an as the  major Far Eastern power by a China w illin g  to  and capable 
o f help ing  to  m aintain peace in  the  f a r  E ast. Success on the  f i r s t  p o in t 
was a p re-cond ition  fo r  success on th e  second p o in t, and M arshall was sen t 
on h is  m ission to  a s s i s t  in  th e  establishm ent o f  a u n if ie d  democratic China.
More sp e c if ic a lly , M arsh a ll's  o b jec tiv e  was to  a s s i s t  the  Nation­
a l i s t s  and th e  Chinese Communists to  arrange a m il i ta ry  tru c e  so th a t  re p re ­
se n ta tiv e s  of a l]  major p o l i t i c a l  elements in  China could meet in  peace 
to  work out th e  d e ta i l s  fo r  e s tab lish in g  a u n if ie d  democratic China. Mar­
s h a l l 's  d ire c tiv e  s e t  fo r th  conditions th a t  th e  Chinese were ejq^ected to  
meet and o ffered  them an in cen tiv e  to  comply w ith th e  term s. American 
po licy  s tip u la te d  th a t  th e  on»>party Kuomintang Government would have to  be 
replaced  with one providing e ffe c tiv e  rep re se n ta tio n  fo r  a l l  m ajor p o l i t i c a l  
elements. Further, a l l  m il i ta ry  fo rces  would have to  be in te g ra te d  in to  
th e  Chinese N ational Axmy. The new government and m ilita z y  estab lishm ent, 
under th e  leadersh ip  o f  Qiiang Kai-shek, would then  q u a lify  fo r  American 
economic, tech n ica l and m ili ta ry  a id .
Supplementing these  in s tru c tio n s  to  M arshall, General Wedemeyer 
was d irec te d  to  hel^  th e  N ational Government t r a n s fe r  i t s  tro o p s, equdfment 
and supp lies to  Manchurian p o r ts . Wedmeyer was a lso  in s tru c te d  to  complete 
lo g is t i c a l  p repara tions fo r  shipment o f  N a tio n a lis t troops in to  North China,
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with th e  proviso th a t  execution o f these  arrangements depended upon M arsh a ll 's  
p rogress in  the  n eg o tia tio n s  a t  Chungking. In  add ition , and not determined 
by p rogress toward p o l i t i c a l  and m ili ta ry  reo rgan iza tion , th e  United S ta te s  
accepted re sp o n s ib ili ty  fo r  acce le ra tin g  th e  re p a tr ia tio n  o f  Japanese troops 
and c iv i l ia n s .
American Assesanent o f the  Chinese S itu a tio n
The United S ta te s  had made severa l assumptions r e la t iv e  to  th e  
Chinese s i tu a tio n  p r io r  to  and concurrent with the c re a tio n  o f the  M arshall 
M ission. F i r s t ,  C hina 's problems were m u ltip le  and v a rie d . The d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  were w id e^read , and they arose from p o l i t i c a l ,  m il i ta ry , economic, and 
so c ia l cond itions. Second, d ire  circum stances would probably r e s u l t  from 
f a i lu r e  to  solve any one o f these  problems. United S ta te s  o f f i c ia l s  be­
lie v ed , however, th a t  th e  menace o f  c iv i l  war co n s titu ted  th e  most se rious 
th re a t—immediate and long-range—to  both Chinese and world s ta b i l i ty .
Third, th e  Chinese would have to  make the  m ajor e f fo r t  toward solving th e i r  
own problems. Fourth, n eg o tia tio n —not m ili ta ry  m i^ t—would be th e  most 
e f fe c tiv e  technique to  s ta b i l iz e  th e  Chinese s itu a tio n  and achieve th e  Ameri­
can o b jec tiv e . And, f i f t h ,  the  United S ta te s  could make i t s  most e ffe c tiv e  
immediate con tribu tion  by arranging a tru c e  and by g e ttin g  th e  Chinese to ­
gether to  peacefu lly  s e t t l e  th e i r  d iffe ren ces .
Thus, th e  United S ta te s  re je c te d  th e  premise th a t  C hina's problems 
could be solved by re ly in g  so le ly  on m ili ta ry  measures. American aimed 
ftrces were being ra p id ly  demobilized, and th e  American people and th e  Congress 
were demanding th a t  th e  process be acce le ra ted . N either A dm inistration nor 
Congressional siypport ever m ateria lized  fo r  th e  d ire c t  use o f United S ta te s  
troops to  help th e  N a tio n a lis ts  de fea t th e  Communists.
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There were a d d itio n a l reasons, however, fo r  the  American b e l ie f  
th a t  th e  M arshall M ission was ju s t i f i e d  a t  the  time o f  i t s  c rea tio n . F i r s t ,  
th e  United S ta te s  Goverment had always recognized th e  N ational Government 
under th e  leadersh ip  o f  Chiang Kai-shek. American o f f i c i a l s  believed th a t  
th e  Chinese Goverment afforded the  most s a t is fa c to ry  base upon \ddch to  
b u ild  a democracy. Second, th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Communists 
had agreed p r io r  to  th e  form ation o f th e  M arshall M ission to  s e t t l e  th e i r  
d iffe ren c e s  around th e  conference ta b le  ra th e r  than on th e  b a t t le f ie ld .
The basic  p r in c ip le s  o f  th i s  p ac t had been determined on October 11, 19^5, 
and th e  P o l i t ic a l  C onsultative  Conference CPCC] had been designated to  
implement these  p r in c ip le s  and to  solve th e  remaining d iv is iv e  is su e s . 
F urther, the  Chinese had agreed p r io r  to  the  establishm ent o f the  M arshall 
M ission to  convene th e  PCC on January 10, 1946. American o f f ic ia l s  proceeded 
on th e  assumption, th e re fo re , th a t  the  o b jec tiv e  o f th e  M arshall M ission was 
in  accord with th e  wishes o f  the  Chinese. Third, Department o f S ta te  
o f f i c i a l s  believed th a t  China, under c e r ta in  cond itions, would be ab le  to  
recupera te  economically and f in a n c ia l ly  from th e  war o f  th e  p a st e igh t 
y ears . C hina's American fo re ig n  exchange holdings were g rea te r on V-J Day 
than they  had ever been. The productive p o te n tia l  o f  a g ric u ltu re , mining, 
and in d u stry  in  most o f  th e  a reas  l ib e ra te d  from th e  Japanese was not 
s u b s ta n tia lly  d if fe re n t  from th a t  o f  1937» Coal and p ig  iro n  production 
c a p a c itie s  had been m a te r ia lly  increased  under Japanese management over 
pre-W brld War U  le v e ls .  Thus, th e  Chinese could concentra te  iqx)n th e  organ­
iz a tio n  o f production and d is tr ib u tio n  th r o u ^  e x is tin g  f a c i l i t i e s  ra th e r  
than  upon the  reco n stru c tio n  o f productive equipment. Fourth, expectations 
fo r  a peacefu l world were f o r t i f i e d  by p rofessed  commitments o f th e  v ic to rs  
in  World War H  to  in te rn a tio n a l  cooperation and harmony among them selves.
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F if th , th e  Soviet Union had acknowledged Chinese n a tio n a l sovereignty  over 
Manchuria* F\irther, th e  Soviet Union had pledged i t s  support to  the Repub­
l i c  o f China under the  leadersh ip  o f Chiang Kai-shek*
Chinese Problems and American A ssistance
As encouraging as these  fa c to rs  were fo r  th e  success o f the Mar­
s h a ll  M ission, th e  im plaaen tation  o f American p o licy  was s t i l l  confronted 
with some vexy form idable problems* China was t e r r i t o r i a l l y  fragmented, and 
c o n tro l was exercised  by severa l forces* At th e  end o f  World War I I  th e  
a u th o rity  o f  the  N ational Government was lim ited  to  th e  southwest area , and 
the  Russians dominated Manchuria* The Chinese Communists were located  in  
th e  ru ra l a reas  o f  sou theast China, and th e i r  co n tro l in  North China was 
extensive* ^y the  tim e M arshall a rriv e d  in  China, the  Russians s t i l l  occu­
p ied  Manchuria, and th e  Chinese Communists had increased  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  
a rea  which they  dominated* In  ad d itio n , Japanese troops were th e  only 
m ili ta ry  fo rces  in  c e r ta in  a reas o f  East China and South China, and the  
r e p a tr ia tio n  o f  Japanese armed personnel and c iv i l ia n s  had been proceeding 
slowly*
Thus, removal o f  Soviet and Japanese fo rces from Manchuria and 
China and N a tio n a lis t occupation o f those areas were v i t a l  to  th e  re a liz a ­
t io n  o f th e  basic  aims o f  American policy* The immediate problem in  th i s  
connection was tw o-fold: (1) g e ttin g  th e  Chinese Communists to  accQ)t
N a tio n a lis t sovereignty in  Manchuria and to  recognize the  a u th o rity  of 
th e  Chinese Government to  occxq>y th a t  p a r t  o f China not a lready  occupied by 
th e  Chinese Communists, and (2) convincing the  N ational Government th a t  the  
sporadic armed clashes should be stopped before t h ^  developed in to  c iv i l  
war* Nation-wide h o s t i l i t i e s ,  the  United S ta te s  contended, would destroy
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China’ s economic and f in a n c ia l  s tru c tu re  and would c re a te  conditions more 
b e n e fic ia l to  the  Communists than to  the  N a tio n a lis ts .
There were a d d itio n a l, and p o te n t ia l ly  equally  porten tous,
Chinese problems th a t  would have to  be solved i f  the  United S ta tes were to  
r e a l iz e  i t s  basic  aim s. D om estically, N a tio n a lis t m il i ta ry  ejqienditures in  
r e la t io n  to  t o t a l  expenditures would have to  be reduced, the  in f la tio n a iy  
trend  p reva len t during World War I I  and a f t e r  would have to  be reversed , and 
Goverment revenue would have to  be augmented. Production, d is tr ib u t io n  
and communications ^ s te m s  requ ired  r e h a b i l i ta t io n .  In  add ition , th e  acqui­
s i t io n  o f  Manchuria and Formosa and th e i r  resources were considered v i t a l  
to  C hina 's economic s t a b i l i ty .  E x ternally , C hina 's economic s ta tu s  requ ired  
a speedy recovery o f th e  eaqwrt in d u s tr ie s  and a re tu rn  to  the  pre-W brld 
War n  le v e l  o f  payments from th e  Chinese overseas.
And what about th e  people o f  China? Their savings had been 
depleted  during th e  s tru g g le  w ith Japan, and th e  l iv in g  standards o f th e  
s a la r ie d  worker were endangered by in f la t io n .  The Chinese were weary from 
the  demands and e f fe c ts  o f e i ^ t  years o f war and in  need o f r e l i e f .
VB.Uiam M. Clayton, A ss is tan t S ecre tary  o f  S ta te , emphasized the l a s t  p o in t 
on November 14, I 945, when he sa id  th a t  " . . .  China could absorb alm ost 
any amount o f  r e l i e f . ” Thus, Mardi a l l ' s  ta s k  was to  ge t the  N a tio n a lis ts  
and th e  Chinese Communists to  compete peacefully  and dem ocratically  f o r  
the  co n tro l o f China and in  th e  in te r e s t  o f  th e  people ra th e r  than to  re s o r t  
to  th e  b a t t l e f ie ld  f o r  p a r tis a n  gain i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  needs o f  th e  people.
The United S ta te s  t r ie d  to  solve C hina 's  problems during th e  
M arshall M ission by u t i l i z in g  th e  se rv ices  o f  severa l o f  i t s  most capable
^Supra. Chapter V, n . 39*
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men and by re so r tin g  to  a v a r ie ty  o f a ss is ta n c e  measures. S tu a r t, Wedemeyer, 
Robertson, Et/roade and a la rg e  number o f  American economic and m ili ta ry  
personnel were in  China during p a rt  o r  a l l  o f th i s  period . 1 h ^  a l l  made 
worthy co n trib u tio n s to  th e  American ven tu re . M arshall was instrum ental 
in  securing an armed tru c e  w ith in  th re e  weeks o f  h is  a r r iv a l  in  China, thus 
ronoving th e  most se rious o b stac le  to  th e  convocation o f  th e  PCC on January 
10, 1 9 ^ .  He a lso  served as advisor to  th e  M ilita ry  Subcommittee o f the  
PCC which completed p lans on February 25* 1946, fo r  th e  reo rgan iza tion  and 
re d isp o s itio n  o f th e  Chinese aimed fo rc e s . A fter th e  i n i t i a l  ceas& .fire  
broke down in  i ^ r i l ,  1946, M arshall p rim arily  devoted h is  tim e as Chairman 
o f th e  Committee o f Ih ree  to  seeking a d d itio n a l tru c e s  and extensions o f 
the  tim e l im its  on axm istice o rders so arranged. In  th i s  connection, Mar­
s h a ll  had tru c e  teams foraed  to  go from one tro u b le  spot to  another to  t r y  
to  prevent h o s t i l i t i e s .  F urther, M arshall made proposals fo r  considera tion  
by both Chinese p a r t ie s ,  d ra fte d  statem ents fo r  Chiang Kai-shek, and served 
as an agent fo r  th e  transm ission  o f  ov ertu res  from one Chinese p r in c ip a l  to  
th e  o th e r. In  ad d itio n , M arshall urged th e  Chinese to  reorganize the  Govern­
ment so th a t  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  views would be e ffe c tiv e ly  rep resen ted . He 
encouraged u t i l i z a t io n  o f  th e  lead ers  o f  th i rd  p a r t ie s  in  prominent govern­
ment p o s itio n s . And when n eg o tia tio n s  were broken o f f  by th e  N a tio n a lis ts  
and th e  Chinese Communists in  th e  f a l l  o f  1946, M arshall strong ly  supported 
the  e f fo r ts  o f minor p a r t ie s  to  reop an th e  c o n su lta tio n s . Further, economic 
and m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n c e  were provided only  upon M arsh a ll 's  approval and 
sometimes on h is  i n i t i a t i v e .
Economic a ss is ta n c e  during th e  M arshall M ission was made d ire c tly  
a v a ila b le  through g ran ts  and c re d its  to ta l in g  $677,600,000 and in d ire c t ly  
throiiffr g ran ts  to  ÜNRRA. A ssistance th r o u ^  UNHRA c o n s titu te d  th e  g re a te s t
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American economic co n trib u tio n  during M arsh a ll 's  stay  in  China. Though 
d e liv e r ie s  under a l l  programs were le s s  than h a l f - f u l f i l l e d  during th is  
period , shipments consisted  o f food, c lo th in g , m edical su p p lies , raw co tton , 
railw ay re p a ir  m a te ria ls , cargo v e sse ls , motor v e h ic le s , dockyard f a c i l i t i e s ,  
and coal mining and construc tion  equipment. C iv ilian  surp lus property  
tra n s fe rs  alone had o r ig in a lly  co st th e  United S ta te s  $900,000,000.
A ll m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n ce  during th e  M arshall M ission was made 
th ro u ^  d ire c t  channels and consisted  o f  both g ran ts  and c re d i ts .  _ t i s  
not p o ss ib le , however, to  accu ra te ly  d e te ra in e  th e  monetary value o f a id  
fu rn ished  during M arsh a ll 's  stay  in  China as d is tin g u ish ed  from th a t  o f 
tr a n s fe r s  during periods preceding and follow ing th e  M ission. The d i f f ic u l ty  
in  th i s  connection i s  in d ic a te d  by th e  follow ing references to  a id  provided 
in  re la tio n  tc  th e  d a te s  o f  d e liv ery : (1) a  g ran t o f $17,700,000—d e liv e r­
ed September 2, 19^5-March 2, 1946; (2) len d -lea se  s i^ p U es valued a t  
$489,932,000—delivered  between V-J Day and December 31, 1945; and (3) th e  
tr a n s fe r  o f $204,368,000 in  len d -lease  item s during 1946-March, 1949. 
N evertheless, United S ta te s  m ili ta ry  programs provided fo r  shipments o f a 
broad assortm ent o f m il i ta ry  stqppUes and fo r  American acceptance o f th e  
co sts  o f redeploying N a tio n a lis t troops and r ^ a t r i a t i n g  Japanese.
In  ad d ition , no pecuniary value can be placed upon severa l types 
o f  m ili ta ry  a ss is ta n ce  rendered by th e  United S ta te s  during th e  M arshall 
M ission. These means o f  siq)port fo r  th e  N ational Government included th e  
follow ing: ( l )  use o f  American troops fo r  guard duty in  o rder to  f re e
N a tio n a lis t fo rces fo r  occupation o f a reas  l ib e ra te d  from th e  Japanese;
(2) planning the  redeployment o f N a tio n a lis t troops; (3) dev ising  the  Japa­
nese re p a tr ia tio n  program; and (4) th e  establishm ent o f American Army and 
Navy Advisory Grotps.
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Reasons fo r  th e  F a ilu re  o f American Policy 
In  view o f t h i s  a ss is ta n ce  by the  United S ta te s , why did th e  Mar­
sh a ll  M ission fa i l?  Was the  f a i lu re  due to  an in c o rre c t assessment o f the  
Chinese s itu a tio n  by American o f f ic ia l s  in  la te  1945? Or d id  unforeseen 
developments lead  to  th e  de fea t fo r  American policy? Was the  United S ta te s  
e f fo r t  thwarted because i t  had th e  wrong o b jec tiv es  o r  used the  wrong tech­
niques to  achieve those ob jec tives?  Or d id  American p o licy  f a i l  because 
o f cond itions over lA ich th e  United S ta te s  had l i t t l e  o r  no control?
The one in co n tes tab le  f a c t  about th e  M arshall M ission i s  th a t  i t  
d id  not achieve i t s  o b jec tiv e s . No voice, includ ing  th a t  o f P residen t Tru­
man o r General M arshall, was ever ra ised  to  th e  con tra ry . This does not 
mean, however, th a t  th e  P residen t has agreed th a t  he made an e rro r  in  judg­
ment idien he sent M arshall to  China. His decision  was made, Truman noted, 
on th e  b a s is  o f  vdiat was known when th e  M ission was c rea ted . The p re v a il­
ing view in  l a t e  1945, he sa id , was th a t  th e  Chinese could be persuaded to  
un ify  th e i r  country. According to  advice given th e  P residen t, i t  was be­
liev ed  th a t  the  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Communists would continue th e i r  strug ­
g le  fo r  power, even in  a  u n ified  China. The P re s id e n t 's  adv isors a lso  be* 
U eved, however, th a t  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  could win the  s tru g g le  i f  they took 
care  o f  th e  fundamental needs o f th e  people and th e  country . A dditional 
ju s t i f i c a t io n  by th e  P residen t f o r  sending M arshall was th a t  i t  was th e  only 
p ra c t ic a l  course fo r  th e  United S ta te s  a t  th e  tim e.
I t  was p re c ise ly  on the  p o in ts  re fe rre d  to  by Truman, however, 
th a t  th e  p rev a ilin g  view about conditions in  China in  l a t e  1945 proved to  
be in c o rre c t . That i s ,  th e  Chinese could not be persuaded to  un ify  th e i r  
homeland peacefu lly , and th e  N ational Government did not a tten d  to  the  
fundamental needs o f th e  people and the  country.
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The c o a litio n  concept was not unknown to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and 
th e  Chinese Communists. They had formed two un ited  fro n ts  on e a r l ie r  
occasions, once frcm 1924 to  192? and again  during 1937-45» Acceptance o f 
the  id ea  o f  c o a lit io n  d id  no t mean, however, th a t  i t  was p rac tic ed . In 
f a c t ,  th ese  years were never more than periods o f uneasy peace. In  ad d itio n , 
th e re  was open w arfare between the  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Communists 
from 1927 to  1936. R irth e r, C hina's co n trib u tio n  to  the  A llied  e f fo r t  in  
World War I I  was considerably reduced because the  Chinese had ra th e r  f ig h t  
each o th er than th e  Japanese.
And in  the  post-V -J Day period , th e  Chinese continued to  f ig h t  
each o th e r although they had agreed in  October, 1945, to  peacefu lly  reso lve 
th e i r  d iffe ren ces . Die United S ta te s  made i t s  basic  e rro r  \Aien i t  accepted 
th e  October compact as an in d ic a tio n  th a t  the  Chinese intended to  s e t t l e  
th e i r  disagreements through n eg o tia tio n s . Surely, th e  f a i lu r e  o f the  
N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Communists to  reach agreement during th e  1941- 
45 pe riod  should have fo re to ld  the  impasse which developed during M arsha ll's  
e f fo r ts .  Die Chinese t a c t i c s  to  prevent a p o l i t i c a l  se ttlem ent were p a r t ic ­
u la r ly  apparent during th e  Hurley period  in  China. Diese t a c t ic s  included 
th e  confron ta tion  o f proposals with counter-proposals, mutual unw illingness 
to  accept the  o th e r 's  amendments to  p roposa ls, and period ic  m ili ta ry  c lashes 
o f  th e  contending fo rces . Die United S ta te s  erred , th e re fo re , in  believ ing  
th a t  th e  Chinese m i^ t  be w illin g  to  a c t  in  good f a i th ,  to  compromise, to  
s e t t l e  th e i r  d iffe ren ces  around the  conference ta b le .
M arshall’ s Mission to  China, th e re fo re , was based on a mistaken 
image o f the  Chinese p o l i t i c a l  scene. Die United S ta te s  knew th a t  the  
Chinese Govexment was a d ic ta to rsh ip  o f  th e  Kuomintang and th a t  th e  Chi­
nese Communist Party  was not ju s t  a  group o f  ag ra rian  reform ers. American
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p o licy  s tip u la te d , th e re fo re , th a t  th e  Chinese should cease h o s t i l i t i e s ,  
democratize th e  government and in te g ra te  the  arm ies. I t  must be remembered, 
however, th a t  the  a u th o r ita r ia n  one-party  ^ s tem , ra th e r  than  democracy, had 
been t r a d i t io n a l  in  th e  development o f  China. Also, re v o lt  had been long 
recognized in  China as th e  proper means to  remove th e  governing group. 
F urther, n e ith e r  the  Kuomintang nor th e  Chinese Communist p o l i t i c a l  organiza­
t io n s  were p a r t ie s  in  th e  sense th a t  Americans understood th e  te rn . Both 
m ajor Chinese p a r t ie s  had th e i r  own arm ies, were dominated by m ili ta n t 
creeds and occijpied la rg e  t e r r i t o r i a l  a reas  in  China. Ih ird  p a r t ie s  were 
in e f fe c tiv e  because e ffe c tiv en e ss  depended igwn armed m i^ t ,  no t in fluence  
a t  th e  b a l lo t  box. As minor p a r t ie s  had no arm ies, t h ^  had n e ith e r  in f lu ­
ence nor power. Ihus, no Chinese p a rty  gave e ffe c tiv e  support to  the  United 
S ta te s  p o licy  o f m ediation—the  Kuomintang and th e  Communists because they  
would no t and o th er p a r t ie s  because they  could n o t. Compromise under such 
cond itions was prob lem atica l i f  not im possible.
Unforeseen developments in  China a lso  c o n s titu ted  o b stac les  to  
th e  achievement o f United S ta te s  p o licy  aims. Ihe United S ta te s  was not 
prepared fo r  th e  N ational Government's read iness e ith e r  to  renew m ilita ry  
c o n f l ic ts  w ith th e  Communists o r to  accep t b a t t le  vdien in i t i a t e d  by th e  
Communists, j^ p a re n tly , th e  United S ta te s  d id  n o t fo resee  th a t  i t s  a id  
and srq)port would serve a s  stim ulan ts f o r  th e  m il i ta ry  am bitions and p lans 
o f  N a tio n a lis t le a d e rs . In  add ition , M arshall ev iden tly  d id  no t a n tic ip a te  
th a t  th e  Communists would a tta c k  the  United S ta te s  and him personally  fo r  
posing a s  m ediator between th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and the  Communists id iile  th e  
United S ta te s  was a id in g  th e  N a tio n a lis ts . M arshall even tually  met th i s  
o b jec tio n  o f  th e  Communists by iagwsing an embargo in  August, 1 9 ^ ,  upon 
th e  t r a n s fe r  o f  m ili ta ry  item s to  th e  N ational Government.
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Further, th e  United S ta te s  d id  not fo resee  th e  ea rly  breakdown 
in  n eg o tia tio n s . With th i s  development, th e  United S ta te s  became more d e ^  
ly  involved in  C hina's domestic a f f a i r s  than M arshall had a n tic ip a te d  o r  
wanted. Thou^ M arshall believed th a t  he should stay  out o f p o l i t i c a l  d&> 
velopments in  China, he became in creas in g ly  involved a f t e r  m id-A pril, 1946, 
in  both th e  m ili ta ry  and p o l i t i c a l  phases o f th e  Chinese d isp u te . Because 
o f the  suspicion  and d i s t r u s t  o f th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and the  Chinese Communists 
fo r  each o th e r , M arshall a f t e r  mid>1946 was groping not fo r  what he could 
do, but fo r  lA ether he could do anything.
Achievement o f  th e  dual o b jec tiv e  o f  United S ta te s  po licy  would 
undoubtedly have seï'ved tVi» b est in te r e s ts  o f th e  United S ta te s  in  th e  post- 
Vforld War I I  period . However, n e ith e r  th e  o b jec tiv e s  nor th e  techniques 
fo r  achieving them were su ited  to  th e  ta sk s  a t  hand. China was not ready 
to  govern i t s e l f ,  and u n t i l  i t  was so prepared i t  could no t be th e  s ta b i l ­
ising fo rce  fo r  peace i n  th e  Far Bast. I t  i s  doubtfu l th a t  the  N a tio n a lis ts  
wanted a democratic China as proposed ly  United S ta te s  polif^y, and i t  i s  
evident th a t  th e  Chinese Communists d id  not want the  American o b jec tiv e  to  
m a te ria liz e .
Unity and s t a b i l i ty  in  China were ob ta inab le  only th ro u ^  coopera­
tio n  o f  th e  Chinese o r i f  one Chinese p a rty  broke th e  px>wer o f th e  o th e r. 
Since th e  in f le x ib le  p o s itio n s  o f  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  and th e  Chinese Communists 
made peacefu l change im possible, revo lu tionary  change was in e v ita b le . Ihus, 
the  conditions n re re q u is i te  to  m ediation by th e  United S ta te s  simply d id  
not e x is t .
Ihe Chinese s i tu a t io n  would have had to  change d ra s t ic a l ly  a f t e r  
M arsha ll's  a r r iv a l  in  o rd er f o r  th e  Mission to  have had any reasonable 
chance to  achieve i t s  o b jec tiv e , lh a t  th i s  d id  not happen i s ,  o f  course.
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q u ite  evident* Progress toward achieving the  American goal was e ith e r  
im perceptib le  o r non -ex isten t except during January-February, 1946, and p a r t  
o f June o f th e  same y ear. And th e  agreements reached during January, 
February, and June were i l lu s o ry . I t  has long been debated \diether the  
N a tio n a lis ts  could have re ta in ed  power i f  thqy had made the  re fo m s suggested 
by M arshall and tended to  the  needs o f  th e  people. As M arshall c o rre c tly  
p red ic ted , however, th e  N a tio n a lis ts ' r e s o r t  to  arms, re fu s a l to  make re ­
forms, and neg lec t o f the  people ended in  th e i r  ignominious d e fea t.
Ihoug^ th e  United S ta te s  had c o n s is te n tly  s ta te d  th a t  i t  would 
extend economic, te c h n ic a l and m ili ta ry  a id  to  the  Chinese a s  they  made 
p rogress toward reorganizing  the  government and aim3.es, th e  United S ta te s  
d id  give a id  w ithout w aiting  fo r  the  reform s. I t  does not seem probable, 
however, th a t  th e  United S ta te s  could have forced  th e  reform s. Ihe United 
S ta te s  was w ithout adequate means to  e i th e r  co n tro l o r  strong ly  in fluence  
e i th e r  the  N a tio n a lis ts  o r  th e  Communists. M arshall could not withdraw a id  
from th e  Communists in  o rder to  secure compliance with American o b jec tiv e s  
because the  Communists had never received  any American a id . VSien th e  Com­
m unists re s is te d  N a tio n a lis t proposals fo r  reform s, Chiang Kai-shek rec ip ro ­
cated , and v ice -v e rsa . Chiang re je c te d  u n i la te r a l  g ran ting  o f reforms by 
the  Govemnent on th e  ground th a t  the  Government would be weakened in  i t s  
s tru g g le  with the  Communists. M arshall on severa l occasions th rea tened  to  
term inate  h is  m ission i f  p rogress were not made, and P residen t Truman wrote 
Chiang in  August, 1946, to  th e  same e f f e c t .  However, n e ith e r  these  warnings 
nor th e  embargo on th e  t r a n s fe r  o f American m ili ta ry  a id  to  the  N ational 
Government had any la s t in g  impact upon th e  two Chinese p a r t ie s .
Two a d d itio n a l p o in ts  m erit considera tion  r e la t iv e  to  th e  sug­
g estio n  th a t  the  United S ta te s  could have o r should have forced reforms in
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China. F i r s t ,  w ithholding American a id  to  th e  N a tio n a lis ts  in  the  absence 
o f reforms probably would have weakened th e  p o s itio n  of the  N ational Govern­
ment while improving th a t  o f th e  Communists. Second, the  United S ta te s  was 
not sovereign in  China. Ihe United S ta te s  d id  no t have th e  power o f decision  
in  China. M arshall ap p ro p ria te ly  assessed  the  s i tu a tio n  in  December, 1 9 ^ ,  
(upon ten a in a tio n  o f th e  M arshall M ission) idien he was asked by Chiang Kai- 
shek to  become h is  (Chiang) personal adv iso r. Ihe P re s id e n t's  emissary 
remarked th a t  he d id  no t be lieve  he could in fluence  the course o f events 
alone lAen he had been unable to  do so with the  f u l l  backing o f  the  United 
S ta te s  Government.
In  the  f in a l  a n a ly s is , th e  Chinese Government must bear primary 
re sp o n s ib ili ty  fo r  M arsh a ll 's  f a i lu r e  in  China. The National Government 
was in e f f ic ie n t  and reac tio n a ry . C ontro lling  governmental fo rces t h o u ^ t  
only in  term s o f personal and group gain and power and refused  to  make 
necessary reform s. These conditions con tribu ted  to  the  Government's lo s s  
o f popular support w hile h o p in g  to  generate  th e  Communist iq)surge.
In  ad d itio n , the  f a l l  o f  th e  N ational Government in  19^9 was no t 
due to  American ac tio n  o r  in ac tio n . The United S ta te s  capacity  to  a f f e c t  
th e  outcome o f  th e  Chinese a f f a i r  was severely  l im ite d  ty  developments which 
the  United S ta te s  had t r i e d  to  co rre c t when M arshall was in  China. China 
fo r  a long tim e had been confronted with two rev o lu tio n s . N a tio n a lis t 
con tro l o f  China was l o s t  by the  N a tio n a lis ts  in  th e  process o f  unsuccess­
fu l ly  f ig h tin g  one rev o lu tio iw -th e  Communist th re a t—with arms, vdiile 
ignoring  th e  o th e r rev o lu tio n —demand fo r  reform s. The N a tio n a lis ts  l o s t  
th e i r  co n tro l because o f  p o l i t i c a l  in e ff ic ie n c y , m ili ta ry  iiiuonqietence and 
d is in te g ra tio n , economic d e te r io ra tio n  and popular d isapproval o f th e  Nation­
a l i s t  regime. Dean Acheson g raph ica lly  described th e  l a s t  days o f the
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Republic o f  China in  th e  follow ing words:
What has happenened in  my judgment i s  th a t  th e  alm ost inex­
h a u s tib le  pa tience  o f  the  Chinese people in  th e i r  misezy ended.
Ihey d id  not bother to  overthrow th is  government. There was 
r e a l ly  nothing to  overthrow. Thqy simply ignored i t  th ro u ^ o u t 
th e  country. They took th e  so lu tio n  o f t h e i r  immediate v illa g e  
problems in to  th e i r  own hands . . . .  They completely withdrew th e i r  
siq)port from th is  goverm ent and when th a t  support was withdrawn, 
th e  whole m ili ta ry  establishm ent d is in te g ra te d . Added to  the  
g ro sses t incompetence ever experienced by any m ilita zy  command was 
t h i s  to ta l  lack  o f simport both in  the  azmies and in  th e  country, 
and so the  idiole m atter ju s t  simply d is in te g ra te d . 3
3Speech before N ational Press Club, Jan . 12, 1950. c ite d  in  
Boncly (ed. ) , pp. 177-78.
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Quotations fo r  US D ollar Bank Notes, 
January, 194$ to  May, 1949^
(CNC$ and Gold Yuan'*/ per 05$)°
Monthly Average O ff ic ia l  Rate Actual Market Rate
1945 -  Jan.
«
» • • • • 20 # # # * .................  512
Feb. * # * * » 20 • • • • .................  611
Mar. • • • • • 20 # # # * .................  532
Apr. • • • • • 20 # # # * .................  708
Hay * # # * # 20 » # # # .................  987
June # » * # # 20 • • • • .................  1,811
Ju ly # * # # # 20 # * # # .................  2,974
Aug. * # # # # 20 • • • • .................  1.330
Sept. # # # # # 20 • • • • .................  670
Oct. • • • • • 20 # * # * .................  1.350
Nov. * * # # # 20 • • • • .................  1.555
Dec. » # # * * 20 # # * * .................  1.320
19^  -  Jan . • • • • • 20 • • • • .................  1.457
Feb. » # » # # 20 * # * * .................  2,053
Mar. .................  2,020 (4 Mar.) .................  2,029
Apr. # * * # * 2  ̂020 # # * * .................  2,099
May • • • • • 2|^020 • • • • .................  2,318
June • • • • • 2^020 • • • • .................  2,563
Ju ly * * # # # 2  ̂020 • • • • .................  2,515
Aug. .................  3,350 (19 Aug*) .................  2,882
Sept. » # * * # 3*350 • • • • .................  3.548
Oct. # # # # # 3*350 • • • • .................  4,377
Nov. # # # * » 3*350 • • • • .................  4,882
Dec. * * * * * 3*350 • • • • .................  5.906
1947 -  Jan . # # # # # 3*350 • • • • .................  6,790
Feb. .................  3.350 (28 Feb.) .................  12.550
Mar. . .  • • .  12,000 # # # # .................  13.000
Apr. .  • • • • 12,000 . . . . .................  14,215
May • • .  • • 12,000 . . . . .................  26,600
June . . . . .  12,000 . . . . .................  37.980
Ju ly . . . . .  12,000 . . . . .................  43.330




Monthly Average O ff ic ia l  Kate Actual Market Rate
1947 — Sept. ................. 41,500 ..................... 49,510
Oct. .  . . - .  53# 620 . . . . .................  80,250
Nov. . . . . .  65,000 . . . . ..................... 98,500
Dec. . . . . .  81,000 . . . » .................  142,000
1948 -  Mar. .................  211,583 . . . . ................. 449,620
June . . . .  1,273.000 . . . . .................2 , 311.250
Aug. 1-18 . . . .  7, 094,625 . . . . .................  8 , 683,000
Aug. 19-31 . . . . .  4 . . . . .................  4
Sept. . . . . .  4 . . . . .................  4
Oct. . . . . .  4 . . . . ....................  15
Nov. . . . . .  28 . . . . .................  42
Dec. . . . . .  122 . . . . .................  135
1949 -  Jan. . . . . .  240 . . . . .................  700
Feb. . . . . .  2,660 . . . . .................  2,980
Mar. . . . . .  16,000 . . . . .................  17,700
Apr. .................  205,000 . . . . .................  813,880
May 1^21 . . . . ................. 23,280,000
^Quotations f o r  th e  years 194^1947, in c lu s iv e , a re  taken from 
Table XU in  P ric e , "UNRRA. in  China," UNRRA, O perational Analysis Papers,
No. A pr., 1946, p . 78. Rates given fo r  th e  years 1948-1949 a re  taken 
from Chang Kia-Ngau, i^pendix  D, Table D-1, pp. 382-83.
O f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  during 1945-1947, in c lu s iv e , were published 
only fo r  o f f i c i a l  r a te s .  Inform ation on which th e  market f ig u re s  in  th is  
ta b le  were based was secured th r o u ^  p e rio d ic  spot checks by various i n s t i ­
tu t io n s ,  includ ing  UNRRA China O ffice . Market f ig u re s  were based upon two 
s e ts  o f  monthly averages. 1945 fig u re s  a re  fo r  Chungking, 1946 and 1947 
fo r  Shanghai. The r a te s  fo r  1948-1949 were based on monthly re p o rts  com­
p ile d  by the  C entra l Bank o f China.
°lhe  explanation fo r  th e  apparent decrease in  ra te s  on Aug. 19,
1948, i s  th a t  ehen th e  o f f i c i a l  exchange r a te  o f CNC d o lla rs  reached 7,094,625 
fo r  one U. S. d o lla r ,  th e  N ational Govenment in troduced the Gold Yuan 
( ra t io  o f  GY 1 to  CNC $3 m illio n  1 a t  the  o f f i c i a l  r a te  o f  four Gold Yuan fo r  
one U. S. d o lla r .  Thus, one U. S. d o lla r  on Aug. 19, 1948, was o f f ic ia l ly  
worth CNC $12,000,000 under th e  discarded CNC system. A ll estim ates fo r  
Aug. 19, 1948, and th e re a f te r  a re  given in  Gold Yuan ra te s  and th e  re la tio n -  
ship o f  GY to  CNC quo tations should be viewed in  l i ^ t  o f the  above expla­
n a tio n .
APPENDIX I I a
United States Government Economic, Financial 
and Military Aid to China since 1937





Sales of U. S. Government 





Reali zation by U. S.




Economi c 2 & 4)
1. Export-1mport Bank Credits
Authorized ............... $ 120 . . .
2. Stabilization fund agree-
men t, 1 9 4 1 ............... 50 . . .
3. 1942 Treasury Credit. . . . • • • 500
Total Economic Aid . . . . $670
Mi 1itar y
4. Lend-lease ($845.7 million) $825.7 20
Tota1 Mi 1i tary Aid . . . . $825.7 20
Total Pre-V-J Day Aid. . . $825.7 $690
ro





Sales of U. S. Government 
Excess and Surplus Property








Economi c 2 6-4)
5. Lend-lease "pipeline" credit 51.7
6. UNRRA-US Contribution. . . . 474.0
7. BOTRA-US Contribution. . . . 3.6
8. Export-1mport Bank Credits
Author i zed................. 82.8
9. Civilian Surplus Property
Transfers (Under August 30
1946, bulk sale agreement) • • • 55 $900 $ 120 $175
10. OFLC dockyard facilities
sales ..................... •  • • 4. 1 n . a . 4. 1
11. Maritime Commission ship
sales ...................... $16.4 $77.3 $9.8 $26.2
12. U.S. Foreign Relief Program $46.4 •  • • • •
13. ECA Program................. 275 • • • • • •
Total Economic Aid........ $799.0 $210.0 $977.3 $ 129.8 $205.3
Mi 1i tary
14. Lend-lease ($694.7 million) 513.7 181 .0
15. Military Air Under SACO. . . 17.7
16. Sale of excess stocks of
U.S. Army in West China • • • 20.0 n . a . (b) (b)20.0
ro
vn
APPENDIX I I -Cont i nue d
Sales of U. $. Government 
Excess and Surplus Property
Grants Credi ts Procure­ Rea 1i zat i on by U . S.
ment 
va lue Initial U 11 i ma t e
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post V-J Day-Continued
17. Ammo Abandoned and Trans­
ferred by U.S. Marines in 
North China (over 6,500 
tons)......................
18. Transfer of U.S. Navy
Vessels (PL 512) .........
19. Sales of surplus military
equipment (total accepted 
by Chinese Govt. ).........
20. $125 Million Grant Under










Tota1 Mi 1i tary Aid . . . . 











Grand Tota1............... $2,422.4 $1 . 101.0 $1,078. 1 $136.5 $232.0
^State Department, U. S. Relations with China , Annex 185, pp. 1043-44. Data
N)"O
ON
^Down payment covered under I tern 9.
^No estimate of total value available, 
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